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The system for space and water heating in the UK must be transformed if policy 
goals are to be met. This transformation will require major technological and 
social changes including the renovation of homes and other buildings, the 
replacement of any appliances which combust fossil fuels with low carbon heat 
technologies and infrastructure changes. An effective Government strategy will 
need to drive these changes through policies, regulations and the development 
of a clear vision. The UK Government has already made a number of policy 
interventions associated with decarbonising heating. 
 
Transformations of large systems, such as the UK heat system, have been 
increasingly considered from the perspective of ‘sustainability transitions’, a 
branch of theory which considers the transitions of large socio-technical 
systems from being ‘unsustainable’ to ‘sustainable’. The ‘multi-level perspective’ 
is a model which has emerged from the ‘sustainability transitions’ literature as 
potentially valuable. However, this model and wider approaches to 
‘sustainability transitions’ have been accused of not paying enough attention to 
the complex social phenomenon of power. Greater insights around power and 
policy change associated with transitions could strengthen transitions theories 
by providing evidence of how power can affect socio-technical change. 
 
Employing an approach to power called the ‘four faces of power’ and using a 
methodology called the ‘EAR instrument’ based on data triangulation which has 
never before been applied to UK energy policy issues, this inter-disciplinary 
research investigates the combined issues of power, transitions and the policies 
associated with UK’s heat system. Power in this thesis is understood as the 
ability of actors to affect policy and governance associated with the 
decarbonisation of heat. Therefore an actor is considered powerful or to have 
had power if their behaviour has successfully affected policy change. 
 
The thesis examines if actors have had the power to affect historic UK heat 
policy and what approaches have been used to attempt to influence it. In doing 
so, the research provides original contributions to the literature on UK energy 
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policy which has seen little focus on heat decarbonisation and similarly little 
focus on how politics and influence affect policy change. A Dutch case study 
has also been completed as the Netherlands has a similar, highly natural gas 
dependent heat system. Similarities and differences between the two countries 
have been investigated.  
 
Numerous attempts to influence heat policy by various actors have been 
identified in both countries. Approaches used to have power over policy and the 
actors involved in attempts to have power have been considered in detail. Only 
some attempts to influence have been successful and contextual and 
institutional issues have also affected power struggles. The size of actor has not 
determined policy influencing success in this analysis. 
 
The power associated with policy change is shown to be an important element 
of the UK’s heat transformation. As actors primarily attempt to influence policy 
based on their own interests and appear to have some success, a major issue 
for transitions may be that the speed and direction of transitions reflect 
politically active actors’ interests, rather than wider societal interests. However, 
in this study, actor power has operated to both constrain and emancipate the 
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Heat is a vital part of every life. It provides health benefits protecting people 
from the external elements; it delivers hygiene through washing and cleaning; it 
cooks food enhancing flavours, increasing nutritional value and killing harmful 
bacteria and it can also provide a great deal of thermal comfort. However, the 
current greenhouse gas emissions associated with heat production and use at a 
global level must be reduced to mitigate climate change, a key sustainability 
challenge.  
Heat accounts for more than 50% of global energy consumption and is 
responsible for around a third of global carbon dioxide emissions (as a result of 
the burning of fossil fuels) (IEA, 2014). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) suggests in its 2014 Fifth Assessment Report that a pathway 
which keeps global warming to below two degrees Celsius from pre-
industrialised levels needs to see global greenhouse gas emissions reduced to 
around zero levels by 2100 (Edenhofer et al., 2014). A major reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions requires a major reduction in emissions from fossil 
fuel energy and therefore heating.  
The target of limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as an 
aspiration in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, requires global net 
zero emissions by 2050 (Sanderson et al., 2016) therefore requiring even faster 
decarbonisation of energy (and heating) across the world. 
This thesis is interested in the decarbonisation of heat in the United Kingdom, a 
country which uses fossil fuels for the vast majority of its heating needs. 
Currently 78% of heat consumed in the UK comes directly from fossil fuels and 
only around 7.7% of the UK’s heat currently comes from lower emission 
renewable sources (BEIS, 2018c).  
The UK needs to rapidly transform the way it produces and consumes heat in 
order to meet its own legal commitments under the UK’s Climate Change Act to 
reduce emissions by 80% compared to 1990 levels (Parliament, 2008a). As a 
result of signing up to the Paris Agreement, the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction trajectory may need to be even steeper and the UK looks likely to 
need to reach net zero emissions levels during the second half of the century on 
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even a two degree pathway (Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, 2017). Net 
zero implies no fossil fuels are combusted for heating without either some form 
of offsetting or emissions capture, clearly requiring transformative change for 
heating. 
This thesis is specifically interested in the energy policy associated with 
attempts to decarbonise heat used in buildings for the purposes of space 
heating and the production of hot water1 in the UK. Energy policy is taken to 
mean the Government rules, incentives, instruments, strategies and goals 
associated with energy – in this case heat energy. Energy policy is one element 
that can potentially drive change in energy systems and the rapid and deep 
decarbonisation needed for the UK’s heating system means that policy may be 
very important.  
The specific theoretical focus of the thesis considers ideas of ‘power’. Power is 
a broad social and political concept interested in how people and groups of 
people such as organisations (both referred to as ‘actors’ throughout) can cause 
or slow change2. While a much more detailed investigation into the idea of 
power is taken in chapter 4 which highlights the complexity of the idea of power, 
power is defined in the context of this thesis as the ability of actors to affect 
policy and governance associated with the decarbonisation of heat. 
The thesis is interested in how actors have attempted to influence UK heat 
policy, and their success or failure. Because policy is likely to be an important 
driver of the UK’s potential heat transformation, if actors can influence policy, 
this could be important in shaping or perhaps constraining the UK’s 
transformation to low carbon heating. 
As well as being interested in power, policy and heat decarbonisation, this 
thesis situates itself in the field of ‘sustainability transitions’, an approach 
                                            
1 Around 24% of the heat consumed in the UK is used by the industrial sector and 15% of total 
heat demand is used specifically for industrial processes (BEIS, 2018d). Because of the nature 
of industrial heat requirements, this heat demand is very different to space and hot water and so 
technologies and approaches for industrial heat are very different. In their work on incumbency, 
Lowes et al., (2018b) consider current industrial heat use and describe the Government 
sponsored industrial roadmaps for industrial decarbonisation released in 2015. There is notably 
very limited research into decarbonisation of industry in the UK and a complete absence of any 
recent industrial decarbonisation policy research. 
2 A much fuller description of ideas around power takes place in chapter 4. 
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interested in how and why the transformation of large systems, which include 
social and technological elements, take place. Specifically, the ‘multi-level 
perspective’ (MLP) approach is used as a framework to consider the UK heat 
sector; MLP is an approach which attempts to consider the entirety of large 
systems but which has previously been accused of not paying due attention to 
issues of power (see Smith et al., (2010) and Geels, (2014)). This thesis 
provides a valuable case study for transitions scholars, investigating power 
associated with a live socio-technical (heat system) transition. 
The empirical elements of this research consider UK heat policy between 2003 
and 2015 (research interviews were carried out mainly during 2015). During this 
time period, two key developments took place, firstly the introduction of the 
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), a policy to deploy renewable and low-carbon 
heating in the UK and secondly the development of a long-term strategy/vision 
for decarbonised heat. The thesis considers: 
 if and when actors have been successful in causing policy change; 
 the actors involved; 
 the approaches taken in attempting to cause change. 
Particular approaches of interest are lobbying (i.e. purposive attempts by actors 
to attempt influence heat policy change) and framing (where actors shape their 
approaches to lobbying around particular ideas which may resonate with policy 
makers).  
A short comparative case study also considers power and heat policy in the 
Netherlands, a country with a similar heat profile to the UK. Similarities and 
differences between policy power issues in the two countries are identified in 
order to consider if generalisations can be made. 
While project research questions are formulated in the theoretical chapters of 
the thesis (3-6), the research questions are also placed here for reference: 
1. How has UK heat generation policy been affected by the power of actors? 
2. What approaches have been used by actors to attempt to affect UK heat 
policy? 
3. Do ideas have power as frames in the heat policy process? 
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4. How can understandings of power which emerge from this research be used 
to strengthen the multi-level perspective on transitions? 
1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 2 considers the UK’s current heat system exploring the requirement for 
change, the potential pathways for low carbon heating and the policies which 
currently exist to drive the move to lower carbon heating. 
Chapter 3 explores the concept of sustainability transformations, approaches 
which consider how large systems can change from being unsustainable to 
more sustainable. Particularly, it pays attention to the so-called multi-level 
perspective. This chapter also investigates how the concept of power has, and 
often hasn’t, been considered in approaches to transitions. 
Chapter 4 investigates the concept of power, considering key themes and 
developments in this social and political field. It highlights the key ideas of 
power used throughout the thesis, introducing the ‘4 faces of power’ approach, 
the role of structural and agent-based power and ideas of ‘transitive’ and 
‘intransitive’ power. 
Chapter 5 considers the relationship between ideas of power, politics and 
policy; showing that the three are closely linked. The chapter also describes the 
frequent focus in the power/politics/policy literature on ‘ideas’, ‘institutions’ and 
‘interests’ and expands on the elements of these approaches most relevant for 
this thesis. 
Chapter 6 is the final chapter of the underpinning theory section and it pulls 
together elements from the previous three theoretical chapters to develop a 
framework for considering power in the context of policy which is looking to 
drive system transformations. 
Chapter 7 outlines the methodological approach taken for data collection and 
analysis. The method is based on a case study approach which uses a 
combination of interviews and grey data analysis. A triangulation approach 
(where a number of sources are compared for accuracy) is used to investigate 
successes and failures at lobbying by actors and is also used to consider 
approaches to influence.  
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Chapter 8 is the first results section, outlining the key heat policy episodes 
between 2003 and 2015 where power has been seen to be an important 
element. 
Chapter 9 describes the key actors who have been involved in power and the 
development of heat policy over the research time period. 
Chapter 10 describes the approaches used to influence heat policy which were 
highlighted by the analysis. 
Chapter 11 contains a comparative case study which considers power and heat 
policy in the Netherlands. 
Chapter 12 contains the overall project conclusions and also includes an 
implications for policy section.     
The annexes include information on associated research, outputs, impact and 
the role of the researcher (annex 1), information on interviews (annexes 2 and 
3) and technical information on heat policy issues (annexes 4 and 5). 
1.2 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the thesis and described the 
general structure. While this chapter has briefly considered the global context of 
the UK’s heat system, the following chapter considers heating in the UK in 
much more detail and explains what the UK’s own climate change mitigation 







2 THE UNITED KINGDOM HEAT REGIME 
This chapter paints a picture of the current system for space and hot water 
heating in the UK3, describing the types and quantities of different fuels used 
and the different sectors of heat demand. It explores how the current gas 
dominated system has developed and also considers the key issues with the 
existing system: import reliance and greenhouse gas emissions. 
The chapter then considers the need for a transformation of the UK’s heat 
system and outlines the potential technological pathways towards low carbon 
heating. Finally this chapter considers the previous and current policy 
approaches which have attempted to deploy low carbon heat in the UK. 
2.1 HEAT USE IN THE UK 
Heat use makes up 44% of total UK energy consumption (BEIS, 2018d). Of the 
59,456 thousand tonnes of oil equivalent used for heat in 2017, the majority of 
heat is provided by natural gas with electricity and oil providing the next most 
significant shares (BEIS, 2018d). The split in fuels used for total heat use is 
shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
                                            
3 In this thesis, if the term ‘United Kingdom’ is used, this includes Northern Ireland. If the term 
Great Britain is used, this means that Northern Ireland is not being considered. The key issue 
associated with this differentiation in this thesis is that the UK Government’s work on the Heat 
Strategy considered the UK whereas the Renewable Heat Incentive which was developed by 
the UK Government only operates in GB. Northern Ireland has its own separate renewable heat 











Figure 2-1. UK 2017 total heat consumption by fuel based of BEIS consumption data (BEIS, 2018d) 
UK Government data splits heat consumption into three main sectors, domestic, 
service and industry. In 2017, 56% of all heat was consumed in the domestic 
sector, 20% in the service sector (including shops, offices, schools) and 24% in 
the industrial sector (BEIS, 2018d). Across these sectors, space heating is the 
largest element of heat consumption making up 63% of total heat consumption 
with the remaining 14% of heat being used for heating water and 15% used in 
industrial processes. Overall, space heating, water heating and cooking account 
for 82% of total heat demand (BEIS, 2018d). 
Of the heat not used in industry, i.e. that for space and hot water heating and 
cooking, the majority of heat (69%) is provided using gas with electricity, oil and 
bioenergy responsible for around 10% each (BEIS, 2018d). The full split is 
shown in Figure 2-2. While the domestic and service sectors are relatively 
similar in the terms of the proportion of fuel types used for heating, one notable 
difference is that the service sector has a lower proportion of gas heating but 
higher proportions of electric and oil based heating compared to the domestic 
sector (BEIS, 2018d). Also worth noting is that heat for cooking in the UK is 

















Figure 2-2. UK space heating, water heating and cooking consumption split by fuel based on BEIS data 
(BEIS, 2018d). 
In practice, this all means that the majority of UK homes (84%) and businesses 
are connected to the gas distribution network; this is around 24 million 
connections in total (Xoserve, 2018). Those not connected to the gas network 
generally use oil for heating which is delivered by tanker or use electricity for 
heating either in night storage heaters or direct electric heaters. A very small 
amount of solid fuel (primarily coal) is used and 2% of heat (referred to as ‘heat 
sold’ in Figure 2-2) is provided via heat networks which distribute heat as hot 
water or steam. The 9% of heat which is produced using bioenergy and waste 
primarily comes from the combustion of wood in fires and stoves with some 
energy also from biogases (BEIS, 2018c). 
The UK has one of the highest penetrations of gas heating in the world4, beaten 
only by the Netherlands which has around 93% of households connected to 
their gas network (ECN et al., 2016).  
There are two key historical periods associated with the growth of gas for 
heating which have been explored in detail by Arapostathis et al., (2013). From 
the end of the eighteenth century to the mid twentieth century, gas use grew as 
private companies who operated local gas networks using town gas expanded 
                                            













UK 2017 Space Heating, Water Heating and Cooking 
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their gas grids and moved beyond gas purely being used to provide lighting with 
gas increasingly also being used for cooking at heating. As shown in Figure 2-3, 
the number of gas customers grew rapidly between 1900 and 1930. The second 
period of rapid change followed the discovery of ‘natural’ gas in the North Sea. 
In the late 1960s, the Government started a national programme to connect the 
small networks together and convert the network and gas appliances to burn 
‘natural’ gas from the North Sea. The conversion programme took around a 
decade and as can be seen in Figure 2-3, following the programme the number 
of gas customers grew rapidly as more customers were connected to the gas 
system as part of the Government’s gas expansion programme.  
 
Figure 2-3 Total number of UK gas customers from 1990-2012. Based on data from BEIS, (2013) 
For those UK customers who aren’t connected to the gas grid, the type of 
heating used depends simply on what was installed when the building was first 
built or what it has been changed to since. New buildings near to a gas network 
do often connect to the gas grid although recent connection data is not publicly 
available. In 2014, the Energy Networks Association suggested that over 
150,000 buildings connect to the gas grid each year in the UK (Energy 
Networks Association, 2014) which implies a slower level of growth than in the 
past few decades. This reduction may however have happened because 
housebuilding rates were significantly lower when the Energy Networks 







Total number of UK gas customers 1880-2009 (average 
for each decade, thousands)
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(International Longevity Centre, 2014). Despite the fact that more homes are 
connecting to the gas grid each year, overall the total volume of gas used in UK 
homes has reduced between 2004 and 2017 by around 25% because the 
average household demand for gas has reduced (BEIS, 2018d). This reduction 
in domestic gas demand has been suggested to be as a result of various factors 
including increasing prices, energy efficiency improvements including those 
associated with new boilers and changes to household composition (BEIS, 
2018g).  
As described previously, significant growth of the UK gas system was driven as 
a result of discoveries of North Sea gas. However, much of the gas which was 
present in UK gas reserves has now been used and since 2001, the UK has 
been a net importer and currently imports around 50% of all gas demand; this 
import reliance is expected to increase as continental shelf gas fields become 
completely depleted (National Grid, 2018). With regards to gas supply security 
the UK Government stated recently: ‘We are secure now, and the GB gas 
system is well placed to continue to be secure and robust in a range of supply 
and demand outcomes over the next two decades’ (BEIS, 2017a, p3). However, 
if the UK continues to import high levels of gas or increases levels of imports, 
high levels of import dependence could be a reason for concern in the future 
(Bradshaw, 2018). 
2.2 THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROBLEM 
As described in the previous section, much of the UK’s heat consumption is met 
through the combustion of fossil fuels; these fuels all produce greenhouse gas 
emissions when they are burnt. Heat produced from electricity will also have 
associated emissions because fossil fuels are used to generate some electricity 
too5. Overall, the consumption of heat in the UK is responsible for 182 
megatonnes of greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalent); meaning that 
heating is responsible for 32% of all UK greenhouse gas emissions (DECC, 
                                            
5 In 2017, around 47% of the UK’s electricity was produced from gas or coal; however the fossil 




2012a)6. 48% of these emissions come from domestic heat, 20% from service 
heat and 32% from industrial heat (DECC, 2012a). 
If the world is to limit temperature rises caused by greenhouse gas emissions, 
emission reductions are needed. The UK’s Climate Change Act mandates in 
law an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 
levels (Parliament, 2008a). This implies an annual UK carbon budget in 2050 of 
165 megatonnes of greenhouse gas emissions (Committee on Climate Change, 
2016b). The current emissions from heat are higher than the 2050 carbon 
budget suggesting that some emission reductions from heat will be required 
even if all non-heat emissions were eradicated. However, the Committee on 
Climate Change, who advise the UK government on climate mitigation and 
adaptation, suggest that nearly all emissions may need to be eradicated from 
space and hot water heating in order to meet the 2050 carbon budget. This is 
because there are other sectors that look extremely difficult/impossible to 
decarbonise completely; these are industry, agriculture and international 
aviation and shipping (Committee on Climate Change, 2016b). Other analysis 
considering heat in the UK has come to the same conclusion, that in order to 
meet the 80% emission reduction target, emissions from space and hot water 
heating need to be almost eradicated by 2050 (e.g UKERC, 2009, DECC, 2012, 
Committee on Climate Change, 2015). 
While the UK’s current 2050 greenhouse gas reduction target may allow some 
residual emissions, as explained previously, it is generally assumed that space 
and hot water heating will need to be fully decarbonised. However, the Paris 
Agreement on climate change of which the United Kingdom is a signatory aims 
to hold ‘the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels’ and to pursue ‘efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’ (UNFCCC, 2015). The 1.5°C target would 
require global greenhouse gas emissions to reach net zero emission levels by 
                                            
6 This is the most recent data available as these statistics have not been published since. In 
light of the limited recent change in the UK heat sector, it is unlikely that the total emissions will 
have changed. However, as noted in UK emissions statistics, as there have been significant 
reductions in the emissions associated with electricity generation, it is likely that the proportion 
of the UK’s emissions from heat as a percentage has increased. The CCC note that for the past 
two years, temperature adjusted emissions from buildings have increased (Committee on 
Climate Change, 2018a) 
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2050 (Sanderson et al., 2016). The UK Government has asked the UK 
Committee on Climate Change to consider what the Paris agreement may 
mean for the UK’s existing carbon reduction target following the release of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s report into a 1.5°C scenario 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2018b). Previously in 2016, the UK 
Government explained that ‘The Government believe we will need to take the 
step of enshrining the Paris goal of net zero emissions in UK law’ (Parliament, 
2016). 
It therefore seems likely that the UK will at some point introduce a net zero 
emissions target although when this may happen and when the target date 
would be is not known. The expectation of a net-zero emissions target therefore 
means that the requirement for the eventual total decarbonisation of heating is 
now more likely than under the UK’s existing 80% reduction target.  
By taking ethical issues into account in their analysis of decarbonisation 
pathways for Europe, including considering historical emissions and current 
wealth levels, Anderson and Broderick (2017) explain that a ‘fair’ emissions 
reduction pathway even to 2°C would mean that in Europe no fossil fuels can be 
burnt by 2035. While this more rapid decarbonisation pathway has not been 
adopted by the UK Government, it does show that even the UK’s own targets 
for the rate of decarbonisation are not universally seen as in line with 
international obligations. Overall however, the need for rapid decarbonisation of 
the UK’s heat sector is clear. 
In addition to the UK’s own climate change reduction goals, the European ‘20 
20 20 Energy and Climate Package’ placed targets on member states for 
carbon reduction, growth in renewable energy and improvements in energy 
efficiency (EU Commission, 2018). As a result of this package, the UK is 
obliged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 16% compared to 2005, 
increase the proportion of renewable energy in the energy mix to 15% by 2020 
and reduce expected energy consumption by 18% compared to business as 
usual expectations (EU Commission, 2018). With the UK Government stating 
that the UK will leave the EU in 2019, it is unclear whether these targets will be 
maintained. It is however possible that these targets have had some previous 
impact on UK energy and heat policy. 
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2.3 THE ROUTE TO DECARBONISED HEATING 
Since the introduction of carbon reduction targets in the UK, various pieces of 
analysis have considered the technological pathways for the decarbonisation of 
the energy (and heat) system. This section gives an overview of the key 
analysis to date and is based on a literature review by Lowes et al. (2018b) 
carried out as part of the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) Heat, 
Incumbency and Transformations project. 
2.3.1 UKERC 2050 scenarios 
Some of the earliest work which considered the long term future of UK heat 
(although not specifically heat but the long term future of the energy system 
under carbon targets) was carried out by UKERC. Since 2006, UKERC has 
been working on energy system modelling considering the UK energy system in 
2050. In 2009, it released results from this modelling work which considered 
potential energy systems subject to various levels of carbon constraint using an 
updated version of the MARKAL energy system model (UKERC, 2009). The 
modelling showed that under 80% emission reduction scenarios, both 
reductions in heat demand and the shift to heat pumps7 powered using 
electricity would be important for the domestic and services sector.  
Energy demand would need to be reduced by around 10-15% in the service 
sector and by between 20-25% in the residential sector. The report adds, ‘when 
looking at the decarbonisation of end-use technologies, in general, the 
residential sector is decarbonised by shifting to electricity (from gas) as well as 
technology switching from boilers to heat pumps for space heating and hot 
water heating’ (p45). Decarbonising heat in the service sector was suggested to 
also involve a switch to electricity but could also see an increase in the use of 
biomass (UKERC, 2009, p45). The UK’s first long term scenario for a 
decarbonised space and hot water heating consisted of reductions in the 
demand for heat alongside an almost complete switch to heat pumps which 
would be powered by low-carbon electricity.  
                                            
7 ‘Heat pumps use electricity to absorb heat from either the air, ground or water. This heat can 
then be used to heat radiators and underfloor heating systems and to provide hot water’. 
(National Audit Office, 2018, p5) 
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2.3.2 Early ‘heat strategy’ development 
Following the early UKERC work, in 2010 DECC (The Department of Energy 
and Climate Change, at the time responsible for UK energy and climate change 
policy) released ‘2050 pathways analysis’ which considered various 
technological pathways that were seen to be able to meet the 80% carbon 
reduction target (DECC, 2010a). Much like with the previous UKERC research, 
the DECC analysis suggested that across all pathways considered, a significant 
move to electricity for space and hot water heating (using heat pumps) would be 
required with a potential role for the use of waste heat and solar thermal. 
Later in 2010, the same version of the MARKAL model used by UKERC for the 
2050 analysis was then used to underpin the advice from the Committee on 
Climate Change (CCC) for the fourth Carbon Budget (2023-2027) (Committee 
on Climate Change, 2010). The CCC explained: ‘Direct emissions from heat in 
buildings are reduced significantly by 2030, as a result of major improvements 
in energy efficiency and roll-out of low-carbon heat, especially heat pumps. 
Beyond 2030, further reductions are required, through energy efficiency 
improvement, further deployment of heat pumps where suitable (e.g. to cover 
around 60% of homes and the large majority of non-residential buildings), 
possibly combined with conventional electric heat and a potentially important 
role for district heating in those built-up urban areas for which heat pumps are 
not suitable. A feasible pace of deployment could almost fully decarbonise heat 
in buildings by 2050’ (p29). The Committee on Climate Change’s scenario for a 
decarbonised heat system like others, suggested high levels of demand 
reduction and high levels of electrification. It also included a significant level of 
district heating, where heat from low-carbon sources is piped directly to 
buildings in urban areas where heat demand is the highest (and so heat 
networks are the most cost effective).  
In March 2012, based on various pieces of analysis, DECC released ‘The 
Future of Heat: A strategic framework for low-carbon heat’ which for the first 
time, outlined the Government’s view, specifically on the long term future of 
heat in the UK (DECC, 2012e). DECC drew out common messages from all of 
the research, explaining that all scenarios eliminated fossil gas from the heat 
energy mix, showed a major role for electric heat pumps at a building level and 
phased out the use of oil, coal and resistive heating. Much like with the CCC’s 
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previous advice in 2010, DECC’s 2012 scenario for heat consisted primarily of 
reduced demand for heating, heat networks providing building level heat and 
individual heat pumps in areas where heat networks don’t make economic 
sense (DECC, 2012e). As shown in Figure 2-4, the Government’s ‘strategic 
framework for low-carbon heat in buildings’ suggested that in order to meet the 
carbon reduction targets, heat demand would be reduced through energy 
efficiency measures; simultaneously the use of gas for space and hot water 
heating would be squeezed out by electrically driven heat pumps in more rural 
areas and district heat networks in urban areas. The 2012 DECC heat strategy 
work was released as a consultation exercise as it was recognised that the 
proposed changes would have major social and technological implications for 
the UK. In chapter 8, policy episode 8 considers elements of socio-political 
power associated with the development of this initial heat strategy document. 
 
Figure 2-4. Government's strategic framework for low carbon heat in buildings (DECC, 2012, p97) 
Separate to the DECC work on the heat strategy, in April 2012, The Committee 
on Climate Change released the results of heat system modelling carried out by 
AEA and Element Energy, produced in the context of the CCC’s international 
aviation and shipping review (Committee on Climate Change, 2012). The 
analysis by the CCC suggested that a 2050 low-carbon heat system would 
primarily be using heat provided by heat pumps and through district heating, 
although the split between the two different technologies was a major 
uncertainty (Element Energy and AEA, 2012). 
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2.3.3 A potential role for gas in a low carbon heat system? 
Later in 2012, consultancy ‘Delta ee’ released scenario analysis research 
focusing on the UK’s domestic heat sector up to 2050 funded by the Energy 
Networks Association Gas Futures Group, a group made up of gas network 
owners (Delta ee, 2012). This bottom up modelling suggested that if some gas 
heating was maintained through both the supply of biogas as well as the more 
efficient use of gas in appliances including gas boiler/heat pump hybrids, it 
would be much more acceptable to energy consumers because not all 
consumers would need to switch away from gas; it also suggested this 
approach would have much lower energy system impacts. The study suggested 
that there would be major energy system costs as a result of moving the peak 
heat demand currently provided by the gas system onto the electricity system, 
due to an increase in requirements for both electricity generation and network 
capacity. The authors therefore suggested that maintaining the gas system and 
using gas to provide peak heat through hybridised appliances, may be a more 
sensible option. 
It’s important to note that as a result of the continued gas use, the carbon 
reduction of this scenario (90%) is lower than the fully non-gas scenario also 
explored in the report (96% potential carbon reduction). The hybrid scenario 
also requires the maintenance of two sets of networks (gas and electricity) and 
requires customers in many situations to have two appliances, a gas boiler and 
an electric heat pump. However, even in this ‘balanced’ scenario which has 
some role for gas appliances, there is still a major role for electrification and 
heat networks; in 2050, under this scenario, a quarter of households use district 
heating, half use electric heat pumps and the final quarter use a lower carbon 
gas appliance of some variety such as hybrids. 
In March 2013, DECC released ‘The Future of Heating: Meeting the Challenge’, 
an updated heat strategy document which had been produced in light of 
responses to the 2012 DECC heat strategy document and further research and 
energy system modelling (DECC, 2013k). Policy episode 10 in chapter 8, 
considers elements of socio/political power associated with this 2013 document. 
The updated modelling used Redpoint’s (now Baringa) RESOM model and also 
used the Energy Technology Institute’s ESME model. These models included a 
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greater number of technologies for heat and also used a higher temporal 
resolution than the previous modelling.  
The greater level of temporal granularity used in the models was recognised as 
being particularly important as its inclusion represented much more clearly the 
very short term peaks for heat which occur in the UK heat system. The UK’s 
current heat system which has a high number of gas boilers and relatively 
inefficient buildings means that heat in the UK sees two significant peaks across 
the day, one in the morning and one in the evening when people turn their 
heating on and use hot water (Sansom, 2014). This so called ‘peak heat’ issue 
had not been considered in detail in previous heat modelling however the 
updated modelling, by using higher temporal granularity, represented these 
peaks much better (DECC, 2013j).  
As a result of the changes to the modelling approach, the updated modelling for 
space and hot water heating suggested that while in 2050 there would still be 
no role for gas boilers, up to 2050 there may be a greater role for fossil gas 
used for heating. Gas could be used in smaller volumes and in different 
appliances such as gas absorption heat pumps and hybrid systems using an 
electric heat pump with a gas boiler. This increased potential role for gas was 
because the continued use of gas to provide heat peaking ability reduced the 
impact on demand on the electricity system therefore reducing system costs 
(DECC, 2013k). DECC’s framework for heat was therefore updated to show this 
slight shift away from full electrification and district heating to a scenario where 
in the time before 2050 a higher level of gas was used (see Figure 2-5). It is 
however important to note that even after this change to the heat strategy 
framework, in DECC’s scenarios, in line with the 80% carbon reduction target, 
in 2050 the vast majority of heat was still expected to be provided through heat 
networks or by using electric heat pumps with some reduction in heat demand, 




Figure 2-5. DECC's updated strategic framework for low-carbon heat in buildings over time 
2.3.4 Ongoing heat in buildings analysis 
Since DECC released its updated heat strategy in 2013, there have been no 
major policy or political announcements on the future of heating in the UK 
although in December 2018 the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy did release a comprehensive evidence review on heat decarbonisation 
(BEIS, 2018b).  
Other actors have been releasing their own scenarios and thoughts around low 
carbon heat futures. The Committee on Climate Change produces annual 
progress reports in terms of reducing carbon and produces advice on how 
future carbon budgets can be met. Specifically on heat, for its 2013 advice on 
the fourth carbon budget, the period from 2023 – 2027, The Committee on 
Climate Change commissioned new analysis through Frontier Economics and 
Element Energy to consider the future of the heat sector (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2013). This review did not propose any major changes to the long term 
low-carbon heat solution but suggested that in the shorter term i.e. for the fourth 
carbon budget, there could be a lower level of heat pump uptake than had been 
previously suggested primarily because of (among other things) a higher 




 ‘We have revised our uptake down from 7 million heat pumps in homes 
to 4 million by 2030 (i.e. 13% of homes have heat pumps in 2030, rather 
than 21%), along with lower deployment in non-residential and industrial 
buildings. 
 This is offset to a degree by higher uptake of district heating – increased 
from 10 TWh to 30 TWh (i.e. from 2% to 6% of buildings heat) in 2030.’ 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2013, p45) 
Heat pumps and district heating are so central to the Committee on Climate 
Change’s vision for low-carbon heat in buildings, that the number of heat pump 
installations are tracked on an ongoing basis and the committee has called for 
greater efforts to collate data on the number of heat network connections 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2016a). 
2.3.5 Consensus on a low-carbon heat future? 
As described in the previous sections, between 2006 to the present day, there 
has been a significant body of work undertaken in order to consider and 
produce scenarios for low-carbon heat in buildings in the future. In all of the 
work which considers carbon reduction, at least in line with the UK’s climate 
change target, major changes in the provision of heat are seen to be necessary 
with all studies suggesting a greater role for electrification of heating using heat 
pumps and increases in the use of district heating. Much of the work also 
suggests a far smaller or even potentially non-existent role for natural gas in 
heating.  
Chaudry et al. (2015) explain that while a number of uncertainties exist within 
analysis of UK heat decarbonisation, there are common messages for the future 
of heating (Chaudry et al., 2015, p628); these messages are: 
 ‘Energy demand reduction is essential for meeting emission targets’ 
 ‘A substantial level of electrification of heating (via heat pumps) is 
expected’ 
 ‘District heating will play an important role in heat supply decarbonisation’ 
While Eyre and Baruah (2015) agree that a much greater role for electric 
heating is likely, they explain that there may be a much more significant role for 
reducing heat demand using energy efficiency measures than Government 
models have suggested; in light of this, bio-energy (which is limited in quantity 
by supply issues) may be able to play a bigger role in domestic heat (as biogas 
or biomass) than has been suggested elsewhere. Elsewhere, it has also been 
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suggested that storage heating which uses off-peak electricity may have value 
in certain situations in order to reduce the impact from the potential increase in 
resistive electric heating (Darby, 2018). Overall it appears that while there may 
be some elements of certainty, particularly around the need for heat 
electrification, there is still substantial uncertainty around the specifics of a low 
carbon heat system. 
2.3.6 Dissent from the electrification and district heat vision 
Although there has been a fairly strong consensus on the need for electrification 
of some heat demand, not all actors’ views align with that consensus. For 
example, section 2.3.3 discussed modelling produced for the Energy Networks 
Association’s Gas Future Group by Delta ee which suggested a higher role for 
gas for heating in the future that had been suggested elsewhere (Delta ee, 
2012). 
Scenario analysis by Delta ee was also used by trade body The Heating and 
Hot Water Industry Council (HHIC), a trade association which represents the 
UK hot water and heating industry and is a member of the larger Energy and 
Utilities Alliance group of trade bodies. Much like with the previous Energy 
Networks Association scenarios, the HHIC scenarios suggested a more 
‘balanced’ rollout of technologies to 2030 which included lower carbon gas 
appliances such as: micro-combined heat and power, gas powered heat pumps 
and hybrid systems using a gas boiler plus a heat pump (HHIC and Delta ee, 
2013). This scenario was expected to provide more flexibility, better choices for 
consumers and reduce impacts on the electricity system (HHIC and Delta ee, 
2013). However, as this scenario analysis relied on the same modelling used by 
the ENA, this scenario does not put the UK on a path to fully decarbonised 
heating, which is recognised as being vital for the UK’s wider decarbonisation 
goals in line with the Climate Change Act. 
While there has been some dissent from the consensus on the decarbonisation 
of heat, the two examples described above which propose higher levels of gas 
use have been developed and promoted by the incumbent heat actors, via the 
trade association which represents gas network companies (The Energy 
Networks Association) and trade association which represents existing heat 
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interests such as appliance manufacturers (Heating and Hot Water Industry 
Council).  
A major project which formed part of the UK Energy Research Centre’s third 
phase, and on which this author was lead research fellow, investigated ideas of 
incumbency in the UK heat sector.  
The key publications from this research: 
 Developed a working definition of incumbency and considered 
how it could be applied to the UK’s heat sector (Lowes et al., 
2017); 
 Analysed the structure and make-up of the UK heat sectors and 
investigated the risks posed to incumbents by heat 
decarbonisation (Lowes et al., 2018a); 
 Investigated the behaviours of UK heat incumbents associated 
with decarbonisation highlighting directed innovation and lobbying. 
This report also highlighted the policy implications associated with 
the behaviour of incumbents (Lowes et al. 2018b); 
 Provided a short policy briefing for the project (Lowes and 
Woodman, 2018). 
Overall, that research showed that in recent years, incumbents in the gas 
sector, particularly actors associated with gas networks and gas heating 
appliance manufacturers have been heavily promoting ideas of decarbonising 
the gas grid with low-carbon gases (focusing on hydrogen). The efforts of 
incumbents appear to be in response to the threat that heat decarbonisation, 
and specifically heat electrification, creates for these companies. The low 
carbon gas technologies have been promoted in attempts to influence the 
Government’s view on the potential future role for gas and increase support for 
the future role of gas in the UK’s heat system.  
In particular, the key behaviours of incumbents identified highlighted the use of 
political lobbying to attempt to influence policy makers so that they support the 
option of low carbon gas. This attempted political influencing took place 
alongside ‘innovation’ activities which were designed to show that low carbon 
gas could become an important heat vector. At the same time, the idea of 
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decarbonising the gas grid using low carbon hydrogen has increasingly been 
seen as a potential heat decarbonisation solution by the Government.  
While the current Government has said little about their view of, or vision for the 
long term future of heating, in their 2017 ‘Clean Growth Strategy’, they propose 
two potential low carbon heat scenarios, one based around the more traditional 
approach to heat decarbonisation of increased electrification and another 
scenario which sees much of the gas grid converted to hydrogen (HM 
Government, 2017b). The UK Government explain that ‘at present it is not 
certain which approaches or combination of them will work best at scale and 
offers the most cost-effective long-term answer’ and before decisions can be 
made, a greater understanding of the pathways is required (HM Government, 
2017b, p75). Two recent significant reports by UK Government advisors have 
highlighted the current uncertainty of heat decarbonisation options. Analysis for 
The National Infrastructure Commission suggested pathways existed for full 
electrification, full conversion of gas heating to hydrogen and hybrid pathways. 
This report suggested that hydrogen conversion may be slightly cheaper than 
an electrification approach for heat decarbonisation, but across all scenarios, 
there was significant uncertainty over costs and technical performance; the 
authors suggested policy makers should focus on energy efficiency and support 
research and development into low carbon heat (Element Energy and E4tech, 
2018). 
A report for the UK’s Committee on Climate Change highlighted similar 
scenarios to the work for the NIC but suggested that hybrid approaches (where 
heat systems comprise small heat pumps alongside gas boilers used for 
peaking) may provide the most cost effective solution for heat decarbonisation. 
This analysis also suggested that because of the fugitive emissions associated 
with producing hydrogen from natural gas with CCS, a wholesale conversion of 
the UK’s gas grid to hydrogen may not reach levels of decarbonisation suitable 
for net-zero (Strbac et al., 2018). The CCC’s hydrogen review and report on 
‘net-zero’ both suggested that while hydrogen may be able to play some role in 
heat decarbonisation, electrification looks likely to be the optimum solution for 
much heat decarbonisation (Committee on Climate Change 2018c and 2019 
respectively).   
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In a Government publication which gave an overview of the current evidence 
base for UK heat decarbonisation published in December 2018, Government 
announced a new heat policy roadmap to be published within eighteen months 
(BEIS, 2018b). 
While the recent UK heat policy developments and associated work on 
incumbency are of interest to this thesis, the focus of this analysis is on the 
period up to 2015, before the incumbency research started. 
2.3.7 Space and hot water scenarios overview 
An increasing body of evidence and a number of scenarios have emerged over 
the past thirteen years considering the future of heat in the UK in light of carbon 
reduction requirements. Eliminating the use of fossil fuel combustion for space 
and hot water heating is a requirement in all scenarios yet fossil fuels are 
currently used for the vast majority of heat use.  
Reducing the demand for heat is seen as centrally important in order to both 
protect the most vulnerable energy users and to reduce overall heat system 
costs. Scenario analysis has also generally shown that as well as reducing 
demand for heat, much of the heat which is still required is provided by either 
electric appliances such as heat pumps at a building level, or provided through 
district heat networks (these district heat networks may themselves use large 
heat pumps which rely on electricity). In these scenarios, electricity is 
decarbonised making it a low carbon source of energy. It has also been 
recognised, that there may be a role for some bio-energy to decarbonise UK 
heat either in the form of biomass or biogas however, how and where this 
should be used and the availability of bio-energy resource are uncertain (Eyre 
and Baruah, 2015). 
More recently, scenarios and visions of a future heat system have emerged 
which maintain the UK’s gas based system, but see this decarbonised using 
forms of low carbon gas such as hydrogen. However, this low-carbon gas 
approach is deeply uncertain and is being promoted by incumbents in response 
to the threat of decarbonisation.  
Clearly, major changes for how space and hot water heating are provided in the 
UK are required as a result of objectives for decarbonisation. These changes 
could impact, involve or potentially challenge a variety of actors. In order to 
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drive these changes and associated actors, government intervention is widely 
seen as needed to drive heat decarbonisation (Policy Exchange, 2016; 
Committee on Climate Change, 2016b; HM Government, 2017b). Indeed, the 
Government itself has recently explained that ‘Decarbonising heat is our most 
difficult policy and technology challenge to meet our carbon targets’ (HM 
Government, 2017a, p75). 
2.4 UK GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND APPROACHES FOR HEAT 
GENERATION DECARBONISATION 
This section considers the previous and current UK government policy which 
has attempted to deliver low carbon heat technology. It aims to build a basic 
policy background upon which the empirical sections can build. Overall, policies 
promoting low carbon heat in the UK have only delivered limited quantities of 
low carbon heat. While renewable heat is not necessarily the same as low 
carbon heat (an issue considered in annex 5), the renewable energy 
technologies which have and are being promoted by UK policy (air and ground 
source heat pumps, solar thermal and bio-energy) are all seen as potentially 
important low-carbon heat technologies and have been supported for their low 
carbon as well as renewable attributes. Therefore for the sake of this section, 
renewable heat support can also be taken to mean low carbon heat support. 
2.4.1 Early renewable heat support 
The earliest policy specifically aiming to support low carbon heat deployment 
was the Clear Skies Programme which operated between 2003 and 2006 
(Connor et al., 2015). The Clear Skies programme delivered 6434 grants for 
renewable energy systems, these included solar and biomass technologies but 
precise numbers of installations split by technology and whether they are for the 
production of heat cannot be determined (Department for Trade and Industry, 
2006). The Low Carbon Buildings programme followed the Clear Skies 
Programme and between 2006 and 2010 supported 8,545 solar thermal 
systems, 5,805 biomass boilers and 2,399 heat pumps out of a total of 18,240 
grants (DECC, 2011b). While these schemes delivered some small quantities of 
renewable heat, even if all the Clear Skies heat delivery was associated with 
heat, these two programmes would have delivered just over 21,000 low carbon 
heat installations, around 3300 per year. If as described in section 2.1, 150,000 
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connections are being made to the gas network each year, the Clear Skies and 
Low Carbon Buildings Programme will have had only a minor impact on the UK 
heat system.  
2.4.2 The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) 
The RHI is the UK Government’s key current policy measure to grow the 
deployment levels of low carbon and renewable heat generation in the UK. This 
section and the sub-sections within it, consider the RHI’s development and 
performance to date. The RHI scheme considered here supports the 
deployment of renewable heat in Great Britain only (i.e. it does not apply to 
Northern Ireland). It should however be noted that a separate RHI scheme did 
operate in Northern Ireland which is the subject of an ongoing inquiry8. 
The 2007 UK Energy White Paper made a commitment to conduct further work 
to investigate the policy options for low carbon heat (Department for Trade and 
Industry, 2007). This commitment was also outlined by the then Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown who said ‘we will introduce new measures to bring forward 
renewable heat, with a call for evidence in January prior to a full consultation’ 
(Telegraph, 2007).  
In January 2008, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR), the department then responsible for energy (including heat) 
released a call for evidence on the subject of heat which outlined some potential 
financial support policies for heat; these were a capital grant based system, a 
‘Feed in Tariff’ system (which would provide payments to producers of 
renewable heat) and an obligation/quota system (which would require energy 
suppliers to ensure that a proportion of their heat supplies came from 
renewables) (BERR, 2008a). A few months later in June 2008, BERR released 
a consultation into the UK’s ‘Renewable Energy Strategy’ which considered the 
potential options for promoting renewable energy in more detail in order to 
make progress towards the EU’s 2020 renewable energy target. This 
consultation introduced the Government’s preferred options for the support of 
                                            
8 As well as creating the powers for the GB RHI, the 2011 HM Government Energy Act created 
the power for the Northern Ireland government to run a renewable heat incentive but that 
scheme has run separately and is subject to different legislation and regulation.  
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renewable heat, a ‘Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), or a Renewable Heat 
Obligation’. 
At the end of 2008, the legislation for a tariff-based incentive mechanism to 
support renewable heat which came to be known as the Renewable Heat 
Incentive (the RHI) was introduced alongside legislation for the Feed In Tariff 
(FIT) which supported small scale renewable electricity generation (Parliament, 
2008d). The introduction of this legislation was driven partly by industry (the 
power and detail associated with the introduction of this legislation is considered 
in policy episode 2 in chapter 8). The final Energy Act 2008 contained little 
about how the scheme would be operated beyond what types of technologies 
could be supported and simply provided DECC with the ability to financially 
reward renewable heat through some sort of levy on fossil fuel suppliers 
(Parliament, 2008d).  
The Heat and Energy Saving Strategy consultation, released in February 2009, 
followed the laying of the primary legislation in the 2008 Energy Act. The 
consultation explained that DECC expected the RHI to broadly take the form of 
the scheme which had previously been set out in the 2008 Renewable Energy 
Strategy Consultation but the preferred design was an incentive mechanism 
rather than a supplier obligation which had been seen as a competing option 
(DECC/DCLG, 2009). An obligation would have been designed similarly to the 
‘Renewables Obligation’ which supported renewable electricity and would 
require fossil fuel suppliers to procure certificates to demonstrate that a 
proportion of their supplied heat came from renewable sources (DECC/DCLG, 
2009). The proposed model for the Renewable Heat Incentive contained within 
the Renewable Energy Strategy Consultation was: 
 Any heat user producing renewable heat would be entitled to claim a set 
per MWh payment from a central fund or an obligated supplier. 
 For small installations, payments would be expected to be based on the 
‘deemed’ (or estimated) heat demand of a building rather than requiring 
metering. 
 A method for spreading payments across suppliers would be introduced. 
 The scheme could alternatively be operated by a central body. 
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 The scheme costs would be passed onto buyers of non-renewable fuels 
through suppliers. 
 The level of financial support paid to an installer of renewable heat would 
be known in advance. 
 The value of payments would be important for driving uptake under the 
scheme. 
 Smaller heat users may need to access upfront financial support in order 
to assist with capital investment costs. 
 The energy industry would be expected to market products which would 
be supported under the RHI. 
Exactly why the incentive rather than obligation was preferred at this point is not 
explained in the Heat and Energy Savings Strategy consultation (DECC/DCLG, 
2009). However, the Government explained in the previous Renewable Energy 
Strategy consultation that ‘An obligation could fit well with the UK’s existing 
market-based policy landscape. Being a market mechanism, it would allow the 
market to search out the lowest cost opportunities for the installation of 
renewable heat’; the strategy did however recognise issues with whom the 
obligation would be on and the difficulty with measuring heat output and setting 
obligations (BERR, 2008b, p116).  
The Heat and Energy Saving Strategy consultation continued with the idea that 
the RHI would be funded by a levy on fossil fuel suppliers and DECC expected 
the scheme to be running by April 2010 (DECC/DCLG, 2009). Following the 
2010 general election which resulted in the Liberal Democrat/Conservative 
coalition Government, there were uncertainties over how the RHI would be 
funded. However, in October that year it was announced that funding would be 
made available for the RHI but this would come from Government revenues 
rather than from fossil fuel suppliers (the subject of policy episode 4 in chapter 
8) (HM Treasury, 2010b).  
Initially the RHI opened only for non-domestic applications in November 2011. 
The initial focus on non-domestic renewable heat is considered in policy 
episode 6 in chapter 8 and resulted from a Government decision to initially 
focus on the lower cost areas of renewable heat. Further details of domestic 
renewable heat support is considered in section 2.4.2.2. 
47 
 
The non-domestic RHI continues to this day to provide qualifying new 
renewable heat installations with a fixed payment for each unit of renewable 
heat produced for 20 years (DECC, 2011c). The initial non-domestic tariffs and 
supported technologies are shown in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 1, small 
and medium biomass installations received a tiered tariff where the first units of 
renewable heat produced each year received a higher tariff and beyond a tier 
threshold, further heat generated received a lower tariff. This mechanism was 
designed to attempt to ensure that there was not an incentive to burn more 
biomass in order to make greater financial returns. 
Tariff name  Eligible technology  Eligible sizes  Tariff rate 
(pence/  
kWh)  
Small biomass  Solid biomass; Municipal Solid 
Waste (incl. CHP)  
Less than 200 kWth  Tier 1: 7.6 
Tier 2. 1.9  
Medium 
biomass  
200 kWth and above; less 
than 1,000 kWth  
Tier 1: 4.7  
Tier 2: 1.9  
 
Large biomass  1,000 kWth and above  2.6  
Small ground 
source  
Ground-source heat pumps; 
Water-source heat pumps; 
deep geothermal  
Less than 100 kWth  4.3  
Large ground 
source  
100 kWth and above  3 
Solar thermal  Solar thermal  Less than 200 kWth  8.5  
Biomethane  Biomethane injection and 
biogas combustion, except 
from landfill gas  
Biomethane all scales, 
biogas combustion less 
than 200 kWth  
6.5  
Table 1. Non-domestic RHI tariffs at the time of scheme introduction in November 2011 (DECC, 2011c)  
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2.4.2.1 Early modifications to the RHI 
During 2012, DECC released a number of consultations considering further 
development of the RHI scheme. The July ‘Providing certainty, improving 
performance’ consultation proposed the introduction of a tariff degression 
budget management system which would reduce tariff levels if deployment of a 
particular technology went above pre-determined levels. It also proposed the 
introduction of sustainability requirements for bioenergy9 alongside other more 
minor changes (DECC, 2012d). The proposed introduction of the degression 
system followed the introduction of a short term cost control measure which 
would quite simply close the scheme to new applications if a spending threshold 
was reached. There were concerns that the RHI could grow much faster than 
expected as had happened with the Feed in Tariff policy for electricity and 
therefore, the scheme could cost more than expected. Lord Marland, a minister 
at DECC, explained regarding the introduction of the cost control that ‘we have 
learnt lessons from FITs’ (Hansard, 2012).  
In September 2012, before responding to the July consultation, DECC 
consulted further on the RHI. The consultation document, ‘Renewable Heat 
Incentive: Expanding the non-domestic scheme’ proposed that extra 
technologies should be included in the scheme, including an uplift for the use of 
combined heat and power and a specific geothermal heat category. The 
consultation also included calls for evidence on other potential technologies 
including landfill gas, ground source heat pumps and biopropane (DECC, 
2012b). At the same time, a short consultation was also released into the 
proposed inclusion of air source heat pumps (ASHPs) and energy from waste 
for heat (DECC, 2012c).  
The degression system to manage scheme spending was eventually introduced 
in 2013. This automatically decreases specific technology tariffs by pre-
determined amounts if one particular technology is deploying faster than 
expected (DECC, 2013d). Later in 2013 a number of further changes were 
introduced for the RHI. This included the addition of new technologies into the 
non-domestic RHI including air to water heat pumps, biomass combined heat 
                                            
9 The introduction of sustainability criteria was expected and the 2011 RHI document mentioned 
this previously (DECC, 2011c) 
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and power systems, biogas combustion and deep geothermal (DECC, 2013e). 
At the same time, DECC explained that tariffs for large biomass systems, solar 
thermal and ground source heat pumps were to be increased to the levels 
shown in Figure 2-6. This was in order to increase the deployment of these 
technologies which had not been deploying at their expected levels. 
 
Figure 2-6. Proposed new RHI tariffs (DECC, 2013f) 
In the same 2013 document, DECC also explained that because certain 
technologies were deploying much faster than others, namely small and 
medium biomass (as shown in Figure 2-7), it looked likely that the previously 
introduced budget management system would reduce the small and medium 
biomass tariffs. However, overall the scheme was underspending and a 
reduction to the biomass tariffs could mean that much of the scheme’s budget 
would be unspent. 
 
Figure 2-7. 12 month forecast spend for RHI at 30th April 2013 (DECC, 2013f) 
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DECC explained that excess budget which was unlikely to be spent which had 
previously been allocated to other technologies could be spread to technologies 
which had delivered more capacity (i.e. small and medium biomass) in order to 
reduce the likelihood of their tariff being reduced by degression and therefore 
continue to support the well performing technologies (DECC, 2013f). This 
change was introduced and the industry involvement and impact on this budget 
management issue is considered in policy episode 12 in chapter 8 which 
considers the reasons for the Government’s decision on the matter (section 
8.12). 
The 2013 document also explained that the Government would introduce rules 
associated with the sustainability of bio-energy being funded through the RHI. 
This would include a greenhouse gas reduction requirement and rules on the 
sourcing of bio-energy (DECC, 2013d). Policy episode 13 in chapter 8 
specifically considers elements of power associated with the introduction of 
these new rules for producers of biomethane grid injection. Policy episode 13 
also considers a further change specific to biomethane producers relating to a 
tariff modification and the introduction of a ‘tiered’ tariff for biomethane which 
Government consulted on during 2014 (DECC, 2014c). 
No further policy changes were made to the non-domestic RHI in 2015 but in 
2016, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the 
department now responsible for energy, consulted on and introduced further 
changes to the non-domestic RHI (BEIS, 2016). These changes included 
introducing a single biomass combustion tariff regime which applies to all sizes 
of installation and further tightening rules for the sustainability of bio-energy, by 
introducing limits on the volume of purpose grown energy crops used for the 
production of biogas. The scheme is expected to continue under these rules 
until its expected closure in March 2021. 
2.4.2.2 Renewable heat support for households 
As explained previously, the initial implementation of the RHI for households 
(the domestic scheme) was delayed (the power associated with this delay is 
considered in policy episode 6 in chapter 8) and in 2011 an interim policy called 
the Renewable Heat Premium Payment’ (RHPP) was introduced. THE RHPP 
provided capital grants covering part of the costs of air source and ground 
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source heat pumps, solar thermal systems and biomass boilers and was taken 
up by around 15,000 households (DECC, 2014a).  
The domestic RHI eventually opened in Spring 2014 and continues to reward 
homeowners who generate renewable heat with a fixed tariff for each unit of 
renewable heat produced for seven years (DECC, 2013a). Technologies 
supported by the domestic RHI are air and ground source heat pumps, biomass 
boilers and solar thermal heat generation. The original tariffs for the domestic 
RHI are shown in Table 2 and these tariffs have changed over time as they are 
linked to inflation and have been modified by Government. 
Table 2. Original domestic RHI tariffs as introduced in 2014. Data from (DECC, (2013h) 
Like the non-domestic scheme, the domestic scheme is also subject to a budget 
management system and has requirements for the sustainability of biomass fuel 
sources. There are two key difference between the domestic and non-domestic 
schemes. Firstly, the domestic scheme uses estimated household heat usage 
(often referred to as deemed) as the basis for awarding payments rather than 
requiring that heat be metered (DECC, 2013a). Secondly, the domestic scheme 
initially targeted a rate of return of 7.5% for the additional capital expenditure 
compared to a fossil fuel heating system. For the non-domestic scheme, the 
targeted rate of return was 12%, apparently reflecting the availability of finance 
and required financial returns for different sectors (DECC, 2013b). 
When changes to the non-domestic scheme were proposed in 2016, changes 
were also proposed for the domestic scheme. The key eventual change was the 
increase made to tariffs for air and ground source heat pumps to 10.02 pence 
per kilowatt- hour (p/kWh) and 19.55p/kWh respectively. This was in order to 
support the deployment of a greater number of these systems that were seen to 
be strategically important for the Government, but which had not been 
deploying at expected levels (BEIS, 2016). The biomass tariff was also 
increased from 4.28p to 6.54p as BEIS believed that the automatic tariff 
reductions had reduced the tariff so much, that deployment may be slower than 










7.3 18.8 12.2 19.2 
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they hoped for and they supported some further growth in domestic biomass 
combustion (BEIS, 2016). 
2.4.2.3 Deployment resulting from the RHI 
Building on the previous two sections considering the domestic and non-
domestic RHI, this section describes deployment under the schemes up to July 
2018. 
Firstly the non-domestic scheme is considered. Table 3 shows total technology 
deployment under the non-domestic RHI up to December 2018 (most recent at 
time of writing). This data splits deployment into the number of each type of 
technology and the amount of heat generated by each technology type. Small 
and medium biomass installations dominate the total number of installations 
representing 86% of all installations. Clearly other technologies have deployed 
significantly less, with deep geothermal seeing no deployment at all. With 
regards to the total heat delivery, the splits do not directly reflect the number of 
installations. This is because large installations, such as large biomass boilers 
and biomethane sites produce more energy per installation. Combined, biomass 
has produced 70% of all renewable heat with the majority of the rest of the 




















Small Solid Biomass 
Boiler (< 200 kW) 




3,576 19% 9095 31% 
Large Solid Biomass 
Boiler (> 1000 kW) 
87 0% 3000 10% 
Small Solar Thermal 
(< 200 kW) 
314 2% 6 0% 
Small Water or 
Ground Source Heat 
Pumps (< 100 kW) 
804 4% 109 0% 
Large Water or 
Ground Source Heat 
Pumps (>100 kW) 
203 1% 259 1% 
Biomethane 89 0% 6661 22% 
Biogas 661 3% 1,471 5% 
Air Source Heat 
Pumps 
466 2% 35 0% 
CHP 61 0% 502 2% 
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Deep Geothermal 0 0% 0 0% 
        
Total 19,756 100% 25,710 100% 
Table 3. Total numbers of renewable heat installations and total amount of heat produced under the non-
domestic RHI up to December 2018. Data from (BEIS, 2018h) 
BEIS data also shows the monthly number of applications to the non-domestic 
RHI split by technology (BEIS, 2018h). This data shows how small biomass 
applications dominated the first part of the scheme up to June 2015 and peaks 
in installation numbers occur in advance of automatic reductions to the small 
biomass tariff (inferred from Ofgem, 2018, data). Installers appear to rapidly 
install systems before tariffs were reduced to ensure installations receive higher 
tariffs. After June 2015, medium sized biomass became a much more popular 
technology under the scheme and this reflects an automatic tariff change as a 
result of budget management; this meant that medium sized biomass 
installations received a higher tariff than small biomass boilers therefore 
incentivizing the installation of larger boilers (Ofgem, 2018c). 
Overall, bio-energy has dominated the non-domestic RHI. The original 
Government impact assessment for the non-domestic RHI policy suggested that 
heat from biomass was expected to contribute to around 49% of heat supported 
by the RHI and heat from biogas would form around 7% of all heat produced 
(DECC, 2011d). However, as has been shown, the proportion of biomass under 
the scheme is much higher than was originally anticipated and this appears to 
be partly as a result of the increased budget awarded to biomass discussed in 
section 2.4.2.1. The power associated with this policy change is considered in 
more detail in policy episode 12 in chapter 8. 
Deployment under the domestic RHI scheme has been more balanced than 
under the non-domestic RHI and total delivery up to July 2018 is shown in 
Table 4. Air source heat pumps have been the most popular technology making 
up over half of all installations. However, over half of the renewable heat 
produced as a result of the domestic RHI has been produced by biomass 
combustion. This may reflect higher levels of heat demand in homes where 
biomass is used (because homes are likely to be larger) and the BEIS data 
show that maximum heat output capacities of biomass boilers are over double 
the capacity of heat pump systems (BEIS, 2018h) (likely because biomass 
boilers normally have a higher capacity than heat pumps to heat bigger homes). 
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This could also reflect the fact that not all heat pump heat output is counted as 
renewable; specifically the electricity inputs used to run heat pumps are netted 






















Air source heat 
pump 
34,790 53% 1,016,084 31% 
Ground source 
heat pump 
9,621 15% 528,253 16% 
Biomass 
systems 
12,645 29% 1,693,094 52% 
Solar thermal 8,850 13% 48,434 1% 
 
Table 4. Total numbers of renewable heat installations and total amount of heat produced under the 
domestic RHI up to December 2018. Data from (BEIS, 2018h) 
While the domestic RHI has been more balanced, the original impact 
assessment produced by the Government in advance of the domestic RHI 
scheme suggested that 9% of expected installations under the RHI would be 
biomass boilers, whereas the largest proportion (46%) would be for ASHPs, 
25% for solar thermal and 20% for GSHPs (DECC, 2013b). Like in the non-
domestic scheme, in the domestic RHI, biomass is also delivering a greater 
proportion of installations than was anticipated. 
Deployment data show that for the first year of the domestic RHI, biomass 
combustion was the most popular technology, but since around July 2015, air 
source heat pumps have been more popular. The reduction in deployment of 
biomass appears to be a result of repeated (6 in total) automatic reductions in 
the biomass tariff due to biomass deploying beyond expected levels (Ofgem, 
2018a). While the tariffs for biomass and heat pumps were increased in January 
2018 (as described in section 2.4.2.2) the deployment data does not suggest 
that these new tariffs have yet increased deployment of these technologies. 
2.4.2.4 Recent analysis and the future of the RHI  
Throughout 2017 and 2018 the National Audit Office (NAO), the Government 
spending watchdog, reviewed the performance of the RHI to date and released 
their final report in February 2018 (National Audit Office, 2018). As well as 
considering issues such as non-compliance and value for money, their review 
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also concluded that under current forecasts the RHI is expected to deliver 65% 
less renewable heat than it was originally expected to and will deliver only 22% 
of the expected number of installations (National Audit Office, 2018). Following 
the report by the NAO, the Public Accounts Committee (a group of MPs who 
oversee Government spending) carried out an inquiry into the RHI. This inquiry 
agreed with the NAO’s assessment that deployment under the RHI had been 
much lower than expected and the RHI hadn’t achieved its goal of delivering a 
supply chain for low carbon heating (Public Accounts Committee, 2018). The 
Government agreed with all of the Committee’s recommendations (HM 
Treasury, 2018). 
The RHI is expected to be open to applicants up to 2021. However, the 
Government has as yet announced no policy to replace it once it ends. BEIS 
have simply explained that: ‘Beyond the RHI, our ambition is to phase out the 
installation of high carbon fossil fuel heating in new and existing off gas grid 
residential buildings (which are mostly in rural areas) during the 2020s, starting 
with new homes as these lend themselves more readily to other forms of low 
carbon heating’ although the Clean Growth Strategy does suggest there will be 
some form of successor policy (HM Government, 2017a, p79). BEIS is currently 
collating evidence regarding a future heat policy framework for buildings not 
connected to the gas grid (BEIS, 2018a). 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the key energy policy issues that are the basis of this 
thesis. It has described how the UK’s current system for the generation and use 
of heat is based on fossil fuels and is incompatible with the UK’s climate change 
targets. It has also explained that a transformation of the UK’s heat system is 
needed and described analysis which has shown that in order to meet goals for 
decarbonisation, the UK needs to entirely stop burning fossil fuels for space and 
hot water heating. In order to decarbonise heating in the UK, as well as by 
reducing demand for heat, fossil fuels have been expected to be replaced with 
electrical heating technologies and heat networks in some urban areas. The UK 
Government’s development of a heat strategy outlining its view on the future of 
heating was also described. The chapter also explained that more recently, 
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incumbent gas interests have been promoting the idea of using low carbon 
forms of gas in the gas grid. 
Previous policies have deployed some low carbon heating technology however, 
the most significant low carbon heat deployment policy is the currently active 
RHI. The development of this policy has been described in some detail and it 
has been shown that the delivery of low carbon heat under the RHI has been 
skewed towards bioenergy in the non-domestic scheme and both the domestic 
and non-domestic schemes have significantly under-delivered.  
Overall, this chapter has discussed the real world policy context of the thesis. 
The following four chapters consider the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis 
investigating theoretical approaches to consider the transformations of large 
systems such as the UK’s heat system, exploring ideas of power (and how it 
links to policy change) and finally considering how ideas of power, policy 




3 SUSTAINABLE TRANSFORMATIONS AND 
AN INCREASING INTEREST IN POWER 
This chapter is the first of four chapters which together form the theoretical 
underpinning of this thesis. This chapter introduces the concepts of sustainable 
transformations and the multi-level perspective (MLP) model; these are related 
theoretical approaches which are used to consider the transformation of large 
and complex socio-technical systems such as the UK’s heat system. The end of 
this chapter describes how approaches to transitions and transformations have 
frequently been critiqued because they appear to have overlooked the 
importance of power, but goes on to explain that researchers have been 
increasingly recognising the importance of power in transformation related 
research. 
3.1 KEY CONCEPTS 
The chapter introduction above included some language which requires a more 
detailed unpicking before going any further. The following sections therefore 
explore the term ‘sustainability’ and expand on the terms ‘transition’ and 
‘transformation’ in order to provide readers with a useful definition or 
understanding of the use of these terms within this thesis . 
3.1.1 Defining sustainability for heat 
The term sustainability is central to discussions around transformations yet it is 
often not defined in this context. The widely used definition from the 1987 
Bruntland Report considers sustainable development as ‘Development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (p43, Brundtland, 1987). This definition 
however considers sustainability in the context of sustainable development and 
implies that continued economic development can be compatible with 
sustainability goals; an idea which has been questioned (e.g. Jackson, 2009). 
Others have suggested that economic growth is not a primary dimension of 
sustainable development but a potential means to drive sustainable 
development and so while economic growth should not be seen as a 
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requirement of sustainable development, it could be associated with sustainable 
change (Holden et al., 2014). 
During the 2002 UN Earth Summit in Rio, the ‘Johannesburg Declaration’ on 
sustainable development was agreed and built on the Bruntland definition. This 
declaration suggested that sustainable development consists of three 
independent but mutually reinforcing pillars: economic development, social 
development and environmental protection (United Nations, 2002). The focus 
on economic development in this definition implies that economic growth was 
seen to be a requirement for sustainable development. This question over the 
relationship between sustainability and economic growth while important is not 
the subject of this research and is therefore not discussed in any more detail.  
Building on the Bruntland definition and the Johannesburg Declaration, for the 
sake of this thesis, sustainability is understood as practices or activities linked to 
economics, society and the environment that meet the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
This project is fundamentally interested in the potential change of the UK’s heat 
system towards a more sustainable system. Linked to the concept of pillars, this 
means a future heat sector which is economically, socially and environmentally 
sustainable. Economically, the system should be relatively low cost compared 
to other options, socially, the system should be equitable and in terms of 
sustainability, the system should have a reduced environmental impact.  
These three pillars or elements of sustainability are clearly connected. For 
example, at a global level, decarbonising the energy system is primarily 
associated with environmental goals however, decarbonisation may also be 
socially beneficial as a result of potentially reduced climate change impacts. A 
lower cost energy system may also be more socially equitable than a high cost 
system as more people are able to afford energy.  
The sustainability of energy systems is not however generally considered 
specifically in relation to the three pillars of sustainability. Instead, energy 
systems are often considered under another system formed of three aspects, 
referred to as the energy ‘trilemma’. This term, used most notably by the World 
Energy Council, a UN accredited global body, considers energy sustainability as 
being based on three dimensions, energy security, energy equity and 
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environmental sustainability (World Energy Council, 2016). This energy 
trilemma approach has clear similarities to the pillars of sustainability approach. 
The term ‘trilemma’ has also been used by energy researchers such as Bolton 
and Foxon (2015) who suggest the trilemma involves elements of energy 
security, managing costs and achieving emission reduction targets.  
While there may be agreement on the elements of the energy trilemma, views 
on what constitutes a sustainable energy system differ. For example, some UK 
research has suggested that a sustainable energy system is a: non-nuclear, 
primarily low-carbon, low energy demand system which emits 80% per cent less 
carbon by 2050 from 1990 levels, and meets its European energy obligations 
(Mitchell, 2014). This is however not the only view and The UK Government in 
its 2009 Low Carbon Transition plan suggested a ‘world which is sustainable for 
future generations’ which included nuclear energy and fossil fuel use with 
carbon capture and storage (DECC, 2009, pV).  
Clearly determining the sustainability of energy systems requires a number a 
normative judgements. In my view of a sustainable UK heat system, the heat 
system must be reliable, nearly fully decarbonised as is seen to be required by 
the UK Committee on Climate Change (Committee on Climate Change, 2016b), 
have lower levels of energy demand to reduce system stress and minimise 
decarbonisation costs, and have an equitable sharing of costs with very low 
levels of fuel poverty. The UK does have legally binding carbon reduction 
targets and the deployment of energy efficiency to reduce heat demand is 
widely seen as a requirement for decarbonisation. 
3.1.2 A transformation rather than a transition 
The word ‘transition’ is used frequently to describe energy system change in 
both the academic literature as well as in grey literature. For example, the UK 
Government used the term ‘Low Carbon Transition’ to describe progress 
towards a low-carbon energy system in the UK (DECC, 2009). Academic 
researchers have used to term ‘transition’ repeatedly to consider the 
development of increasingly sustainable socio-technical systems (STSs) (e.g. 
Shove and Walker (2010), Geels (2011), Lockwood (2013), Geels  (2014) and 
Sgouridis and Csala (2014). 
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However, the term transition engenders the idea of subtle and managed 
primarily technical changes. For example, Stirling (2014, p13) explains that 
transitions are: ‘mediated mainly through technological innovation implemented 
under structured control, presided over by incumbent interests according to 
tightly-disciplined knowledge, towards a particular known (presumptively 
shared) end’. However, transformations are: ‘…based more around wider 
innovations in social practices as well as technologies, driven by 
incommensurable, tacit and embodied knowledges, involving more diverse, 
emergent and unruly political re-alignments that challenge incumbent structures 
pursuing contending (even unknown) ends.’  
As described in chapter 1.2, the decarbonisation of the UK heat system requires 
rapid, technological and social change including changing business structures, 
the potential for stranded assets, the development of new industries and 
changes to energy consumer behaviour. As such, the slow and managed 
change suggested by the term ‘transition’ is not appropriate in the context of 
rapid and structural change. Therefore, this thesis uses the term 
‘transformation’ to consider the required changes to the UK heat system.  
3.2 UNDERSTANDING SUSTAINABLE CHANGE 
While I use the term transformation in the case of the UK heat sector to 
highlight the need for rapid technological and social change, from the late 
1990s, a rapidly growing research agenda around the changes of large 
unsustainable socio-technical systems to sustainable socio-technical systems 
has emerged which is often referred to ‘sustainability transitions’ (e.g. Smith et 
al., (2010), Meadowcroft, (2011), Avelino and Wittmayer, (2016)) or ‘socio-
technical transitions’ (to sustainability or similar) (e.g. Smith et al., (2005), 
Geels, (2010) and Markard et al., (2016)). I use the term ‘sustainability 
transitions’ throughout the rest of this thesis to describe this field of research but 
the term transformation will be used to describe the required UK heat sector 
changes. 
Central to the concept of sustainability transitions is the idea that certain large 
systems can be considered as ‘socio-technical regimes’ where the interlinking 
of technology and socio-economic elements means that the system is dominant 
and rigid (Markard et al., 2012, p956). Take for example the UK’s automotive 
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system, it is formed of technical elements such as roads and cars but it also 
includes social elements, such as driving practices, the laws which regulate 
transport and the economics of the system. These elements all function 
seamlessly together to form something which is greater than the sum of its 
parts. Rip and Kemp (1998, p338) describe regimes as ‘the rule-set or grammar 
embedded in a complex of engineering practices, production process 
technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling 
relevant artefacts and persons, ways of defining problems—all of them 
embedded in institutions and infrastructures.’ 
Socio-technical regimes develop over time and are seen to become increasingly 
networked and structured as technologies become socially normalised, learning 
takes place and economies of scale develop (Rip and Kemp, 1998). As a result 
of this integration, mature regimes are seen to have elements of irreversibility, 
lock-in and path dependency and become increasingly stable with innovation 
becoming increasingly rare (Berkhout et al., 2003). The consequence of this 
increasing strength and stability is that as technologies become locked in, other 
technologies are locked out and struggle to compete even though better (for 
example more sustainable) solutions may exist (Berkhout, 2002). 
This idea of sub-optimal technology lock-in builds on work by Arthur (1989) who 
explains that in an example where two technologies are competing, 
‘insignificant events’ (p116) can give one technology a temporary advantage; as 
a result that technology can gain an early advantage giving it increased 
deployment and therefore increased learning which allows it to win against the 
other technology and means it becomes locked it in. One widely used example 
of this lock-in is the QWERTY keyboard layout which was introduced to 
overcome a now eradicated technical issue with typewriters; QWERTY has now 
become a standard configuration but it is not believed to be the optimum 
keyboard layout for efficient typing10 (David, 1985). Unruh's (2000) widely cited 
paper specifically considered this idea of path dependency from the perspective 
of carbon lock-in suggesting that existing locked in high carbon technologies 
                                            
10 Discussions have taken place suggesting that the QWERTY configuration may actually be as 
good as potential alternatives (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990) although the QWERTY example is 
still often used as a good example of path dependency. 
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systems (and associated institutions) are having the effect of locking out low 
carbon technologies.  
This research considers the UK’s current heat system as a socio-technical 
regime. This reflects a recognition of both the physical and social elements of 
the UK heat system as well as the need for it to (be) transform(ed) from an 
unsustainable system into a sustainable system. It also builds on the previous 
use of the concept of a socio-technical regime to consider the heat system in 
Sweden (Dzebo and Nykvist, 2017). Further still, there are few if any other 
approaches which consider the entirety of social and technological elements of 
large socio-technical systems. 
A rapidly growing field of research into sustainability transitions considers how 
these complex and stable yet unsustainable socio-technical regimes can 
change into more sustainable systems. Markard et al. (2012, p957) provide a 
summary and analysis of the key work on the topic of sustainability transitions, 
suggesting that there are four key but linked research strands in sustainability 
transitions studies, these are ‘transitions management’, ‘strategic niche 
management’, ‘the multi-level perspective’ and ‘technological innovation 
systems’. Genus and Coles (2008) however suggest that there are two key 
branches of research associated with sustainability transitions, ‘systems in 
transition’ (primarily the so-called multi-level perspective) and ‘transition 
management’ (p1436).  
The concept of technological innovation systems is described as being ‘focused 
on the development, diffusion and use of a particular technology’ (Bergek et al., 
2008, p408) whereas strategic niche management is described as the ‘creation, 
development and controlled phase-out of protected spaces for the development 
and use of promising technologies by means of experimentation’ (Kemp et al., 
1998, p186). These descriptions imply a focus on specific technologies or 
innovations rather than the systemic or regime change I am interested in for this 
thesis. So-called ‘transitions management’ approaches (which are considered in 
a little more detail in upcoming section 3.3 because of their relationship to ideas 
of power) build on understandings from the multi-level perspective but represent 
a more ‘avowedly interventionist, not fully analytical approach concerned with 
how to actively steer technological change’ (Genus and Coles, 2008, p1439). It 
appears then that while the approaches of ‘technological innovation systems’, 
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‘strategic niche management’ and ‘transitions management’ are related, none of 
them are suitable approaches to consider the entirety of the UK’s heat system. 
The following section considers the potentially more useful multi-level approach 
in more detail. 
3.2.1 The multi-level perspective 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) is a theoretical model which attempts to 
describe how transitions of large socio-technical systems take place. The MLP 
can be traced back to analysis focusing on technological change in relation to 
that required to decarbonise energy systems (Rip and Kemp, 1998). Rip and 
Kemp (1998) suggested that large socio-technical systems have three layers 
which include the ‘micro’, where single artefacts or machines are developed, the 
‘meso’ which considered regimes (or paradigms, considered previously in this 
chapter as socio-technical regimes) and the ‘macro’ level which considered the 
landscape in which the other levels sat. Rip and Kemp’s (1998) model 
suggested that these three layers are interrelated and networked through social 
linkages to form seamless webs but did not use the term ‘multi-level 
perspective’ to describe the socio-technical system. 
Building on the previous work, Geels and Kemp (2000) introduced a three 
layered model considering a ‘multi-level perspective on innovations’ which 
similarly to Rip and Kemp's (1998) model had three layers, (micro (niche), meso 
(regimes) and macro (landscape). A sketch of this multi-level perspective is 
shown in Figure 3-1; this shows the three layers as vertically stacked with each 
layer linked to the others with the landscape layer forming the broad context, 
the regime layer representing the socio-technical regime of interest (formed of 
numerous interconnected elements) and the niche layer formed of a number of 
niches which have the potential to challenge and become the regime. Further 
analysis by Geels considering shipping specifically highlighted the 




Figure 3-1. The dynamic multi-level perspective on transitions. From (Geels and Kemp, 2000, p22) 
The multi-level perspective model was further updated in 2004 and included a 
specific recognition of users and user practices as well as the role of institutions 
and their part in structuring regimes (Geels, 2004). This 2004 article widened 
the ‘unit of analysis from sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical 
systems, encompassing the production, distribution and use of technology’ and 
also suggested that when transitions happen, socio-technical dynamics at all 
three levels ‘link up and re-inforce each other’ (Geels, 2004, p915 and p916 
respectively). 
The MLP approach has been used to consider the transition from horse and 
carriage to automobiles (Geels, 2002b), changes in Swiss agriculture towards 
more organic and integrated approaches (Belz, 2004), the move toward 
sustainable transport (Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008) and low-carbon electricity 
scenarios (Hofman and Elzen, 2010) (as well as many other examples of 
transitions). These examples show the MLP approach has been used to 
consider both historic and potential future transitions and that across these 




The MLP is not without critique. Among other things, the MLP has been 
accused of not paying due attention to the agency and power of actors and 
institutions which are seen to be an important element of promoting or 
constraining change (Smith et al., 2005). Coming from a similar angle, the MLP 
has also been accused of being too descriptive and ignoring the politics which 
drives change (Shove and Walker, 2007). Shove and Walker (2010) continue 
their critique and suggest that a much better understanding of social practices 
and policy development would strengthen the MLP model.  
Geels (2011) explains that throughout the course of the development of the 
MLP model it has received a number of sometimes valid criticisms including: 
 A lack of focus on agency within the model; 
 Difficulties with operationalising the model in particular how to delineate 
regimes; 
 A bias towards bottom up models of change; 
 That the model is of use only as a heuristic or explanatory tool; 
 That it suffers from methodological issues including no clear analytical 
approach; 
 That the landscape levels appears to be a residual category containing 
elements which simply don’t fit neatly into other layers; 
 That a hierarchical approach is not suitable for studying socio-technical 
systems because of their networked and systemic nature. 
Recognising these criticisms, Geels (2011) responded to each of them and 
further updated the visual representation of the MLP to how it is shown in Figure 
3-2. With regards to the suggested lack of agency in the MLP, Geels (2011) 
suggested that while elements of agency were actively considered, some 
elements including power struggles had not been but could be more thoroughly 
considered. This most recent visual representation showed much more clearly 
the connections between the different levels of the MLP and provided some 




Figure 3-2. Multi-level perspective on transitions (Geels, 2011, p28) 
Specifically with regard to agency and power issues, Geels (2011) recognises 
that while power has been indirectly included in approaches to the MLP, the 
theory could be ‘theoretically enriched by mobilizing insights from other theories 
[including power]’ (Geels 2011, p30). Section 3.3 provides a much more in-








3.2.2 Using the MLP to consider the UK’s heat socio-technical 
system 
There are a number of ways to consider energy system change from 
considering purely technical change to considering purely social change. 
However, the availability of tools to consider the combined social and 
technological elements of large systems is limited and the MLP offers an 
approach which can do just this. Therefore, for this thesis, the MLP is used as a 
tool to consider the UK’s heat socio-technical system.  
With the MLP as the framework to consider the system under study, the 
concept of power is the analytical focus of this thesis. In the following chapters I 
draw together ideas of power, policy development and transformation. I first, 
however, consider how the UK’s heat system can be understood using the MLP 
and then investigate in more detail how power has been seen in relation to 
sustainable transformations.  
3.2.2.1 The socio-technical landscape 
This is the top level in the MLP. From a theoretical perspective, the landscape 
level has been recognised as being particularly difficult to define, described as 
‘a ‘garbage can’ concept that accounts for many kinds of contextual influences’ 
(Geels, 2011, p36). The landscape level is considered to be composed of 
exogenous factors which can remain stable, change suddenly or change slowly 
but which can put pressure on existing regimes and/or on niche-innovations 
which sit within the landscape. Geels (2002, p1260) suggests:  
‘The metaphor ‘landscape’ is chosen because of the literal 
connotation of relative ‘hardness’ and the material context of 
society, e.g. the material and spatial arrangements of cities, 
factories, highways, and electricity infrastructures. The socio-
technical landscape contains a set of heterogeneous factors, such 
as oil prices, economic growth, wars, emigration, broad political 
coalitions, cultural and normative values, environmental problems. 
The landscape is an external structure or context for interactions 
of actors.’  
It is then the exogenous nature of the landscape level that is key. Thus the 
landscape can be understood as the exogenous context to the regime and 
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niche level, both of which sit within and are affected by pressures from the 
landscape level. However, while the landscape can be seen as the exogenous 
context, it is suggested that alongside other factors, the niche and regime levels 
of socio-technical systems can affect the landscape (Geels, 2011). 
When considering the UK’s heat system, the landscape level can be considered 
as the elements outside of the socio-technical regime and niche levels which 
can affect these levels such as environmental problems, macro-economic 
factors and particularly important when we are considering power, political 
coalitions and cultural and normative values. Delineating the landscape layer is 
challenging as it is not entirely clear where the landscape ends and the regime 
begins if they affect each other. However, a more precise delineation of the 
landscape is not necessary for the thesis. 
3.2.2.2 The Socio-technical regime (STR) 
This is the middle level of the MLP and represents the current and dominant 
social and technological aspects of systems. As shown in Figure 3-2, this level 
is formed of, among other things, markets, user preferences, policy, technology, 
industry, science and culture.  
In the context of my research, the regime represents the existing system for 
providing space and hot water heating in the UK as described in chapter 1.2; 
primarily a gas based system with many of those not connected to the gas grid 
using electricity or oil for heat. The heat socio-technical regime therefore 
includes the companies present in the heat market and heat industry and their 
technologies as well as the heat consumers, consumer preferences and the 
cultural practices of consumers as well as the policy (which I take to include 
wider governance and regulation) which affects the heat system. 
Section 3.2 explained that regimes are often considered to be relatively 
resistant to change because of the increasing integration of elements within 
them and the development of economies of scale as regimes grow. If a regime, 
or elements within one, can affect change, potentially blocking (a negative 
impact) or supporting change (a positive impact), this could clearly have 
implications for any transformation. Scholars have introduced ideas of regime 
resistance where actors have been seen to attempt to affect change in other 
socio-technical regimes (Geels, 2014) however it is not necessarily the case 
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that regimes may slow change with examples of regime actors also driving 
sustainable change (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008).  
Other research by this author has investigated the recent activities of 
incumbents (regime actors) in the UK heat sector. That research has shown 
that incumbents have attempted to affect the move to sustainable heating by 
using lobbying and directed innovation to promote technologies which support 
their own interests (Lowes et al., 2018b). This thesis considers the period 
before the author’s work on incumbency and its focus is wider than purely 
‘incumbents’, focusing across the wider heat system, also taking into account 
activity at the niche layer. 
3.2.2.3 Niche-innovations 
This is the lowest level in the MLP model and represents actors and networks 
developing novel technologies and practices which may develop to challenge 
the regime by displacing regime technologies or practices. In niches, radical 
innovations can be generated for technologies which are currently expensive 
and unreliable (Geels, 2002a). When considering the UK heat system, the 
niche-innovation represents novel and more sustainable technologies and 
practices for generating, using and supplying heat including those identified in 
chapter 1.2 which appear to be important for the UK to reach its carbon 
reduction goals. 
3.3 POWER WITHIN THE TRANSITIONS LITERATURE 
This section builds on section 3.2 which introduced the concept of sustainability 
transitions and introduced the MLP model. The previous section highlighted 
some critiques of the MLP and a number of these suggested that there is a lack 
of focus on power within the theory. This section expands on the issue of power 
and sustainability transitions and contains the most in-depth and up-to-date 
review of considerations of and research into the concept of power within the 
sustainability transitions debates.  
The review is generally presented chronologically in order to show how ideas 
around power have developed in this field. While the MLP model is being used 
within this thesis, the following section also considers discussions of power 
linked to transitions management approaches (briefly mentioned previously). 
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Transitions management is a concept which utilises the MLP model (Rotmans 
et al., 2001) but offers an ‘avowedly interventionist’ approach to sustainability 
transitions (Genus and Coles, 2008, p1439). It has been summarised as an 
approach that employs: 
 ‘Long-term thinking (at least 25 years) as a framework for shaping short-
term policy  
  Thinking in terms of more than one domain (multi-domain) and different 
actors (multi-actor) at different scale levels (multi-level) 
 A focus on learning and a special learning philosophy (learning-by-doing 
and doing- by-learning) 
 Trying to bring about system innovation alongside system improvement  
 Keeping a large number of options option (wide playing field).’  
(Rotmans et al., 2001, p22) 
Collaborative working to develop long term goals, developing long-term visions, 
setting shorter term objectives and continually evaluating and learning from 
previous experiences is also central to transitions management approaches 
(Rotmans et al., 2001). Kemp and Loorbach (2006, p111) add that ‘transition 
arenas and multi actor governance’ are important aspects of transitions 
management approaches. These arenas are discussion forums for actors with 
an interest in the transition under focus and there is a suggestion that these 
arenas represent new institutions for actors to develop interaction, exchange 
knowledge and also develop visions of the future collaboratively.  
As a result of the closeness of the MLP and transitions management concepts, 
it is expected that understandings from critiques of transitions management may 
also be applicable to the MLP framework.  
3.3.1 Early considerations of power within sustainability transition 
debates 
Smith et al. (2005) considered the power of the regimes linked to Dutch 
transitions management approaches. They argued that because of the concepts 
of regime strength and stability, the role of incumbent regime actors and the 
credibility that existing players had to shape visions, a much greater 
understanding of the agency of actors to shape the governance of system 
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transformations was required. Conversely, Smith et al. (2005) also recognised 
that a regime could constrain regime actors’ attempts to make changes as a 
regime may have the power to limit the agency of actors.  
The ability of regimes to affect Dutch transition approaches was also recognised 
by transition management proponents. Kemp et al., (2007) explain that while 
transitions management approaches have become ‘one of [the Dutch 
government’s] pillars to achieve a sustainable energy supply’ (Kemp et al., 
2007, p321). However, established players had played too large in role in the 
processes so far as ‘the transition paths have been chosen by people in the 
platforms (in which the business voice is prominent’ (Kemp et al., 2007, p327). 
Kern and Smith (2008) repeat the suggestion that Dutch transition management 
has been captured by regime actors who have steered discussions in a 
direction which suits them. Others researching Dutch transition policy for 
agriculture suggested that actors were primarily interests in protecting 
themselves and this was a particular issue because of the open and reflective 
nature of transitions approaches (Hendriks & Grin 2007).  
Again, focusing on transition management approaches, Shove & Walker (2007, 
p764) explain that ‘studies of systems in transition are typically distanced, even 
voyeuristic making few claims about how individuals can, might, or even should 
act to affect the processes in question’ (p764). They go on to explain that these 
approaches can ‘all too easily obscure their own politics, smoothing over conflict 
and equality’ (p768) and like Smith et al. (2005) recognised that regime actors 
have the ability to shape visions and understandings of transformations; they 
called for a far greater recognition of the agency of and politics associated with 
transitions.  
Smith & Stirling (2007), once again with regard to transition management, 
explained that power relations and established structures can limit visions and 
affect constructions of transitions toward sustainability and even the notion of 
‘sustainability’ is affected by power; they suggest that in order to open up 
debates and reveal these often hidden political aspects ‘…we need to move 
from a view of ‘steering as management’ to ‘steering as politics’ (p369). With a 
similar focus, Walker & Shove (2007) argue that while reflexive governance 
approaches such as those used within transition management bring issues into 
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the open, these approaches may frame discussions in a way which naturally 
excludes certain actors thereby obscuring the associated politics.  
In response to Shove & Walker’s (2007) critique, Rotmans & Kemp (2008), 
leaders in the transition management approach suggest (without going into any 
detail or explaining how) that within transitions management ‘power is 
distributed over various actors, with different beliefs, interests and resources’ 
(p1007) and argue that over the course of transitions, the fact that there will be 
winners and losers is simply ‘accepted by business’ (p1008). However, Kern & 
Smith's (2008) analysis of transition management approaches by the Dutch 
Government’s Department of Economic Affairs discovered significant ‘capture’ 
of the approach by incumbent energy industry actors. These actors dominated 
the so called transition arenas and the overall transition task force was led by 
the chief executive of Shell, a firm with major fossil fuel interests in the 
Netherlands. This caused serious legitimacy issues for the overall transition 
project (due to the perception that Shell wanted to shape the project around its 
own interests) and highlighted the role that power can play. Recognising 
previous critiques around a lack of focus on agency, Genus & Coles (2008) 
explain that in order to test and strengthen the MLP, there are significant 
opportunities for analysing how actors, including the state and other interested 
actors affect the diffusion of technologies through society. 
Overall, even relatively early on in the development of approaches to 
sustainability transitions, power was seen to not be fully considered or explored. 
In particular, it was argued that greater attention should be paid to the agency of 
regime actors to shape future visions. A much greater understanding of the 
politics associated with the regime was also seen to be necessary. 
3.3.2 Increasing recognition of the importance of power 
In 2009, the Policy Sciences journal released a special edition focusing on 
‘designing long term policy’ which contained articles primarily interested in 
transition management, mostly in the Dutch context. In their synthesis article for 
the special issue, Voß et al., (2009) explain that while transitions management 
approaches may be a useful framework for long-term policy design, these 
approaches will always be embedded within broader political contexts and 
policy and politics are some of the most unresolved issues with transitions 
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management. Within this special edition, Hendriks (2009) focused (like previous 
researchers) on the power associated with the Dutch energy transition project 
and explained that despite the potential value of transition management 
approaches, the important and immovable politics (particularly associated with 
regime actors) was widely being ignored.  
Many of these issues were also considered in the same special issue by 
Meadowcroft (2009) who highlighted the lack of external actors present in 
transitions processes and noted the dominance of regime actors with their own 
interests aiming to affect transitions. He explained that ‘to the extent that 
societal actors become engaged in transition activities, and think more clearly 
about the future evolution of the systems with which they are involved, they are 
bound to be concerned with their own place in future arrangements. In other 
words, acute social and political struggles about the character of these 
transitions seem inevitable‘ (p328). However, perhaps Meadowcroft's (2009) 
key critique of transitions management concerns a lack of consideration of who 
is actually able to drive transitions and a lack of focus on the importance of 
policy and regulatory change.  
In the same special issue, considering transition management approaches, 
Avelino (2009) considered the dis-empowerment that small and non-regime 
actors may feel when taking part in transition workshops associated with 
unfamiliar topics or language and engaging with large and often experienced 
regime actors; this highlighted a potential lack of power for new entrants and 
niche players and a power asymmetry between regime and niche actors.  
Moving the discussion further, Avelino & Rotmans (2009), in recognising the 
importance of power within the MLP framework and in particular the importance 
of power in slowing system change, suggested five different types of power 
within transitions can be distinguished:  
 Innovative power where actors through working together can create or 
discover new resources; 
 Destructive power, where actors have the ability to destroy resources 
such as natural resources, infrastructure, people or animals; 
 Constitutive power, linked to ideas of structural power is the ability to 
establish, institute or enact a distribution of resources; 
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 Transformative power is the ability to transform the distribution of 
resources; 
 Systemic power is the combined capacity of actors to mobilise resources 
for the survival of a societal system.  
While the work of Avelino & Rotmans (2009) provides an interesting 
interpretation of the potential types of power associated with sustainability 
transitions, it is unclear how the researchers reached the conclusions they did 
from their analysis. The types of power they describe have not been 
synthesised from existing literature or been developed from novel analysis. The 
ideas proposed above also appear relatively abstract and it is not clear how 
they could be applied to real life examples of transitions. Attempting to take this 
work forward and based on the five types of power considered previously, 
Avelino & Rotmans (2011) attempted to develop a framework to conceptualise 
power for sustainability research in general (as opposed to transitions) however, 
it’s applicability to real word challenges appears questionable as there is no 
clear methodology but rather a number of complex ideas describing the types of 
power (as in the 2009 article) and a suggestion that in real life power relations 
are made up of: 
 The power of actors over other actors; 
 Some actors having more power than other actors; 
 Actors having different types of power. 
The focus on sustainability in general and the lack of an obvious methodology 
means that the Avelino & Rotmans (2011) framework while of theoretical 
interest appears of only limited value for this thesis. 
3.3.3 A greater focus on power within the MLP 
Building on certain criticisms of the MLP model with regard to its limited social 
focus, and specifically with regards to power, Geels (2010) suggests that ‘The 
MLP…can perhaps be enriched with further crossovers to power theories’ 
(p508). This was primarily because change in systems is unlikely to occur if 
incumbent actors are able to maintain their existing power and block innovation. 
Within the same article Geels (2010) explains that while in his view the MLP 
does include some understandings of power, the model could benefit from 
‘richer, multi-faceted views of power and conflict’ (p506), one example being 
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Lukes’ ‘3 faces of power’ model (which is considered in more detail in upcoming 
chapter 4). Geels (2010) describes the three faces of power as: 
‘the first being the use of political power and authority in formal 
decision-making arenas. The second relates to the power to place 
issues on or keep them off the agenda (backroom deals, lobbying, 
implicit threats). The third is about influencing the preferences of 
subordinate groups so that they do not feel the urge to place 
issues on the agenda’ (p506).  
In a general review of the MLP approach, Smith et al. (2010) suggest that as 
well as considering power in general, MLP approaches would benefit from 
‘opening the black-box of public policy’ because policies can affect socio-
technical change through funding for innovation, incentives, regulations and the 
provision of platforms for promoting niches. Smith et al. (2010) go on to explain 
that ‘there are long-standing literatures on regulatory capture, government-
industry relations, clientilism, iron triangles, policy networks, and discourse 
coalitions that can help us ensure analysis of socio-technical regimes and public 
policies are more deeply intertwined’ (p446).  
Shove & Walker (2010) consider socio-technical transitions from the 
perspective of social practices and propose a very different idea of power, not 
purely associated with policy. Linked to the approaches of among others, Michel 
Foucault (introduced in detail in section 4.1.5.1), they suggest power in socio-
technical systems can be ‘invisibly woven into the design of arrays of materials 
and services like those which constitute regimes of family life’ (p475) 
highlighting the potential importance of more dispersed, structural and less 
purposive forms of power.  
At a similar time, Grin (2010) considered the role of power associated with the 
governance of transition management approaches, recognising the importance 
of reflexivity and legitimacy within transition management. Like others, Grin 
(2010) suggests that many innovative solutions to sustainability issues run into 
problems associated with incumbent regime actors but Grin introduced a model 
which considered power in the three layers of the MLP based on previous work 
by researchers focusing on power and policy (Arts and Tatenhove, 2005). This 
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model is shown in Figure 3-3 and suggests there are three different types of 
power acting across the MLP:  
1. Relational power linked to the behaviours of actors to actively have 
power; 
2. Dispositional power associated with the positioning of actors in privileged 
positions; 
3. Structural power associated with long term landscape trends.  
 
Figure 3-3. Three layers of power (Grin 2010, p283) 
The framework in Figure 3-3 has since been used in an attempt to analyse wind 
energy developments in Denmark and while seen to have value, a number of 
shortcomings in the framework were identified. In particular, the framework did 
not represent the development of novel social practices and how these affect 
and are affected by the other layers of socio-technical systems (Hoffman, 
2013).  
Focusing on power as politics, Meadowcroft (2011) explains that ‘sustainability 
transitions are inherently political’ (p71) and argues that because of this, a much 
greater focus by researchers on the politics of transitions focusing on interests, 
ideas and institutions and using insights from previous political experience 
would strengthen understandings of sustainability transitions.  
In a response to a number of criticisms regarding the MLP, Geels again 
recognises the importance that agency, power relations and political lobbying 
can have within socio-technical systems and in particular the role these aspects 
can have in stabilising regimes and slowing change (Geels, 2011). Geels (2011) 
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goes on to suggest that ‘the MLP can be theoretically enriched by mobilizing 
insights from other theories’ (p30) associated with agency and power.  
While much of the previous literature has suggested that power may be an 
important element of transitions, Kern (2011) actually investigated elements of 
power within sustainability transitions. He considered the roles of ideas, 
institutions and interests in two energy transition policy initiatives, the Dutch 
energy transition project and the UK ‘Carbon Trust’. Kern identified the 
important role that discourses and institutional structures played in causing the 
policy variance between the two initiatives with both existing interests and 
existing institutional factors affecting policy outcomes. In further research into 
the Carbon Trust which didn’t focus specifically on power but instead used the 
MLP as a tool to assess innovation policy, Kern (2012) recognised that the 
Carbon Trust was inadvertently supporting powerful groups such as financiers 
and corporations to be involved in energy innovation but not taking account of 
other societal actors; it was explained that this was as a result of its institutional 
pro-business focus and led to non-neutral technology policy choices by the 
Carbon Trust. 
In other UK based research, historical document based analysis of UK gas 
sector governance considered the role of various actors within the gas regime 
suggesting that both of the cases considered, ‘show[ed] the significance of 
actors having the power not only to take decisions, set policy regimes and plans 
but also the coercive power to align actors along specific pathways’ 
(Arapostathis et al. 2013, p42). However, within this research, the authors did 
not define power or their methodology for measuring it, even though 
understanding it formed a central part of their analysis. 
3.3.4 Applying political science approaches to transitions 
Following discussions around the importance of power and transitions and calls 
for research, more recently researchers have considered sustainability 
transitions using political science/policy analysis approaches. 
Kuzemko (2013b) considers the applicability of new institutional approaches, 
which consider the role of ideas, social construction and policy paradigms, to 
understand socio-technical change and explains that there is a much greater 
role for analysis using these approaches. These approaches were expanded 
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further by Kuzemko et al. (2016) who developed a framework for considering 
the various elements which can affect the governance of sustainable energy 
system change; this drew on insights from institutional approaches, policy 
change, practice based research and socio-technical transitions. Latterly, 
Lockwood et al. (2017) also recognised the approach of institutions with regard 
to energy transitions but specifically noted the role of ‘historical institutionalism’ 
approaches where the development of institutions over time and their impact on 
governance and policy is considered. One example Lockwood considers is the 
development of energy industry network codes and the role of incumbents in 
being able to control them as a result of their institutionally set position on the 
panels which control changes to codes; this work highlighted concerns around 
the dominance of regime actors. 
Focusing again on institutions, Fuenfschilling & Truffer (2014) considered urban 
water systems in Australia, recognising the potential role of institutions as a 
form of power within socio-technical systems to drive approaches to 
governance. 
In a notably significant intervention in the debate regarding power and 
transitions, Geels (2014) focused specifically on the idea of ‘regime resistance’ 
and the ability of regime actors to slow transitions with their power. Geels 
(2014) summarises the main previous attempts to consider power in 
sustainability transitions studies as shown in Figure 3-4. He suggests that there 
appear to be three key distinctions of power which share similar characteristics 
but are generally referred to differently. The top level considers what are 
referred to as material, instrumental, relational or interest based elements of 
power. The middle level appears more related to the power of ideas or 
discourse and the bottom level is associated with more structural, institutional or 
organisational power. One suggested distinction highlighted in Figure 3-4 (from 
Kern, 2011) is between ‘interests’, ‘ideas’ and ‘institutions’ and chapter 5 which 




Figure 3-4. Various distinctions of power11 (Geels, 2014) 
While Geels (2014) suggests that there should be a much greater focus by 
researchers on regime power and Geels explains how regimes may have had 
power with regards to the UK’s electricity system, Geels does not show that 
these regimes actually did have any power. Neither does Geels provide a 
thorough or complete conceptualisation of what power actually is. 
Hess (2014), like Geels (2014) also suggested that analysis of incumbent 
regimes should be at the centre of analysis of sustainability transitions and 
Hess (2014) specifically investigated the financing of renewable energy political 
campaigns within US politics. The analysis by Hess (2014) suggested that 
because of the relationship between financial contributions and vote successes, 
the financial contributions of actors may be a way that actors can have power in 
the US policy process.  
A 2016 special edition in the The Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 
focused on the politics of transition suggested that power was spread across 
socio-technical systems (Avelino et al., 2016). The authors went on to explain 
that while power was not necessarily only present at the regime level, vested 
interests often did have the ability to capture transition processes because 
visions are produced by regime actors and thus reflect the status quo (Avelino 
                                            
11 It should be noted that the distinctions of power in this table do not align with the description 
of Avelino and Rotmans’ (2009) types of power explored in detail in section 3.3.2 suggesting 
discrepancies between understandings of power in transitions debates. 
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et al., 2016). Within the special issue, authors considered the institutional lock-
in effects of electricity system governance (Castán Broto, 2015), representation 
and the lack of representation in transition management approaches (Kenis et 
al., 2016), the role of incumbents in capturing and controlling the direction of 
innovation in relation to Dutch traffic management policy (Pel, 2015) and the 
importance of ideas and visioning in energy scenarios (Gaede & Meadowcroft, 
2016).  
In the same special issue, Avelino & Wittmayer (2016) suggest that ‘the regime 
is by definition associated with ‘power’, ‘dominance’ and ‘vested interests’ 
(p631). It is clear however that Avelino & Wittmayer (2016) take a normatively 
negative approach to the existing power in regimes asserting that the energy 
transition is ‘also a socio-political transition from centralised for-profit energy 
companies, to decentralised, not-for-profit community based and/or Third 
Sector-based energy cooperatives’(p368) implying the niches must somehow 
overtake the regime actors who are unable to change. This thesis doesn’t 
necessarily view incumbents and regime actors as a force of resistance and 
instead looks to investigate power within the UK’s heat system taking an 
explorative approach. This reflects the limited investigation into the UK’s heat 
sector and the diversity of actors within it, who each may take their own 
approach towards a sustainable heat transformation. 
Separate from the special issue, Raven et al. (2016) suggest that transition 
frameworks would benefit from an understanding of how protective spaces and 
policies for niche technologies develop in the first place, focusing on the role of 
policy advocates. In a more applied investigation into transitions and policy 
change and also considering advocacy, Markard et al. (2016) analysed energy 
related consultation responses in Switzerland and showed that there were two 
broad coalitions of actors, a ‘pro-economy’ conservative coalition formed 
primarily of incumbent businesses operating in the energy system and a more 
diverse ‘pro-ecology’ coalition more interested in green energy transition. 
However, whilst interesting in exploring the coalition, the research actually says 
nothing about actual policy change resulting from the coalitions. 
81 
 
3.3.5 Synthesising ideas of power within the transitions literature 
There is a growing literature associated with sustainability transitions 
considering elements of power. However, there is no general or agreed theory 
in the transitions literature of what power is and why it is important and 
understandings of power are broad and disparate. 
A few themes have however emerged. Some authors have recognised the 
importance of the agency of actors to cause change when considering 
transitions (Smith et al., 2005; Shove and Walker, 2007) whereas social 
structure has also been recognised for its importance (Smith et al., 2005; Geels, 
2010). There has been a major recognition of the importance of the power of 
incumbents and actors currently involved with existing regimes (Smith et al., 
2005; Kemp et al., 2007; Meadowcroft, 2009; Grin, 2010; Geels, 2011; Geels, 
2014; Hess, 2014; Pel, 2015; Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016). Closely related to 
these issues around incumbency is the suggestion that the main form of power 
associated with sustainability transitions is linked to the capture of transitions by 
incumbents (Kern and Smith, 2008) and self-interest (Hendriks and Grin, 2007; 
Meadowcroft, 2009).  
Small and niche actors have also been recognised as having some power from 
outside the regime (Späth and Rohracher, 2010) yet there has also been a 
recognition that niche actors may be unable to participate due to a lack of 
access or technical understanding (Avelino, 2009; Kenis et al., 2016). 
There has also been a recognition of the importance of the more discursive 
aspects of power with actors able to shape language, visions and ideas of 
transitions (Späth and Rohracher, 2010; Smith and Stirling, 2007; Walker and 
Shove, 2007). Actors may therefore have the potential to shape what a 
sustainability transition looks like before it has even started by, for example, 
determining goals or approaches.  
Wider power concepts such as legitimacy (Grin, 2010) and leadership 
(Meadowcroft, 2009) have also been recognised as important. And the literature 
has specifically recognised the importance of politics (Meadowcroft, 2011; 
Kuzemko, 2013d) and policy (Hendriks, 2009; Meadowcroft, 2009; Raven et al., 
2016) associated with transitions. 
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Yet while the literature has recognised the potential importance of power in 
transitions, there has been more limited research into the actual role of power in 
affecting transitions. As described in the previous sections, researchers have:  
 Considered the development of local discourses becoming 
institutionalised at regional levels (Späth and Rohracher, 2010); 
 Seen the dominance of transition arenas by incumbents (Kern and 
Smith, 2008); 
 Considered the creation of novel practices in wind energy in Denmark 
(Hoffman, 2013); 
 Considered the role of ideas, interests and institutions (Kern, 2011); 
 Recognised the involvement of certain groups (Kern, 2012); 
 Hypothesised about historic regime power (Arapostathis et al., 2013); 
 Investigated the dominance of certain industry codes by incumbents 
(Lockwood et al., 2017); 
 Considered the power of institutions in driving change in water systems 
(Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014); 
 Considered the role of political paradigms (Castán Broto, 2015); 
 Analysed the development of energy scenarios (Gaede and 
Meadowcroft, 2016); 
 Considered energy technology advocacy (Raven et al., 2016); 
 Analysed policy coalitions using consultation responses (Markard et al., 
2016). 
This previously identified research which has considered the role of power 
associated with sustainability transitions represents an important theoretical 
contribution to debates associated with transitions. However, the literature is still 
relatively limited in scale and says little about how power has actually caused 
real world impacts. There is therefore scope for a much greater understanding 
of power associated with sustainability transitions and room for further 
investigation into its impacts on real world change.  
As well as suggesting that a much greater general focus on power is needed in 
the transitions literature (Geels, 2010; Geels, 2011), researchers interested in 
power and transitions have also called for a specific focus on how actors can 
affect technology diffusion (Genus and Coles, 2008), a greater focus on power 
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and public policy (Smith et al., 2010), a focus on ideas, interests and institutions 
(Meadowcroft, 2011), a greater focus more specifically on new (Kuzemko et al., 
2016) and historical (Lockwood et al., 2017) institutional approaches as well as 
the application of more general power theories such as the ‘three faces of 
power approach’ (Geels, 2010). 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced concept of sustainable transitions. This approach 
has been used to consider how large socio-technical systems change from 
being unsustainable to becoming more sustainable. The chapter suggested that 
a sustainable UK heat system would be low carbon, secure and socially 
equitable and that to consider the changes required for the UK’s heat system, 
because of the scale and speed of changes required, the term transformation 
was more appropriate than transition.  
The multi-level perspective was highlighted as a key approach for 
understanding sustainable change within large systems and its ability to focus 
on the breadth of entire socio-technical systems suggests it may be suitable to 
consider the UK heat system. However, while the MLP approach may be a 
valuable framework, it is an approach which has been critiqued for not paying 
enough attention to ideas of agency and power. Ideas of the power of 
incumbents and political power have been suggested to be potentially 
interesting and valuable areas for research. While there has been some 
research and analysis considering ideas of sustainable transitions and power, 
the literature is still fairly limited.  
This thesis adds to the literature on power and transformation. It uses the multi-
level perspective as a primarily descriptive model to consider the UK’s current 
heat system and investigates power within political elements of this system. 
Building on this chapter, to further support the theoretical underpinning of this 
thesis, the following chapter explores how the contested concept of power has 








4 UNDERSTANDINGS OF POWER 
The concept of power is central to this thesis but the specific focus of the thesis 
is on the power of actors such as companies, trade associations and policy 
makers, to influence policy and governance associated with the UK’s 
transformation to low-carbon heating. Taking a wide conceptual view to start 
with, this chapter considers theoretical approaches to the general concept of 
power, a topic which appears unbounded and has been studied in various 
disciplines including sociology, philosophy and political science. 
At this point, a reader may be thinking: ‘but what is power?’ or ‘how is it 
defined?’. These are valid and important questions. However these are 
questions which are extremely difficult to answer in any sort of a complete way. 
Power has been seen as ‘essentially contested’ (Lukes, 1974, p9) which implies 
that it has similar definition problems to things such as art, democracy or 
legitimacy which all have ‘continual disagreement concerning their essence’ 
(Haugaard and Ryan, 2012a p10). As well as being essentially contested, 
power has also been described as a ‘family resemblance concept’ (Haugaard 
2010 p419) due to the large number of different approaches to power (i.e. the 
family relations) but with a recognition that there are similarities and differences 
between the members of the family.  
This chapter outlines some of the key contemporary approaches to 
understanding power and power relations and describes how these 
understandings have come to be. While the key approaches to consider power 
and the associated authors are explored, there is a vast literature associated 
with the concept which no scholar could ever completely review. This scale 
issue is compounded by the interaction of power studies with other elements of 
the social sciences such as economics12, psychology, sociology and political 
science.  
                                            
12 The idea of ‘economic power’ is a related but more specific power issue which ‘can be 
broadly defined as the ability to control or influence the behaviours others through the deliberate 
and motivated use of economic assets’ and this could be at a nation state or business level 
(Frost, 2009, p9). Marxist economists see economic and political power as being closely related 
(Strange, 1975). Greater economic assets can create a greater ability to attempt to influence 
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As far as is possible, this section is written chronologically explaining how 
approaches to power have emerged or developed over time. The development 
of thinking around power has evolved in such a way that rather than there being 
one unifying theory, power has become a group of related concepts. However, 
attempts have been made to combine approaches to power. At the end of this 
section I introduce a theoretical approach which attempts to blend the key 
understandings of power into one overarching framework called ‘Four Faces of 
Power’. This approach is then used throughout the thesis as the key theoretical 
approach to the essentially contested, family resemblance concept of power. An 
ongoing recognition of the important differences and connections between 
‘agent’ based and more ‘structural’ forms of power is also considered 
throughout the thesis. 
Defining power is clearly complicated and according to one scholar it ‘seems as 
if any student of power designs his or her approach’ (Arts, 2000, p112). So, 
rather than defining power in a broad way which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis anyway, I now define my interest in power for the purpose of this thesis:  
Specifically, this thesis is interested in how actors have affected elements of UK 
policy and governance associated with heating in a way which could support or 
slow the transformation towards a more sustainable heat system. Power in this 
thesis is seen as the ability of actors to affect policy and governance associated 
with the decarbonisation of heat. This understanding suggests that in order to 
have had power, actors must have been able to affect policy and governance 
and this reflects the focus within the thesis on purposive attempts by actors to 
have power. While examples of when actors have had power is of central 
interest, the thesis also considers the approaches that UK heat market actors 
may use to attempt to have power to affect policy change even though they may 
not have been successful. 
4.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF POWER STUDIES 
Despite being a ‘core concept’ within social sciences, power ‘…is arguably one 
of the most difficult concepts to make sense of’ (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009, 
                                            
(Salamon and Siegfried, 1977) linking to ideas of ‘capacity’ to have power which are considered 
throughout the thesis.        
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p1). It is suggested that power remains one of the most contested issues in the 
social sciences (Arts, 2000).  
As described previously, even descriptions of the concept vary widely with 
Lukes (1974, p9) describing power as ‘essentially contested’; more recently, 
Lukes (2005) explained that 'there is no agreement about how to define it, how 
to conceive it, how to study it and, if it can be measured, how to measure it' 
(p61).  
Haugaard (2012) gives a historical overview of the development of thinking 
around power in the social sciences. He explains that within modern social 
science, the concept of power has moved from more simplistic concepts such 
as motivations to vote in particular ways and the control of particular issues on 
and off the agenda to more complex understandings of power around 
knowledge, truth, institutions and ideas.  
Across approaches to power (which include understandings from the disciplines 
of sociology, philosophy and political science), many authors agree that as the 
theory has developed over time, a rough framework to consider power has 
emerged. This understanding sees a relatively chronological development of 
different and additional ways to conceptualise power, often described in the 
literature as different faces or dimensions of power13 (e.g. Clegg, (1989), 
Haugaard & Ryan (2012), Lukes, (2005) and Sadan, (1997)). This implies that 
there is at least some consistency around understandings of the development of 
power theoretically, even if authors disagree on the actual theories.  
It should be noted that as new understandings of power have developed, rather 
than one theory replacing another, the process has been additional with the 
theory becoming generally wider and more complex over time.  
4.1.1 Early approaches to power 
Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’ written in the 16th century represents some of the 
earliest writing on power and is seen as a ‘classic’ in the field (Sadan, 1997, 
p33). In ‘The Prince’, Machiavelli, suggests that in order to maintain power, 
politicians and leaders must separate morality and politics implying that in order 
                                            
13 The term ‘faces’ is used rather than ‘dimensions’ within this thesis although this is purely for 
simplicity rather than any particular preference or for semantic reason. 
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to be effective, politicians and leaders do not need to act ethically or honestly 
(Machiavelli, 1999). Power is seen as a means by which individuals can seek 
strategic advantages in order to reach their own goals (or interests, an idea 
considered in more detail in section 5.3) (Sadan, 1997), this suggests 
Machiavelli was more interests in agent based power of actors. Machiavellian 
thinking implies that those with power could employ a dishonest and fabricated 
image using deceitful methods to rule and control, and while being written 
centuries ago, this is an approach which it has been argued reflects corporate 
marketing and lobbying in the UK (Harris and Lock, 1996). This could be seen 
as a conflictual or domination linked approach to power, something which is 
sometimes described as ‘power over’ where one actor has power over another. 
The other historical ‘classic’ in the field of power is Hobbes’ Leviathan published 
in 1651. Leviathan is interested in the role of the legitimacy and authority of 
leaders (monarchs) in leading and organising society; it sees individuals as 
primarily self-interested elements of society who require the authority of a 
legitimate leader to maintain social stability (Hobbes, 1996). This approach is 
clearly quite different from Machiavelli’s, and power to Hobbes while being 
linked to the power of the monarch over society, also implies an element of 
social contract between the monarch and individuals; this suggests that the 
individuals are part of a two way power relationship rather than being purely 
dominated and could be seen as a more structural approach to power. 
4.1.2 Initial modernist understandings of power 
Despite what many would now consider the centrality of power to social (and 
political) sciences, it was not until after the second world war that the concept of 
power became an important specific theme (Sadan, 1997). The literature on 
power rapidly expands from the 1960s.  
Hay (2002) explains that in the early days of this new era of power studies, 
power theorists initially considered power simply as the power of actors over 
other actors; often referred to in the literature, the power of actor A over actor B. 
Like Machiavellian approaches, this could be considered as a more ‘conflictual’ 
approach to power (as was discussed earlier in section 4.1). This approach to 
understanding power has since become described by some as the first face of 
power (Lukes, 1974, Hay, 2002 and Haugaard, 2012). Quite simply in this 
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approach to understanding power, an actor (A) is able to get another actor (B) 
to do something that would have not happened without the presence or 
behaviour of actor A. This view which represents a conflictual view of power 
linked to ideas of domination, generally sees elites and leaders as the 
individuals who have power over the population. Box 1 below contains a heat 
related theoretical example of the first face of power. 
Box 1. Example – The First Face of Power  
A theoretical example of the first face of power linked to UK heat 
decarbonisation policy is described below: 
 
Press release: ‘Flame-heat, the UK’s leading manufacturer of oil boilers has 
forced the Government to cancel its subsidy for electric heat pumps which 
were expected to replace oil boilers in off gas grid areas. Flame-heat 
demanded that the Government removes the subsidy and if it didn’t, it would 
be forced to shut its factory in Manchester and make 500 employees 
redundant. Thankfully, those jobs are now protected.’ 
 
This theoretical example shows how Flame-heat has power over the 
Government and how the first face of power could work in practice. Flame-
heat’s behaviour caused the Government to change their policy for heat 
pumps. However, this example also shows that Flame-heat has power only 
because they threatened job losses and that power is linked to the position 
and situational factors of Flame-heat rather than just because they are 
powerful per se.  
 
It should also be noted (and these issues are expanded in section 7.4) that 
just because the company says it may have been successful, the actual 
policy change could have happened for other reasons or only in part due to 
the efforts of Flame-heat. 
 
Robert Dahl is considered as one of the key modernist theorists on power 
(Haugaard, 2012a) and Dahl’s study ‘Who Governs’ on the politics of New 
Haven, Connecticut, is considered as a key piece of work and is widely 
referenced and discussed across the power literature. In this study, Dahl looked 
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at the development of politics and voting preferences in New Haven policy 
making. The research concluded that previous views which has suggested that 
New Haven was governed by an elite group was in fact not correct but that in 
reality, New Haven was governed by a wider plurality of actors representing a 
wide range of different actors (Dahl, 1961). 
In showing that power was diffuse beyond the elite and was not solely linked to 
domination, the Dahl work represented a major advance and a first step into 
more sophisticated modernist understandings of power; it showed that simple 
ideas of the first face of power may not show the whole picture in real world 
situations. However, despite the wide impact of the Dahl work, even in 1989, 
Clegg (1989) suggests that the approach to power which considers the agency 
of actors to have power over other actors, i.e. the first face of power, is still the 
most pervasive view of power. Indeed, in recent examples of research 
considering sustainable change and energy system change, normative 
assumptions are made around the ability of elite corporate actors to dominate 
policy arenas (e.g. Dutch Energy Transition Arenas (Kern and Howlett, 2009) 
and fossil fuel interests in the UK policy space (Geels, 2014)). This is not to say 
that the dominating power of large corporates over the policy process is not an 
issue worthy of investigation. However, the focus of previous research on this 
implies less of a focus elsewhere, for example on the ability of individuals from 
the bottom up to have power or on the power within political systems. Clearly 
the first face does not offer a complete view of power. 
4.1.3 Setting the agenda, the second face of power 
Although the first face understanding of power is recognised as being a real and 
relatively easy to understand and potentially measure aspect of power, theorists 
(such as Dahl) saw it as over simplistic and relying too much on observable 
displays of power (Haugaard, 2012a). In response to this over simplistic 
understanding, American theorists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz 
developed the idea of ‘Two Faces of Power’ which widened the view of power 
which purely considered the power of an actor over another, now referred to as 
the ‘first face of power to’ include a second face of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962). This understanding of power considers a less observable aspect of 
power which doesn’t directly involve decision making but is associated with 
controlling whether or not decision making can happen.  
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The second face of power can be considered as the power of actors, be they 
from within or outside of institutions, to control the agenda of what decision 
making is actually taking place or, to be in control of what cards are on the 
table, both controlling what can be discussed and also what cannot.  
From their text, Bachrach & Baratz (1962) suggest that:  
‘….power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to 
creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional 
practices that limit the scope of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively 
innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is 
prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any 
issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s 
set of preferences?’ (p948). The authors go on to say that: ‘All 
forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the 
exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of 
others because organisation is the mobilization of bias. Some 
issues are organised into politics while others are organised out 
(p949).’ 
Box 2. Example – The Second Face of Power 
A theoretical example of the second face of power linked to UK heat 
decarbonisation policy is described below: 
 
The new energy minister in the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy has a strong personal belief that decarbonising the gas 
grid using biogas is the best approach to decarbonise heat in the UK. With 
her power over the department, she commands civil servants to set up a new 
heat decarbonisation forum formed of industry players focusing on biogas. 
This forum provides advice on policy decisions around subsidy support and 
innovation funding for heat decarbonisation. Because the minister has set the 
agenda of the heat forum to focus on biogas, its members are linked to the 
biogas industry. Naturally the forum’s recommendations promote policies and 
innovation for biogas at the expense of other technologies. The agenda of the 
heat decarbonisation forum has been set and as a result, biogas as a 
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technology option is very much on the table whereas other technologies are 
much less so. An element of UK heat decarbonisation policy development 
now has a bias in favour of a particular technology. 
 
This is a clear example of the second face of power. However, this example 
highlights how the second face of power can be linked to other elements of 
power. As a result of her institutional position, the minister has power over 
departmental decisions, to set up the forum so that it contains a high number 
of biogas interests – and therefore has a biogas heavy agenda. The minister 
could be seen as having power over the department which in turn allows her 
to (potentially inadvertently) lean the policy agenda towards biogas. 
 
Although many accepted Bachrach and Baratz’s arguments, it was argued that 
analysing the second face of power was a very difficult, or even impossible task 
because it doesn’t display itself like the much more observable first face (Hay, 
2002). Bachrach and Baratz suggest investigating the so-called mobilisation of 
bias in the institution under scrutiny by looking at who gains from bias and who 
suffers and how this status quo is maintained and by whom (Haugaard, 2012a).  
This new idea of a second face suggested that power was something which 
acted everywhere at all times, no longer just when decisions were being made. 
Rather than being episodic i.e. something that happened at certain points, the 
second face of power can be something that is institutionalised and fixed, a 
more structural rather than purely agent based face of power where one actor 
has power over another. The idea of setting the agenda or mobilising bias 
continues to be an important concept in both power studies and political science 
(e.g. Birkland, 1998 and Dür, 2008b). 
4.1.4 The third face of power and structuralism 
The so called second face of power is widely recognised as a real word social 
phenomenon and is now a key concept in power studies. However, the 
development of power theory did not stop at the second face, as theorists 




Steven Lukes is recognised as being a key theorist on power issues and his 
seminal 1974 publication ‘Power: A Radical View’ (Lukes, 1974) set out to 
develop an ‘operational’ (p9) approach to understanding power. Lukes 
suggested that the work of Bachrach and Baratz was a good move forward 
when considering the role of agenda setting and organised bias explaining:  
'As Bachrach and Baratz themselves maintain, the domination of 
the defenders of the status quo may be so secure and pervasive 
that they are unaware of any potential challengers to their position 
and thus of any alternatives to the existing political process, 
whose bias they work to maintain’ (Lukes, 1974, p21).  
The setting of the agenda could be so powerful that actors may not even realise 
it had been set. However Lukes took this idea further and suggested that the 
approach of two faces required radical change and focusing just on behaviour, 
observable or not, as previous theorists had done was not comprehensive 
enough. Lukes proposed that there will be socially structured and culturally 
patterned group behaviours which are maintained by the actions of groups 
formed of individuals but which are not attributable to specific individuals; this 
change widened modernist understandings of power to include more structural 
aspects i.e. linked to society as a whole rather than to specific actors (Lukes, 
1974). He went on to suggest that there are structural effects where the 
mobilisation of bias in agenda setting can come from an organisation itself as a 
result of its history. Box 2 provides a good example of this idea of historical 
events or situations, it was the minister that originally set up the forum as a 
result of her power but the forum is now institutionally set and could exist 
beyond the tenure of the minister.  
Further still, and in adding in a third face of power, Lukes suggested that actors 
can have power by controlling the thoughts and minds of others in order to 
control behaviours at a more structural and societal level. Lukes explains:  
‘To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by 
getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also 
exercises power over him by influencing, shaping and determining 
his very wants.’…‘Indeed, is it not the supreme and most insidious 
exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from 
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having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things, either because they can see it as natural 
and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained 
and beneficial?' (Lukes, 1974, p24).  
Under this new understanding, power is no longer something which actors have 
over other actors or the ability to keep issues off or add issues to the agenda. 
Power is also something which exists in an even wider structural context than 
the second face. Actors can have power over other actors by affecting their 
views and preferences; these affected views and preferences result in 
behaviours by the dominated actors which reflects their perceived desires but 
actually reflects the desires of the dominating actors. Lukes suggests that the 
third face of power makes actors less free and unable to use reason correctly 
(Lukes, 2005). 
Swartz (2007) and Dowding (2006) suggest that understanding how actors 
achieve domination over other actors is the key issue Lukes tries to address 
through his third face of power. Indeed, Lukes (2005) suggests that the new 
approach can help understand ‘the various ways of supressing latent conflicts 
within society’ (p59) implying that those dominating can constrain actors from 
doing certain things. Lukes explains that his text refers to both political and 
sociological power issues and it’s clear to see how this third face could relate to 
society. Examples could include the suppression of societies by the state using 
media control to control thoughts and preferences or the suppression of 
societies using religion as a tool of domination. Clearly, in this understanding, 
the relationship between the knowledge/information which is used to control 
preferences and power is very strong.  
In 2005 Lukes released a second edition of his 1974 book in order to update his 
theory. In this work Lukes (2005) makes clear that he sees power as a capacity 
of actors i.e. something which can be deployed by an actor rather than it being 
an event or instantaneous force. Lukes also differentiates between active and 
passive power where passive power can be considered more structural or 
institutional and active more closely related to specific observable outcomes or 
conflict and the role of agents. The concept of active and passive power has 
similarities with some international relations’ (IR) understandings of power 
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which conceive of power as ‘hard’ (the use of coercion and payment) and ‘soft’ 
(attraction, agenda setting and preference shaping) (Nye, 2009). As explained 
previously, this thesis is specifically interested in the more active elements of 
the power of actors although some attention will be paid to other more passive 
and structural elements of power which may be related. 
As a concept, the third face of power in itself is not particularly complex and it is 
possible to consider examples where societies or social groups have their 
preferences shaped in order to make them accept their place ‘in the existing 
order of things’ (Lukes, 1974, p24); e.g. state controlled media . However, the 
third face of power in the context of policy change implies that actors in the 
policy process may be dominated in a way which shapes their thoughts and 
preferences and results in a policy decision which reflects the desires of the 
actors doing the domination. Indeed, scholars interested in more discursive 
approaches to power (e.g. Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016), climate governance 
(e.g. Marquardt, 2017) and structural change (e.g. Avelino and Rotmans, 2009) 
refer to Lukes’ approach to power as simply ‘preference (-) shaping’ (p321, 
p170 and p547 respectively) suggesting it is less about maintaining the existing 
order of things but is instead about shaping policy preferences to affect change.  
But even taking the third face to mean preference shaping could be particularly 
complex from an analytical perspective. The development of policies could 
involve various interested actors who may be attempting to shape preferences 
of policy makers at the same time in different ways. Box 3 below highlights a 
potential example of how the third face could affect a heat policy situation.  
Box 3. Example – The Third Face of Power 
A theoretical example of the third face of power linked to UK heat 
decarbonisation policy is described below: 
 
The UK’s gas networks have been carrying out a campaign aimed at MPs 
using emails, letters and social media and the general media. The campaign 
aims to convince the MPs that gas is a sustainable fuel for the future which 
can help meet carbon reduction targets and reduce fuel poverty. This 
campaign is continued for many years and the idea of gas as a clean fuel 
(whether true or not) has gained traction with many politicians. Policies to 
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remove gas from homes and businesses become increasingly unpopular for 
policy makers who perceive gas as a green fuel and as a result, the UK’s heat 
sector does not become decarbonised in line with the Climate Change Act 
target. 
 
Clegg's (1989) text on power, provides a visualisation of Lukes’ three faces of 
power idea which is reproduced in Figure 4-1 below. The model shown in 
Figure 4-1 considers the various elements of the three dimensions of power 
considering how the different dimensions (or faces) can be observed. The 
diagram breaks down each face of power into its elements such as ‘objects of 
analysis’, ‘indicators’ and ‘field of analysis’ providing a potentially useful applied 
approach to understand power. The diagram suggests that the three faces 
framework is formed as a nested hierarchy, with the second face approach 
incorporating the first and second faces and the third face view incorporating 
the first, second and third faces. This implies therefore that if you are interested 
in the second or third face of power, you should also consider the first or first 
and second face respectively in order to gain a complete picture. Clegg’s 
approach highlights the potential connections between different elements of 




Figure 4-1. The three dimensional framework, (Clegg, 1989, p90)  
4.1.5 Post-structuralism and Michel Foucault, the fourth face of 
power 
Despite the clear increase in sophistication and scope in understandings of 
power with the addition of the third face, it has been argued that there are still 
more elements of power to consider beyond the three faces. ‘Post-structuralist’ 
approaches such as concepts of discourse, language and the de-centering of 
the human subject have had an ongoing effect on understandings of power 
(Clegg, 1989). The term ‘post-structural’ is seen within the power debates to 
generally describe the work of Michel Foucault and represents a move on from 
or critique of previous structuralist debates; both structuralism and post-
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structuralism are linked to French intellectual debates in the decades following 
the second world war (Harcourt, 2007). 
Critics of Luke’s three faces of power claim that the approach took a morally 
relative approach and that in order to understand the third face, a normative 
judgement would need to be made on what the interests of the subject being 
studied actually were. The requirement for these moral judgements, it was 
suggested, implied Marxian undertones of domination by an elite (which may or 
may not be representative of reality) (Clegg, 1989, Clegg et al., 2014). The 
analysis of power using the three faces approach therefore required subjective 
judgements by researchers which could undermine results. 
While not responding directly to the three faces approach, post-structuralism 
removes fixed points of reference and instead focuses on texts and 
representations to understand the world; in post-structural understandings of 
power, it is then ‘knowledge that is used to structure and fix representations in 
historical forms [that] is the accomplishment of power’ (Clegg, 1989, p152). The 
post-structuralist approach to power therefore requires a focus on texts and 
language and how they have come to be the way they are as a result of 
previous power struggles.  
Post-structuralism is an abstract idea which has no clear methodological 
approach. In order to explore the idea further, the following section drills down 
in more detail into the approaches of Michel Foucault who is seen as being 
central to post-structural understandings of power. 
4.1.5.1 Michel Foucault 
The fourth face or post-structural approach to power is seen by some as 
essentially Michel Foucault’s understandings of power (e.g. Haugaard and 
Ryan, 2012, Harcourt, 2007; van Tatenhove, Edelenbros and Klok, 2010). 
However, Foucauldian approaches to power, like the wider power debates, are 
often considered complex, undetermined and difficult to apply. This section 
firstly considers some of what Foucault actually said about power and then goes 
on to consider the view of others on Foucault’s understanding of power. 
In an interview on the topic of power with Foucault himself, in what appears to 
be an attempt to distance himself from power he explains ‘I scarcely ever use 
the word [power]’ (Gordon, 1980, p115). Foucault goes on to describe how he 
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links power to the historical development of institutions and practices and 
explains that power can be thought of as productive (i.e. causing things to 
happen) rather than limiting (constraining change) and is very closely linked to 
ideas of truth production (Gordon, 1980). One example of Foucault’s 
consideration of power is the novel ‘Discipline and Punish’. This novel considers 
the move from physical forms of state punishment to incarceration in prisons; 
this change is seen as the power and control of the state which is acted out and 
reproduced through the bodies of individuals (Foucault, 1977).  
In an essay, ‘Subject and Power’, Foucault explains that the goal of his work 
‘has not been to analyse the phenomenon of power’ (p326) but that his work is 
more interested in the importance of the subject (i.e. individuals) rather that 
power per se (Foucault, 1994). He goes on, ‘power relations are more rooted in 
the whole network of the social’ p345. In ‘The History of Sexuality- Volume 1’ 
which followed ‘Discipline and Punish’ Foucault does take a more direct 
approach to power (and uses the word frequently) but suggests that that the 
purpose of the enquiry is not to develop a theory of power but to consider 
certain power relations associated with repression, in this example specifically 
associated with sexuality (Foucault, 1998).  
While Foucault may have explained that he was more interested in the role of 
individuals as reproducing expectations and behaviours rather than specifically 
power, others see Foucault as central to understandings of power. Schirato et 
al., (2012) suggest that Foucault is an author and philosopher whose name is 
widely considered synonymous with power studies in general and it is Foucault 
who created the greatest debate and enthusiasm around power studies. It has 
been suggested that Foucault’s work widened the study of power to include 
concepts which are beyond simple understandings of power as influence and 
pressure to include ideas such as language, discourse and the structural 
elements of society (Kendall and Wickham, 1999). 
Mills (2003) provides a brief summary of Foucault’s work which she describes 
as complex, mixed, changing and difficult to apply. Mills (2003) goes on to 
suggest that perhaps the most influential aspect of Foucault’s work was the 
consideration of power not as the wills and actions of individuals but as the 
strategy and thoughts of society displayed at every moment of interaction; 
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power can be considered as a chain or network of relations where people are 
the place where power is enacted or resisted.  
Haugaard (2012) adds that much of Foucault’s work focuses on the importance 
of the role of the individual as a conduit for power within society, including the 
researcher themselves, as well as the importance of knowledge and discourse. 
He adds that Foucault’s interpretation of power sees two general levels of 
conflict: local struggles over specific conflicts, events or truths and deeper 
struggles over the regime of truth production. There could therefore be seen to 
be some relationship between Foucauldian understandings of power and the 
previously considered three faces. The first face considers the power of actor ‘a’ 
over actor ‘b’, which could be seen as a local struggle over a specific conflict. 
Struggles over truth could be seen as related to the third face and the shaping 
of preferences. It is not however clear how the second face of power, the setting 
of agendas, would fit in to Foucault’s idea of power, but it seems to be more 
closely aligned with ideas of local and more active conflicts.  
In building on Foucault’s analysis of punishment systems, Garland (1990) 
suggests Foucault sees power as: ‘a pervasive aspect of social life and is not 
limited to the sphere of formal politics or open conflict. It is also to be thought of 
as productive in its effects rather than repressive in so far as power shapes the 
actions of individuals and harnesses their bodily powers to its ends. In this 
sense power operates ‘through’ individuals rather than ‘against’ them and helps 
constitute the individual who is at the same time its vehicle’ (p138). This view 
again sees the human subject as central to Foucault’s idea of power suggesting 
that the power operating through individuals can control what they do and don’t 
do. 
Foucault’s idea of power has also been seen as being closely related to 
knowledge or perceived truths, diffuse and as something which can have both 
dominating as well as empowering aspects (Powercube, 2016), this again could 
be seen to link to ideas of the third face of power.  
The understandings of Foucault’s view of power imply that power runs deeply 
through individuals on a personal and cognitive level affecting all behaviours of 
individuals and the interactions between individuals. Individuals can be thought 
of as conduits of power and without the individuals, power would not exist as 
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power is reproduced though the thoughts and behaviours of each individual. 
This power itself within the individual is linked to the knowledge of individuals 
and how that knowledge relates to the truth and where the knowledge has come 
from. It can be seen as linked to ideas of normalisation and the acceptance of 
one’s position in the existing order of things. 
Kendall & Wickham (1999) suggest that Foucault’s three major themes and 
methodologies (which are not necessarily completely focused on power) are:  
 Archaeology, which is the non-anthropological and non-interpretive 
investigative process of describing regularities, differences and 
transformations in the archives of discourse. 
 Genealogy, which uses archaeological approaches to examine histories 
but also includes the analysis of power. The focus here is the lack of 
judgement and the move beyond right and wrong and the move past 
one’s own knowledge. Kendall & Wickham, (1999, p29) use the following 
metaphor for genealogy: 'It is, in other words a methodological device 
with the same effect as a precocious child at a dinner party: genealogy 
makes the older guests at the table of intellectual analysis feel decidedly 
uncomfortable by pointing out things about their origins and functions 
that they would rather remain hidden.' 
 Discourse, which is the investigation of historical archives in order to 
reconstruct the material conditions of thought or language constructions 
at particular times or places. Foucault argues that discourses can interact 
with other discourses and affect non-discursive physical practices, such 
as torture, through discourses around law and ethics.  
Genealogy is generally recognised as the key Foucauldian approach to 
consider the role of power (Haugaard, 2012a). Genealogy builds on 
archaeology but considers power as an aspect of ‘the history of the present’ 
looking to understand how the present came to be (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, 
p29). Foucault produced a number of genealogical studies including the 
previously mentioned ‘Discipline and Punish’ (Foucault, 1977) and ‘The History 
of Sexuality (volume 1)’ (Foucault, 1998).  
So, while Foucault’s explicit focus was not power, power is clearly implicitly 
important within his work and others argue that his work has been central to 
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how power as a subject has developed. Yet a simple or working definition of 
power is absent from Foucault’s own work (Powercube, 2016) and therefore 
applying Foucauldian thinking around power is a complex task requiring a 
judgement on what power is and then requiring a judgement on how it should 
be analysed. 
While Foucault’s approaches have been seen as a fourth face of power, it is 
clear that while different to the other faces, there are also links. In particular, 
Foucauldian approaches are linked to the third face of power (the shaping of 
preferences) specifically around ideas of knowledge and truth and their 
resultant behaviours.  
The application of Foucault’s idea of power within the rest of this thesis is 
considered in some more detail throughout the following theoretical chapters. 
However, whilst Foucault’s approaches may have value for some analysis, it is 
clear that the focus of this thesis on the active and purposive attempts by actors 
to affect policy may not be suitable for the more abstract and structural yet 
individually centred Foucauldian approaches to power. Box 4 below contains 
two examples of how a heat policy issue could be considered from a 
Foucauldian approach to power.  
Box 4. Example – The Fourth Face of Power 
Two theoretical examples of the fourth face of power linked to UK heat 
decarbonisation policy are described below: 
 
Example 1 - Around 85% of homes in the UK are heated using gas and most 
citizens have grown up not knowing anything different. As a result, when 
replacing appliances, because of their previous knowledge and experiences, 
consumers do not even consider the option of moving to non-gas forms of 
heating. Having gas heating is normalised and consumers are not aware of 
the environmental impact of gas heating. As a result, the normality of gas 
heating is reproduced through individuals and the gas system is maintained 
as consumers pick gas heating over other options when they replace or 




Clearly this example is very different to the previous examples in that it 
focuses on individuals in society rather than those involved in the policy 
process. Further still, the views and behaviours of the individuals in the 
example are also linked to other factors rather than just power; this includes 
the industry and products available for them to switch to and highlights the 
difficulty of this approach to power and the importance of the context of that 
power. This example, and the issues with it, show how Foucault’s approach is 
difficult to apply to society and that it may even be more complex to consider 
power and policy change from a Foucauldian perspective. 
 
Example 2 - The majority of civil servants in the UK energy department have 
economics degrees and their training means that their approach to policy 
making has a natural preference towards market based and competitive 
solutions for decarbonisation. The minister heading the energy department 
shares this view and ensures that the department focuses on competition and 
markets within its policies.  
 
The UK policies created to support low-carbon heat reflect this focus and do 
not successfully deliver low cost decarbonised heating. However, elsewhere 
around the world, particularly in Scandinavia, approaches to heat 
decarbonisation are more state led with less of a focus on competition and 
are more successful; this is because, in this example, the state is better able 
to deliver than a market. 
 
In this theoretical example, knowledge within the subjects involved (policy 
makers) clearly affects the policy outcome. However, it’s worth noting that in 
this example no-one actually wanted the policy approach to result in a high 
cost outcome, showing the fourth face as a more passive policy impact, rather 
than a purposive attempt to have a policy impact. This example also clearly 
could be seen as being linked to institutions (and ideas, considered in section 
5.4 and 5.2 respectively). 
 
Overall, these examples highlight the complexity of the fourth face as an 
approach, particularly around policy and show it as a more passive element of 
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power, something which is not the main focus of this thesis. These examples 
both also include elements of the shaping of preferences (albeit passively) 
suggesting perhaps that separating the third and fourth faces of power is not 
without issue. 
4.2 SYNTHESIZING APPROACHES TO POWER 
The ever growing literature on the concept of power has meant that the topic 
has become increasingly broad and complex. Few attempts have been made to 
create a meta-theory for considering power potentially in light of this complexity 
and as mentioned earlier, power has been seen as a family resemblance 
concept (Haugaard, 2010).  
It was Digeser (1992) who first referred to Foucault’s approach to power as the 
‘fourth face of power’. With this recognition of Focualdian/post-structural 
approaches as the fourth face, for the first time all four faces were considered 
together. 
The idea of four faces of power as a tool to consider the various and 
consolidate various approaches to power has been used since then, most 
notably by Mark Haugaard (e.g. Haugaard and Ryan (2012) and Haugaard 
(2012)) and in these examples, the four faces idea is considered a typology 
rather than a grand theory of power. The four faces model therefore allows a 
relatively straightforward descriptive approach to the concept of power which 
considers the key elements of the main theory around power. 
On top of the ‘faces’ approach, Haugaard & Ryan (2012) suggest that modern 
approaches to understanding power are dominated by three key considerations 
used by scholars interested in power: 
 Conflictual power games are the approaches which see power as 
something actors have over other actors, these are often considered as 
negative aspects of power and are almost forms of coercion 
 Consensual power language understands power as the capacity of 
actors to have power, to act and to be empowered 
 Constitutive power language considers both conflictual and consensual 
power where the coercive and domination linked elements of conflictual 
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power (over) exists alongside the capacity of actors to act and have the 
power to affect change  
(Haugaard and Ryan, 2012b) 
Goehler (2000) identifies a similar dualism in the literature on power linked to 
‘power to’ and ‘power over’, the difference between transitive power and 
intransitive power. While it is recognised that both of the concepts are relational 
i.e. to do with social relationships, there are clear differences between the two. 
Transitive power, can be considered as the power of actor A over actor B, it is 
zero sum in the sense that if A has power, B doesn’t; intransitive power, 
considers actors acting in harmony increasing power in certain situations i.e. not 
zero sum but increasing power thorough joint action or behaviour: the power to 
(do things) (Arts and Tatenhove, 2005, Goehler, 2009). 
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although this review section has only directly considered a small area of a vast 
subject, I have given an overview of the key themes and ideas around power 
and have provided routes that allow certain concepts to be investigated in more 
detail. The chapter has shown that the concept of power is complex and varied, 
with little agreement about both what it is and how to measure it. 
I have shown that there have been two main stages in the development of 
understandings of power; a historic phase and a modernist phase. Modernist 
approaches to understanding power have moved from understandings which 
look at the power of actors over other actors (sometimes considered as the first 
face) to understandings where power arranges issues off or onto the agenda 
(sometimes the second face). The third face of power considers more structural 
aspects of power such as the shaping of opinion and preferences and the fourth 
face considers post-structural approaches to power which are linked to wider 
structural issues. It is important to note that there are many other ways of 
considering power aside from the ideas of the four faces. Actor-network theory 
has been suggested to be one approach which may have value for inter-
disciplinary energy research (including considerations of power) such as this 
study (Wong, 2009). However the focus of actor-network theory on social 
connections and power as ‘the study of associations’ rather than power as a 
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discrete issue (Gaventa, 2003, p10) means that a more power centered 
approach would be of more value here. 
The four faces do represent a useful typology foer considering the key power 
specific approaches. In light of this, the four faces of power typology is used as 
a key theoretical approach to consider power issues throughout this thesis.  
In addition to the four faces approach, other theoretical elements of power will 
also be taken forward. One key dualism in the power literature is the difference 
between active (agent based) or passive structural power. In Foucault’s work, 
this emerged as two levels of power, one at a more local level of conflict and 
truth struggles and a deeper level of struggles over the regime of truth 
production (Haugaard and Ryan, 2012b). Lukes’ considered this differentiation 
explicitly, referring to passive and active power (Lukes, 2005). In the 
international relations literature, ideas of hard and soft power can also be 
considered to reflect elements of this dualism however in this situation, all 
power can be seen to be purposive (Nye, 2009). Overall, this dualism reflects 
the importance of arguments around structural power versus agent-based 
power and shows that a great level of consideration of this issue is needed 
when considering power. Despite the research focus on the power of agents, 
the role of agent based versus structural power will be considered explicitly 
throughout this thesis. 
The other key dualism recognised in the power literature is associated with 
difference between ‘power over’ i.e. domination (sometimes referred to as 
transitive power) and ‘power to’ (do things) i.e. empowerment (sometimes 
referred to as intransitive power particularly when actors work together). This 
element of power could be of particular interest from a policy perspective as 
actors may work together to achieve joint outcomes or indeed, actors may have 
significant power as a result of their positions of authority. 
Overall for the purpose of this thesis, the ongoing theoretical approach to power 
taken forward includes three main elements of power considered in this chapter. 
These are: 
1. The four faces of power approach 




3. The role of transitive or intransitive power (power over or power to). 
And, power in this thesis is understood as the ability of actors to affect policy 
and governance associated with the decarbonisation of heat. Therefore an actor 
is considered powerful or to have had power if their behaviour has successfully 







5 POWER, POLITICS AND POLICY 
Building on the previous chapter which considered theoretical approaches to 
the concept of power, this briefer chapter forms the third part of the theoretical 
underpinning of this thesis and explains how politics and policy can be 
considered from the perspective of power. 
Because of the radical changes needed for the UK’s heat sector and the need 
for policy to drive these changes, focusing on policy (which as described below 
is closely linked to power) associated with the transformation of the heat sector 
is expected to highlight an important element of power within the UK’s heat 
socio-technical system. 
There is a strong relationship between the concepts of power, politics and policy 
and Hay (2002) explains that power is central to politics and because of the 
links between politics and policy, power is also central to policy issues. Political 
analysis is seen as the investigation of the nature, exercise and distribution of 
power (as well as the consequences of such applications of power) and ‘power 
is to political analysts what the economy is to economists’ (Hay, 2002, p168). 
Goverde et al., (2000) explain that in political theory and political science, 
'power has constantly stood out as the single most important defining 
conceptual issue' (p1). 
Politics can be considered as ‘…the formulation and execution of decisions that 
are binding upon the population of a community or society and the relationships 
between those who make or implement such decisions and those who are 
affected by them’ (Johnston, 2007, p18). Clearly, the development of policies 
would also fit with this definition suggesting that policy development can be 
seen as politics.  
Despite the importance of power as a major element of policy development 
(Arts and Tatenhove, 2005), attempts to specifically bring the social science 
fields of power and policy development closely together are limited in the 
literature. Scholars focusing on policy development do not generally directly 
consider ‘power’, even though it is central to policy and governance change. In 
attempting to bridge the theoretical gap between power and policy, Goverde et 
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al. (2000) suggest that there are five elements to consider when investigating 
power, politics and policy development: 
1. Power over agents; 
2. Power as force, violence or coercion; 
3. Power as hierarchical control of rules, knowledge and discourse; 
4. Power as something consciously exercised and also as veiled and 
embedded in structures ; 
5. The difference between power over and power to.  
(Goverde et al., 2000) 
These understandings of power in a policy perspective are clearly closely linked 
to the theoretical understandings of power considered in chapter 4. Power over 
agents and power as force, violence or coercion (1 and 2 above) bear clear 
similarities to the idea of the first face of power, which considers the power of an 
actor to have power over another actor and get that actor to do something they 
otherwise wouldn’t have done. Power as hierarchical control of rules, 
knowledge and discourse (3 above) links to the second, third and fourth face of 
power around agenda setting and the construction of knowledge and its 
reproduction through society. The idea of power as something consciously 
exercised versus something more structural and the differences between power 
over and power to (4 and 5 above) links to the dualisms also recognised in the 
previous chapter around passive or more structural power and active or more 
agent based power; this element also links to ideas of domination and 
empowerment considered in the fourth face of power (poststructuralism and the 
work of Foucault). This is helpful in that the theoretical approaches to power 
taken forward for the first chapter closely link to existing understandings of how 
power and policy are related. 
Arts and Tatenhove (2005) suggest that generally modern policy analysis no 
longer directly focuses on power as a key analytical tool but instead 
emphasises the importance of discourse, governance, interdependence and 
institutions. Arts and Tatenhove's (2005) view of power sees it as: ‘the 
organisational and discursive capacity of agencies, either in competition with 
one another or jointly, to achieve outcomes in social practices, a capacity which 
is however co-determined by the structural power of those social institutions in 
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which these agencies are embedded’ (p347). This particular approach suggests 
that actors can work together or separately to affect policy change but that 
existing structures and institutions will shape how the power plays out. This 
repeats the ideas of transitive and intransitive power and structure and agency 
highlighted in the previous chapter again suggesting that these are important 
issues. 
In synthesising approaches to power and policy, Arts and Tatenhove (2005) 
suggest a three layered approach to power analysis in policy shown in Figure 
5-1. While three layers are present, this model hasn’t been created with the 
multi-level perspective in mind and it doesn’t map neatly onto the MLP 
framework14.  
 
Figure 5-1. Three layers of power (Arts & Tatenhove, 2005, p350) 
As with the approach of Goverde et al., (2000), the above ‘Three Layers of 
Power’ model has clear crossover with the power literature and can be linked to 
the four faces of power model but places less emphasis on post-structural 
approaches. The relational type of power (the top layer) is comparable to the 
first face of power and the active role of actors during social interaction. 
Dispositional power is linked to the second face of power of agenda setting and 
the existence and roles of institutions and associated relationships. These first 
two elements are more aligned with a focus on agent based elements of power. 
Structural power around signification, domination and legitimisation is closely 
linked to the third face of power and the controls of thoughts and preferences as 
                                            
14 The three layers of the model in 5-1 do generally move from agent based activities to more 
structural issues from top to bottom. In the MLP model, increasing structuration of activities is 
suggested to exist but this goes from bottom (niche) to top (landscape). It is therefore possible 
that if 5-1 was inverted vertically it could show some correlation with the shape of the MLP. 




well as more structural and institutional ideas of power. Arts and Tatenhove 
(2005) explain that the three layers of power model does not directly include 
Foucauldian approaches to power and the authors suggest these post-
structuralist approaches are too deterministic and deny a role for human 
agency, something the authors suggest is a requirement for policy analysis 
because of the importance of agents. This calls into question the value or 
applicability of Foucauldian approaches to consider the influence of actors on 
policy change. 
While there is some agreement between the two frameworks discussed which 
consider power and policy change, the one key difference between the 
frameworks of Goverde et al., (2000) and Arts and Tatenhove, (2005) is the 
recognition of the role of post-structural approaches to power, something not 
included in the latter. The use of the faces of power approach alongside ideas 
of ‘agency and structure’ and ‘power over and power to’ as outlined in the 
conclusions of the previous chapter include all of the aspects of power which 
have been associated with policy in this section. Therefore, while the specific 
approaches of considering power and policy change are of interest, they do not 
change the fundamental approach to power taken in this thesis outlined 
previously.  
5.1 CONCEPTUALISING POWER AND POLICY: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS AND 
INTERESTS 
Arts (2000) suggests that during the 1970s and 80s there was a reduction in the 
use of the measurement of power as a form of analysis but that more recently 
(at the time of his writing) the focus on measuring or analysing power has been 
increasing. However, the academic analysis of UK politics and policy and its 
explicit association with power is very limited. This could be for a number of 
reasons including the fact that power is notoriously difficult to apply and is a 
broad topic. However, this is also likely to be because as a family resemblance 
concept (i.e. many related parts to it but all with differences) (Haugaard, 2010), 
power contains many different ideas and concepts which aren’t necessarily 
directly considered as ‘power’. Therefore, researchers may be working on 
power without directly referring to it.  
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Hay (2004) suggests that the ‘conventional three-fold classification of 
independent variables’ associated with political institutional change is made up 
of ideas, interests and institutions (p204). Others have also recognised these 
three aspects as the key areas of analysis for the development of policy (e.g 
John, 2012) including that specifically associated with the governance of energy 
system change or stability (Kuzemko et al. (2016). In research considering 
sustainable change in the UK and the Netherlands, Kern (2011) also highlights 
the general focus in the policy studies literature on ideas, institutions and 
interests. These three elements are all closely linked to ideas of power. 
Because of the recognition of the importance of these three elements from a 
policy perspective, the following sections consider each of these elements and 
how they relate to power in more detail. This is not to say the ideas, interests 
and institutions approach is the only way to understand how power can affect 
the policy process and policy change but reflects the previous and frequent use 
of this approach and terminology.  
5.2 IDEAS  
This sub-section considers ideas in the context of policy change and how they 
relate to power. Campbell (2002) defines ideas as 'theories, conceptual models, 
norms, world views, frames, principled beliefs, and the like' (p21) suggesting 
that, 'what actors believe may be just as important as what they want' (p21). 
Campbell (2002) goes on to say that the ideas can be so important that they 
may actually affect interests (interests are discussed in section 5.3). Ideas and 
power are deeply related concepts and ideas can be used to help actors 
legitimise the need for reform, serve as intellectual maps during times of 
uncertainty and also help actors reach common goals (Béland 2010).  
Blyth (2014) suggests that 'the most important aspects of ideas as causal 
factors in explanations or political change are located in this boundary-setting 
function...Once the parameters of discourse are institutionally set, then an 
important source of power is established' (p235). This view suggests that ideas 
which are associated with particular policy changes can shape the policy 
discourse, limiting what can be discussed. While this sounds similar in practice 
to the second face of power, i.e. the setting of the agenda, it is unclear whether 
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the role of ideas in limiting discussions in this context is seen as a purposive 
action or a more passive impact. 
While ideas can be seen as important independent influences on politics and 
policy development, they are often seen as related to ‘institutions’ (discussed in 
section 5.4) or sometimes even considered as a type of institution. In fact, those 
interested in the role of institutions have increasingly incorporated the concepts 
of ‘ideas’ and ‘discourse’ within their analysis (Campbell, 1998, Schmidt, 2010, 
Blyth, 2014). Schmidt (2010) suggests that the focus on ‘ideas’ and ‘discourse’ 
could in fact be a ‘fourth ‘new institutionalism’’ (p1) referring to this new 
approach as ‘discursive institutionalism’ (p1). Others, with a greater focus on 
ideas rather than discourse, refer to this as ‘ideational institutionalism’ (Kangas, 
Niemelä, & Varjonen, 2013, p73). 
There is limited evidence of the wide application of the ideational approach (i.e. 
an approach focusing primarily on the role of ideas) in the area of energy policy 
or socio-technical transformations. As described previously, Kern (2011) 
investigated the role of ideas, institutions and interests in the development of 
the Dutch energy transition approach and the development of the Carbon Trust 
in the UK. This work suggested that in the UK, existing neo-classical economic 
ideas around competition and markets meant that the development of the 
Carbon Trust developed in a way which aimed to maintain support for existing 
energy system regime actors. The Dutch economic discourse which used ideas 
from the ‘polder-model’15 is based on much more consensual policy (Kern, 
2011, p1123). This includes non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade 
associations, industry, scientists and trade unions and therefore the Dutch 
approach to low-carbon transition didn’t focus so strongly on existing interests.  
The importance of ideas in these instances could be seen to be linked to the 
third face of power where the preferences of policy makers shaped the 
development of the Carbon Trust and the Dutch approach; it is however unclear 
in these examples who has had power over those policy makers in order to 
actively shape their preferences and cause them to choose the approach they 
                                            
15 The consensual polder model involves: ‘close cooperation between political parties, trade 




did. Perhaps the fourth face of power could be a better analytical tool in these 
examples. It may be the that the thoughts and beliefs of the subjects (the policy 
makers) involved made them follow an approach to shaping the Carbon Trust 
and the Dutch transition plan as they did and the location of power is across 
society rather than linked to purposive attempts by actors to steer the shape of 
policy makers. Box 4 in section 4.1.5 considers a potentially relevant theoretical 
example. 
More recently, Kern et al., (2014) describe how the energy policy paradigm in 
the UK has changed from one focused on pro-market ideas to one which is now 
focused on climate change and energy security ideas suggesting that over time 
ideas and their policy impacts can change.  
Separately, Kuzemko (2013a) considered the ideas behind EU-Russia energy 
relations suggesting that the EU’s complex energy goals included ideas of 
security, climate change and maintaining competitive markets whereas Russia’s 
energy policy is based on a more statist national asset approach. Kuzemko 
(2013a) considers ideas as being capable of structuring the policy process as 
ideas become institutionalised and also as a way of conferring authority through 
the use of ideas which are widely seen as legitimate. Kuzemko (2013a) goes on 
to suggest that the complexity of the EU’s mixed and competing ideas around 
energy policy has reduced its power over Russia. 
There is a wide recognition that ideas can affect policy development and 
governance. One key difference between ideas and other institutional 
approaches (considered in section 5.3) is that whereas those institutional 
approaches suggest more passive approaches to power, ideas can have both 
passive or structural power in terms of their role in shaping governance and 
institutions but they can also be applied by actors as a form of agent based 
power by using them as frames. The use of ideas as frames is considered in the 
following section. 
5.2.1 Framing 
Campbell (2002) suggests that the impacts of ideas can potentially come from 
their active use by actors and communities who may use them to filter policy 
ideas or approaches in an attempt to affect the policy discourse. McGrath 
(2007) recognises the role of framing within political lobbying, comparing 
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framing to product positioning in the practice of marketing; frames can be used 
to win the minds of policy makers by associating policy changes with issues 
which will receive attention. For example, a business interested in selling heat 
pumps could frame the systems as ‘good for fuel poverty’ or ‘good for energy 
security’ in order to convince policy makers to support the technology. Of 
course, heat pumps may not be good or helpful for either of these objectives. 
Kangas et al., (2013) use the concept of ideas as ‘frames’ suggesting that 
'Ideational framing is a strategic process that aims to create the basis for 
political decisions and to help political actors legitimize decisions to their 
constituencies’(p77). Kangas et al., (2013) specifically investigated the effect of 
framing questions posed to members of the public on social support policies 
with different ideas to see if different frames significantly altered survey results; 
their results suggested that ‘framing matters a lot’ (p84) because how questions 
were posed had a significant impact on responses to questions.  
Béland (2009 and 2010) suggests that ideas can be used as: 
 Frames to shape and legitimise the need for reform and to introduce new 
policy; 
 Ideologies which can legitimise or challenge approaches particularly 
during times of uncertainty; 
 Tools of domination and also as useful tools for reaching shared goals. 
Framing can therefore be seen as a purposive or active use of ideas for the 
purpose of policy influencing. There is not a great deal of previous analysis 
investigating the use of framing in the UK energy policy making process 
however, Scrase and Ockwell (2009) discussed framing associated with UK 
energy policy. They considered three main frames, ‘access’, ‘security’ and 
‘efficiency and the environment’ explaining that these frames had all had policy 
impacts; they did not however give a clear explanation of how these frames had 
been used or by who but suggested that in order to have success in promoting 
policy change, framing must ‘speak to core government imperatives’ (p52). 
Kuzemko (2013c) also considered the role of framing in UK energy policy 
suggesting that the increased framing of energy supply around security issues 
often within the media has politicised energy in the UK, increasing the general 
policy focus on energy issues. 
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The analysis of framing has been used in non UK energy policy settings. 
Nilsson et al. (2009) considered the various frames which emerged during the 
development of EU renewable energy policy suggesting that important frames 
in this area were innovation, energy security and the EU internal market. 
However, this analysis considered the presence of frames rather than their 
application as lobbying tools. Further framing analysis at an EU level which 
focused on policy change in general rather than energy suggested that the 
frames employed to influence policy vary by different types of actor; cause 
based lobbies such as charities and NGOs are more likely to use frames around 
social or environmental benefit whereas industry lobby groups are more likely to 
use economic frames (Klüver et al. 2015). 
As a tool then, the frames being used by actors should be aligned with or 
support other government priorities in order to be successful in causing policy 
change. While both ideas and the use of ideas as frames are believed to have 
an important impact on the development of policy, framing represents a more 
active element of power than the concept of ideas and represents an interesting 
area of focus for this thesis. 
5.3 INTERESTS 
Interests are often recognised as being particularly important when considering 
political power and the interests ‘lens’ represents an agent based approach to 
power. Interests can be considered as the things which offer benefits to a 
particular actor, for example things which are aligned with existing business or 
organisational practices or focuses. While the term is sometimes used to 
describe the actors who are themselves interested in a particular thing, this 
thesis is interested in the things which actors are interested in. Under political 
approaches which centre on interests, actors are seen to aim towards 
‘maximising personal utility’ (Kern, 2011, p1120) and are therefore expected to 
attempt to influence policy and governance in line with their interests.  
In general, the ‘interests’ lens on power could be considered a more agent 
based approach to power than that of ideas or institutions because it focuses on 
specific actors and their behaviours. However, whilst some (realists) suggest 
that ideas do not matter as interests and power drive politics (Price 2006), it is 
also the case that some (constructivists) believe that interests are 
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fundamentally social constructs based on ideas (Hay, 2004). While going into 
further detail on this discussion is not necessary, this argument does suggest 
that rather than being neatly separable, ideas and interests may be closely 
related concepts. 
The active focus of this research is more interested in the realist approach to 
interests that sees interests as observable real world phenomena, such as the 
interests of a business to make a profit or the interests of a charity to for 
example, aim to protect consumers. The following sub-section considers 
lobbying, a general term used to describe attempts by actors with interests to 
purposively influence policy. Reflecting the connection between ideas and 
interests, framing (discussed in section 5.2.1) can be considered as an aspect 
of or an approach to lobbying but, for the purposes of this discussion, they are 
in separate sections. 
5.3.1 Lobbying  
This section introduces the concept of lobbying and describes some of the key 
lobbying literature focusing on energy and sustainability policy issues. 
Lobbying has been defined as ‘...interest groups' contact with, and activities 
directed at, decision makers in an attempt to influence public policy’ (Gullberg, 
2013, p612-613). Lobbying is a key concept when considering the role of the 
power of interests in politics. Gullberg (2013) explains that lobbying has been 
successful if 'a decision making body adopts a decision it would otherwise not 
have adopted' (p613). Lobbying is recognised as not just being associated with 
political lobbying (i.e. the lobbying of politicians), but also with administrative 
lobbying when actors look to influence Government departments and civil 
servants (Rommetvedt, 2000). 
Taking this a step further, Parvin (2007) suggests that lobbying is 'increasingly 
about plugging into a diffuse web of organisations and institutions, rather than 
merely establishing contacts among particular Government departments or 
MPs’ (p8). Lobbying activity can involve building partnerships, media 
management, engaging consumers, brand management, marketing and 
strategic advice as well as more traditional written and oral information 
exchanges between government and non-government actors (Parvin, 2007).  
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Although a literature exists on lobbying and there have been a number of 
studies considering lobbying and policy development (often in the US), it is 
recognised as being a difficult area to research. This is because of 
confidentiality issues whereby lobbyists and those being lobbied wish to protect 
their own interests and not highlight their involvement in the lobbying process 
(Harris and Lock, 1996). There is therefore only a limited body of work which 
looks to empirically analyse lobbying and much of this is recognised as being 
descriptive as opposed to explanatory (John, 2012). 
A major study which considers the role of lobbying is Baumgartner et al's (2009) 
‘Lobbying and Policy Change’ which reports on a very wide scale study 
investigating the influence of lobbying on policy in Washington DC. The 
Baumgartner et al (2009) work was based on over 300 interviews and 
considered a wide array of different policy areas. A key finding was that US 
policy making favoured maintaining the status quo and the status quo is also 
reflected in how lobbying takes place and who is able to lobby; those who 
represent the status quo have greater access and power.  
Focusing in on lobbying associated with environment and energy issues 
reduces the volume of existing work further, however there are some 
international examples. Arts & Mack (2003) showed that non-governmental 
organisations did have power over the outcome of global genetic modification 
regulations, ‘The Biosafety Protocol’, using a combination of lobbying, issue 
promotion and public pressure.  
At an EU level, whilst there is research into lobbying in general (e.g. 
Greenwood, (2011) who focused on EU interest representation and policy 
process and Dür (2008a) who considered the power of EU interest groups) the 
literature specifically focusing on energy lobbying or interest representation is 
relatively limited.  
Focusing on EU level environmental and energy policy issues, Gullberg (2008) 
investigated the differing styles of lobbying between business and 
environmental interest groups around low-carbon transition policy. Again, this 
article highlighted a lack of research in this area but interestingly did show that 
different types of organisations have different approaches. Environmental 
organisations lobbied actors who were likely to agree with them and also had 
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access to more formal institutional settings, whereas businesses lobbied both 
‘friends and foes’, often in less formal settings, in order to affect immediate 
policy and to build longer term relationships.  
Specifically on renewable energy, Toke (2008) investigated the role of influence 
in the development of the EU renewables directive, observing the pressure from 
existing market actors to develop a trading system for renewables certificates 
but showed how this policy was limited by the concerns of renewable energy 
pressure groups. In more recent work on EU lobbying associated with the 2020 
EU renewable energy target, Gullberg (2013) investigated the role of the 
renewables industry. Gullberg (2013) showed that early informational lobbying 
(providing information) to EU civil servants was a much more effective tool 
compared to pressure-based lobbying (using threats or rewards) because the 
small scale of the renewables industry meant that they didn’t have the capacity 
to make significant threats. Other research work focusing on EU climate policy 
has highlighted the reliance on trade associations by businesses for much of 
their policy interaction (Fagan-Watson et al., 2015).  
At a national level within Europe, Sühlsen & Hisschemöller (2014) focused on 
Germany and considered the lobbying approach of the renewable energy 
industry. They suggested that this approach was more informal than that of 
Germany’s incumbent energy companies. The authors introduce the term ‘deep 
lobbying’ which they consider as something which 'shapes the intellectual 
atmosphere around decision making’ and involves think tanks and the media 
(Sühlsen & Hisschemöller, 2014, p320). When considering the four faces of 
power framework, the idea of deep lobbying seems to move beyond the first 
face of power of having the power to get someone to do something, to more 
structural understandings of power such as agenda and preference shaping and 
the importance of knowledge. If the intellectual atmosphere is being shaped by 
think tanks and the media, this suggests that knowledge or information is being 
used to shape the preferences of policy actors or those associated with policy 
actors in order to get them to act in a particular way. Interestingly, the authors of 
the study suggest that because of the scale of the renewables industry in 
Germany, a policy network has now developed in this area and; the renewable 
energy companies are no longer niche actors but could be considered as part of 
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the regime effectively becoming politically empowered (Sühlsen and 
Hisschemöller, 2014). This example highlights how power can shift over time. 
In another notable study associated with low-carbon transition policy, Gullberg 
(2011) considered Norwegian actors and their attempts to lobby in Norwegian 
energy policy and EU energy policy. Their results showed that businesses 
believed they had better access to both Norwegian and EU policy making than 
environmental organisations and in general, interest groups suggested access 
to EU policy making was more resource intensive than efforts at a national 
level. This research did not however consider the success of actors in 
influencing policy and the resulting policy change 
Overall, lobbying is seen as a central element of how actors have power over 
the policy process. However there is a limited literature on energy and climate 
lobbying at an EU level and much of what exists is descriptive rather than 
explanatory. The lobbying literature identified in this section also shows many of 
the ideas associated with lobbying can be linked back to the underpinning ideas 
of power discussed in the previous chapter. 
5.3.2 Lobbying in United Kingdom 
In the UK there has been some academic research considering lobbying in 
general. For example, Harris and Lock (1996) explain that during the 1980’s 
and 1990’s, the use of political lobbying grew significantly. They mention a few 
examples where their research showed it had an impact. These include the 
regulatory changes that allowed shops to open on Sundays (something that 
retailers had lobbied for) and levies on audio tape which never appeared and 
were vociferously opposed by Japanese electrical manufacturers who employed 
a lobbying firm. Others agree that lobbying activity in the UK, particularly by 
corporate actors, has increased significantly since the 1980s and argue for 
much greater transparency around Government access and lobbying (Miller and 
Dinan, 2008). 
Some UK based research has considered lobbying around financial accounting 
measures although this focused primarily on responses to consultations and 
didn’t consider actual policy change (Georgiou, 2005). Other research has 
considered UK lobbying around food and alcohol (Miller and Harkins, 2010), 
has investigated alcohol industry lobbying including around minimum unit 
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alcohol pricing (McCambridge et al., 2014) and has investigated approaches 
used by the alcohol industry to lobby including by using consultations, 
parliamentary groups and long term relationship building (Hawkins and Holden, 
2014). Mirroring the research on EU energy lobbying, the UK lobbying research 
highlighted here is generally descriptive rather than explanatory, focusing on the 
approaches actors take to influence as opposed to considering specific policy 
changes and why they have taken place.  
Despite limited research, there is a clear recognition of the significant scale of 
lobbying in the UK. Parvin (2007) provides an interesting snapshot of the UK 
lobbying system. This review was carried out by an independent education 
charity but was supported by Ellwood and Atfield, a public affairs consultancy. 
The review showed that UK public affairs activity16 was generally more 
widespread than is assumed, with around 14,000 employed by the public affairs 
sector working for public affairs consultancies and in-house for firms; the 
industry was suggested to be worth £1.9 billion but the exact size is hard to 
determine; not all public affairs professionals self-declare and others may be 
working on public affairs indirectly. The research also showed that the business 
sector was generally considered less effective at lobbying than charities. This 
contrasts with EU focused research which showed that at an EU level 
businesses believed they had better access to policy makers than 
environmental organisations (Gullberg 2011).  
Despite the scale of UK lobbying and the importance of energy policy, there 
appears to be no academic research which specifically considers UK lobbying 
associated with energy. Some of the limited information on energy lobbying in 
the UK has been reported in The Guardian newspaper and simply details the 
interaction between civil servants and potential lobbyists at events without 
showing any evidence that any particular policy change had resulted from these 
interactions (Guardian, 2013).  
The other key non-academic organisation in the UK with an interest in 
researching lobbying in the UK is Spinwatch which is based online (Spinwatch, 
                                            
16 This includes not just direct lobbying of MPs and civil servants but includes wider work 
associated with policy development such as building partnerships, raising issues in the media 
and providing political advice (Parvin, 2007) 
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2017) and also has associated books on the methods used to influence policy 
(Cave and Rowell, 2014). Spinwatch is one of the few organisations to 
specifically consider energy lobbying on their website although their focus is on 
lobbying by the shale gas and nuclear energy industry, both areas where they 
suggest that industry has close relations to the Government (Spinwatch, 2017).  
Despite the lack of research associated with lobbying, as a result of growing 
concern around lobbying in the UK and an increased media interest in the role 
of lobbying, the UK government introduced legislation requiring lobbyists17 to 
join a central register of lobbyists in 2015 (HM Government, 2015b). This 
register has however been criticised for not covering in-house lobbyists and 
even then only covering limited lobbying activities (Independent, 2016). As a 
result, only very limited information about lobbying can be gleaned from the 
register.  
5.4 INSTITUTIONS 
The role of institutions is another key element associated with power and policy 
change. The term institution can be interpreted in a number of ways with some 
authors using the term to describe organisations such as regulators, 
Government departments or firms (Bolton and Foxon, 2011) whereas some 
understandings of the term institution can be so wide that they consider all 
social structures and norms (North, 1990; Hodgson, 2006). In the context of the 
UK heat system, taking the widest view, would mean that an institution could be 
the UK legal framework while at the smallest scale an institution could be the 
behaviour of heating engineers. The broadness of the term means that it can be 
difficult to apply without significant justification and an institutional focus could 
be linked to structural or agent based ideas of power. 
Theoretically, institutions can be considered as power which has become fixed 
in time (Goehler, 2000). An institution can been seen as the result of a power 
struggle. One good practical example of this process would be the development 
of a UK law which has travelled through both Houses of Parliament (with 
significant scrutiny and power struggles) and upon receiving royal assent has 
                                            
17 Lobbyists can be considered as individuals who sit outside of Government and whose role 
includes attempting to influence Government policy or regulation. 
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become fixed into the UK legislative framework18. At the other end of the 
institutional spectrum, a much smaller scale example could be the emergence 
of a social practice such as ‘good manners’ which has emerged from previous 
power plays and now become a social norm. While there is a temporal element 
to institutions, it should of course be remembered that institutions may not be 
fixed forever. 
Since the 1960’s, three distinct approaches to institutionalism have emerged in 
the social sciences in the form of historical institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996 and 
Schmidt, 2010). In the economic literature there is also the field of institutional 
economics which considers the role of institutions on the economy and 
economic performance, a field which is fairly distinct from three previously 
mentioned approaches (Rutherford, 2001). 
Discursive or ideational institutionalism is a new approach which is increasingly 
being used by researchers (briefly introduced in section 5.2). As well as 
considering more traditional approaches to institutions, in ideational 
institutionalism, the role of ideas and wider discourse and language around 
policy and politics is considered in order to understand how this can affect the 
development of policy (Schmidt, 2010).  
Even as just one aspect of the applied approaches to considering power, 
institutional approaches entail a number of different methods all with very 
different characteristics. Based on the understanding of the power literature it 
could be argued that institutional approaches are linked to more ‘passive’ or 
‘structural’ forms of power as opposed to more active or agent based power. 
For this thesis, institutions are understood as social structures associated with 
the policy process in which power has been fixed which can constrain or enable 
actors. In focusing on more purposive approaches to power, this research is 
primarily interested in the behaviour and power of actors to influence policy but 
attention will be paid to the institutional context of purposive displays of power. 
                                            
18 Actual UK laws become fixed by being written on archival paper and stored in the House of 
Lords archive in the Victoria Tower. Up until 2017 these laws were written on ‘vellum’, a 
substance made of calf or goat skin. 
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5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has considered the links between power, politics and policy 
change and has shown that the three are inextricable linked although, research 
crossover is actually quite limited. In focusing on power associated with the 
policy process, this thesis focuses on one element of power in the UK’s heat 
system. While elements of power are expected to be present in other elements 
of the system such as between companies in the market or associated with 
consumers, the focus on power and policy change in this thesis allows for an 
appropriately sized research project. 
Ideas, interests and institutions are seen as key elements associated with 
power and policy change. Ideas are seen as both passive (or structural) and 
active (or agent based) elements of power, with ideas both passively affecting 
the behaviour of actors involved in policy making (linked to norms and world-
views) and also being actively used to frame attempts to cause policy change. 
Interests can be seen as the potential winners and losers associated with policy 
changes and this represents a more agent based approach. Institutions can be 
viewed as power which is fixed such as the policies, regulations and associated 
governance structures but can also be linked to specific actors (and can 
therefore be both agent based or structural). However, the three issues are 
closely linked with suggestions that institutions and ideas may be overlapping 
concepts, that the interests of actors can be affected by ideas and that actors 
can use ideas as frames to attempt to influence policies.  
With a focus on active and agent based attempts to affect policy, this thesis is 
primarily interested in how actors have purposively affected or attempted to 
affect the UK heat policy process. Therefore while institutions are linked to 
power, they are seen to represent a more passive or structural element of 
power and are not a direct focus of this research. Similarly ideas, in being linked 
to institutions, are not a central focus however how ideas are used as frames by 
actors in attempts to influence policy will be a key focus. The other key focus of 
this thesis is linked to interests in the UK heat sector and how the interests of 
actors influence policy change through lobbying.  
The previous two chapters explained firstly, that the multi-level perspective will 
be used as a descriptive model to consider the UK’s heat system and secondly, 
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that the theoretical focus on power within this thesis will be based around the 
four faces of power approach alongside other elements of power. Building on 
the previous chapters, this chapter has considered the relationship between 
power and policy, highlighting the potential importance of framing and lobbying 
when considering the role of actors in having power in the policy process. The 
following chapter brings together the key theoretical elements of interest to this 




6 BRINGING TOGETHER POWER, 
SUSTAINABILITY TRANSFORMATIONS AND 
POLICY 
This chapter forms the fourth and final part of the theoretical underpinning of the 
thesis drawing together the three theoretical elements considered in each of the 
previous 3 chapters.  
As described in chapter 3, the theory around sustainability transitions has been 
critiqued for a lack of consideration of power. While there is an increasing body 
of work which has recognised the importance of power associated with 
transitions and attempting to understand it, there is little coordination of this 
work and no over-arching theory of power and sustainability transitions. There 
have also been a number of calls to focus specifically on the power associated 
with the policy and politics of transitions (Hendriks, 2009; Kuzemko, 2013a; 
Meadowcroft, 2011, 2009; Raven et al., 2016). 
In recognition of the importance of power associated with transitions and the 
specific calls for investigations into power and transition policy, this thesis 
focuses on the power associated with policy which is looking to drive a UK 
transformation from unsustainable heating to sustainable heating.  
This focus reflects previous calls for a focus on the effect of power on policy 
associated with transformations and allows the original research element of this 
thesis to be an appropriate size and have a specific focus. This research also 
contributes to the UK energy policy literature as there has been only a limited 
focus on heat decarbonisation and lobbying.  
Based on understandings of power, ideas of power and policy change and the 
concepts of sustainability transitions, this chapter pulls together the themes 
from the previous three chapters and develops a theoretical framework. 
6.1 CONCEPTUALISING POWER FOR HEAT TRANSFORMATION POLICY 
The following section introduces a framework for conceptualising the role of 
power when considering governance and policy associated with socio-technical 
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transformations. In the framework, the UK’s heat system is the focus. This 
framework is not necessarily about showing change but is about visualising how 
power can be understood in the context of multi-level socio-technical systems. 
Before introducing the framework, there are two things to bear in mind. Firstly, 
the power associated with policy change represents just one element of the 
potential power associated with the UK heat system and socio-technical 
systems more generally. Power is likely to exist in non-policy related elements 
of the heat system and could for example be associated with the power of 
companies to promote certain technologies to consumers or the power of social 
groups (or cultures) to normalise certain products or service expectations. 
Secondly, this framework considers power as a purely social phenomenon and 
does not consider ideas of technological power or technological determinism, 
an issue which has been considered at length elsewhere (e.g. Hess, 2015). 
Technology is not seen as having its own power in this thesis, instead it is 
actors associated with technologies (such as companies, installers, politicians) 
who can have power over the policy process. This does not suggest the 
technological lock-in is not an issue but reflects the fact that this thesis is 
primarily interested in purposive attempts to affect heat policy19. 
In advance of the introduction of the framework, now represents a good point to 
recap on the key elements from the different strands of literature that feed into 
it. 
Firstly, with regards to sustainability transformations, the UK heat system is 
considered as a socio-technical regime situated in a three layered multi-level 
perspective. This is a framework not beyond critique but which appears to fully 
represent the entirety of large socio-technical systems. 
The 4 faces of power approach is used as a general framework to consider 
different elements of power alongside a recognition of the important differences 
(and links) between more agent based and more structural forms of power. The 
                                            
19 It should be noted that actor-network theory does consider ‘non-human’ entities such as 
technologies in its analysis (Wong, 2016) but as described in section 4.1, the actor-network 
theory is not used in this thesis due to the specific power focus. Practice theory also considers 
physical artefacts in its consideration of practices (Shove and Walker, 2010) however a practice 
based approach has not been taken in this study.    
129 
 
other important element of power is the difference between ‘power over’ and 
‘power to’ (linked to ideas of transitive and intransitive power). 
With regards to power and policy change, while recognising the importance of 
ideas and institutions, the key focus is on the active attempts of actors to affect 
UK heat policy through lobbying and the connected idea of framing. 
6.2 THE TRANSFORMATION POLICY POWER FRAMEWORK 
This section now introduces the visual framework which considers power, policy 
and a transformation of the UK heat system. The ‘transformation policy power 
framework’ is shown in Figure 6-1. This framework specifically considers the 
UK’s heat system although it could be modified for different socio-technical 
systems. 
The framework has two axes. The vertical axis represents the three different 
levels of socio-technical systems considered by the multi-level perspective, the 
niche level at the bottom, the regime level in the middle and the landscape level 
at the top. The horizontal axis contains a number of different aspects of power 
including how this relates to the heat system (location), the actors involved, the 
type of policy power (based on understandings of institutions, ideas and 
interests and the theoretical understanding of power which considers whether 
power is structural or agent based and also the four faces framework i.e. which 
face is most likely to be present at each level of the socio-technical system. 
Overall the framework has been created for two main reasons, firstly to 
synthesise the key ideas from the three areas of focus (sustainability 
transformations, power and policy change) and secondly as a hypothetical 
model which can be tested and built on as the research progresses. Based on 
the literature previously reviewed on power, policy and transformations, the 
following subsections will describe each of the levels of the framework and give 





Figure 6-1. The transformation policy power framework 
6.2.1 Socio-technical landscape 
This top row of the framework considers the landscape level which as described 
in section 3.2.2.1 is not fully defined but contains contextual influences. At this 
level, in terms of the location of power, power is not considered to be controlled 
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by specific actors and so is more structural. Power at the landscape level can 
be considered like an atmosphere in which the power of the other levels of the 
socio-technical system sits and therefore, landscape level power can potentially 
affect power at other levels in the framework. For example, the ideological 
aspects of the landscape level could affect the salience of particular frames at 
other levels or affect consumer views. 
In terms of the actors who have the power, rather than being specific actors, 
power is within society as a whole and within political systems. This is passive 
or structural power which may drive policy change in particular ways with a 
force or momentum of its own without being purposefully driven by specific 
actors.  
When considering the type of policy power (whether this is ideas, institutions or 
interests), because of the less purposive forms of power at this level, ideas and 
ideology appear to be the key types of power. Therefore, understanding power 
as ideas using discursive institutionalist approaches and institutional 
understandings in general may be of most use for understanding power at this 
level. 
With regards to a theoretical understanding of power at this level, as described 
previously it is clear that landscape level power is more structural and this also 
reflects Geels's (2011) view that as you travel from the niche to the landscape 
level, the structuration of activities increases in general. This is reflected in the 
consideration of the four faces of power model and its applicability to the MLP 
framework shown on the far right hand side of the framework. The more agent 
based faces of power, the first and second face, are not believed to be 
important at the landscape level because of their association with purposive or 
active attempts by certain actors to have power although it is possible that 
landscape power issues could have some effect on the setting of agendas. 
However, the fourth face of power is considered to be an aspect of power at all 
levels since post-structural understandings of power see power as reproduced 
through all individuals in all interactions.  
Ideas are recognised as an important aspect of power at this level and it is 
possible to see how these are reproduced during human interactions and form 
part of a landscape level atmosphere, being present in for example culture and 
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politics. However at this level, the third face of power is also potentially 
important. Actors can, by using frames which support their interests (for 
example through marketing) potentially shape the preferences of society. While 
the actors promoting certain frames (considered in more detail in section 5.2.1) 
may be present at the lower levels of the system, their actions can potentially 
impact the landscape level by affecting wider societal views or beliefs. 
While power at the landscape level is potentially very important, the empirical 
focus of this thesis on the power of actors to affect policy means the more 
passive or structural aspects of power associated with the landscape level are 
not directly considered in this research. 
6.2.2 The socio-technical regime 
When considering the UK heat socio-technical system, the regime level can 
simply be considered as the existing system for providing heat which, as 
described in chapter 2, is primarily based around gas for the provision of heat. 
Within this regime, the actors present and therefore those who could have or 
use power include various companies involved in heating and their associated 
trade associations, consumers who use heat, and also the relevant Government 
departments such as BEIS and the energy regulator Ofgem.  
At this level, the key aspects of policy power are expected to be firstly linked to 
institutions which are associated with business, consumers and governance 
practices and act as the rules of the system. The second key element of power 
is expected to be lobbying, most likely by the regime industry players and also 
though the use of ideas and frames by industry players. At this level, policy 
power is a combination of both active agent-based power with actors looking to 
cause policy to develop in particular ways as well as more structural power 
associated with the role of institutions in driving policy in particular ways. 
Because of the combination of various actors and both structural and agent-
based power, at the regime level, it is theorised that all four faces of power may 
be present. The first face could be present as some actors have power over 
other actors through successful lobbying for example. The second face of 
power, the ability to set the agenda, is likely to be present at this level because 
of the institutional embeddedness of regime level actors. Industry actors are 
expected to be working closely with regulators and policy makers quite simply 
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because they are already present and active within the regime and have high 
levels of knowledge and the capacity to engage with the policy process. The 
third face of power could be present at the regime level as for example actors 
use ideas and framing to shape the preferences of other actors in order to get 
others (such as policy makers) to support their desired policy outcomes. As 
described in the previous section, the fourth face of power is believed to be 
present at all levels of the MLP acting through all individuals. 
6.2.3 The niche level 
Considering the UK’s heat system in the context of a sustainable 
transformation, the actors at the niche level can be considered as those actors 
associated with the generation of low-carbon and sustainable heat; these are 
the actors and the technologies which may need to grow and eventually 
become the regime level as part of a transformation to sustainable heating. As 
well as small and novel companies, the niche level will also include companies 
and organisations not specifically focusing on low-carbon heating but which 
have an interest. These could include government departments and regulators 
looking to promote niche technologies and regime level companies who have 
interests in low-carbon technology. Based on previous research, it is also likely 
that NGOs and charities interested in environmental or consumer issues are 
likely to be involved in niche level developments. 
At this level, it is expected that much of the power will be associated with 
lobbying and the use of ideas and frames as part of approaches to lobbying. 
Institutional aspects of power are not expected to be as important at this level 
as these institutions are unlikely to have developed due to the much smaller 
scale of the niche level and the shorter amount of time it has been operating. 
However, the power of institutions at the regime level could have implications 
for the niche level by excluding certain actors. Therefore, at this level, power is 
expected to be primarily agent based rather than structural. 
The most important face of power at this level is expected to be the first face of 
power as actors look to directly have power over other actors through lobbying 
and the third face of power may also be important as actors use ideas and 
frames to promote their lobbying positions. However, because of the limited 
institutional involvement of the niche actors, the ability to set the agenda of 
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policy (the second face) is not expected to be significant but could have some 
impact. The fourth face, as discussed previously is expected to be present 
across all levels of the MLP.  
6.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has introduced a framework which pulls together the theoretical 
underpinnings of this thesis. The ‘transition policy power framework’ includes 
ideas from power studies, policy studies and approaches to sustainability 
transitions and elements of this framework will be considered in the empirical 
parts of this thesis. 
Building on this framework, the next chapter describes the methodological 
approach for the empirical aspect of this thesis. The shape of this methodology 
is driven by the following research questions which have been developed from 
an understanding of the transformation needed for the UK’s heat system 
alongside theoretical understandings of sustainability transitions, power and the 
policy development process. The research questions are: 
1. How has UK heat generation policy been affected by the power of actors? 
2. What approaches have been used by actors to attempt to affect UK heat 
policy? 
3. Do ideas have power as frames in the heat policy process?20 
4. How can understandings of power which emerge from this research be used 
to strengthen the multi-level perspective on transitions? 
The research questions reflect a focus on active attempts by actors to influence 
UK heat policy, considering what if anything actors have changed (question 1) 
and what approaches actors have used (including framing) (questions 2 and 3) 
to attempt to influence. Question 4 is about investigating if the framework 
introduced in this chapter has value for approaches to sustainable 
transformations and how the framework may be strengthened (question 4).  
                                            
20 This is a modified version of a proposed research question which was altered following expert 




This section describes the methodological approaches employed to answer the 
research questions outlined previously in section 6.3. 
Briefly, the research consisted of the following elements: 
1. Firstly, a small number of interviews with UK heat experts were used to 
assess and consider the methodological approach initially proposed.  
2. At the heart of the project are two case studies. One considers UK/GB 
heat generation policy between 2003-2015, the second briefer case, 
investigates heat policy in the Netherlands and is a comparative study. 
3. A number of semi-structured interviews were carried out with actors who 
have major interests associated with and/or knowledge of each case 
study area.  
4. This interview data was transcribed and coded using Nvivo software and 
data was then analysed using a triangulation approach comparing 
different views alongside relevant grey literature on developing heat 
policies. This analysis investigated where actors had and had not been 
successful and also considered the approaches used by actors to 
attempt to affect heat policy. 
A flow diagram of the overall methodological approach is shown in Figure 7-1 





Figure 7-1. Overall methodological framework 
7.1  EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
Interviews have been an important source of data for the project and have been 
used for two phases of the research. This section focuses on expert interviews 
carried out at the start of the project. 
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Expert interviews in which the interviewer identifies subject matter experts and 
interviews them are recognised as an approach which can provide detailed 
objective data (Bogner et al., 2009). Expert interviews were carried out in 
advance of the case study data collection in order to generate external input 
and allow an element of project co-design. Much like an advisory group, the 
experts were asked to consider the data collection techniques and project 
research questions, in order to hone the case study approaches and to consider 
the project’s conceptualisation of power. These expert interviewees were also 
seen to be important in giving the project a greater real world grounding. In 
advance of the interview, the expert interviewees were issued a PowerPoint 
presentation which outlined the project theory and methodology alongside a list 
of potential interviewees for the following stages of the research. Relevant 
ethics procedures were also followed.  
A small number of these interviews took place in March 2015 with experts on 
the topic of UK heat policy. Experts were identified by the author through desk 
based research and represented different elements of the UK heat sector. They 
were:  
 An academic with a high level of knowledge on heat policy;  
 A senior UK civil servant working on heat policy; 
 An industry expert with experience of working on heat policy for one of 
the UK’s largest energy companies; 
 The chief executive of a UK trade association working in the area of heat 
policy.  
The aim of these open interviews was to provide an applied and real life sense 
check to the project’s theoretical framework and the general methodological 
approach and also to identify new contacts and actors who may be worth 
engaging for the further stages of the research.  
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7.1.1 Expert interview results21 
The expert interviews were extremely valuable and provided useful data on 
proposed research ideas and methods and also contributed to discovery and 
selection of potential interviewees in both the UK and the Netherlands for the 
case studies. All expert interviewees were supportive of the study in general. 
However, two of the interviewees believed that there would be difficulties in 
measuring power and policy change (2, 4). It was suggested that there would 
be difficulties associated with defining power and applying it to the real world. 
Because of the potentially political, secretive and conflictual nature of lobbying it 
would be difficult to get ‘honest answers from lobbyists’ (4) and attributing 
particular changes to particular actors may be problematic because of the many 
different factors and individuals at play in the policy process (2). It was also 
suggested that the use of the word ‘power’ would potentially be confusing to 
readers for whom it may mean electricity (2). 
There was general agreement from the expert interviewees that consumers 
were extremely important for a sustainable heat transformation in general, in 
terms of uptake of technologies, culture and behaviours and that excluding 
consumers could limit the value of the study because consumers can have 
power. However, one interviewee suggested that because of the focus on 
power in the policy process rather than power more generally: ‘I can see why 
you’re excluding consumers within the policy debate’ (4). 
The expert interviews were valuable for developing the project’s methodological 
approach and expert interviewee concerns around getting ‘honest answers’ 
confirmed the importance of a rigorous approach to investigating power.  As a 
result of the interviews, several changes to the project methodology were made: 
1. While the word ‘power’ is central to the project, because of the confusion 
between ‘power’ and ‘electricity’, the meaning of the word power in the 
context of this thesis has been made explicitly clear from the beginning. 
2. As a result of the complexity of applying the concept of power to real-world 
policy change, the use of power in terms of the policy process is described 
                                            
21 The numbers in brackets which are present throughout the thesis from this point forward refer 




using accessible language and terms such as ‘lobbying’ and ‘influence’. The 
methodology has also been designed to focus on more active 
understandings of power such as the role of lobbying in directly causing 
policy changes rather than more passive understandings such as 
institutional or structural power. Whilst the more passive elements of power 
may be important and are considered throughout, the focus is on how actors 
can attempt to affect and have affected UK heat policy. Building on the ways 
in which power has been recognised as affecting policy from the literature 
review in the previous chapters, the focuses of this empirical research are 
therefore specifically around lobbying and framing.  
3. While the project doesn’t focus specifically on the power of consumers in the 
potential heat transformation, the impact of consumers on the development 
of heating policy is considered as part of the interview design and consumer 
organisations were approached for interviews.  
4. The third research question was modified to reflect the focus on the use of 
framing approaches by actors rather than a general focus on ideas. 
7.2 CASE STUDIES 
This research focuses on two key heat policy case studies, covering the 
development of UK/GB heat generation policy alongside another national 
example, the Netherlands. 
In order to delineate the research, the project focused only on policies 
associated with heat supply or generation, in the UK case study, primarily the 
development of the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) (which is active at a GB 
level although a similar but separate scheme has operated in Northern Ireland) 
and the Government’s 2012 and 2013 ‘strategy’ work on the future of heating 
which considers the UK as a whole. Considering heat demand policy (i.e. 
buildings energy efficiency policy) as well as supply would have significantly 
increased the scale of what is already a broad project and these issues have 
already received a significant level of scholarly focus (e.g. McLeod et al., 2012; 
Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).  
The use of case studies in social research has been growing over the past three 
decades reflecting the recognition that the case study approach can explain in 
detail ‘how’ social science phenomenon work in practice as well as being useful 
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for in-depth descriptions of social phenomenon (Yin, 2014, Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Case study approaches take an in-depth look at a particular aspect of a wider 
issue or subject (Flyvbjerg, 2006) but are recognised as having various potential 
formats or methods of production (Hamel et al., 1993). 
Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests that one issue for the writing up of case studies is the 
potential depth and thick description; a lack of breadth can be an issue for the 
use of single case studies.  
My approach uses Yin’s (2014) multiple case study approach and attempts to 
overcome the recognised (lack of) breadth issue of using a single case study by 
placing a number of case studies (in this case two) in a wider context. It has 
been suggested that the use of multiple-case designs can produce more robust 
evidence as the use of evidence from more than one case study may be more 
compelling and synthesising data across multiple cases can yield good results 
(Yin, 2014). The multiple case study approach proposed by Yin (2014) is shown 
in Figure 7-2 and bears similarities to the shape of this thesis in that there has 
been a theory phase, followed by case selection and methods development, 
parallel case studies and then the development of cross case conclusions to 
inform theory. 
 
Figure 7-2. Multiple case study procedure (Yin, 2014) 
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7.2.1 Selected cases 
7.2.1.1 UK/GB Heat Generation Policy 
Initially, UK/GB heat policy was expected to be split into two separate cases, 
the GB Renewable Heat Incentive and the UK heat strategy. However, because 
of the synergies and links between the two in terms of actors, it transpired that 
there was one network of actors with interests spanning both aspects of heat 
generation policy. As such, both aspects of UK heat generation policy are 
considered in one case although this case study is split into chapters. This case 
also considers the politics surrounding the introduction of regulations which 
mandated condensing (rather than non-condensing) boilers. This policy change 
was highlighted by a number of interviewees as important and is clearly relevant 
when considering policy associated with heat generation. 
The RHI is the Government’s key policy instrument designed to support low-
carbon heat generating technologies and this is a quickly developing and rapidly 
growing new policy. As such it is a key policy but has yet been the subject of 
little analysis. The RHI is central to the niche level of my conceptual framework 
as it is a policy designed to protect and promote new niches for sustainable 
heat technologies and practices.  
The second aspect of the UK case study considers the UK’s long-term strategy 
for heating. The ‘heat strategy’ is linked to the RHI but has separate aims and is 
a very different policy approach. The Government’s heat strategy represents a 
long term vision up to 2050 which suggests how the UK will be generating and 
using heat in a decarbonised energy system (DECC, 2013k). Unlike the RHI, 
the heat strategy is not a specific policy instrument and it is not directly written 
into or required by legislation. However, the ‘heat strategy’ represents an 
extremely important element of UK heat policy, and provided for the first time 
the UK Government’s view on what specific technologies and technology mixes 
could be used to decarbonise heat and the scale of the challenge. The UK heat 
strategy has been considered in previous sections and whilst various technical 
scenarios have been developed which question the Government’s approach, 
the actual development of the UK heat strategy and potential politics has not 
been the subject of any academic research. While there have more recently 
been debates around the conversion of the gas grid to gases such as hydrogen 
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and biogas, these discussions have been taking place mostly since the 
research interviews for this work were conducted and this more recent time 
period has been the subject of other work considering incumbency in the UK 
heat sector (Lowes et al., 2018b).  
The heat strategy proposed radical changes to the existing heat regime 
representing a potential existential threat to some of the regime actors including 
gas networks and gas suppliers. However, it also represented the development 
of a new low carbon heating market offering significant potential opportunities 
as well as threats. The significant level of risk and opportunity introduced by the 
UK’s heat strategy therefore means that the issue is expected to have been 
associated with power struggles. 
7.2.1.2 Heat Policy in the Netherlands  
The Netherlands is an interesting case because, like the UK, it has a high (in 
fact, higher) penetration of gas for heating and the Dutch have adopted policy 
goals and have practical experience of projects and policy to try and change 
this. The Netherlands also has a similar energy background to the UK with large 
historic supplies of fossil fuels. The Netherlands is therefore likely to face similar 
issues to the UK in moving to more sustainable heating practices, although 
there are of course likely to be differences between the countries. Actors 
involved in attempting to shape and influence policy may also have similar 
interests to those in the UK and so the Netherlands may represent a good 
international comparator to the UK. 
The second case study therefore considers the role of power in the 
development of Dutch heat generation policy. This study is less in depth than 
the UK study in light of limited time in the Netherlands and the difficulties of 
accessing foreign policy materials. However, the case study still offers valuable 
comparisons to the UK as described in the results sections. 
7.3  DATA COLLATION 
Case studies can use a wide range of data sources including documents, 
archives, participant observation and physical artefacts, however, interview data 
is recognised as being particularly important (Yin, 2014, Stake, 1995). Because 
of the public policy nature of this research, the main data sources have been 
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interviews and grey literature rather than other approaches such as 
ethnography and observation.  
Stake (1995) suggests a more qualitative and self-reflective approach (i.e. 
greater consideration of the role and views of the researcher) than others such 
as Yin for case studies (2014). While an ethnographic study in this area, if 
successful, could be extremely interesting and useful, getting close (or even 
internal) access to the policy making process inside Government or the 
influencing approaches inside a company would have been practically 
impossible because of issues of confidentiality. Therefore, a non-ethnographic 
approach based on interviews and document analysis was chosen. However, 
while the methodology didn’t use an ethnographic approach, the role of the 
researcher in this research is central in relation to the lobbying analysis tool 
(EAR) described in more detail in section 7.4.2.  
7.3.1 Interviews 
Interviews are central to this project as they are a key research method for case 
studies (Yin, 2014, Stake, 1995). Much of the literature discussed in previous 
chapters which has considered power and influence over policy has also used 
methodological approaches which include interviews (e.g Gaede and 
Meadowcroft, 2016; Gullberg, 2013, 2011; Hawkins and Holden, 2014; 
Lockwood, 2017; Sühlsen and Hisschemöller, 2014). For the case studies here, 
semi-structured interviews are used. These are less rigid than structured 
interviews, having themes to be covered and suggested questions but with an 
openness which allows the interviewer to follow up on previous answers or 
change the interview sequence (Kvale, 1996).  
This semi-structured interview approach is better suited to the exploratory 
nature of this research as it is felt that structured interviews would have the 
potential to miss aspects of power which I have not considered during the 
development of my theoretical framework. Unstructured interviews would be 
unsuitable because the breadth of the topic means that some control over the 
interviews will be required. 
Participants for interviews were selected through the early expert interviews, my 
own knowledge of the heat policy network and also through document analysis, 
such as DECC’s 2012 heat strategy consultation (DECC, 2012e) which includes 
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a list of respondents, all of whom clearly believe they have an interest in UK 
heat policy. The interviewees included those with commercial interests in the 
development of heat policy, civil servants and experts without specific business 
interests but with expertise in heating and heat policy. The balance of the type 
of interviewee was important for the analytical framework for lobbying, the ‘EAR’ 
instrument which is described in detail in section 7.4.2. Therefore, interviewee 
selection ensured that enough interviewees who could represent both policy 
makers and policy influencers were interviewed.  A snowballing approach was 
also used, whereby if interviewees identified other actors who they believed 
may be particularly useful for the research, these would be followed up if they 
were expected to add value to the research.  
A total of 52 interviews were carried out throughout 2015, reflecting events to 
that point. Most of the interviews took place in London, although there were also 
interviews across wider England, in Rotterdam and in The Hague. Some 
interviews were carried out by phone if it was not possible to carry out in 
person.  
A list of interviewees along with their place of work is included in annex 2. 
These interviews are numbered and are referenced accordingly in the text of 
the results sections using the format: (interview number) e.g. (1).  
Before interviews, interviewees filled in and signed a consent form in line with 
University of Exeter policy. On this form, interviewees were given the option of 
full attribution of comments, full anonymity or attribution but with certain 
comments unattributed. Ideas and quotes from anonymous interviews and 
unattributed quotes are labelled (anonymous) in the text. Most interviews were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim by the researcher however a small number 
were either conducted by email or were not recorded at the request of the 
interviewee. 
The questions used to shape the semi-structured interviews are included in 
annex 3. The interview questions were tested prior to research interviews with 
colleagues working on energy policy research and were refined primarily for 
reasons of clarity. The ‘ego’ questions were the questions posed to those 
looking to influence policy and the ‘alter’ questions were those posed to those 
on the receiving side of lobbying and influencing. Section 7.4.2 explains more 
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about the use of these terms which are related to the analysis of lobbying. The 
first question was designed to give details of the interviewee’s position and 
interest in the UK heat policy network. Within the ‘ego’ questions, questions 2-4 
ask about the interviewee’s own work or experience of looking to influence heat 
policy. Questions 5 and 6 ask about their view on the ability and approaches of 
others to influence policy. Questions 7 and 8 ask about the interviewee’s use 
and experience of framing.  
Question 9 asks about the ‘objectivity’ of policy making and the use of evidence 
by civil servants. This question is included because according to UK civil service 
guidance, civil servants are required to act objectively in their role where: 
‘‘objectivity’ is basing your advice and decisions on rigorous analysis of the 
evidence’ (HM Government, 2017a). It is possible that those attempting to have 
power over policy change could try and affect or use this need for objectivity by 
for example providing evidence which supports their policy goals. It is also 
possible that policy making takes place which is not objective and is affected by 
power in other ways and this question also aims to explore this issue. It should 
be noted that while the use of ‘evidence’ is a requirement for objectivity under 
the Civil Service Code, ‘evidence’ cannot be assumed to be reliable or true. If 
‘evidence’ is simply taken to mean written or recorded knowledge and 
knowledge is power (as some suggest, see chapter 4), then clearly the 
evidence on which ‘objective’ policy may be based could have been affected by 
power and this power within the evidence could affect policy making.     
Finally, question 10 asks about preference shaping, in an attempt to gain 
evidence around the third face of power.  
The ‘alter’ questions, delivered to interviewees who were policymakers or not 
associated with heat companies, were similar questions but the questions 
reflected the position of ‘alters’ as individuals who may be or have been lobbied. 
While the interview questions were shaped around the overall project research 
questions, the questions and semi-structured nature of interviews in general 
allowed for a wider consideration of ideas of power within the development of 
heat policy rather than purely considering lobbying and framing. 
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7.3.2 Grey literature 
Alongside the interviews, grey literature was another vital source of data in 
examining both actual legislative and regulatory changes and various 
approaches to influence heat policy. Grey literature included Government 
documents such as legislation, strategy papers, consultations and responses 
and committee reports. This grey literature also included data from wider 
industry relevant to the specific case studies including consultation responses, 
company reports and web pages. The use of grey literature is fully referenced 
throughout the text. 
7.3.3 Data organisation 
Following the interviews, interview data was transcribed directly into NVivo 
software, a widely used tool for qualitative data analysis. NVivo was then used 
to organise (code) the many different types of data into related topics or themes 
for analysis. This capability makes NVivo particularly useful for data 
triangulation techniques and the generation of case study reports (both 
described in more detail in the following sections). 
7.4  DATA ANALYSIS 
Yin (2014) suggests that high quality case study analysis is underlined by four 
key principles: 
1. Analysing all available data; 
2. Assessing all plausible rival outcomes for your conclusions; 
3. Addressing the most significant aspects of your case studies; 
4. Maximising the value of your own a priori knowledge. 
Stake's (1995) focus on personal descriptions echoes this idea of making the 
most of your own knowledge, however the risk with this approach is that prior 
knowledge and the subjectivity of the researcher can cloud objective 
judgements. Therefore, whilst I made the most of my own knowledge in terms of 
the design of the project, I attempted to separate my own knowledge and 
preconceived ideas and experiences from the results; case study reports were 
purely based on the data collected and analysed as part of each case. 
The use of triangulation, whereby data from different sources is compared and 
contrasted is recognised as a very useful approach for analysing case study 
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data (Yin, 2014, Stake, 1995). Its name comes from its use in navigation where 
the location of a point is determined by measuring angles to that point from 
other known points. Stake (1995) suggests that despite its importance within 
case study approaches, triangulation is only necessary when data is 
contestable. However, for this research, because of its focus on power and 
politics which is likely to be contestable and conflictual, the use of triangulation 
will be used as standard where possible. Triangulation is also central to the 
chosen approach to analyse lobbying (The EAR instrument) described in 
section 7.4.2. 
7.4.1 Coding 
The key interpretive stage of analysis was the coding of the interview data in 
NVivo. Codes (described as ‘nodes’ in NVivo) can be considered as 
categorising devices for qualitative data (Basit, 2003). Coding is quite simply the 
organising of data into themes or categories to allow for ease of analysis. 
The coding process coded the interview data by emerging theme or issue and 
to a specific actor or group of actors. In practice, this meant that if a quote within 
an interview was linked to the project research questions, or power and 
influence in general, it would be coded to the specific relevant theme. 
Therefore, some codes emerged naturally from the data and some codes were 
also based on research questions. However, the actual results emerged fully 
from the data and no presuppositions about power were made in the coding 
structure or process.  
In general, the codes fitted into three main themes of ‘What’, which included 
successes and failures of attempts to influence policy; ‘Who’, which considered 
the actors involved; and ‘How’’ which included the various methods used to 
attempt to influence policy. The 'How' element of the coding also specifically 
coded issues of framing and the frames used by actors as these emerged from 
the interview data.  
While coding also attempted to organise power issues into the relevant face of 
power, the faces of power didn’t actually appear particularly clearly through the 
coding. Instead, faces of power were primarily considered and emerged during 
the synthesis and write up of the results sections.  
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The results chapters are based around the three over-arching codes and the 
coding process has provided not just a useful way of organising data but has 
been valuable for the overall shape of the results. 
Within some of the codes, there were also sub-codes (daughter codes) and 
sub-codes within these sub-codes which represented sub-themes or sub-
issues. There were also some codes outside the three main themes, for 
example some quotes highlighted methodological issues with the research and 
these were collated. An extract from NVivo is show below in Figure 7-3 which 
shows some codes expanded into sub-codes and sub-sub-codes.  
 
Figure 7-3. An extract from NVivo showing all parent codes with some sub-codes expanded.  
7.4.2 Lobbying analysis 
There are a number of different approaches to analyse lobbying. Arts & Mack 
(2003) consider political influence on the United Nations Biosafety Protocol 
using a reputation method which uses in depth interviews to understand the 
reputation of particular actors from the perspective of other actors. The theory is 
that in the context of social relations, reputation is very important and can be a 
149 
 
proxy for influence. However, this approach doesn’t necessarily show that there 
have been actual policy changes which are attributable to certain actors.  
Dür (2008) suggests that as well as the previously mentioned approach of 
looking at reputation, another approach is to consider the distance between the 
preference of actors and the actual policy outcomes (referred to as ‘preference 
attainment’). The clear risk however with this approach is that correlation 
doesn’t signal cause and there are many reasons why a policy may or may not 
be changed. It may simply be a coincidence that a policy outcome matches an 
actor’s preferences and there are clearly many more ways policy can be 
changed than because of role of one particular actor. 
Dür (2008b) expands on methodological approaches within his previous work 
and suggests that methodological triangulation can meet many of the 
shortcomings of methods described previously by combining a number of 
approaches. Dür (2008b) cites the ‘EAR instrument’ (p570) as one particularly 
systematic approach to triangulation. 
In 1999, Arts & Verschuren (1999) introduced the ‘EAR’ (p411) instrument (also 
see (Arts, (2000)) as a triangulation tool which takes into account firstly the 
political player’s own perception of their influence (‘E’ for Ego perception), 
secondly, the other players’ perception of influence over them (the person being 
lobbied, ‘A’ for alter perception) and thirdly analysis of the development of policy 
and regulations by the researcher (‘R’).  
In this approach, understanding the ‘ego’ perspective can give the researcher 
insight into what the preferences of the actor trying to change policy are and 
where that actor believes it has been successful; speaking to ‘egos’ can also 
provide data on the reputation of other actors, as ‘egos’ may explain who else 
has been active and successful at policy making. Understanding the ‘alter’ or 
policy maker’s perspective can provide data on where and how policy has been 
successfully influenced by lobbyists and can also provide information on the 
reputation of actors involved in lobbying activities. 
The data from the ‘egos’ and the ‘alters’ can then be triangulated with analysis 
by the researcher. The researcher uses archive and document data to 
understand how the policy has actually changed and can also investigate 
whether there is any further evidence that the policy changes can be attributed 
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to that particular actor. In a detailed description of the ‘EAR’ instrument, Arts 
and Verschuren (1999) (and also in a separate publications Arts, (2000)) 
explain that in order to fully consider the various factors at play during policy 
development influencing activities, attention must be paid to: 
 Whether or not the ‘ego’ met their goal for influencing; 
 Whether the ‘ego’ had access to the policy process; 
 Actual interventions in the policy process as well as the number and 
frequency of these; 
 Whether their views are adopted by policy makers; 
 External or autonomous developments which could have affected policy 
changes. 
Figure 7-4 shows how this approach would work in practice. The ‘EAR’ 
approach has clear elements of ‘process tracing’, an approach whereby case 
studies are considered according to the preferences and activities of actors and 
the extent to which polices are changed in line with these preferences and 
actions (Dür, 2008a). However, process tracing of the policy process has been 
described as a method which: ‘through detailed case studies, can take 
interacting causal variables into account’ but which does not purely focus on 




Figure 7-4. My approach to the triangulation process for the analysis of lobbying based on the EAR 
instrument (Arts and Verschuren, 1999) 
The strength of the EAR approach is that it combines elements of the previously 
described reputation methods and policy attainment methods. It also builds on 
these approaches taking much greater account of grey literature and the view of 
the actor being lobbied. While combining methods and approaches in 
triangulation has clear benefits, it is not without its risks as it can increase the 
time and complexity of data collection and possibly show competing results 
(Dür, 2008b).  
Direct examples of the application of the EAR instrument are limited. One 
notable example is its use to consider EU foreign policy, however even in this 
study the instrument was used differently as process tracing was central and 
the perceptions of actors were used as a secondary element to validate the 
process tracing (Schunz, 2010). Without mentioning the EAR instrument, 
Gullberg (2013) used a similar triangulation approach which analysed written 
sources of data and also used semi-structured interviews with interest groups 
and decision makers to consider whether there had been successful lobbying 
associated with binding EU renewable energy targets.  
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Despite the limited application of the EAR triangulation approach, the EAR 
instrument represents an applied and possibly more verifiable approach than 
other methods which investigate the role of influence and lobbying on policy 
development. By combining methods, it overcomes some of the shortcomings 
of attributed influence and preference attainment methods which may produce 
false positive results as a result of coincidental or chance factors. However, 
even the creators of the ‘EAR’ instrument recognise it may not be flawless. Arts 
and Verschuren (1999) explain that ‘in the case of complex decision-making, it 
is unthinkable that all relevant documents should be available to the researcher’ 
(p418) and this could limit the potential for researcher analysis and increase 
reliance on interview data. Dür (2008b) also suggests that the complexity of 
combining methods may increase the time required for analysis and reduce the 
potential for the number of case studies and therefore the potential for 
generalisations. 
Nonetheless, because the approach of triangulation and the use of semi-
structured interviews are recognised as being important approaches for case 
studies and these methodologies are also central to the EAR approach to 
analysing influence on policy, I use the EAR approach as visualised in Figure 
7-4 in my approach to analysing lobbying. I also consider wider contextual 
factors highlighted by Arts and Verschuren (1999) around whether lobbying 
goals were met, whether lobbyists had access to policy makers, types and 
frequency of influencing interventions and wider developments. Furthermore, 
Yin's (2014) approach to case studies which suggests maximising the use of the 
researchers a priori knowledge matches neatly with the part of EAR approach 
which relies on policy analysis by the researcher. I already had a good 
understanding of the UK heat policy network. The use of the EAR approach 
also represents an original application of this technique to UK energy policy. 
7.4.3 The analysis of ideas and framing 
Ideas represent a more abstract research area than lobbying and unlike 
lobbying, there are only currently loose approaches for how researchers can 
understand ideas and the impact that they have on politics and policy. As 
described in section 5.3, there are numerous approaches to investigate 




The approach of considering ideas as frames (considered in section 5.2.1) 
provides an approach to ideas which focuses on how ideas are purposively 
used by actors in the development of policy. There are no clear methods for 
considering framing and so my analysis of frames and their role within the 
development of UK heat policy will use the triangulation approach described 
earlier in relation to lobbying. So, in addition to considering how policy has been 
affected by lobbying, I will also be investigating how ideas have been used as 
frames by actors in order to attempt to cause policy change.  
This approach to consider framing is very similar to the approach to analyse 
lobbying, based on the EAR instrument described previously. It relies on 
interviews with those trying to change policy ‘ego’, interviews with those who 
are the target of the influence ‘alter’ as well as desk based analysis by the 
researcher to see if the frames observed in the interviews are reflected in policy 
developments. 
The analysis of ideas as frames is a relatively new approach to understanding 
political change and there have only been limited attempts to put this into 
practice. Based on a wide analysis of literature around ideas and influence, 
Shorten (2013) proposed a ‘typology’ suggesting how ideas and influence can 
be studied in politics which contains five potential types of influence using ideas. 
While this typology doesn’t specifically refer to framing but to ideas in general, 
the author suggests ideas can be employed as: 
 Mediated influence is where original ideas have subsequently been re-
used by different actors and have an impact on policy; 
 Unconscious influence is where ideas affected political outcomes but the 
source of how they have arrived with particular actors is not clear;  
 Adoptive influence is where ideas are actively adopted by actors;  
 Distorted influence is where ideas are deliberately misrepresented or 
distorted; 
 Cumulative influence is where ideas have grown, merged and developed 
over time to have an influence.  
The typology provides an interesting set of potential concepts of how frames 
could be employed by those looking to influence including by repeating the 
framing of others or by misrepresenting the frames of others. In order to 
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maintain the focus on active or purposive use of framing in UK heat policy, the 
analysis of framing in this thesis considers primarily what frames (if any) are 
being used and who is using them rather than how frames have emerged. 
However in light of what appears limited methodologies to consider framing, 
Shorten's (2013) typology is considered during the analysis of framing.  
7.4.4 Case study reports 
Following the analysis of lobbying and ideas within each case study, a report 
has been produced detailing the results and conclusions of each case. The UK 
case study is broken down into three chapters which consider firstly the key 
policy changes, secondly the key actors involved and finally the approaches 
used to influence. Stake (1995) explains the importance of the case study report 
itself as the key way of communicating the findings of the study and includes a 
checklist to consider when writing up the report in order to make the report 
clear, readable and valuable. The checklist is shown in Figure 7-5 and includes 




Figure 7-5. Critique checklist for a case study report (Stake, 1995, p131) 
The checklist was used as a guide when completing the case studies. The 
Dutch case study also considered similarities between the GB and Dutch case 
studies. Cross-case conclusions were drawn in order to combine and 
synthesise the outputs of the project into overall project conclusions and in 
order to answer the research questions. 
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7.5  RESEARCH LIMITS  
The concept of power is a large and complex topic and the research questions 
have been designed to take this into account and shape the research into a 
manageable size. Research questions (shown on p134)  one, two and three 
focus on two major issues, the direct role of actors in the policy process (1 and 
2) and the role of ideas used as frames by actors in the development of heat 
policy (3). Question 4 is designed to situate the overall project theme of power 
and policy within the wider debate around sustainability transitions.  
Based on the previous literature review, the aspects of power considered by the 
research questions are clearly important elements of the power that actors can 
have on the policy process and an important element of power in general. It is 
however important to note that there may be other aspects of power which may 
have an impact on policy development which are not the primary focus of this 
thesis; these features are primarily associated with more institutional, structural 
or passive elements of power which are not associated with purposive attempts 
by actors to attempt to cause policy change. It has been necessary to focus on 
the more active or purposive approaches to power in order to ensure the thesis 
is an appropriate size. While I accept that this thesis does not cover all 
elements of power within heat policy and transitions/transformations, the 
exploratory nature of my research sheds light on an important but under-
researched aspect of UK energy policy development and understandings of 
transitions. In doing so, the research makes an important novel contribution to 
the literature on power and energy transformation in the UK. There is clearly 
however scope for further research into power and UK energy transformations.  
7.6 ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 
This thesis has used a methodology based on interviews and includes 
information about the behaviour of specific individuals and companies. The 
research project was subject to a University Ethics Assessment. The key ethical 
issues were associated with the interviews themselves and the interview data.  
In order to protect interviewees (and as explained previously), in advance of 
interviews a consent form was provided which interviewees had to read through 
and sign if they were to take part. The consent form described the project, 
explained that taking part was voluntary and that interviewees could withdraw 
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from the project at any time. The consent form also explained that all interview 
data would be held electronically on a computer and secured with password 
access. The form asked interviewees if they were happy to take part, if they 
were happy with the interview being recorded, whether their comments were 
attributable, anonymous or if they wished to make a mixture of attributable and 
anonymous comments.  
The other key ethical issue associated with the project relates to the potential 
reputational damage that the publication of results could cause. The nature of 
the research means that it is inherently political and considers specific 
individuals and companies. The research has the potential to highlight lobbying 
activity, the approaches used and possibly show where individuals and 
companies have had successes or failures. There is of course also the potential 
for legal challenges under libel laws if any statements made in the thesis 
identify a particular actor and are damaging and untrue.  
In order to minimise the risk of any legal issues, every effort has been made to 
ensure all statements made in the thesis precisely reflect the collected data to 
ensure the thesis is accurate. Referencing of interview data has been carried 
out as thoroughly as possible. I have also protected individuals where 
necessary. This has involved anonymising statements made by interviewees if 
their own statements could damage themselves; if, for example, the interviewee 
mentioned elements of their own behaviour which could be seen as 
questionable. This required a value judgement in some places. Where data has 
highlighted behaviour by certain actors which could be seen as dubious, I have 
only included the names of individuals and companies if it adds value to the 
thesis and two companies have been fully anonymised. Finally, only the 
company/organisational affiliation of interviewees is included in the list of 
interviewees in annex 2 rather than their personal name. 
7.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has described the project methodology which is designed around 
answering the research questions introduced in chapter 1. The first phase of the 
methodology used a small number of interviews with subject matter experts. As 
a result, the third research question was changed slightly to ensure it focused 
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on the role of ideas in the policy process as frames, and specifically the use of 
frames by actors. 
The rest of the chapter has described the overall methodological approach to 
answer the finalised research questions which are: 
1. How has UK heat generation policy been affected by the power of actors? 
2. What approaches have been used by actors to attempt to affect UK heat 
policy? 
3. Do ideas have power as frames in the heat policy process?22 
4. How can understandings of power which emerge from this research be used 
to strengthen the multi-level perspective on transitions? 
The project uses two case studies, firstly heat generation policy in UK and 
secondly heat generation policy in the Netherlands as an international 
comparison.  
For both case studies, semi-structured interviews with key actors in the relevant 
heat policy network were carried out in order to understand who is active in the 
policy network, where there have been policy changes affected by actors and 
the approaches used by actors to attempt to influence policy. Interviews were 
carried out with actors with interests in heat policy and with actors on the 
receiving end of attempts to influence policy such as civil servants. The EAR 
instrument which is based around triangulation of data sources was used to 
investigate successes and failures linked to lobbying; this approach offers a 
repeatable and rigorous analytical methodology.  
The following four chapters contain the research results and associated 
discussion based on the methodology described in this chapter and linked to 
the underlying theoretical framework. Chapter 8 focuses on if and where actors 
have affected UK heat policy and uses the EAR instrument for thorough 
triangulation. Building on the rich EAR analysis in chapter 8 and continuing to 
use triangulation approaches, chapters 9 and 10 consider the key actors 
involved and approaches used to influence respectively. Chapter 11 considers 
similar issues of power and heat generation policy in the Netherlands.  
                                            
22 This is a modified version of a proposed research question which was altered following expert 
engagement on the subject on focus of the thesis as described in section 7.1.1.   
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8 UK CASE STUDY - THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
HEAT GENERATION POLICY IN THE UK 
2003-2015 – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
SECTION 1 
This chapter is the first part of the results and discussion section of this thesis. It 
considers where data has highlighted that power may have had an impact on 
actual policy changes associated with UK heat policy. Using the EAR 
triangulation approach described in the methodology, it considers why these 
changes have happened and how actors have or haven’t been successful in 
affecting these changes.  
The chapter is structured around thirteen policy episodes. There have been a 
significant number of heat policy changes/interventions and interviewees have 
provided a large number of instances where it is suggested that actors have 
had some power over policy change. Episodes are only included in this chapter 
if interviewees have explained that the power of actors has been vital in causing 
policy change and the actual policy change has been apparent or if grey 
literature has shown that a significant policy change has taken place. The EAR 
instrument is used to investigate power in each of these episodes.  
These policy episodes are set out chronologically (although some overlap) and 
the overall policy timeline is shown in Figure 8-1. This chapter develops a thick 
narrative of power and heat policy and how it has been influenced. The 
following two chapters build on the episodes considering ‘who’ (i.e. which 
actors) has been attempting to have power and ‘how’ (i.e. which approaches) 
actors have attempted to use power in the policy process. Where important 
themes linked to other chapters have emerged, these are highlighted in the text 
and the reader is guided to the relevant section which considers the issue in 
greater detail. 
Using the EAR approach, interview data detailing lobbying was triangulated with 
interview data from interviewees with experience of being lobbied; interview 
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data was also triangulated with grey literature if available. Depending on the 
availability of evidence, the level of triangulation possible for each episode is 
described in the relevant episode as ‘none’, ‘part’ or ‘thorough’ and this is also 
highlighted in the chapter summary table Table 6 on page 208. 
All insights gained from interviews are referenced as follows where x represents 
the interview number e.g. (X). All comments from anonymous interviewees or 
off-the-record comments are labelled or described as such. Some comments 
have been anonymised in order to protect sources if the comments are seen as 
being potentially controversial and/or reputation damaging. 
Policy episodes are also considered from the perspectives on power identified 
earlier. These perspectives are the ‘four faces of power’ approach, ideas of 
power over and power to and also the difference between structural or agent-
based elements of power. 
Elements of this chapter which focus specifically on the development of the GB 
Renewable Heat Incentive policy have been published elsewhere as a 
conference paper (Lowes, 2016) and following peer review, published in journal 
















Figure 8-1. Timeline of policy episodes identified through research 
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8.1 POLICY EPISODE 1 - THE INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION MANDATING 
CONDENSING BOILERS (2003-2005) 
The first heat policy episode highlighted from the interview data was the 
introduction of condensing boilers. This was a policy measure which had been 
proposed in the 2003 UK Energy White Paper (Department for Trade and 
Industry, 2003), a paper which had four key goals: 
 Aiming to reduce UK greenhouse gas emission levels by 60% on 1990 
levels by 2050; 
 Maintaining security of energy supplies; 
 Promoting competition in energy markets; 
 Ensuring consumers could afford their energy bills. 
The 2003 Energy White Paper did not consider the need for a wholesale 
transformation of the UK heat sector as has been described as necessary in 
section 1.2. Rather, heat was considered simply as a segment of UK energy 
demand and discussed in the context of energy efficiency and building 
regulations and this appears to be because the Government had only just 
introduced a policy target for decarbonisation (Department for Trade and 
Industry, 2003). Some of the earliest low-carbon heat market interventions, 
however, were being considered within this 2003 white paper. As well as 
discussing solar thermal systems and the development of district energy 
systems, the white paper explains that the Government will use building 
regulations ‘to raise the standard required for new and replacement boilers to 
the level of the most efficient boiler types - A and B rated condensing boilers.’ 
(Department for Trade and Industry, 2003, p34). Condensing boilers increase 
efficiency by extracting the heat from the boiler flue gases which would 
otherwise be lost to the air.  
The eventual mandating of condensing boilers in 2005 represented a significant 
challenge to the boiler market and it is recognised as being one of the most 
significant interventions ever in the UK heating market (17, 20) as ‘it 
transformed the market in a very short period of time so prior to then, the 
minimum boiler efficiency threshold was I think 78% and it became 86% from 
the 1st April 2005 and the boiler market flipped over from non-condensing 
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boilers to condensing boilers almost overnight with only a 2 year running period’ 
(20). 
Despite the recognised benefits of condensing boilers (Department for Trade 
and Industry, 2003), industry support does not appear unilateral and this policy 
change highlights a potential power struggle involving boiler manufacturers who 
would need to change their products.  
A representative from Worcester Bosch, at the time a major UK boiler 
manufacturer and currently the UK’s largest boiler manufacturer23 (17) 
explained during an interview that as a company, they ‘embraced’ the potential 
mandating of condensing boilers, describing it as ‘good policy’ (17). These 
comments, however, may not be reliable as according to an interviewee from a 
heat interested trade association, ‘Worcester were one of the companies, and 
REDACTED NAME (name of Worcester Bosch representative) will tell you 
otherwise but I was there as he was and it's not true, for the first year Worcester 
were the most vociferously opposed company, it was Worcester and Baxi that 
were opposing it most strongly for that condensing boiler regulation being 
brought into existence’ (20).  
While these two interviewees clearly disagree, this actual opposition by 
Worcester Bosch and Baxi is one interviewee’s word against another. A media 
and grey literature search has not shone any more light on this particular issue. 
This issue was also followed up directly with Margaret Beckett’s office (Margaret 
Beckett is still an MP at the time was secretary of state who was responsible for 
and launched the condensing boiler regulations) which explained that 
‘unfortunately she does not recall the specifics of the policy’ (Personal 
communication 13/9/2018) adding no further evidence. An anonymous civil 
servant, however, who was involved with the regulations for condensing boilers 
did explain that ‘the company that was probably the strongest/most vocal in its 
opposition was Baxi Potterton’ and that ‘Worcester Bosch may have initially 
opposed the change but subsequently, when it became clear Government was 
serious, took a quieter approach’ (personal communication 27/09/2018). So, 
triangulation does suggest that it looks likely that boiler manufacturers Baxi and 
                                            
23 Worcester Bosch is part of the multi-national Bosch Group 
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Worcester Bosch were at least initially opposed to this change although no grey 
literature has been identified to confirm this.  
Despite this apparent resistance, the Government confirmed the introduction of 
the new building regulations to mandate condensing boilers at a launch event at 
another boiler manufacturer’s (Glow-worm/Vaillant) site (DEFRA, 2003). Glow-
worm/Vaillant had apparently supported the Government’s plan out of the sight 
of the other boiler manufacturers who had been more opposed in order to 
prepare their own operations and gain a market advantage and this support had 
boosted the Government’s confidence in the changes (20). The Vaillant website 
explains that in 2005 ‘Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Margaret Beckett announces new legislation for the changeover to high 
energy efficiency during a visit to Belper’ (where their UK manufacturing site is 
located) (Vaillant, 2018). Separately, the Glow worm website explains that in 
2005, Glow Worm (a Vaillant brand) became ‘the leading manufacturer in the 
switch to high efficiency boilers. This important launch is announced by Dame 
Margaret Beckett in Belper, Derbyshire’ (Glow Worm, 2018). Together, these 
comments suggest that Vaillant/Glow worm was communicating with 
Government, arranging the announcement of the condensing boiler legislation 
alongside the launch of a new boiler.  
Two interviewees made unprompted comments regarding the strong will of 
Margaret Beckett in pushing the condensing boiler regulations through in spite 
of some discontent in industry (8, 20). Whilst the power of ministers is 
considered further in section 9.1.1.2, this policy episode represents a good 
example of the first face of power where an actor, the energy minister, has been 
able to make a change which may otherwise not have happened; another 
minister in the same position may not have pushed this policy change through 
suggesting that the minister has an element of agent based power.  
Of course the power of Margaret Beckett to drive through the regulation is 
associated with her formal position of authority in the Government and her 
responsibility for a particular policy area, her power is therefore linked to more 
structural elements of power. It was also the case that the 2003 white paper had 
also put the issue onto the policy agenda and there was therefore a temporal 
element to this policy and the policy idea was already ‘in play’. The Government 
had previously used its power to put this policy on the agenda (i.e. the second 
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face of power). While certain boiler manufacturers are alleged to have 
attempted to stop this change from happening, if these attempts did happen, 
they clearly failed, indicating a potential lack of power. Overall then, this first 
policy episode indicates a power struggle and also highlights the power of the 
Government and ministers to drive policy through different faces of power.  
‘Part’ triangulation in this episode is possible. The episode highlights the 
difficulties of triangulating data using the EAR approach when certain data such 
as grey literature or the view of the person being lobbied is not available. 
From 2005 onwards for gas, and from 2007 onwards for oil, all new boilers fitted 
in England and Wales need to be able to operate in condensing mode (similar 
regulations cover Scotland and Northern Ireland) (DECC, 2013k). There were 
9.3 million condensing boilers operating in the UK in 2015; this is 2.5 million 
installations ahead of the Committee on Climate Change’s indicator trajectory 
for meeting the UK carbon target suggesting24 a significant carbon saving 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2015). 
8.2 POLICY EPISODE 2 - THE CREATION OF THE RENEWABLE HEAT 
INCENTIVE IN LAW (2008) 
This policy episode considers the introduction of the legislation that underpins 
the Renewable Heat Incentive and investigates the power that drove its 
inclusion in the 2008 Energy Act, where the Government at the time had not 
initially expected it to be located. 
During 2008, the 2008 Energy Bill was passing through Parliament and civil 
servants from BERR were working to ensure the Government’s important 
energy policy areas were being maintained in the bill. One of these areas 
included the introduction of so-called ‘banding’ for the ‘renewables obligation’ 
scheme which was aiming to introduce differentiated levels of support for 
different large scale renewable electricity generation technologies (26).  
There was support among parliamentarians for the development of a feed-in-
tariff mechanism to support smaller scale renewable electricity generation, 
                                            
24 In order to work efficiently in condensing mode, the water return temperature on a condensing 
boiler must be below 55 degrees. However, many boilers are set higher than this meaning the 
actual efficiency savings may be limited (YouGen, 2012) 
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something which was not in the bill at this point (26). This support was officially 
set down in an Early Day Motion25 tabled on the 5th February 2008, shortly after 
the Energy Bill entered Parliament; this Early Day Motion had the support of 
281 MPs (Parliament, 2008c) representing a significant proportion of the 646 
MPs at the time (Rallings and Thrasher, 2005).  
In April 2008, Alan Simpson MP who laid the Early Day Motion, along with a 
number of other MPs laid a potential amendment to the 2008 Energy Act; this 
amendment would have caused the Government to introduce a Feed in Tariff 
system which would have supported small scale electricity and heat (26, and 
Parliament, 2008a). Whilst the amendment was voted down (210 votes for and 
250 against) (Parliament, 2008e), this vote represented a significant rebellion by 
the Government’s MPs as 33 Labour MPs voted in favour of the amendment 
(Guardian, 2008b).  
The Government was concerned that the level of political support for the Feed 
in Tariff policy would eventually lead to a defeat in the Commons, which would 
be a major embarrassment. They therefore decided that rather than risk defeat, 
they would take the opportunity and develop a Government amendment which 
would create the Feed in Tariff and also lay the primary legislation for a 
Renewable Heat Incentive (26). In the words of one interviewee, Parliament 
‘forced the Government’s hand’ (32). The amendments for both the Feed in 
Tariff and the Renewable Heat Incentive were introduced to the bill on 5th 
November 2008 at third reading in the House of Lords, the latest stage 
amendments can be introduced (Parliament, 2008f).  
Because of their late introduction and the limited time to debate them, the 
amendments were not contested and the bill received Royal Assent on 26th 
November (26). ‘The primary legislation, it wasn't perfect and we knew, we 
knew it wasn't perfect because we ended up having something like two months 
when you normally have like six months to a year to define primary legislation, it 
literally was about two months and we had people working round the clock 
literally just do that, so that amendment went in, it got passed again partly 
                                            
25 ‘Early Day Motions’ are a method for members of parliament to raise important issues and 
gather the support of other members 
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because the bill was so far down the track that nobody really wanted to disrupt it 
and then the bill got passed so it gave us the RHI’ (26).  
Whilst the wording of the amendment was written by officials working in the 
newly created Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (26), the 
driver to instigate the RHI at that time appears to come from Parliament and 
there are a number of different opinions on who caused the RHI to come into 
legal existence when it did. The Renewable Energy Association (REA), a trade 
body representing renewable energy companies, explained that they believed 
they, along with Friends of the Earth, a non-governmental organisation had 
been primarily responsible for the RHI through their efforts lobbying MPs or in 
their words, ‘instrumental in getting that’ (14) and this was also repeated by 
other previous employees including their ex-chief executive (7, 11):  
‘Interviewee: the whole of that Feed in Tariff and the RHI 
existence was the big win. That was the first big goal. 
RL: And do you think that’s the REA? 
Interviewee: I really do yeah, because we got that campaign with 
the academics and the NGOs, we got that diverted onto a more 
constructive path which was not just electricity and was not just rip 
the RO up and have Feed in Tariffs in place, have tariffs for heat 
and small scale and gas and we did lobby for it.’ (7).  
Use of the EAR triangulation method corroborates the REA’s (the ‘ego’s) story; 
two civil servants (representing the ‘alters’) working on the RHI as the legislation 
developed explained that the REA played the leading role in terms of political 
campaigning for the RHI (26, 29). One civil servant explained:  
‘that was definite lobbying with, my recollection is with the REA 
who really drove that and then the REA drove the amendment and 
everyone coalesced behind the REA including the Micropower 
Council26’ (26).  
Another civil servant explained:  
                                            
26 The Micropower Council is a trade association which has since become the Sustainable 
Energy Association   
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‘they were a big force certainly, even just to get the legislation in 
so she [Ex REA Chief Executive] was a big force and I think 
probably on Feed in Tariffs as well so I think, it's fair to say we 
dealt with the REA the most throughout and again they could 
corral the right people into a room…the REA were the biggest sort 
of influence’ (29) 
Other sources also mention the role of Environmental NGO Friends of the Earth 
(32), and while Friends of the Earth spearheaded the campaign, it was 
(according to a Friends of the Earth ex-employee) initially the Renewable 
Energy Association who had suggested that heat was included as part of the 
original amendment (52), which rather than using the word ‘electricity’ used the 
word ‘energy’ therefore including heat (Parliament, 2008b). Friends of the Earth 
continued campaigning on the issue as the bill passed through Parliament and 
most notably coordinated a joint letter with various academic and industry 
actors which was sent to members of parliament and received media attention 
(Guardian, 2008a). This letter represents grey literature indicating that Friends 
of the Earth were indeed active with regards to this policy change. 
An ex-employee of the Micropower Council, a trade body specialising in micro-
generation explained that he believed that the Micropower Council had been 
important for the emergence of the RHI (20). Using the EAR triangulation 
approach, whilst the role of the Micropower Council was recognised by civil 
servants involved in the RHI, it was suggested that its impact was less 
significant than that of the REA (26, 29). No grey literature identified has 
suggested that the Micropower Council had a significant role in this policy 
development. 
While most of the interviewees from industry who had been involved with the 
campaign to introduce the RHI suggested that industry had played an important 
role in driving the introduction of the RHI legislation, one interviewee suggested 
that even though the campaign led by the REA and Friends of the Earth did 
support the RHI’s development, the RHI probably would have happened 
anyway, it simply happened sooner, in advance of the 2010 general election 
(11). This view is supported by the words of a DECC civil servant, ‘we thought 
this is a fantastic opportunity to get some primary legislation in around a 
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renewable heat incentive’ (26) and this follows from the fact that the 
Government was already discussing introducing support for renewable heat.  
It is, of course, impossible to know if this legislation would have ever been 
introduced or what the policy would have looked like if it wasn’t included in the 
2008 Energy Act. Policy episode 4 which considers the funding of the RHI 
suggests that the RHI may not have been funded by the 2010 to 2015 coalition 
Government without strong-willed politicians and perhaps the existence of 
legislation gave momentum to the eventual funding of the RHI by the coalition 
Government. The development of the Energy Act was also taking place in the 
context of the UK agreeing the EU 2020 climate and energy package part of 
which required 15% of the UK’s energy from renewable sources by 2020 (EU 
Commission, 2018). Wider developments may therefore also have had some 
impact on the voting preferences of MPs. Overall, however, it does appear that 
lobbying did drive the specific inclusion of the RHI in the 2008 Energy Act and 
‘thorough’ triangulation has been possible for this episode. 
Applying the faces of power model to this example shows the importance of the 
first face of power. The REA and associated organisations appear to have 
induced the Government to do something that they would have otherwise not 
done, i.e. the amendment for the RHI and the Feed in Tariff. This change also 
suggests the role of the second face of power, with parliamentarians alongside 
the REA having the power to have heat put on the agenda in the Early Day 
Motion and the original amendment. The third face of power, the shaping of 
preferences can also possibly be observed, with the development of a joint 
letter by renewable energy interests promoting the issue of small-scale 
renewables in the media attempting to pressure MPs to vote for an amendment 
to the Energy Act. This campaign was about shaping the preferences of MPs to 
get them to support the idea of a Feed in Tariff and support for small scale 
renewable energy production.  
As with the previous episode, clearly in this example, the power of MPs and 
indeed lobby groups exists in a structural context with MPs having the ability to 
do things such as lay Early Day Motions and trade associations and charities 
with access to finance to pay for engagement and advocacy work. It also 
appears in this episode that there is an element of intransitive power (joining 
forces to have power) with organisations such as Friends of the Earth, The 
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Renewable Energy Association and academics joining together on the 
campaign to support the addition of the FIT and the RHI to the Energy Act. 
Overall, the EAR approach does in this example suggest that actors have had 
power to cause the introduction of the RHI (and Feed in Tariff) legislation into 
the 2008 Energy Act.  
8.3 POLICY EPISODE 3 - RHI SCHEME DESIGN (2009-2010) 
This policy episode considers the power behind the development of the tariff 
structure for the RHI which one organisation believes they influenced 
significantly. 
In February 2010, DECC released a full consultation into the RHI which 
explained its thoughts on what types of renewable heat the scheme would 
support and how projects would be rewarded (DECC, 2010c). The approach to 
setting tariffs for the RHI scheme proposed that payments would be ‘calculated 
to bridge the financial gap between the cost of conventional and renewable heat 
systems at all scales, with additional compensation for certain technologies for 
an element of the non-financial cost (e.g. the inconvenience of digging up a 
garden to install a ground source heat pump)’ (DECC, 2010a, p3). This, in 
practice, would be expected to mean that a person installing a renewable heat 
system would be fully compensated for any additional costs compared to a 
fossil fuel system and would make a financial return on the additional 
investment. 
Two interviewees associated with a particular trade association, The 
Micropower Council, suggested that they had been directly involved in this 
financial aspect of the scheme design and that a paper had been prepared by 
their organisation at the time which formed the basis of this particular aspect of 
the scheme (20 and anonymous quote). If this is the case, then the interviewees 
could be seen to have had power over the RHI policy design process. One of 
them explained; ‘We actually wrote the original blueprint that suggested that the 
tariffs of the incentives at least should be calibrated to cover the difference in 
costs between a fossil fuel system and the renewable system that you're trying 
to promote (20)’ and the other explained that they were ‘intimately’ involved 
(anonymous quote).  
171 
 
When asked about the importance of this particular trade association paper, the 
lead civil servant on the RHI at the time (representing the alter using the EAR 
approach) explained: ‘I don’t recollect that at all because we had a really good 
guy who's now gone to the private sector who was our tariff kind of expert…so 
the tariff structure was based on an internal discussion saying how easy and 
simple can we make this and so then a decision was taken’ (26). If this is 
believed, this suggests that the role of the trade association mentioned above 
was significantly less than they themselves suggested and actually the same 
outcome would have come about without their engagement. In order to fully 
triangulate the interview data with grey literature, the paper sent by the Micro 
Power Council to DECC was located (available from author on request). This 
paper does contain suggestions on the shape of the RHI with regards to how 
payments should be made and how the scheme should be funded. While the 
paper explains that payments should be based on ‘gross renewable heat’ 
produced, however, the paper contains no mention that tariffs should be based 
on the difference between renewable and fossil fuel system costs and there is 
therefore no evidence that the Micro Power Council did have any power over 
this policy detail. 
It’s interesting to note that the off-the-record interviewee discussed above who 
mentioned intimate levels of involvement within this policy episode also noted 
the general importance of the role of luck in lobbying. He suggested in relation 
to this perceived lobbying win: ‘I mean that was an example of success but it's 
also luck, lobbying is half luck, half chance. More than that probably.’ While this 
interviewee believed they were lucky to be so ‘intimately’ involved in the policy 
process, the evidence does not suggest that it was their lobbying efforts which 
caused the policy tariff setting methodology to be designed in the way it was. 
The availability of evidence means that level of triangulation possible in this 
episode has been ‘thorough’. 
In indicating a lack of power, this policy episode shows that the triangulation 
process can be very useful for investigating lobbying as, it appears that a 
lobbyists comments may not reflect actual policy change. While the lobbyist in 
this example believed that they had the first face of power over the 
Government, they do not appear to have had any actual power. It should of 
course be noted that the lobbyists may have had power but the civil servant did 
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not want to admit this. Because of the apparent lack of lobbying success 
identified, it is not possible to identify the existence of a specific face of power in 
this episode. The Micro Power Council, however, believed they had power over 
(the first face of power) the Government to shape the policy in a particular way 
and it appears that their close working relationship with civil servants meant that 
they may have exercised the second face of power and get their RHI paper and 
some of their recommendations on the policy agenda. 
8.4 POLICY EPISODE 4 – HOW TO FUND THE RHI (2009-2010) 
This policy episode considers the decision around how the RHI was going to be 
funded and the potential power associated with this decision.  
As discussions regarding the operation of the RHI were taking place, 
concurrently, discussions concerning the funding of the policy were also taking 
place. Shortly after the 2008 Energy Act received Royal Assent (becoming law), 
the February 2009 Heat and Energy Saving Strategy Consultation maintained 
the Government’s view that ‘Funding for the RHI will come from a levy on 
suppliers of fossil fuels for heating’ (DECC/DCLG, 2009, p60). The 2008 Energy 
Act allowed for the scheme to be either central Government funded (e.g. taxes 
or Government borrowing) or funded by ‘designated fossil fuel suppliers’ 
(Parliament, 2008d). The February 2010 RHI consultation into the running of the 
RHI scheme, however, explained that DECC was considering changing how the 
scheme was going to be funded following informal consultation with industry 
(DECC, 2010c).  
The consultation explained that the Government had met with and heard from a 
number of organisations who might be liable to meet the costs of the RHI and 
recognised the problems with funding the scheme through fossil fuel suppliers: 
‘The Government has listened to the concerns of stakeholders about some of 
the potential practical problems of implementing a new levy equitably, 
transparently and efficiently’ (DECC, 2010a, p13). The consultation document 
didn’t however explain in any detail what the specifics of these issues were. The 
question of this policy episode is therefore, did any actors cause this change to 
how the RHI was funded? 
Representing the ‘ego’ in the EAR approach, a representative from an off-grid 
fossil fuel company, referred to from now on throughout the thesis as ‘company 
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A’27, explained explicitly ‘We lobbied very hard that the RHI should come from 
general taxation, not from a levy on fuel bills and it came from general taxation, 
how much we had to do with that I don’t know, but that was certainly our line’ 
(16).  
Confirming this lobbying, one interviewee from Government explained that the 
same off-gas-grid company had been lobbying to ensure that their product 
wasn’t covered by the RHI revenue raising as this could increase fuel poverty 
for their consumers (by pushing up prices of the relevant fuel); they had also 
been suggesting that this could be complicated to administer for people who 
buy the fossil fuel product for various uses such as barbecues (26). Grey 
literature confirms that the view of the company ‘A’ was that the RHI should 
have been funded through general taxation with a report funded by the 
company (carried out by the so-called ‘Renewable Energy Foundation’ through 
their consultancy arm) stating that ‘it appears to us that general taxation is the 
most transparent, and the least likely to have unforeseen consequences’ 
(reference not included to maintain anonymity). 
But it was not just this company who appear supportive of the scheme not being 
funded via a levy on fossil fuels. According to a civil servant in DECC working 
on the RHI at the time, whilst the ‘Big 6’ companies were generally supportive of 
the RHI, ‘off-the-record they would say we might stomach it for a while but 
eventually we will not, we will challenge you because it just doesn’t make sense 
that we get a levy on us’ (29). The potential approach of a levy on fossil fuels 
supposedly didn’t ‘make sense’ because if the RHI covered only the Big 6 
suppliers and was levied on gas bills as it was expected to be for reasons of 
simplicity, gas consumers would be penalised but other fuels such as electricity, 
coal, oil and bottled gas would not be penalised even though they are more 
carbon intensive than gas. 
Clearly, in this instance, ‘thorough’ triangulation confirms that lobbying from the 
fossil fuel sector was felt by DECC and this lobbying was attempting to ensure 
that the RHI was not funded from fossil fuels. It was, however, explained by a 
civil servant that the development of a system to fund the RHI through energy 
                                            
27 This company has been anonymised to protect both the interviewee and eliminate the 
potential of reputational damage to the company in question. 
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suppliers would have been incredibly complex and long-winded and funding it 
through taxation would be a simpler option (26). So, while triangulation shows 
that elements of industry were supportive of the RHI not being funded through 
fossil fuels, triangulation does not show that industry lobbying caused the RHI to 
be funded from Government spending. As such, no faces of power can be 
recognised in this episode. 
This episode, again, highlights the difficulties of measuring power and highlights 
another example of a lobbyist lobbying in a particular way and policy change 
suiting them. It is however unclear if their behaviour caused the change. 
Specifically, this example shows the key methodological issue with so-called 
‘preference attainment methods’ (considered in section 7.4.2) which are 
sometimes used to analyse lobbying. While the outcome matches the lobbyist’s 
desires (i.e. their preference is attained which suggests success using the 
preference attainment approach), it cannot be determined that the lobbyist 
actually caused the outcome meaning that this approach would provide a false 
positive in this example. This episode also once again highlights the various 
factors other than lobbying which can cause policy change such as 
administrative issues (i.e. the ease of funding the scheme from Government 
spending compared to a levy) highlighting the importance of the context of 
power and combinations of different factors in the policy process. 
8.5 POLICY EPISODE 5 - THE BRIEF OVERLOOKING OF THE RHI (2010) 
Following the election of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
Government in May 2010, neither the initial ‘Coalition Agreement’ (HM 
Government, 2010) nor the first budget of the new Government in June 2010 
contained any mention of the RHI (HM Treasury, 2010a) suggesting that the 
policy was a low political priority. There was nothing to provide any certainty to 
the low-carbon heating industry that the policy would ever actually open to 
participants. It was not until the Spending Review in October and once 
departmental budgets had been set that the Government would announce that 
funding would be made available for the RHI (HM Treasury, 2010b).  
While no announcements were made by DECC before the Treasury 
announcement, according to one interviewee working at DECC, the policy did 
have some strong political support within DECC, ‘I think the words Chris Huhne 
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(secretary of state for DECC at the time) used were: 'it's there in invisible ink'’ 
(29). It was also the case that the DECC ministers at the time, Conservatives 
Charles Hendry and Gregory Barker, had been in opposition as the 2008 
Energy Act passed through parliament and had supported the early amendment 
to introduce small scale renewable heat and electricity support (Parliament, 
2008d, discussed in policy episode 2) suggesting that they were in favour of the 
Feed in Tariff and the RHI. The DECC ministers were also considered 
supportive of green policies in general and DECC was seen as the most ‘left 
and green’ department (29). No grey literature, however, has been discovered 
which provides any detail of the commitment to fund the RHI and so only 
interviewee comments from the civil servant can be used.  
As well as the internal political support, another interviewee also explained that 
there was lobbying of both DECC and the Treasury by external organisations 
including some supply companies to ensure that the RHI did go ahead in 
advance of the release of the spending review (26), however, a literature search 
has not highlighted any evidence of this either. 
Continuity of ministerial and departmental support for the RHI through the 
change in Government is a significant policy outcome particularly as the 
Government was at the time targeting major reductions in Government 
spending (HM Treasury, 2010b). Attributing this outcome to a specific actor, 
however, is not possible because of the limited evidence; triangulation is not 
possible in this case. This episode highlights the potential power of an actor 
who is not a lobbyist but who is within Government. In this case, using the EAR 
instrument, the DECC ministers, despite being inside Government, could be 
seen as the ‘egos’, attempting to lobby their own Government (the Treasury) for 
funding. It is also the case that in this situation, ‘egos’ from industry were 
attempting to influence the policy from outside Government. Again, this example 
highlights the complexity of power with various actors attempting to have power 
at the same time though not necessarily working together. The specific issue of 
the political power of ministers and power within Government has emerged as 
an important theme in the research and is explored more fully in section 9.1.1.2. 
Grey literature, including the spending review document which announces the 
RHI funding, simply explains that the RHI is being introduced in order to help 
the UK meet its EU renewable energy targets (HM Treasury, 2010b) while 
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providing no further evidence on the reasons for this policy development. The 
lack of evidence also means that evaluating the type of power at play is not 
easy. It is possible that the minister, in getting funding from the Treasury for the 
RHI, had power over the Government (the first face) but it is also possible that 
more structural elements of power such as the existence of the EU Renewable 
Energy Directive also drove this change. It may also be that because both 
DECC and external organisations were lobbying for the funding of the RHI, an 
element of intransitive power, with organisations coming together, had some 
policy impact. 
8.6 POLICY EPISODE 6 - THE MANDARIN AND THE NEAR DEATH OF THE 
RHI (2010-2011) 
This policy episode considers changes to the format of the RHI which meant 
that the domestic element of the scheme was delayed and overall the scheme 
was targeted more towards a goal of cost-effectiveness. The episode shows 
that it appears one civil servant in particular had power over this policy change. 
Despite clear political and industry support, the existence of underpinning laws 
and the agreement of finance from the Treasury at a time of Government 
austerity, one major obstacle to the RHI remained in the form of the permanent 
secretary in DECC, the most senior civil servant in the energy department. As 
well as leading a department, the permanent secretary is also normally a 
department’s accounting officer who is the person accountable to Parliament for 
the allocation of public money (HM Treasury, 2015). This structure highlights 
just one example of the institutional nature of power in policy making and the 
various contextual issues which can combine to complicate the policy process. 
The permanent secretary leads the department responsible for decarbonisation 
but also has personal responsibility for ensuring all money spent is 
demonstrably of value. 
Two interviewees explained that at the time of the RHI’s potential introduction, 
the permanent secretary who was also the accounting officer, was opposed to 
the RHI (off-the-record and 28). Other interviewees explained that in fact the 
most negative comments regarding the RHI came from within DECC because 
there was a concern that the rapid increase in spending caused by the Feed in 
Tariffs for electricity would be replicated with the RHI (26, 28, 29). 
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As explained in a non-attributable comment:  
‘after the minister said yes, and we got Chris Huhne to say yes go 
ahead with the RHI our permanent secretary got involved … we 
had a process, a process called the internal approvals committee 
and it is basically a group of very senior people within the 
department that is meant to look at all the big projects we 
undertake in DECC and make sure they're value for money.  
I mean it's a good process, it's a robust challenging process to 
make sure you've thought of everything in terms of your policy, so 
they feel comfortable as accounting officer that something's going 
through and she was very very uncomfortable with what was 
happening on the RHI to the point that it was being held back, 
even after the announcement in the spending review she didn't 
want it to go ahead in April 2011’ (anonymous). 
The RHI was recognised as being both a large amount of spend in general and 
an expensive way of reducing carbon emissions and one civil servant 
explained:  
‘we'd been honest that if we were not being driven by the EU 2020 
targets we wouldn’t have designed it the way we did, it was 
designed purely to meet that 2020 target.  
If you were looking at something purely on low-carbon terms you 
probably wouldn’t have done it like that, in fact we wouldn't have 
done it like that and it was hugely expensive, we knew that’ 
(anonymous).  
This particular quote indicates the power of targets and goals to drive policy. 
With the EU 2020 target of 15% of all UK energy to come from renewable 
sources by 2020, it was clear that policy was required to increase 2011 
renewable heat levels from 1.5% of all demand (DECC, 2011d). The civil 
servant quoted suggested, however, that a policy approach focused primarily on 
reducing emissions from heat rather than promoting renewable heat would have 
been more cost effective. The issue of targets and goals is considered in more 
detail in section 10.2.3. The issue of renewables versus carbon saving is also 
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recognised as being an important issue and is discussed in further detail in 
section 10.2.2, the technicalities of this issues are also considered in annex 5.  
At one point, the issue of whether or not the RHI would ever be introduced was 
almost elevated to a level where the permanent secretary was going to request 
a so-called ‘ministerial direction’ for the policy to progress (28). A ministerial 
direction is requested by a permanent secretary if a minister or secretary of 
state wants to go against the advice of their accounting officer and that minister 
then becomes accountable to parliament for that issue (HM Treasury, 2015). A 
ministerial direction indicates that a Government department is not supportive of 
a policy and it is being promoted by a minister and at the minister’s risk. In 
practice this could mean the minister being called to give evidence regarding 
the policy to select committees or called to Parliament without the support of 
their department. According to analysis by the Institute for Government, only 
two requests for ministerial directions were issued during the coalition 
Government (2010-2015) making them an unusual occurrence (Institute for 
Government, 2015).  
The ministerial direction on the RHI, however, was never issued because of a 
compromise between the permanent secretary and Chris Huhne which meant 
that at first only the non-domestic element of the scheme would progress (28). 
The larger scale renewable heat systems were shown to have some financial 
benefits under Government accounting rules, based on the net present value of 
the policy, whereas domestic scale systems did not have a recognised financial 
benefit (anonymous).  
Similarly to the previous example, this policy change primarily concerns 
administrative (i.e. within Government) power struggles. In this case, from a 
triangulation perspective, the ‘ego’ is the permanent secretary and is attempting 
(apparently successfully) to stop or slow the RHI policy and the ‘alters’ are the 
department’s own ministers. Whilst only ‘part’ triangulation of the data sources 
in this example is possible because of the internal nature of the issue, it 
appears, based on interviews with civil servants that the permanent secretary 
did exercise power to limit the initial scale of the RHI. It is also clear that this 




From the faces of power perspective, in this example, the permanent secretary, 
through the first face of power, had power over the ministers to cause the RHI 
policy to be modified so that only the non-domestic scheme initially progressed. 
While the permanent secretary was able to have power in this situation, this 
power was clearly related to the formal authority of her role. She was both in 
charge of the department and held responsibility for all DECC departmental 
spending. As such, while we can ascribe this policy change to the first face of 
power, in doing so it is important to recognise the institutional context in which 
this power was exercised and this example again highlights the importance of 
structural power in the policy making process. This episode also again 
highlights the difficulties of analysing power with no grey literature available and 
an almost total reliance on limited interview data. Further primary interview data 
could (but may not necessarily) provide additional evidence around this policy 
change but the limits of this research mean that this is not possible within this 
project. This episode highlights the potential level of detail of analysis that can 
be required to understand the power behind just one element of change in a 
policy development process.  
8.7 POLICY EPISODE 7 - RHI SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION (2011) 
This policy episode considers the initial implementation of the non-domestic 
element of the RHI and the changes made to non-domestic tariffs from the 
previously proposed levels. It considers whether these changes were affected 
by the power of industry actors.  
The Labour Government released a consultation into the structure and 
operations of the RHI in February 2010 (before policy episodes 5 and 6). 
Following the consultation, a new (coalition) Government was elected, and as 
described previously, the RHI had its funding agreed but was expected to be 
initially limited in scope to a non-domestic scheme.  
Following these events, the official response to the February 2010 consultation 
was released in March 2011 by the then Conservative/Liberal Democrat 
coalition Government (DECC, 2011c). The consultation explained that initially 
only the non-domestic scheme would be taken forward (though included no 
mention of the power struggle described in the previous section), however 
domestic renewable heat systems would be supported by an interim grant 
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scheme (The Renewable Heat Premium Payment discussed in section 2.4.2.2) 
in the short term and a longer term scheme would be further developed to 
support domestic systems (DECC, 2011c). The consultation document also 
explained that the non-domestic scheme would also not include certain 
technologies which had been included in the consultation; bio-liquids were 
initially excluded because of concerns over competition for bio-resource and air 
source heat pumps were also not included apparently because of uncertainty 
over costs (DECC, 2011c). 
The consultation document also included the tariffs which non-domestic 
renewable heat installations which were to be supported would receive under 
the RHI. The changes to the tariffs between the initial 2010 consultation and the 
Government’s 2011 response affected not just the prices renewable heat would 
receive per unit but also the length of time the tariff would apply for and made 
changes to the tariff that different installation sizes would receive (DECC, 
2011c) (the tariffs from the 2010 consultation document are shown in annex 4 
and the tariffs for non-domestic heat when the scheme was introduced are 
shown in Table 1 on page 47).  
DECC explain in their consultation response that in order to increase the cost 
effectiveness of the scheme, a ‘strengthening’ of the tariffs for large biomass 
and large ground source heat pump systems had taken place. They suggested 
the delivery of a greater proportion of these systems and greater proportion of 
non-domestic systems in general could increase the overall cost effectiveness 
of the scheme. Heat from these technologies is cheaper per megawatt hour 
than from others and producing heat at a larger non-domestic scale was also 
seen as more cost effective (DECC, 2011c). The DECC impact assessment for 
the RHI explains that tariffs were also updated to take account of updated cost 
information which had been collated by consultants AEA (DECC, 2011d; AEA, 
2011). 
Directly comparing tariffs between the consultation document and the 
Government’s response is complex because of the combination of changes; for 
biomass systems it is particularly complex because of the combination of 
altered tariffs, altered tariff time-scales, altered installation size thresholds and 
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the introduction of a ‘tiered’28 approach for biomass. Some simple observations, 
however, regarding the changes to the tariffs between the original consultation 
and the Government response can however be made. Overall: 
 The biomethane tariff was approximately doubled; 
 The solar thermal tariff was halved; 
 The large biomass tariff was increased by approximately 25% (this would 
be less in cash flow terms if discounting was used); 
 It is not possible to easily compare the small and medium biomass tariffs 
but the underlying capital costs of biomass boilers was increased which 
would have led to a slight increase in tariffs; 
 The large ground source heat pump tariff was doubled. For smaller 
ground source heat pumps because of the changing tariff bands, some 
medium heat pumps would see an increase and some a decrease in 
tariff. 
These changes in tariffs represent a significant policy shift, offering greater 
levels of support for specific technologies than had previously been envisaged 
and reducing financial support for solar thermal. As with the previous episode, 
this change is according to DECC primarily an attempt to increase cost-
effectiveness of the scheme (DECC, 2011c).  
No evidence emerged from interviews which suggested that lobbying by private 
sector actors had caused these changes and it appears, based on the 
consultation response, that the power to drive this change came from 
Government and also links to updated technology cost data. It appears highly 
likely that this change can be associated with the previous episode which also 
saw elements of Government drive the initial phase of the RHI towards the 
delivery of cheaper low carbon heat.  
Triangulation of sources using the EAR instrument is not possible for this policy 
episode because the key evidence of this policy change is grey Government 
literature (DECC, 2011d and DECC, 2011e). Nonetheless, this policy episode 
highlights the power of Government (or parts of it) to act decisively and make 
                                            
28 Tiering was briefly described previously in section 2.4.2 and is a mechanism to attempt to 
equalise levels of financial return across different sizes of renewable heat installations 
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significant policy changes. Despite consulting on the scheme, the Department 
(or certainly some people within it) decided that they would significantly 
increase tariffs for large ground source heat pumps and large biomass systems 
and halved the solar thermal tariff, all for reasons of cost-effectiveness. While 
this may indeed have made the scheme more cost-effective, at the same time it 
reduced the potential for solar thermal technologies and increased the expected 
role for bio-energy (biomass and biomethane). While in the original analysis of 
the RHI scheme, solar thermal was only expected to be a small proportion of 
heat supported under the RHI, around 3.5% (NERA, 2010)), the updated impact 
assessment explained that solar thermal would make up only around 0% 
(rounded in source document) of heat delivered by the non-domestic scheme 
(DECC, 2011d). Recent RHI deployment data shoes that solar thermal 
represents approximately 0.17% (rounded to 2 decimal places) of the total heat 
delivered under the domestic and non-domestic RHI combined up to December 
2018 (BEIS, 2018h).  
This episode again highlights the power of Government to make major policy 
changes which can have significant impacts, in this case of the deployment of 
solar thermal technologies. This episode also highlights the structural context of 
power, the Government was able to make this change with no apparent 
opposition using what appears to be the first face of power. It appears that 
structural power is very important here giving both DECC the ability to make this 
significant policy change and also in driving this policy change as a result of a 
departmental focus on delivering cheaper renewable heat. This episode shows 
that the EAR instrument may not be suitable for highlighting all elements of 
power. In this case, the reasons for these significant policy changes have been 
highlighted from relevant grey literature showing how important non-interview 
evidence may be for understanding on power and policy change. 
8.8 POLICY EPISODE 8 - THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF HEAT IN 
GOVERNMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF A HEAT STRATEGY (2011-
2012) 
In 2011, the regulations underpinning the RHI were accepted and laid in 
parliament and the Renewable Heat Premium Payment and the non-domestic 
RHI opened to applicants later that year (DECC, 2015a). It was expected that 
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the full tariff based domestic RHI would open in 2012 (DECC, 2011c). During 
2011, a reorganisation within DECC meant that issues to do with heat and 
industry became a full directorate; in the past, heat issues had not been 
considered on a standalone basis but had been primarily linked to energy 
efficiency and buildings (DECC, 2011a). This reorganisation within DECC 
represented a significant institutional change concerning heat policy issues and 
raised the profile of heat as an issue within government.  
Following these institutional changes, in March 2012, DECC released ‘The 
Future of Heating: A strategic framework for low-carbon heat in the UK’ which 
was considered in section 2.3.2. Based on energy system modelling which took 
carbon emission constraints into account, this document proposed radical 
changes to the UK’s heat system including a near elimination of gas heating 
which would be replaced by district heating and forms of electric heat. 
Two interviewees who had at the time been working at a trade association 
interested in heat (4, 19) suggested that their engagement with DECC and the 
Treasury had been very important for influencing the development of the heat 
directorate, the appointment of David Wagstaff (who was at this time 
responsible for heat strategy work in DECC) and the production of the heat 
strategy ‘Strategic Framework’ document: 
Interviewee 4: ‘Do you know why we have a heat strategy? Do 
you know where it came from? So it came from us.’  
RL: ‘CHPA at the time?’ 
Interviewee 4: ‘Yeah, it really did, this is not me overblowing our 
trumpet, and it came from the Treasury’. 
In this example, the ego (i.e. the one looking to influence policy in the EAR 
instrument) is suggesting that they had power to cause DECC to become much 
more focused on policy development work associated with heat. The 
interviewee went on to explain that in their discussions with the Treasury 
regarding the impact of the introduction of a carbon floor price29 on combined 
heat and power systems, the issue of heat policy had been raised and the ego 
                                            
29 This policy measure was introduced during the UK Electricity Market Reform process to 
maintain a minimum carbon price  for electricity generators (DECC, 2010b) 
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explained to the Treasury that there was no current policy for heat. According to 
the interviewee, following the meeting, the Treasury then forced DECC to 
consider the heat issue and produce a heat strategy, in order to develop policy 
in this area.  
Grey literature, in this case the Treasury’s response to this Carbon Floor Price 
consultation, explains that: ‘DECC will also continue its discussions with 
industry over the summer as part of the development of the Government’s long-
term plans for CHP and for heat supply overall’ (HM Treasury, 2011, p10). So 
clearly the Treasury had some interest in the issue of heat. However, DECC 
had been working on heat well before these discussions between the Treasury 
the trade association in question and, albeit in a different directorate, David 
Wagstaff had been in the post of ‘Deputy Director in charge of Distributed 
Energy & Heat’ since August 2010 (personal communication with David 
Wagstaff 5th April 2016 who can be seen as alter under the EAR approach).  
While the increasing recognition of the importance of heat in the UK 
Government represents an important development associated with UK heat 
policy, using the EAR approach and with ‘part’ triangulation, the influence of 
actors on this change is not apparent. Similarly to policy episode 3, this policy 
episode highlights an example of an actor explaining in interview that they 
believed they had influence but, triangulation does not confirm this influence. As 
this episode has not identified the power of a particular actor, it is not possible 
to highlight any particular elements of power in this episode. 
8.9 POLICY EPISODE 9 - THE ELECTRIFICATION VISION (2012) 
As explained in the previous episode and in section 2.3, the idea of the 
electrification of heat as a key route to decarbonisation has clearly emerged. A 
number of interviewees from trade associations or consultancies involved in 
heat believed that the role of industry had been significant in driving the UK heat 
strategy documents down the path of a much more electric future for heat (9, 
11, 19, 25, 31). Specifically, interviewees suggested that proponents of 
electrification included the heat pump industry (11) and large integrated energy 
company, EDF (19, 25). If actors did indeed drive the UK’s vision for heat 
decarbonisation down the route of electrification, this would represent an 
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important element of actor power in UK heat policy. Triangulation of data, 
however, does not confirm this is necessarily the case. 
Both interviewees commenting on EDF were reporting second hand information 
around the scale of EDF’s Government engagement, such as its political 
activities and the use of staff secondments into DECC. They had not, however, 
seen EDF acting this way first hand. Freedom of Information request data does 
indeed show that EDF had a member of staff seconded to DECC between 
November 2008 to April 2010 and from November 2010 to May 2010 (DECC, 
2013h). There is however no evidence that these particular secondees were 
working on anything to do with heat.  
When asked whether the comments about EDF were true, the civil servant 
leading on the heat strategy (an alter under the EAR approach) replied simply 
‘nope’ (24) and suggested that the 2012 ‘Meeting the Challenge’ document was 
actually about testing the electrification paradigm (24). An interviewee from EDF 
did not give anything away on the issue: ‘Umm, you never know your own 
individual roles, I'd rather talk about the policy more generally’ (18). The 
Government summary of responses to the 2012 heat strategy document 
explains that EDF did indeed respond but does not give the detail of specific 
responses. EDF provided me with a copy of their response to the Government’s 
2012 consultation into their ‘strategic framework for heat’ and this response was 
indeed supportive of the electrification of heat using heat pumps and opposed 
to the growth of heat networks and the continued use of gas as a heating fuel 
(Personal Communication with Policy Manager, EDF, 3/1/2018). However, 
despite a belief among some interviewees about the success and political 
power of EDF to drive the electrification vision, based on triangulation, the data 
shows no compelling evidence of EDF actually having any impact on the 
development of the heat electrification vision.  
Interestingly, this policy episode gives an example of where interviewees 
highlighted the perceived power of other interests rather than comments coming 
from ‘egos’ themselves. While EDF were not shown to have power in this 
example, the example suggests that there may be value in considering 
perceptions of other actors alongside the EAR instrument to gain a wider view 
of power.  
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The heat pump industry was also seen as being successful in driving the 
electrification vision. However, a representative from a heat pump trade 
association mentioned that in fact they believed the potential numbers of heat 
pumps proposed in the heat strategy document was ‘humongous…and 
potentially so great they could be damaging’ because of the rapid scale of 
growth implied in the energy system scenarios; they did not believe this level of 
electrification was being driven by the heat pump industry (31). Again, the EAR 
approach does not show that the heat pump industry did have power over this 
policy change as even the egos themselves deny causing the change. 
A number of interviewees also believed that David MacKay, previous chief 
scientific advisor at DECC (2009-2015), had had a significant impact on the 
electrification direction of the heat strategy (17, 21, 25, 31). As two different 
sources explain: 
‘Anonymous: Does one name keep coming up? A certain 
professor whose malign influence affects all energy and climate 
change policy 
RL: Not one professor, who are you thinking of? 
Anonymous: MacKay, if you’re looking at the heat strategy in 
particular that's pretty much written to MacKay's prescription by 
the Climate Change Committee’ (source protected) 
While this source suggests MacKay has been influential, it is not clear why they 
refer to The Committee on Climate Change, it was after all DECC who 
developed the heat strategy and who David MacKay advised. 
The second source explained: 
‘Professor MacKay latched onto that [electrification] and thought 
that was a panacea to decarbonising heat’ (source protected) 
David MacKay was clearly supportive of heat pumps even before starting his 
Chief Scientific advisor role at DECC. In his well-known book ‘Sustainable 
Energy-Without the Hot Air’, MacKay explains that even replacing a gas boiler 
with an air source heat pump fuelled by electricity from a gas combined cycled 
turbine electricity plant would be a more efficient use of gas (MacKay, 2009). In 
his book he goes on to say, ‘Not forgetting the low-hanging fruit – building-
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insulation and thermostat shenanigans – we should replace all our fossil-fuel 
heaters with electric-powered heat pumps’ (MacKay, 2009, p153).  
MacKay himself believed that he had an influence on the Government’s thinking 
around heat suggesting that the DECC 2050 Pathways Analysis and calculator 
project (DECC, 2010a) had been based on his book and that had affected major 
DECC policy decisions (36). In an interview, David MacKay explained: 
‘the 2050 project was done partly to clarify is David Mackay's book 
right or what should we be doing and what does it actually look, 
like a sort of translation of my book into an excel spreadsheet and 
that 2050 calculator [2050 Pathways Analysis (DECC, 2010a)] did 
have, I think, quite a big direct influence on lots of policies, so 
Electricity Market Reform for example came straight on the heels 
of the 2050 calculator and Jonathan Brearley who was in charge 
of that policy area - he attributes the whole phenomenon of 
electricity market reform to things that actually came out of the 
calculator because before they read my book and made the 
calculator they hadn’t really noticed the important role of 
electrification’ (36) 
As Chief Scientific Advisor at DECC, David MacKay was involved in the heat 
strategy. According to the lead civil servant working on heat at the time:  
‘It would be very odd to write a strategy about heat, which is what 
we use half the energy in the country for, and not involve the Chief 
Scientific Advisor so I am guilty as charged of having involved the 
Chief Scientific Advisor. However, I would like to say and it's 
probably not easy to corroborate this statement but I would like to 
say that we had fruitful and frank exchanges of views on lots of 
issues and it certainly wasn't always his view that prevailed and in 
fact the electrification of heat paradigm was not a David McKay 
paradigm, it was a paradigm that lots of people had come to...’ 
(24). 
While MacKay may have had some influence on the perceived importance of 
the electrification of heat, it is indeed true that it was an idea being put forward 
by many involved in heat system modelling and the development of views on 
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the future of heating has been considered in more detail in section 2.3. For 
example, the UKERC 2050 scenarios project which was the first major energy 
system modelling project looking out to 2050 under carbon constraints began 
work well before Mackay’s book in 2006 and this proposed major switching from 
boilers to heat pumps by 2050 in order to meet carbon reduction goals 
(UKERC, 2009). Overall then, while David Mackay was supportive of 
electrification, the electrification vision cannot be attributed solely to the power 
of David Mackay. 
The idea of a significant level of electrification of heat became an enduring and 
central aspect of the UK Government’s strategy to decarbonise heat. Perhaps 
because it was so central and seen as a ‘paradigm’, some interviewees 
believed it was driven by various actors. However, with ‘thorough’ triangulation, 
the EAR approach does not highlight that any specific actors drove the heat 
electrification vision of Government. Rather, the evidence suggests that the key 
driving force for the electrification vision was the outputs from various energy 
system models considering the future. While the power of specific actors in this 
example cannot be identified, the emergence of such a strong and enduring 
vision could be linked to more post-structural elements of power around 
knowledge and discourse (the fourth face); further and much narrower research 
could consider this in more detail but is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
8.10  POLICY EPISODE 10 - A REDUCED ROLE FOR ELECTRIFICATION? 
(2013) 
This policy episode considers changes to the Government’s long term vision for 
heat between their initial 2012 ‘strategic framework’ document (DECC, 2012e) 
and their 2013 ‘meeting the challenge’ (DECC, 2013i) document which saw a 
greater role for gas in the UK’s heat system in the period up to 2050. 
Specifically it considers whether any actors drove this change in the 
Government’s vision. 
As described in section 2.3.3, in 2013, DECC released an updated heat 
framework which suggested that in the short term (up to 2050), gas may be able 
to play a bigger role in heating that had been suggested in the previous heat 
strategy which proposed a much more rapid electrification of heat (DECC, 
2013k). This change was suggested by DECC to primarily have come about as 
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a result of new modelling which included new appliances and also considered 
short term peaks in heat demand in much more detail (DECC, 2013j). The new 
analysis showed that maintaining some gas appliances or using hybrid systems 
which combine a heat pump and a gas boiler could reduce system costs while 
also allowing carbon targets to be met. 
While the updated framework represented a change, this was primarily a 
shorter term issue and the longer term still represented a significant 
transformation of the heat sector and saw a much greater role for electrification 
of heat.  
Despite the fact that the new scenarios still relied on major growth in electric 
heating and heat networks, a large number of interviewees (12 in total) believed 
that the change represented a major shift in the UK’s heat policy. Comments 
from interviews suggested that the gas industry believed they had some 
success in driving this shift away from electrification of heat. This section 
therefore considers whether the power of actors from the gas industry did 
indeed drive this increased short term role for gas. 
An interviewee from a trade association which represents UK gas and electricity 
networks, believed that their work had influenced the position of DECC on the 
future of heating resulting in a greater role for gas (9). This influencing 
supposedly came about as a result of the publication of energy system 
modelling produced by consultancy Delta EE on behalf of the networks 
association which considered various heat decarbonisation pathways; the 
analysis suggested that full electrification would be more expensive than an 
approach which uses a greater number of hybrid heat pump systems which 
combine an air source heat pump with a gas boiler to provide heat at times of 
peak demand (9) (report here: (Delta ee, 2012)). This interviewee suggested 
that while there were other developments at the same time, they believed they 
had been successful (9): 
‘we've obviously got them to a point where they have to continue 
to consider the gas networks - that they have a role - so that's 
probably how we measure success...you know we calmed them 
down and took them away from their barking 'everyone's gonna 
have a heat pump policy' from the first document’ (9). 
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In a press release, regarding the updated DECC heat strategy document, the 
Energy Networks Association say that they ‘worked closely with DECC following 
their announcement last year, including providing them with the most 
comprehensive report into domestic heat and the role of gas as part of low 
carbon heat solutions, which we commissioned from Delta-ee’ (Energy 
Networks Association, 2012) suggesting that they had been attempting to 
influence the position of DECC. 
According to one anonymous interviewee, National Grid (a member of the ENA) 
and a gas and electricity network owner, engaged closely with DECC on the 
heat strategy. Documents show that in 2012, following the release of DECC’s 
first heat strategy document, National Grid employed consultants Redpoint to 
consider technology options for heat decarbonisation which were eventually 
published (Redpoint Energy, 2012). This modelling, like that by the ENA 
suggested that hybrid heat-pumps which still use gas at times of peak heat 
demand (and therefore require the maintenance of the gas grid) could be a cost 
effective solution (Redpoint Energy, 2012). According to the consultants who 
carried out the modelling work: 
‘Electrification of heat and improved energy efficiency remain the 
critical foundation for decarbonising heat in the UK, but this study 
has also emphasised the potential for retaining more limited direct 
flows of gas to buildings to more cost-effectively manage seasonal 
and peak swings, whilst still meeting our environmental targets.’ 
(Baringa, 2012, (Baringa bought Redpoint)) 
Interestingly, the RESOM model developed on behalf of National Grid was used 
by DECC themselves as part of the official modelling carried out for the second 
heat strategy document (Redpoint, 2013). It is possible therefore that National 
Grid’s input into the assumptions behind the development of the RESOM model 
could have fed through to the DECC RESOM modelling and the final ‘meeting 
the challenge’ report. 
There is clear evidence of parts of the gas industry, primarily gas networks 
promoting an ongoing role for gas in a low carbon heat system at the time of the 
development of the heat strategy work by DECC and a belief by one 
interviewee that the gas industry had been successful. Triangulating these ‘ego’ 
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views with the views of ‘alters’ from the civil service does indeed suggest an 
element of success. One civil servant, responsible for the heat strategy work at 
DECC explained that in the run up to the initial 2012 document, no fresh 
modelling work had been done by BEIS and they had relied on existing work; 
the updated modelling including that carried out by the gas industry was seen 
as useful in highlighting the peak heat argument (24). Another civil servant in 
the DECC heat team explained that the switch away from complete 
electrification ‘came about as far as I can tell as a result of the interventions of 
Grid and various other companies telling the CCC and DECC 'you do realise 
that heat really isn't that simple' via the reports’ (3).  
A consultant who had been involved in the research led by the ENA agreed with 
the views of civil servants. 
‘I think the gas [network] companies were successful in helping to 
highlight the issue, I suspect, I mean DECC couldn’t get all of their 
thinking together in one go, it's not a criticism, it's just a reality. 
And as DECC better understood the problem they better 
understood the problem of the peaks but the gas companies were 
quite helpful in pointing out those challenges and providing 
supporting evidence around that, so I don’t know whether it 
would’ve happened anyway or not but they helped to support it’ 
(25). 
Overall, the interview data suggest that the gas industry was successful in 
attaining their own desires (a greater role for gas in the heat strategy) and 
‘thorough’ triangulation using the EAR instrument suggests that they have been 
successful in driving this change albeit it through providing what was seen as 
useful information. Interestingly, this example of success appears to be 
specifically linked to the provision of evidence to policy makers and some of the 
evidence, (the RESOM model) was actually used by Government themselves 
following its use by National Grid to support policy development. This highlights 
not just the ‘one-off’ use of evidence for lobbying but also the ongoing and 
enduring impact that evidence and knowledge can have in the policy process 
suggesting an element of knowledge institutionalisation.  
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In another case of the ongoing use of evidence, the model developed by Delta 
ee on behalf of the Energy Networks Association was also re-used but in this 
case by the Heating and Hot Water Industry Council (HHIC), a trade body 
representing the heating industry including appliance manufacturers. A 
representative from the HHIC explained that they had been attempting to 
influence DECC’s position on electrification and had released their own 
research report. This was based on that previously commissioned by the 
Energy Networks Association into domestic heating pathways and also carried 
out by Delta ee (8). This work, much like that from the Energy Networks 
Association proposed a more ‘balanced’ approach which considered supporting 
lower carbon gas technologies alongside electric technologies (8) (HHIC and 
Delta ee, 2013). This report was however released after the second DECC heat 
strategy document and therefore would not have affected this policy episode. 
The importance of evidence and energy system models has been highlighted in 
this section as particularly important for the development of the UK’s heat 
strategy. The role of evidence and how it is used is considered in more detail in 
section 10.1. 
Overall, this episode considers how the Government’s view on heat 
decarbonisation changed to one which included more gas and less electricity (at 
least in the shorter term). Results of analysis using the EAR methodology 
suggest that industry, in particular the gas networks, were successful in 
influencing this policy change through the provision of evidence, in this case the 
results from energy system modelling. Interestingly, one energy system model 
produced on behalf of industry was actually adopted by DECC and when used 
by DECC produced similar outputs as it had when used by industry.  
This particular policy episode highlights various elements of power. It appears 
that the industry had power over the Government i.e. the first face of power to 
cause this change. Potentially the second face of power can also be observed 
with the use of energy system modelling to put the issue of ‘peak heat’ and 
‘hybrid’ heat pumps onto the agenda. It could even potentially be argued that 
the preferences of Government were shaped by these actors through the 
provision of evidence (third face) and finally with such a focus on evidence and 
the sharing of models, it could also be argued that this episode could be linked 
to post-structural elements of power (the fourth face). It also appears that this 
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episode shows organisations (across the gas industry) working together to 
achieve shared preferences in what has been described as ‘intransitive power’.  
This episode shows the potential presence of many different elements of power 
at one time and the connections between different elements of power and the 
actors involved. While this is an interesting policy episode and it does show a 
significant policy influencing impact, further more focused analysis on elements 
within this episode, particularly associated with more passive elements of 
power, could provide further interesting results. However, for the sake of this 
thesis which is focused on active power, focusing on more passive approaches 
to power is beyond the scope of this research. 
8.11  POLICY EPISODE 11 - THE LAUNCH OF THE DOMESTIC RHI (2013-
2014) 
This policy episode considers changes made to the tariff levels for the domestic 
RHI between the time when the tariffs were first consulted on to when they were 
eventually introduced. It investigates whether the power of actors caused the 
changes to these tariffs. 
In July 2013, DECC released details of the domestic RHI which was expected 
to be opened to applications in Spring 2014; the scheme would support 
biomass systems, air source heat pumps (ASHP), ground and water-source 
heat pumps and solar thermal with tariffs running for 7 years for each 
installation (DECC, 2013a).  
As shown in Table 5 (overleaf), the new domestic tariff levels were different to 
those proposed in the original consultation document (to which they are directly 
comparable because both the consultation document and Government 
response use a 7 year tariff period). The air source heat pump tariff was 
reduced to below the proposed range, the biomass tariff increased above its 







 Biomass ASHP GSHP Solar 
Thermal 
Tariff range proposed at 
consultation stage in 2012 












Initial tariffs for scheme released in 
2013 (pence/kWh) (equivalent to 
tariff payable on total heat output for 
comparison to row above) 
12.2  4.7  13.2 19.2 
Table 5. Tariffs for technologies under the domestic RHI at 2012 consultation and then after the 
consultation at the introduction of the scheme (DECC, 2013b) these figures represent the tariff paid on 
total heat output as opposed to actual tariffs to allow for fair comparison30 
One interviewee from a ground source heat pump (GSHP) manufacturer i.e. an 
‘ego’ suggested that the ground source heat pump industry had played a role in 
these tariff changes, specifically reducing the tariff for air source heat pumps:  
 ‘the Micro-Power Council (a trade association) were very, very 
supportive of air source [heat pumps] and were very cross with me 
when we argued to DECC that this is a technology that could take 
off and you've got to be careful about the tariff. And we knew we 
were on very fertile ground here, DECC were so worried about 
budget that anyone saying the air source industry could explode, it 
could be cheap Chinese kit … DECC were going “oh we can’t 
have this, this is a dreadful scenario” and they slashed the tariff’ 
(10).  
It is clear from section 8.6 (policy episode 6) that there were already major 
concerns around the budget for the scheme and another interviewee confirmed 
that there were worries within DECC about the potential for a boom in heat 
pump deployment (14). Indeed, a civil servant in DECC explained that the trade 
association representing ground source heat pumps had raised concerns 
regarding the quality and performance of air source heat pumps and suggested 
that they may be over-rewarded by the RHI at the levels which had been 
consulted on (23) confirming the behaviour in the previous quote from a ground 
source heat pump representative. However, while the behaviour of the ground 
                                            
30 Heat pumps only receive payment for the renewable heat produced i.e. the heat extracted 
from air, ground or water and the electricity used to pump the heat is netted off from total heat 
output so that only the renewable component of heat is rewarded. 
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source heat pump interest was confirmed, the civil servant did not confirm that 
this behaviour had anything to do with why the tariff was changed (23). 
According to the DECC impact assessment for the domestic RHI (DECC, 
2013b), the changes to the tariffs were made as a result of new evidence and 
research gathered through the Renewable Heat Premium Payment grant 
scheme and by consultants ‘sweett Group’ (sweett, 2013). The DECC impact 
assessment for the domestic RHI stated that: ‘There are some significant 
changes which have been made to the tariffs most notably for net capital cost 
(Biomass is more expensive than previous evidence suggested, ASHPs are 
slightly cheaper)...’ (DECC, 2013b). The tariffs were, according to DECC, 
adjusted to take account of these new capital costs, with higher tariffs for 
biomass reflecting higher perceived biomass boiler costs and lower tariffs for 
ASHPs reflecting perceived lower ASHP costs. While the grey data shows that 
the tariffs were changed, triangulation using the EAR methodology does not 
attribute this change to the ground source heat pump industry. 
The eventual reduction in the air source heat pump tariff was seen as a success 
by some (10,11), particularly those involved with ground source heat pumps 
who claimed a small victory (10) (although the evidence doesn’t suggest they 
caused this change). However, the level of success for the GSHP industry was 
limited because the domestic GSHP tariff was set near the bottom of the 
proposed spread of tariff levels and it was also the case that the biomass tariff 
was significantly higher than had been expected by industry. One interviewee 
explained ‘It was a policy success, but hurting them and not helping yourselves 
[GSHP] was a fairly disappointing outcome’ (10).  
Interestingly with regard to biomass which also saw an increased tariff, when 
asked whether there had been any lobbying from the biomass industry to 
increase the biomass tariffs, one civil servant suggested that they had no 
reason to lobby because:  
‘they have been treated very generously by DECC with absurdly 
large subsidies for biomass boilers which have been flooding in to 
dubious locations all around the country for many years now so I 
didn’t see much lobbying from them because yeah they were just 
getting fat on the subsidies and didn’t need to lobby me’ (36).  
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It is important to note that the report from ‘sweett group’ on which the new tariffs 
were based used questionnaires completed by industry participants such as 
installers to gather cost data (sweett, 2013). This reliance on industry data is an 
example of the potential power that industry actors can have when 
policymakers source information, on which policy is based, from interested 
actors. Information needed for the development of policy can be provided by 
industry which is broadly in alignment with the interests of the relevant company 
in order to promote large subsidies or supportive regulation. Elsewhere this has 
been referred to as ‘informational asymmetry’ (Helm, 2006, p180). In this 
example, the details of who responded to the questionnaire are not available. 
The general issue of the role of data or knowledge from industry in the 
development of UK heat policy has been seen as an important element of 
approaches of actors to influence and will be discussed in more detail in section 
10.1. 
Overall then, in this episode, while the tariffs were clearly changed between the 
consultation document and the introduction of the scheme, ‘part’ triangulation 
using the EAR instrument does not show that industry lobbying caused this 
change even though one part of industry thought it had had power. While 
lobbying success cannot be identified, the attempts by the Ground Source Heat 
Pump lobbyist could be seen to be linked to the third face of power. By playing 
on existing and known concerns around budgets, the lobbyist for the GSHP 
industry was attempting to shape the preferences of the civil servants to frame 
heat pumps as a poor technology and one that could grow rapidly in order to get 
tariffs reduced for a potentially competing technology. 
8.12  POLICY EPISODE 12 – MORE CASH FOR BIOMASS (2013-2014) 
This policy episode considers the changes made to RHI budgets which resulted 
in a significant increase in the budget available for small and medium biomass 
installations under the non-domestic RHI. This change meant that the tariffs 
available for these technologies remained higher than they otherwise would 
have done. It considers whether actors had any power in driving this change to 
budgets. 
Before the domestic RHI scheme was opened to applicants in April 2014, 
DECC released its ‘Improving Support, Increasing Uptake’ document focusing 
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on the non-domestic scheme (DECC, 2013e). As well as proposing the 
introduction of new technologies, the document also explained that the 
Government’s existing budget management system (degression) for the RHI 
would be changed in a number of ways. The most significant change was that 
the trigger levels which determine what level of deployment causes a tariff 
reduction were to be modified.  
Two technology groups were deploying over what was expected (small and 
medium biomass at 173% and 151% of expected spend respectively) and other 
technologies were delivering well below what was expected. This included: 
 Large biomass spending only 27% of what was forecast; 
 Small ground source heat pumps 1% of what was forecast; 
 Large ground source heat pumps 7% of what was forecast; 
 Solar thermal 1% of what was forecast; 
 Biomethane 8% of what was forecast. 
(DECC, 2013e) 
DECC was concerned that the high delivery of small and medium biomass 
would lead to their tariffs being automatically reduced by the degression 
mechanism; this would then lead to reduced deployment of the technologies 
that were being successful from a deployment perspective. With other 
technologies deploying well below expected levels, and technologies deploying 
successfully expecting to see tariffs reduced, money allocated to the RHI would 
go unspent and renewable heat deployment would be reduced. 
For underperforming technologies, tariff reduction trigger levels were to be 
reduced and small and medium biomass had their trigger levels increased. This 
meant that budget that was not spent and looked unlikely to be spent on the 
underperforming technologies was moved onto small and medium biomass 
approximately doubling their budgets and in doing so reducing the likelihood of 
a tariff degression for these technologies (DECC, 2013e).  
Two interviewees from the Renewable Energy Association (‘egos’ under the 
EAR methodology), a trade association interested in biomass, suggested that 
their lobbying efforts had caused this change, increasing the budgets available 
for small and medium biomass (11, 14) with one of them explaining ‘no-one else 
was asking for that’ (11). It was even suggested that this particular policy 
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change represented a fairly easy win as there are only a small number of 
officials involved in managing the budget element of the RHI (subject to 
eventual ministerial sign off) and so the policy change was easy to influence 
(11). The REA had a clear interest in biomass, founding the Wood Heat 
Association (Wood Heat Association, 2018) and they also attribute this tariff 
increase to their own advocacy efforts explaining that they ‘secured budget 
increases of +40% for sub 1MW biomass in December 2013‘ (Wood Heat 
Association, 2018). 
Triangulating the views of interviewees from the REA with those of civil servants 
(alters) provides a complex picture. It is clear that DECC were engaging closely 
with industry on delivery of technology under the RHI employing a so-called 
‘Head of Market Intelligence’ to understand the sector better and support further 
policy development/adjustment including changes to the budgets (23). Another 
civil servant explained: ‘there was quite a big feed-back loop with industry. Now 
they might not quite necessarily know how big partly because dependent on 
how...what you wanted to use people's information for, you might not want to 
make it completely obvious because you don’t want to put an easy lobbying 
gaming opportunity in people's paths. But I think it was probably more 
collaborative than a lot of people think it was’ (27) 
However, the same civil servant did not attribute the increase in the budgets for 
the RHI to lobbying by the RHI explaining  
‘as I remember this one I think to be honest it was a bit of a no 
brainer because at the time that we were making those changes 
frankly it would've been inconceivable to not increase the amount 
of money that was being given to biomass because otherwise we 
would have been as I said earlier, deciding that we weren't going 
to be spending the money at all, because the timeframes that we 
were talking about meant it would've been inconceivable to have 
other technology markets rise to the level of expenditure that they 
would need to soak up the rest of the budget’ (27). 
Overall then, the role of the REA in this change is not confirmed by the relevant 
policy makers and may simply have happened without their input. Exploring the 
associated grey literature suggests that engagement by DECC with the REA on 
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these issues did indeed take place. The Government impact assessment 
behind the proposals explains that they gathered data using: ‘Industry reports; 
Trade Association data; pipeline data; trend extrapolation; stakeholder interview 
and internal expert judgement’ to build ‘market intelligence’ and they specifically 
mention the REA in the impact assessment as someone who Government 
engaged with (DECC, 2013j, p19). So, while ‘thorough’ triangulation of sources 
doesn’t indicate a clear impact, it is clear from both interviews and grey 
literature that the REA were involved in the process and the policy episode 
represents a clear success for the industry they represent.  
However, while this may be a success, this change can’t be attributed to the 
power of the REA and this once again shows the limits of ‘preference 
attainment’ methods for considering political power. When considering this 
episode from the faces of power approach, while the REA seemed to be 
attempting to have the first face of power over the government, they do not 
seem to have been successful. However, it is possible that the fourth face of 
power is important here with Government looking for knowledge and data on 
technology costs and deployment to support their policy design and this 
potentially power laden knowledge being provided by industry. Once again this 
episode highlights the importance and power of knowledge when considering 
policy change highlighting understandings of power linked to the fourth face. 
The changes to the tariffs and scheme budget came into force on the 28th May 
2014 (Ofgem, 2014). 
8.13  POLICY EPISODE 13 - BIOMETHANE TARIFF REVIEW AND 
SUSTAINABILITY (2014-2015) 
This policy episode considers the potential power behind two policy 
modifications to the non-domestic RHI which affected biomethane. The first 
relates to a new biomethane tariff design and the second relates to the 
introduction of ‘sustainability criteria’ which biomethane (and other bio-energy 
under the RHI) has to meet to receive payment under the RHI. With both policy 
changes happening at a similar time this episode considers the potential power 
of the biomethane industry and its impact on these changes.  
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In May 2014 DECC published a consultation into the RHI tariff for biomethane 
producers amid concerns that large plants were making larger financial returns 
than planned through the RHI (DECC, 2014b). The consultation presented two 
potential options, one was to introduce a ‘banded’ tariff which paid different RHI 
rates depending on maximum capacity of the biomethane production plant. The 
second option was to introduce a tiered tariff similar to the style of tariff which 
already existed for small and medium biomass installations in the non-domestic 
RHI; on an annual basis, an initial amount of annual biomethane production 
would be paid a certain tariff and any biomethane produced beyond the tier 
threshold would receive a lower rate (DECC, 2014b). The idea of both options 
was to reduce levels of financial return for the largest projects and even out 
levels of return across scales of projects. The proposed banding and tiering 
options are shown below in Figure 8-2 and Figure 8-3 respectively.  
 
Figure 8-2. Proposed option (231) for banded biomethane tariff (DECC, 2014b, p41) 
 
                                            
31 One other similar but more complex banded tariff, with similar tariff levels was proposed as a 




Figure 8-3. Proposed option for tiered biomethane tariff (DECC, 2014b, p45) 
Following the consultation, DECC announced that they would introduce a tiered 
tariff as opposed to a banding approach but that the tiered tariff would have 
three levels. However, the proposed tiered tariff had higher tariff levels than any 
of the proposals in the consultation (DECC, 2014c). The proposed tariffs are 
shown in Figure 8-4 but are not directly comparable to those in Figure 8-3 
because the split of tiers has changed between consultation and response. This 
increase in tariffs from consultation was, according to DECC, because 
responses had suggested that DECC’s assumptions regarding feedstocks 
contained too high a proportion of food waste and this food waste had been 
assigned too high a value (referred to as ‘gate fees’) (DECC, 2014c). The new 
tiered tariff was introduced in January 2015 at the higher tariff rates32 (Ofgem, 
2018c). After this date, the expenditure on biomethane has been above (in 
some cases double) expected levels (DECC, 2016a) suggesting that the new 
tariff had little effect on reducing the growth of biomethane and this appears as 
a positive policy change for industry33. 
                                            
32 These are actually higher than the rates in the Government response as they had been 
increased to take account of inflation 
33 In light of deployment beyond expected levels, the biomethane tariff has since been 
automatically reduced by degression and the delivery of new biomethane plant had slowed 
significantly (BEIS, 2018h). However recent data suggests that this year there have been a 
higher number of applications as a result of more recent changes to tariffs which came into 





Figure 8-4. Proposed tiered tariff levels for biomethane following DECC review (DECC, 2014c, p6) 
The second policy change links to rules around the sustainability attributes of 
biomethane. After being delayed, these rules came into force on the 5th October 
2015 (DECC, 2015b). The rules consist of 2 elements: 
1. All bio-energy rewarded by the RHI must meet a certain level of lifecycle 
emissions for each unit of energy produced and this is set at 34.8 
gCO2e/MJ of heat (equivalent to 60% GHG savings against the EU fossil 
fuel average at the time it was introduced) (Adams et al., 2015) 
2. The land on which any bio-energy is grown which will claim the RHI, for 
example energy crops to produce biomethane, must meet certain criteria. 
Crops must not be grown on land which was primary forest, peat land or 
designated for nature conservation activities (Ofgem, 2018b) 
One specific change was made to the rules for sustainability for biomethane 
which meant that the required level of carbon saving was actually less than it 
had been originally expected to be. Originally, DECC explained that the 
greenhouse gas limit for the RHI would be ‘34.8g CO2 equivalent per MJ of 
heat generated’ (DECC, 2013d, p83) like for other bioenergy technologies. The 
inclusion of the term ‘heat generated’ would mean than a conversion factor to 
consider the efficiency of the final combustion in a gas boiler would need to be 
included in the calculation of life cycle emissions.  
The regulations for biomass and biomethane sustainability came into force on 
February 5th 2015 (DECC, 2015a) and the actual requirement to meet the rules 
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came into force on 5th October 2015 (Ofgem, 2015). However, for biomethane, 
the boiler conversion factor was not included in the final regulations. As shown 
in Figure 8-5, under section 2(c) in the regulations, the conversion factor ‘ηh’ is 
not included as it is for other technologies under sections 2(b) and 2(c). As 
explained by DECC in publication of biomass and biomethane sustainability, 
‘When biomass sustainability becomes a requirement of the RHI we will not 
initially require biomethane producers to take end-use efficiency into account 
when calculating their life-cycle GHG savings, i.e. they will need to produce life-
cycle GHG emissions of 34.8gCO2e/MJ or less at the point of injection’ (DECC, 
2015b).  
 
Figure 8-5. Extract from 2015 RHI regulations showing that for biogas and solid biomass (b) a conversion 
factor (ηh) is used but for biomethane (c) it is not included (Parliament, 2015) 
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This change effectively reduced the required level of carbon reduction for 
biomethane under the sustainability rules by around 10% because the energy 
losses in gas boilers no longer needed to be considered in the GHG calculation 
(based on 90% boiler efficiency) (11). In practice, this means that producers of 
biomethane would be able to use higher carbon feedstocks or have operations 
with higher levels of gas leakage than would otherwise have been the case. In 
making the greenhouse gas saving criteria easier to meet, this relaxation of the 
rules from what was previously expected represented a further success for the 
biomethane industry on top of the previously mentioned tariff changes (11, 13, 
14). 
With regards to the first element of policy change in this episode, the tariff 
changes, three interviewees from trade associations which represent 
biomethane interests (egos under the EAR methodology) suggested that this 
tariff change represented a policy influencing success for themselves and the 
biomethane industry and that it came about partly as a result of their lobbying 
activities (11, 13, 14). With regards to the change to the sustainability rules, 
none of the interviewees claimed success but two interviewees suggested they 
were engaging with DECC on the issue (11, 14). 
Using triangulation to consider these policy changes, specifically regarding both 
of these biomethane issues a civil servant working on the RHI at the time 
explained: 
Interviewee: ‘…Biomethane is probably a good example where 
you've got some wealthy landowners who are well connected with 
people in the House of Lords and into the politicians and they can 
smooth the waters or at least make the right phone calls or send 
the right notes and say, my constituent is concerned about this 
issues, can you sort it out. There was quite a lot of that in that 
area. 
RL: And was that when the RHI was first being introduced or is it 
since then? 
Interviewee: It was around all of the changes that we were 
thinking about for biomethane, there was a lot of that background 
activity going on. 
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RL: Was that tariff changes to biomethane? 
Interviewee: Yeah and the sustainability stuff as well. There was 
clearly some back-room stuff going on, it felt like that at times. You 
would get messages coming down from ministerial offices and 
thinking where did that come from? And those people obviously 
knew how to go about doing that, sending the right messages. 
RL: And was that the actual land owners or trade associations 
working with them? 
Interviewee: I think in some cases it was the land owners involved, 
the people who owned the project…I think it did actually help on 
the tariff setting, we did let them off fairly lightly in the end on the 
tariffs. It could've been a lot worse. And the sustainability stuff we 
did delay it for a long time, we did rethink on some of the numbers 
quite a bit as a reaction to some of that lobbying.’  
So in this episode, triangulation with an alter suggested that while the 
biomethane industry may have seen policy successes with regards to 
sustainability criteria and tariffs, this may not be as a result of the trade 
association lobbying but instead a result of the political influence of ‘wealthy 
land-owners’ who were investing in biomethane (23).  
A web search considering grey literature associated with this change has only 
provided limited data. However, a quote from the National Farmers Union 
(NFU), a trade association representing the farming industry and agricultural 
landowners, boasts on its website that the maintenance of a higher biomethane 
tariff agreed by the energy minister until December 2014, was a ‘policy-
influencing ‘win’’ (NFU, 2014). This suggests that the NFU had been lobbying 
around this biomethane tariff issue and believed they had been successful in 
causing DECC to maintain higher biomethane tariffs at least in the short term. 
From a theoretical power perspective, this policy episode highlights the potential 
importance of personal relationships and how these can be related to the first 
face of power. The civil servant is implying that ‘wealthy landowners’ had power 
over DECC with regards to biomethane and that land owners had an element of 
agent based power. It should also be noted that the civil servant suggests that 
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these wealthy land owners have links to the House of Lords and members of 
the House of Lords may be part of or linked to the Government at the time 
providing a possible route for communication between landowners and 
ministers. From a methodological perspective, this episode highlights once 
again how evidence of lobbying may not just emerge from ‘egos’ but also from 
‘alters’ and the EAR instrument could therefore be strengthened by explicitly 
taking this into account. While providing ‘part’ triangulation, this episode also 
highlights the difficulty in obtaining evidence to fully triangulate evidence from 
interviews. It is the potential communications between ministers and ‘wealthy 
landowners’ that would strengthen the findings of this policy episode but 
searches have revealed no evidence of these. 
As a result of the two aspects of this policy episode, biomethane projects are 
allowed 10% higher greenhouse gas emissions than they otherwise would have 
and tariffs were set to be more generous than they otherwise would have been. 
While the focus of this thesis is on the power of actors to cause policy change, 
the policy changes which are the subject of this policy episode appear to have 
had real world impacts. Before the 2014 tariff review, biomethane was 
responsible for 5.8% of the cumulative heat delivered by the non-domestic RHI, 
however, by July 2017, biomethane formed 20% of the heat delivered by the 
scheme and no changes apart from the tariff change seem able to have driven 
this. This indicates that in light of the tariff review, part of which was to control 
the growth of biomethane, the delivery of biomethane actually increased as a 
proportion of the scheme (Based on BEIS, (2017b) statistics) and deployed 
beyond pre-determined budget limits (DECC, 2016b). This is particularly 
interesting considering that the Government’s 2011 impact assessment 
expected biomethane and on-site biogas combustion combined to be 
responsible for just 7% of the scheme’s overall output. It is also likely that the 
carbon savings associated with biomethane in the non-domestic RHI have been 
reduced due to the change in the sustainability criteria causing further real world 
impacts. 
8.14  CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented a number of UK heat generation policy ‘episodes’ 
between 2003 and 2015 where the power of actors to cause policy change has 
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been investigated. These episodes primarily but not solely emerged from 
interview data and were developed using the triangulation approach of the EAR 
instrument. The period outlined in this chapter represents an important time in 
UK energy policy associated with heat decarbonisation with the introduction of 
large scale financial support for renewable heat and the development of a long-
term vision for the UK heating system under carbon constraints. 
Key episodes where actors have had or attempted to have power over the 
policy process include the role of individuals and the Renewable Energy 
Association in the creation of the RHI legislation, the political power of the 
secretary of state to push the RHI into existence, the role of evidence to shape 
the heat strategy and the tariffs for renewable heat support and the role of high-
level political support for the biomethane. Throughout the chapter, how the 
policy episodes relate to the key theoretical understandings of power introduced 
previously, have been discussed. Table 6 below summarises the key elements 
of power identified within each episode as well as the depth of triangulation 
which was possible. Where the fourth face of power has been potentially 
identified, the 4 is followed by a question mark to highlight the difficulty and 
uncertainty of this element of power. ‘N/A’ indicates that power or an element of 
power has not been clearly identified in the episode. 
Policy episode Face of 
power 
identified 
Structural or agent 
based power 












1, 2 Structural, 
associated with 
ministerial authority 






2 - The creation of 
the Renewable 
Heat Incentive in 
law (2008) 
1, 2, 3 Structural, 
associated with the 
power of MPs and 






authority of MPs 







3 - RHI scheme 
design (2009-
2010) 
N/A N/A N/A Thorough 
4 – How to fund 
the RHI (2009-
2010) 
N/A N/A N/A Thorough 
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5 - The brief 
overlooking of the 
RHI (2010) 
N/A N/A N/A None 
6 - The mandarin 
and the near 
death of the RHI 
(2010-2011) 
1 Structural, 
associated with the 
authority of a senior 
civil servant 
‘Power over’, the 
civil servant had 
power over the 
policy change 
Part 
7 - RHI scheme 
implementation 
(2011) 
1 Structural power of  
Government 
highlighted in ability 
to make significant 
policy change 














8 - The increasing 
importance of heat 
in Government 
and the 
emergence of a 
heat strategy 
(2011-2012) 
N/A N/A N/A Part 
9 - The 
electrification 
vision (2012) 
4? N/A N/A Thorough 




1,2,3,4? Primarily agent 
based 






11 - The launch of 
the domestic RHI 
(2013-2014) 
N/A N/A N/A Part 
12 – More cash for 
biomass (2013-
2014) 
4? N/A N/A Thorough 
13 - Biomethane 
tariff review and 
sustainability 
(2014-2015) 
1 Agent based in the 
sense that 
individuals caused 
the changed to 
happen but 
structural in that this 
was built on existing 
relationships 
Primarily ‘power to’ 
as this was driven 




Table 6. Summary of elements of power identified within policy episodes and depth of triangulation 
This chapter has also highlighted the difficulties with measuring and explaining 
the role of power in policy change. Issues include being able to corroborate the 
comments of interviewees, competing views, obtaining valuable evidence and 
the scale of investigation. 
Importantly for policy, a number of the policy changes identified in this chapter 
have provided greater levels of support for bio-energy technologies and it is bio-
energy which has dominated the RHI scheme so far (see section 2.4.2.3). As 
actors have been identified as being successful in affecting some of these 
changes and these changes seem to have affected deployment of renewable 
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heat, it seems very likely that industrial actors have had the power to affect 
renewable heat deployment in the United Kingdom. This chapter has therefore 
highlighted the power that actors associated with socio-technical systems can 
have on policies associated with transitions of those systems. It has shown that 
the power of those actors can have real world implications and therefore 







9 UK CASE STUDY - ACTORS IN THE UK 
HEAT POLICY NETWORK – RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION SECTION 2 
The previous chapter considered the key policy episodes associated with UK 
heat policy between 2003 and 2015 and the role that power is understood to 
have played in these episodes. Building on the previous chapter, this chapter 
presents the results of analysis which has focused on the UK heat policy 
network, considering the actors and interests who have been involved in heat 
generation policy and their associated actions. 
As described in the methodology section (7.4.1), interview data was coded and 
codes generally fitted into three main themes, ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘how’. The basis 
of this chapter is the ‘who’ aspect of the coding which considers the actors who 
have emerged as being involved in the development of UK heat policy 
development. Links between this, and the other results chapters are indicated 
where relevant. Because the actors emerged from the coding process, actors of 
various sizes are considered, ranging from single individuals up to entire 
Governments. 
To some extent, the methodological approach employed in the previous chapter 
was also used to consider the role of different actors. This meant that where 
possible, data was triangulated between sources (although triangulation 
between egos (lobbyists) and alters (policy makers) was not always possible) in 
order to investigate where specific actors had attempted to influence policy. 
Where actors have been identified attempting to influence the policy process, 
ideas from the faces of power model are introduced in order to understand how 
the approaches of various actors link to theoretical perspectives on power. The 
following sub-sections consider the key actor groups highlighted by the 
interview data and more specific actors are discussed in sub-sub-sections. The 
sections are presented in no particular order. 
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9.1.1 Government power 
A key group of actors which emerged from the coding is ‘Government’ and 
within this code, comments from interviewees referred to the ability of 
Government (and Government associated actors, such as civil servants, 
ministers and associated bodies) to have power over policy change. Overall this 
group had the highest number of references after the coding. This section 
briefly considers some of the lesser referenced actors within the group, namely 
the Committee on Climate Change and the Treasury; actors with higher 
numbers of references are discussed in more detail below under their own 
headings. 
Two interviewees specifically mentioned the influence of the statutory 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) for raising the profile of heat (5) and also 
for the production of evidence such as reports which have then used been used 
for wider lobbying work by NGOs (39). The position of the Committee on 
Climate Change as a statutory body which can produce recommendations that 
the Government must legally respond to (Parliament, 2008a) suggests they 
have an element of power over the Government and this is linked to their legal 
standing so this could be seen as a more structural form of power. However, 
while the role of the CCC was mentioned briefly in policy episode 9 (the 
electrification vision) in the previous chapter, the actual power of the CCC on 
heat policy did not emerge as a driver for any policy change identified in any of 
the policy episodes.   
A number of interviewees recognised the role of HM Treasury in the 
development of UK heat policy and most of these comments concerned the 
RHI. The Treasury was mentioned specifically in policy episode 5 concerning 
the funding of the RHI which was eventually allocated through the 2010 
spending review led by the Treasury (HM Treasury, 2010b). This policy episode 
suggests that the Treasury, which controls Government spending did have 
some power over the RHI, as without funding from Treasury, it wouldn’t have 
existed. Two civil servants suggested that they were actually very pleased that 
there was any funding for the RHI; this was after all at a time when Government 
was looking to reduce regulation and spending (24, 26) and so from this 
perspective, the Treasury and its behaviour was seen favourably.  
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One interviewee suggested that the Treasury had forced a reduction in the 
maximum rate for tariffs under the RHI to a rate equivalent to the support 
offered to offshore wind with the aim of ensuring value for money (10). This 
particular link to offshore wind costs is mentioned in the Government’s 2011 
RHI consultation response document which explains that the reason support for 
solar thermal technology in the non-domestic sector was initially set at 
8.5p/kWh (lower than had previously been consulted on) was because the 
Government did not want to fund anything which was more expensive than 
offshore wind; offshore wind support at the time equated to 8.5p/kWh. However, 
the spending review document does not mention this cost cap (HM Treasury, 
2010b) and so it is not possible to ascertain that the Treasury did have power 
over this policy change; other grey literature providing further insight into this 
issue has not been located.  
Policy episode 8, which considered the development of the DECC heat strategy 
work also involved the Treasury although it was not apparent in this episode 
that the Treasury did have any power over that element of policy. 
Whilst comments regarding the Treasury weren’t necessarily negative, they do 
indicate the power of the finance ministry over energy policy making with 
departmental spending decisions being fundamentally controlled the Treasury. 
This indicates that the Treasury had power over elements of DECC’s decisions 
around the RHI and was able to exhibit the first face of power in controlling the 
overall RHI budget which it can do as a result of its institutional situation. The 
power of the Treasury could therefore be seen as a more structural form of 
power.  
The following two sub-sections consider two types of Government actors which 
emerged as particularly important from the coding of actors. 
9.1.1.1 Civil Servants  
Unsurprisingly, many general comments referring to the power within the 
development of heat policy recognised the important role of civil servants in 
shaping policy outcomes (19, 11, 16, 19, 23, 31, 32, 38). In the policy process, 
civil servants are central to the development of policies and all policy decisions 
will at some point involve civil servants (although it will be ministers who make 
most final decisions). Interestingly, some interviewees believed that the 
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personal situations of civil servants would affect their beliefs and objectivity in 
decision making (19) as would their own efforts to protect their jobs (10). The 
implication is therefore that civil servants may not necessarily make fully 
objective decisions. 
More institutional issues which were suggested included the fact that many civil 
servants were economists rather than engineers and some believed this had 
negatively affected policy as decisions were being made without a good 
understanding of technologies (10, 32) (recent civil service data does not 
provide data on the background of civil servants and so this claim cannot be 
validated (ONS, 2018)). Others commented on high rates of staff turnover 
explaining that because civil servants frequently changed roles there were 
issues with continuity (11, 31). Some interviewees also suggested that internal 
conflicts and the separation between DECC departments had affected policy 
outcomes, for example some civil servants focused on renewables targets and 
others focused on reducing carbon emissions and as a result, there have been 
conflicting policy goals (16, 17, 19). One policy issue linked to this idea of policy 
conflicts was the design of the RHI which initially targeted deployment of 
renewable energy rather than reducing greenhouse gas emissions; this was 
discussed previously in policy episode 6. It should be noted that more recently, 
the Government has modified support under the RHI to support technologies 
with a longer term and low carbon strategic importance (BEIS, 2016). 
A number of interviewees believed that the ‘submission’ process for making 
policy decisions in DECC empowered civil servants (10, 28, 32). This process is 
the main method by which ministers decide on the course of policy and involves 
the production of papers on particular issues which are placed within the 
relevant minister’s red briefcase at the end of the day to take home (Civil 
Service Learning, 2015). Within these submissions, civil servants will outline a 
policy issue on which a decision needs to be made by a minister and propose a 
number of options, normally including a preferred option (28). One interviewee 
believed this allowed civil servants to make their preferred outcome more likely 
(10): 
‘the submissions they send to ministers are written in a very 
compelling fashion if they want a particular outcome. They are 
very talented at slanting the submission towards that outcome, 
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‘would the minister agree that...?’ And you get four or five things 
that look really appealing and you don't necessarily get the 
alternatives’ (10) 
Unfortunately, while this submission process may be seen as empowering for 
civil servants, submissions are not publicly available and so grey literature is not 
available to consider this issue in more detail.  
Because of the perceived importance of civil servants, some interviewees 
recognised the importance of building relationships to ensure that civil servants 
support policy ideas as well as ministers (23, 26). 
‘…basically you need to have the officials on side already. The 
officials need to think that actually this idea, from these people is 
quite a good one and you need to try and convince the minister 
let's do it together. So we'll [civil servants] come with you and 
persuade the minister it's a good idea but your chances of going in 
completely cold to a minister and persuading them some new 
thing are slim I think unless you do get very lucky’ (23)     
Another interviewee supported this idea and explained that they had found the 
use of employing a lobbyist very limited and ‘because of the attitudes in DECC it 
ultimately wouldn't have mattered if we'd employed Saatchi and Saatchi (a 
major communications agency), it wouldn’t have made much difference’ (38). 
The previous paragraphs indicate general thoughts on the power of civil 
servants to drive policy and show that interviewees perceive civil servants as 
powerful. However, the previous chapter highlighted that the only time a civil 
servant clearly had power (according to triangulation of the data collected in this 
research) was in policy episode 6 where DECC’s permanent secretary slowed 
down the introduction of the domestic RHI. That is not to say civil servants have 
not had power elsewhere and they are clearly involved in all policy decisions 
however, this is the only time when this research has showed the clear power of 
civil servants. It should also be noted that the potential power of civil servants is 
closely linked to their position in Government where they have the ability to do 
things that others cannot, such as draft legislation and policy and work closely 
with ministers. The power of civil servants is then clearly linked to their 




Interviews also highlighted that ministers were seen as powerful actors 
associated with the development of heat policy. UK government departments 
are led by a combination of a permanent secretary from the civil service side 
and ministers from a political side; a secretary of state is the minister with 
overall responsibility for the department. Within the departmental relationship, 
the political side is responsible for setting the direction of a department, 
representing the department in Parliament and publicly and making policy 
decisions (Civil Service Learning, 2015).  
The submission process which forms the basis for policy decision making has 
been discussed in section 9.1.1.1. While civil servants appear to have some 
power over policy decisions, interviewees specifically recognised the political 
power of ministers (14, 19, 32):  
‘civil servants prepare and in the end it is always the minister that 
decides’ (14) 
‘that [the evidence base] can be circumvented by ministerial diktat, 
a minister can have their own personal likes and dislikes and drive 
the debate however they want’ (19) 
Examples from the policy episodes of ministerial support for policies include 
Margaret Beckett pushing for the introduction of condensing boilers when she 
was in power (8, 20)(policy episode 1) and Chris Huhne, when secretary of 
state for DECC supporting the introduction of the RHI (policy episode 26, 29) 
(policy episode 5); Greg Barker (as a minister for DECC) was also recognised 
as being generally supportive of the RHI policy (28). Triangulation in the 
previous chapter showed that it was only Margaret Beckett during policy 
episode one who had power to cause the policy change and actually policy 
episode 6 highlights how the power of ministers can be constrained, in this case 
by the civil servants (limiting the scope of the RHI). 
In another example of the limits of ministerial power, according to one 
interviewee, Greg Barker was personally very supportive of introducing a 
specific heat subsidy for combined heat and power systems; however, in light of 
concerns among civil servants and thorough analysis, no such direct support 
was introduced (36). As this was an internal DECC issue, no grey literature is 
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available to confirm this. It was also suggested that it was well known in DECC 
that Greg Barker was closely connected to the REA (Renewable Energy 
Association trade association) and so civil servants ensured that they took 
views from across stakeholders and scientific evidence on relevant issues 
rather than purely following Greg Barker (26, this has not been confirmed by 
grey literature); this again highlights the potential ability of civil servants to limit 
of ministerial power.  
Understanding the power of a minister to make policy change is not a simple 
matter and there has been no significant research into the power of ministers for 
over four decades (Norton, 2000). Norton's (2000) analysis (a small scale 
review) recognised the impact of civil servants on ministerial power and 
suggested that ministers generally saw their relationships with civil servants as 
‘positive’ (p112). While this previous analysis explained that ministers have the 
power and legal authority to make decisions other people cannot, it suggested 
the biggest limit to the power of ministers was the prime minister or the 
chancellor or other external influences such as the EU. This again highlights the 
limits of the power of ministers and policy episode 5 describes a specific time 
when the Treasury had power over the minister, in this case deciding whether 
or not to allow funding for the RHI. 
There is no doubt that Government ministers have some level of power in 
driving policy, both in their ability to control the direction of departments and in 
their role as final decisions makers on policies, and these aspects have been 
shown within this research. However, the power of ministers is bounded by their 
institutional setting and is limited by both what the wider Government (including 
the Treasury) is doing and also bounded by the structures of the Government 
which places a significant level of power on civil servants to control or in some 
cases limit the wants of ministers.  
From this research I have shown that ministers can exhibit characteristics of the 
first face of power having power over policy decisions and that they can also 
exhibit characteristics of the second face of power in their ability to set 
departmental policy agendas. However, this research has also highlighted the 
limits of the power of ministers, suggesting that ministerial power alone may 
often not be enough to drive policy change and the power of ministers, as with 
other actors must be considered in its institutional context. The power of 
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ministers like that of civil servants can also be seen as associated with more 
structural ideas of power linked to their privileged position. 
9.1.2 The incumbent heat actors 
The idea of ‘incumbency’ was introduced to this thesis in chapter 2 which 
considered the development of UK heat pathways. The idea was also discussed 
in section 3.3 which considered the power of incumbents to affect transitions. 
The interests of and engagement by incumbents around heat policy was visible 
in two policy episodes including episode 1 (gas boiler manufacturers and the 
introduction of condensing boilers) and policy episode 10 (the gas industry, the 
heat strategy and the future role for gas). This section considers the specific 
interview data associated with incumbents and their power in the heat policy 
process. The following sub-sections focus on specific incumbents or groups of 
incumbents. 
A number of interviewees suggested that the RHI was currently too small a 
policy to concern the large incumbent companies (11, 13, 23, 34). This could 
explain why there appears to be limited engagement by incumbents around the 
RHI, but some engagement on more strategic issues (the gas industry on the 
heat strategy) and those with a more direct impact (boiler manufacturers on 
condensing boilers).   
There was a belief among some interviewees that the size of actors could affect 
their impact on policy. It was suggested that because of their scale, compared 
to non-incumbents, incumbent companies which are already operating at size in 
the heat system had their own ‘momentum’ which keeps the system going 
(anonymous), and that these larger companies have the resources and ability to 
engage in the policy debates which smaller companies do not have 
(anonymous, anonymous, 20). Another interviewee recognised the presence of 
these large heat companies at many heat policy events and conferences (5). 
Overall, findings suggest that larger companies, purely as a result of their scale, 
may have the capacity to engage with policy in a way which smaller companies 
can’t, giving larger companies the capacity to have more power in the policy 
process. This is a similar conclusion to the recent UKERC project investigating 
incumbency in the UK heat sector which showed that the scale of policy 
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engagement by incumbents was far greater than that by new-entrants and 
therefore the voices of new entrants were often not heard (Lowes et al., 2018b). 
One interviewee suggested that because of the lack of proper scrutiny of 
evidence by DECC due to issues with departmental capacity, DECC effectively 
perpetuated the messages of these incumbent companies by often believing 
advice and evidence which they provide at face value (40). The issues of power 
and knowledge is specifically considered in more detail in section 10.1 in the 
next chapter. 
Overall, despite their scale, the impact on heat policy of the UK’s largest energy 
suppliers, the so-called Big 6, appears limited. They were seen to be generally 
supportive of the introduction of the RHI (10, 11), but opposed to the RHI being 
levied on fossil fuels (11, 26, policy episode 4). While some interviewees 
believed that the Big 6 companies had large teams of policy and government 
relations staff and a capacity for detailed work on heat, interviewees couldn’t 
attribute any specific heat policy changes to the Big 6 players (16, 19). A 
possible reason for this is simply due to the limited interest of the Big 6 in this 
area (23), suggesting that the Big 6 did not see heat policy as a major threat/or 
interest to their businesses. 
The following sub-sections consider specific incumbents or groups of 
incumbents which were highlighted during interviews. They are shown in no 
particular order and some sections have been anonymised for ethical and legal 
reasons outlined in section 7.6. 
9.1.2.1 Company ‘A’ (identity protected) 
‘A’, a company which distributes fossil fuel to houses and buildings off the gas 
grid appeared in a number of both civil servant and industry interviewee 
comments (11, 15, 26, 29, 39). Company ‘A’ also appeared in policy episode 4. 
Interviewees believed ‘A’ had been a very vocal member of the heat policy 
network but suggested the impact of their engagement may have been limited. 
One civil servant asked, ‘who pays any attention to ‘A’?’ (anonymous) and this 
may be linked to the fact that ‘A’ only represent a small part of the market (24). 
Nonetheless, despite being small (company ‘A’ supply approximately 70,000 
homes (anonymous)), ‘A’ appear in a large number of interviewee comments. It 
was suggested that ‘A’’s focus was on the RHI rather than the heat strategy in 
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general (24). This is perhaps because the RHI is more focused on off-gas-grid 
homes which is company ‘A’’s main market and the scheme was specifically 
designed to displace higher carbon fossil fuels such as those used off the gas 
grid (11). 
Policy episode 4 highlighted the behaviour of company ‘A’ explaining that they 
had lobbied in order to stop the RHI being funded through a levy on fossil fuels 
which could affect them. As well as publishing research (highlighted in policy 
episode 4 around the costs of the RHI), interviewees also explained that ‘A’ had 
attempted to negatively frame renewable heat technologies. One interviewee 
explained that ‘A’ had publicly negatively framed the performance of heat pump 
systems (31) and it was also suggested that ‘A’ had even publicly attacked the 
performance of oil heating systems in order to reduce public confidence and 
Government support for oil heating (anonymous). Another interviewee 
suggested that ‘A’ also publicly questioned the sustainability of biomass 
heating34, a topic on which ‘A’ released a report titled ‘Biomess’ which has since 
been removed from their website (11). However, grey literature confirms the 
existence of this ‘Biomess’ report which was reported in the Telegraph 
newspaper in 2009; the media reporting of this information in the Telegraph also 
suggests ‘A’ was looking to raise the profile of renewable heat issues and ‘A’s 
specific concerns (reference not included to maintain anonymity).  
Interestingly, despite previous publicly raised concerns with bioenergy, both the 
oil heating sector and the liquefied petroleum gas sector have since come out in 
support of using bio-energy (bio-diesel and bio-LPG respectively) for heating as 
this is seen as a way to decarbonise heat while not requiring new appliances 
(Oftec, 2017; UK LPG, 2017). This more recent support for bio-energy by 
company ‘A’ was recognised by a number of interviewees (6, 29, 38). This 
change in approach by company ‘A’ suggests that the company has moved 
from a lobbying position which looks to stop change to an approach which 
attempts to ensure that the approach to decarbonisation suits the company’s 
interests.   
                                            
34 This is not to say that there are not potential sustainability with biomass heating but to 
highlight the activity of company ‘A’. 
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The approaches used by company ‘A‘ for attempting to affect policy change by 
using aggressive influencing approaches are explored in more detail in section 
10.4 which considers ‘style’, as these appeared as key tactics for attempting to 
influence heat policy. This aggressive approach could be considered linked to 
the third face of power, with company ‘A’ attempting to shape preferences in 
order to affect outcomes. Company ‘A’ could also be seen to be attempting to 
set the agenda (the second face) through the publication of reports and their 
promotion in the media. However, as there are no specific policy wins 
highlighted from this research by ‘A’ but they have clearly been attempting to 
lobby, the success of this more aggressive and overt approach appears, at least 
in this case, limited. 
9.1.2.2 Gas Distribution Networks 
The gas distribution network companies were mentioned by a large number of 
interviewees as being involved in UK heat policy debates. This is unsurprising 
considering that 84% of GB households are connected to the gas network 
(Dodds and McDowall, 2013) and the network is a major heat infrastructure 
asset.  
Interviewees suggested that the gas network companies had actively attempted 
to sow doubts about the idea of electrification of heat, criticising the heat 
strategy and framing heat pumps as poor forms of heat provision; they had  
apparently used reports written by consultants to attempt to do this, such as the 
Delta ee pathways for Heat (Delta ee, 2012) (anonymous, 39). The gas network 
companies had also pushed and highlighted the ‘peak heat’ argument, 
suggesting that because of this issue, electrification was not a good strategy for 
decarbonising heating (9, 25). Both the production of the Delta ee report and 
the promotion of peak heat was highlighted in policy episode 10 and this 
episode shows an element of success by the gas networks in making a case for 
a greater use of gas (at least in the shorter term). Interviewees also suggested 
that the gas networks had supported technologies which supported the 
continuing operation of their businesses such as biogas, biomethane and 
hydrogen (7, 13, 39).  
The future of the gas system and heating is recognised as being an important 
issue for Ofgem’s regulation of the gas networks (5). It was recognised by the 
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networks that if the overall context was that the gas network wouldn’t be there in 
2050, as suggested by DECC’s 2012 strategic framework document (DECC, 
2012e), that would have had a major influence on network regulation and the 
new price control regime for the gas networks which came into operation in 
2013 (Ofgem, 2013) (anonymous). The regulation of the gas networks could 
have had included a much greater focus on decarbonisation, potentially 
reducing allowed investment levels in the gas network which would have a 
negative impact on network company finances. According to one interviewee 
from a gas network, the strategy to push new sustainable forms of gas was a 
result of the upcoming price control review: 
‘I don’t think we were particularly well prepared for it [the Ofgem 
Gas Distribution Price control review RIIO-GD1] , I think it came 
down to an intuitive strategy rather than something which was 
more rationally determined, I think it was probably some very 
clever people at the very top saying ‘we've forgot we can make 
gas renewable’’ (anonymous) 
It is certainly the case that there may be some potential for the decarbonisation 
of heat using lower carbon forms of gas. However, there are major uncertainties 
on the potential scale of and role for low carbon gas and it is far from clear that 
the complete decarbonisation of the UK’s gas grid is even possible (Speirs et 
al., 2017). 
Another interviewee believed the gas networks framed the idea of heat primarily 
as a consumer issue in order to promote maintenance of the system in its 
current form: 
‘what they do is that when one goes to meetings about heat 
someone from the gas networks or the energy networks or 
somewhere, they will usually say something about how we've got 
to think about the consumer, that's how it masquerades, ‘we've 
got to think about the consumer, the consumer values all these 
sorts of things, cheap convenient instantaneous, easily 
changeable and I think we've gotta value their perspective in these 
changes, we've got to take them with us,’ by which they mean 
don’t do anything yet’ (40) 
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This specific frame around consumers has been highlighted a number of times 
and is considered in more detail in section 10.2.5. 
Interviewees recognised the gas networks as being important incumbent actors 
during the development of UK heat policy, particularly around the Government’s 
long term view of heat. The previous chapter also recognised that the gas 
networks were clearly involved in policy episode 10 which saw an increased 
role for gas in the early stages of heat decarbonisation and suggested that the 
gas networks had been partly successful in driving this change. This success 
appears primarily linked to the provision of evidence to Government which could 
be seen as being linked to the third face of power around the shaping of 
preferences and also the fourth face around the power of knowledge. 
Highlighting the so-called ‘peak heat’ issue and issues with consumers could 
also be seen as a form of framing and this is considered in more detail in 
section 10.2. 
Overall, the UK gas networks companies are perceived as relatively powerful 
actors and appear to have used their power to have some success. It appears 
that since interviews took place, gas networks have maintained their activity 
around heat decarbonisation policy. Recently, work specifically on incumbency 
in the UK heat sector has shown that the gas distribution networks have been 
one of the most politically active parts of the heat sector and have in particular 
been strongly promoting ideas of decarbonising the gas grid with low carbon 
forms of green gas (Lowes et al., 2018b). 
9.1.2.3 National Grid 
National Grid is a private company which owns gas distribution networks35 as 
well as gas transmission networks, electricity transmission and gas and 
electricity system operations (National Grid, 2015). The company was 
mentioned by a number of stakeholders in relation to power and the 
development of UK heat policy and clearly has a number of interests across 
both gas and electricity sectors. As discussed in the previous chapter (section 
8.10), heat system modelling commissioned by National Grid was adopted by 
                                            
35 National Grid PLC previously owned the entirety of National Grid Gas Distribution which was 
the UK largest gas distribution network. In 2017 National Grid PLC sold 61% of its share of the 
company and the company has since been renamed ‘Cadent’ (National Grid, 2017) 
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DECC in their 2013 heat strategy, ‘Meeting the Challenge’, document (DECC, 
2013k). National Grid had initially used this modelling to explain to DECC that 
there was an issue with peak heat and that the full electrification scenario could 
be very expensive. While civil servants recognised National Grid’s vested 
interest, it was still seen as a valid point that a number of different people could 
have made (24).  
It was however suggested by a number of interviewees that National Grid is 
influential and that their modelling and their annual ‘Future Energy Scenarios’ 
‘puts them in quite a strong place’ because of their ability to shape the energy 
debate (anonymous). Another interviewee explained that National Grid frame 
arguments based on their importance and role in the energy system, in the 
interviewee’s words, the ‘you need us’ frame: 
‘They've [National Grid] got a lot of power. So the Government's 
got to talk to the Big Six, well God they have to talk to National 
Grid. Without National Grid on-side, everything stops.’ 
(anonymous) 
Another interviewee mentioned their ‘crazy biomethane projections which still 
reverberate today and still get quoted’ (anonymous). These projections 
suggested that in a stretch scenario, 48% of the UK’s domestic (household) gas 
demand could be met by gas produced from biogenic sources by 2020, 
however this relied on all waste being fully segregated and all being treated by 
either anaerobic digestion or gasification (National Grid, 2009). In the 
Committee on Climate Change’s 2011 Review of Bioenergy, the Committee 
recognised that the role of bioenergy in decarbonising domestic heating was 
likely to be very limited due to the limited availability of bioenergy resources and 
the optimal use of the limited bio-resources available would be in industrial heat 
uses (Committee on Climate Change, 2011). 
Despite the fact that the National Grid biogas projections were described as 
‘crazy’, they have been used as a data source for energy system modelling 
work by the Energy Networks Association which represents gas and electricity 
networks (Redpoint Energy, 2010). This provides a good example of how 
information can be repeated and institutionalised becoming knowledge and 
provides an interesting example linked to the fourth face of power where ideas 
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and knowledge are repeated throughout society by individuals. Although this 
example highlights how knowledge can be repeated, there is no evidence from 
this research that the Redpoint scenarios have been seen as credible or 
influential.   
While it is apparent that National Grid did actively seek to promote lower carbon 
gases and the peak heat argument in order to attempt to maintain a future role 
for their gas network, an interviewee from National Grid explained that if the 
evidence had shown something different, they would have taken a different 
direction (anonymous). It is difficult to see exactly what the role or even interest 
of National Grid in heat policy is because of their energy system wide role. The 
energy system model which was eventually used by DECC for its heat strategy 
work was apparently produced by ‘National Grid’ group rather than gas parts of 
the business (Redpoint Energy, 2012). It is however clear that National Grid 
attempted to promote the role of their gas assets throughout the development of 
UK heat policies and interviewees saw them as an actor with some power in the 
heat policy debate. Similarly to the gas networks mentioned in the previous 
section, the approaches used by National Grid can be associated with 
attempting to shape preferences and linked to the use of knowledge (the third 
and fourth face of power respectively). 
9.1.2.4 Worcester Bosch 
Worcester Bosch was mentioned by a number of interviewees as a company 
which has been active in the UK heat policy network. The company, which is a 
UK brand in the thermo-technology division of Bosch, predominantly 
manufactures gas and oil boilers (Bosch, 2015).  
During this research, Worcester Bosch has been accused of opposing the 
introduction of condensing boilers (20) (policy episode 1) and separately 
attempting to influence the sustainable heat debate in order to maintain their 
business of selling fossil fuel boilers (20, 31, 39). A civil servant in DECC 
explained that despite originally supporting the use of sustainable heat systems, 
this support was reduced and ‘NAME REDACTED (representative of Worcester 
Bosch) ‘has really started kind of anti, an anti-heat pump sort-of-thing going on’ 
(23). This approach of attempting to damage other technologies has been 
highlighted elsewhere in this research with attempts by company ‘A’ described 
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in section 9.1.2.1 to attempt to damage the reputation of biomass, oil and heat 
pump heating technologies. Policy episode 11 also saw attempts by the ground 
source heat pump industry to damage the reputation of air source heat pumps 
and ASHP tariffs were reduced (though not necessarily linked to the work of the 
GSHP industry). Like with previous actors in this section, this approach of 
attempting to shape the preferences of policy makers in order to shape policy 
outcomes appears to be linked the third face of power whereby actors look to 
shape the preferences of policy makers by attempting to affect their perceptions 
of (potentially) competing technologies. 
Interviewees also specifically suggested that Worcester Bosch was attempting 
to block policy change in order to protect its UK business: 
‘Anonymous: Take a closer look at Bosch, and look at where they 
make those renewable technologies. 
RL: Well they're not made in the UK… 
Anonymous: They're certainly not, certainly not and they've got 
two factories, one in Worcester and one in Derbyshire, one in 
Derby, one of them makes gas boilers and the other one makes 
oil boilers and irrespective of being part of the wider Bosch group, 
if we moved to a market where there was a nose dive in the sale 
of gas and oil products, what would happen to those factories and 
the jobs of the people who are employed…So I don’t know that it's 
always a case of people acting in the best interests of their 
corporate masters. They employ full time NAME REDACTED to 
just keep dripping negativity into this agenda wherever they can 
so they say they're pro-renewables but when you look at what 
they actually advocate, I think that's questionable.’ 
Another interviewee made similar comments suggesting Worcester Bosch ‘talk 
a good game in public but behind closed doors do everything they possibly can 
to not have to change their business models’ (39). Two interviewees also 
suggested that Worcester Bosch has a strategy of suggesting that Government 
pushes back decisions further into the future with the aim of protecting their 
business in the short term (20, 39). There is nothing highlighted from interviews 
to suggested that Worcester Bosch actually caused the Government to do this. 
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An interviewee from Worcester Bosch explained that they did sell solar thermal 
systems and heat pumps but because of the design of the RHI, only biomass 
had done well under the scheme and went on to describe energy policy as ‘a 
bloody nuisance’ (17).   
Although Worcester Bosch has been recognised for its negativity towards 
change, one civil servant explained (without providing further information on 
why) ‘…no-one’s really listened to them that much…’ (23) and so in the view of 
that civil servant their impact was limited. With regards to the introduction of 
condensing boilers in policy episode 1, Worcester Bosch were accused of 
opposing the introduction of condensing boilers and if that was the case, then 
they clearly were not successful there either. While Worcester Bosch may have 
been active within the policy network, their actual influence on policy seems 
limited from this research. Grey literature regarding the behaviour of Worcester 
Bosch at the time before the interviews is limited however, recent work has 
shown that Worcester Bosch continues to promote heat decarbonisation options 
which maintain the need for gas and oil boilers (Lowes et al., 2018b). 
9.1.3 Lower carbon heat actors 
Companies, organisations and individuals involved with lower carbon (or more 
sustainable) forms of heating emerged from interviews as another important 
group of actors. This section briefly considers some of these actors highlighted 
from the analysis and the following subsections then considers specific actors 
who were suggested to be particularly involved in heat policy.   
Firstly, with regards to biogas and biomethane, The Anaerobic Digestion and 
Bio-resources Association (ADBA) were recognised by a number of 
interviewees as being important for the development of support for biomethane 
and biogas in the RHI (9, 11, 14). It was also recognised by civil servants in 
both DECC and Ofgem that their role and their approach created a very good 
working relationship which was beneficial for both sides (23, 26, 34). However, 
the key policy changes which supported biomethane recognised in policy 
episode 13 were not attributed to ADBA but to landowners with connections in 
the House of Lords. It is of course possible that these House of Lords 
connections were associated with ADBA which was initially set up by Liberal 
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Democrat Lord Rupert Redesdale (ADBA, 2017) however grey literature has not 
provided any specific evidence regarding the role of that specific peer. 
There were also a number of comments regarding the Association for 
Decentralised Energy (ADE, formerly The CHPA). A number of interviewees 
recognised that the ADE was often present within the heat policy network (5, 
15, 23, 26, 30, 36), and like ADBA the ADE provided useful information to 
Government (23). However, as described within policy episode 8, whilst the 
ADE believed they had influenced heat policy, their impact on policy was not 
confirmed by policy makers. It was recognised that they have had some 
influence on heat networks policy, leading the development of the voluntary 
heat network code of practice (5) a scheme which was led by The ADE (Heat 
Trust, 2018) and supported by BEIS (BEIS, 2018e). So, while the ADE has 
clearly been present in much of the debate around heat policy, this research 
has not highlighted any major political power associated with them. It is 
however worth noting that there is significant financial and policy support from 
Government for the development of district heat networks through the Heat 
Networks Investment Programme and the Heat Networks Delivery Unit (BEIS, 
2017b) and the sector has received increased policy support.   
A large number of interviewees recognised the engagement of the heat pump 
industry on heat policy. However, many of these comments are associated with 
specific actors and the two key actors, the Sustainable Energy Association and 
company ‘B’ (identity protected) are considered in more detail in the following 
sub-sections (9.1.3.2 and 9.1.3.4 respectively). One interviewee suggested that 
because the heat pump industry was represented by various bodies including 
the SEA, the Ground Source Heat Pump Association and The Heat Pump 
Association among others, they each had their own interests and could never 
agree and were therefore generally ineffective at influencing policy (23). Linking 
back to the theoretical understandings of power this potential lack of power from 
not joining up could also been seen as a lack of intransitive power. These 
organisations were not working together to meet a shared goal and may have 
been more successful if they were, by forming coalitions. 
The following sections focus in more detail on the activity of actors associated 
with low-carbon heat who emerged from the interviews as being particularly 
important with regards to the development of UK heat policy. 
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9.1.3.1 The biomass industry (and their policy luck)  
A large number of interviewees mentioned the role of the biomass heating 
industry in the development of UK heat policy and there was a general belief 
that because of how favourably the industry had been treated under the RHI, 
the biomass industry was powerful. However, the policy episodes didn’t indicate 
any points at which the biomass industry had caused actual policy change 
(although the episodes did identify that the industry were clearly engaging).  
One interviewee from a potentially competing technology suggested that the 
RHI was ‘…definitely influenced by the biomass lobby, to what extent, I don’t 
know’ (16) and separately a civil servant explained that the REA, who 
represented much of the biomass for heat industry, were both engaged and 
vocal. However, many other interviewees suggested that the success of 
biomass had been down much more to the introduction of higher than expected 
tariffs emerging from DECC’s own evidence base (6, 10, 25, 36). Indeed, policy 
episode 7 explained that the non-domestic biomass RHI tariff had been 
increased at the time it was introduced compared to when it was consulted on. 
While according to DECC, the significant change to the large biomass tariff was 
for reasons of cost effectiveness (DECC, 2011c), it was also the case that the 
underlying cost database had been updated and suggested that biomass 
boilers appeared slightly more expensive than they had previously (AEA, 2011) 
and therefore would receive a slightly higher tariff (DECC, 2011d).   
Policy episode 11 showed that the original tariff for biomass heating under the 
domestic RHI was increased well above the proposed range of 5.2 to 8.7p/kWh 
up to 12.2p/kWh and this change was also linked to changes made to the 
underlying evidence base rather than the power of a particular actor. Policy 
episode 12 saw increased budgets made available for biomass systems in the 
non-domestic scheme, maintaining tariffs at levels which were higher than they 
otherwise would have been; while the biomass industry was supportive of this 
change, evidence does not show that the biomass industry caused this change. 
Although the RHI has created significant growth in the use of biomass heating, 
interviewees suggested that like other actors, the biomass industry had still 
attempted to influence both biomass policy and the market through attempting 
to negatively frame other technologies including heat pumps (3, 26). With 
regards to an individual working in the biomass sector, one interviewee from the 
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civil service explained ‘he would just suddenly fly off the handle in a rage about 
how bad heat pumps were and how DECC were effectively being criminals for 
even considering subsidising heat pumps at all of any description’, the civil 
servant described this engagement as ‘odd’ (anonymised). The civil servant 
went on to that this specific actor had even gone to the time to upload YouTube 
videos explaining the economics of biomass heat system and the implications 
for policy. Two other interviewees also mentioned the same actor with both 
interviewees using the word ‘rant’ to describe the communication approach of 
the actor in question (anonymous, 11). It appears that the approaches of this 
specific actor did little to help their cause and may have actually reduced their 
impact and potential to have power by damaging relationships with policy 
makers. This approach could be linked to ideas of the third face of power 
around the shaping of preferences of policy makers with an actor attempting to 
shape their views on particular technologies (apparently not very successfully). 
While attempts by the biomass industry could have affected the market, many 
believed that the success of biomass was simply due to the high level of the 
tariffs and the fact that biomass was simply better suited to the market than heat 
pumps in that it could easily replace oil boilers and even be a distress 
purchase36 (32, 33, 34, 38). Although the biomass industry wasn’t recognised 
as being particularly successful at influencing policy in the policy episodes 
considered in this research, it has been suggested that as the biomass market 
has grown as a result of the RHI, its influence on policy and regulation has 
increased (14, 37, 39). While this growing power hasn’t been observed in this 
research, this could echo issues considered in the previous section on 
incumbents which suggested that the size of an industry gives it a capacity to 
engage with policy in a way which smaller sectors cannot. 
9.1.3.2 The Micropower Council and the Sustainable Energy Association  
A large number of interviewees recognised the heat policy involvement of the 
Micropower Council trade body, which became the Sustainable Energy 
Association. As discussed previously in policy episode 3, two interviewees 
(anonymous) associated with the SEA (then the Micropower Council) suggested 
                                            




that they had been very involved in the design of the RHI scheme. It was 
however not confirmed that the SEA had any actual policy impact despite their 
involvement. 
The SEA was suggested to initially have been particularly supportive of micro-
combined heat and power systems37 and pushed hard for them, but despite 
some policy success in the form of their inclusion in the Feed in Tariff scheme, 
only a very small number have been installed (7, 8). The SEA were recognised 
at the time of interviews as being particularly interested in air source heat 
pumps (7, 10, 11) although their website shows the SEA has a wide variety of 
members including large integrated companies, insulation companies and 
appliance manufacturers (Sustainable Energy Association, 2016). It was 
explained by a representative from the SEA that they are interested in a range 
of within building energy measures (20).  
One interviewee suggested that the SEA had predicted that air source heat 
pumps would dominate the RHI and that this prediction had been wrong (11). 
However, as described in section 2.4.2.2 while ASHPs have had very low 
growth in the non-domestic scheme, heat pumps have been more successful in 
the domestic scheme. ASHPs were also the most popular technology under the 
Renewable Heat Premium Payment (RHPP) scheme (previously discussed in 
section 2.4.2.2) which preceded the full introduction of the domestic RHI 
(DECC, 2014a). Interestingly, one interviewee from the civil service suggested 
that the SEA were closely involved in the development of the RHPP scheme: 
‘Me and NAME REDACTED (SEA employee) sat down together 
and said what are we going to do, we need something and we've 
got something like three weeks to work out a new policy and the 
only thing we could do in the time and with the legal vires we had, 
we had to use existing legal power, was to do a financial support 
scheme that was like a grant’ (26) 
This level of engagement with civil servants implies that the SEA and individuals 
within it had an extremely good relationship with civil servants regarding the RHI 
                                            




and therefore had the capacity to have a great level of power over this area of 
policy. A number of interviewees recognised that the SEA have used a specific 
and relatively unique approach to attempt to influence policy based on detailed 
knowledge of how the UK Government works and the use of evidence. 
Interviewees also suggested that the Chief Executive of the SEA was a good 
lobbyist and he understood DECC and the civil service (7, 8, 16, 29). He had a 
good relationship with DECC (19, 29) as he was able to ‘speak the regulatory 
speak’ (8) which included providing useful evidence (18, 29).  
One civil servant suggested that the relationship with the SEA was very 
beneficial: 
‘the ones that were better at dealing with Government were SEA, 
again just their approach the way that they became a trusted 
confidant, so they were being given information that we weren’t 
prepared to give to other people but we also tested things with 
them quite early doors and we did this with the REA as well so we 
would have a set of early tariffs which of course were very 
commercially sensitive...Dave’s [CEO of SEA] very good at 
building that trusting relationship so he's very much inside the tent 
and he does it very well’ (26) 
However, another civil servant explained that while their analysis was useful, 
they were always slightly ‘sceptical’ of the SEA particularly as the SEA had only 
one analyst: ‘they're a small organisation compared to the might of central 
Government and hundreds of fantastic economists’ (23) although of course this 
comment could apply to many trade associations. Interviewees also recognised 
SEA’s Chief Executive’s strong relationship with ministers (16, 29,) however, it 
was suggested that the chief executive was careful to maintain relationships 
and not to antagonise civil servants by elevating issues to ministers (29). The 
provision of evidence to policy makers from an apparently trusted source could 
be seen as a way of attempting to shape the preferences of policy makers in 
order to have a policy impact (the third face of power) and the general link to 
evidence could be seen as being linked to the fourth face of power.  
The style of engagement used by the SEA varies significantly from the more 
aggressive and negative approach described in some of the previous sections 
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and the issue of the style of advocacy is discussed in further detail in section 
10.4. However, despite wide agreement that the approach of the SEA and its 
representatives was positive and that the SEA had a very good and trusting 
relationship with Government, the policy episodes did not highlight any 
particular lobbying successes for the SEA.  
9.1.3.3 The Renewable Energy Association 
A number of interviewees highlighted The Renewable Energy Association as an 
important actor associated with UK heat policy. The REA featured in policy 
episode 2 focusing on the creation of the RHI in law and policy episode 12 
which considered budget changes which allocated more funds from the RHI for 
biomass. Interviewees suggested the REA have been particularly focused on 
biomass heat (11, 12, 21). The REA does have the Wood Heat Association as a 
subsidiary (Wood Heat Association, 2018). 
The REA consider themselves as very influential in terms of the development of 
UK heat policy (7, 14), with one employee saying ‘we’re the biggest and most 
influential in our area’ (14). Another employee explained that their relationship 
with DECC was so good that DECC would share drafts of regulations with them 
and no-one else (11). A civil servant confirmed that they had shared 
consultation documents and tariffs with the REA early but this information had 
also been shared with the SEA (26). 
The views of the REA on their own significance were confirmed by civil servants 
who worked on both the RHI’s development at DECC and its operation at 
Ofgem (26, 29, 34). One civil servant explained that they ‘dealt with REA the 
most throughout’ the RHI and they were the ‘biggest sort of influence’ (29). 
Their high level of influence was put down to their sophisticated approach which 
according to interviewees involved using a number of different approaches 
together and being extremely collaborative. According to one former DECC 
employee, the REA had ‘positive working engagement with DECC which I think 
has been very productive, whereas some of the other people have taken an 
antagonistic towards the policy makers, it’s not gonna get you very far…the 
REA had a very positive way of working ‘(23). Another interviewee from DECC 
suggested that REA employees knew that providing solutions rather than 
suggesting problems to Government was a good way of working (29). 
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It was also suggested that the REA also had strong political connections, 
particularly with former minister Greg Barker, and was particularly skilled at 
making strong political arguments such as the potential for job creation and 
economic benefits which could ‘push political buttons’ (26).  
Overall, the interview data has shown that the REA see themselves and are 
seen as a particularly important actor linked to UK heat policy and they appear 
to have had some success in have power over policy change around the 
introduction of the RHI legislation (episode 1). Having both civil servants and 
ministers (who are the key actors from Government) in a supportive position 
could clearly be important from a policy change perspective and this appears to 
be how the REA have operated; section 9.1.1.2 suggested that the REA had a 
good relationship with Minister Greg Barker and this section highlights their 
good relationship with civil servants. 
9.1.3.4 Company ‘B’ (identity protected) 
One heat pump company was the subject of a large number of comments in 
interviews and it was recognised that their CEO was particularly vocal (2, 11, 
14, 23, 26, 28, 29). Two main issues came out of the comments regarding 
company ‘B’, firstly the perceived aggressive nature of their policy influencing 
efforts and secondly the role of a member of company ‘B’’s staff and their 
involvement in the civil service. 
With regard to the particular nature of influencing, interviewees described efforts 
by company ‘B’ to negatively describe other technologies (10, 14).  This 
included, as described by the CEO himself, framing other heat pumps as ‘cheap 
Chinese kit’ and playing on fears associated with the high costs of solar PV and 
the costs associated with the UK Feed in Tariff policy for electricity (10). Policy 
episode 11 described how the RHI tariffs for certain technologies were reduced 
but triangulation did not show that this was a result of lobbying by company ‘B’. 
One interviewee also mentioned that the CEO of company ‘B’ had attempted to 
negatively frame biomass combustion technologies and was quoted in a 
national newspaper article (14). The newspaper article in question includes a 
quote from the CEO of company ‘B’ which explains: ‘Policy flaws have resulted 
in absurdly generous tariffs for biomass installations, attracting inexperienced 
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entrants to an immature market which does not benefit from any effective 
regulation’ (reference not included in order to maintain anonymity).38 
It was also reported during interviews, that the conflictual approach of company 
‘B’ was also aimed directly at civil servants and ministers. One civil servant 
explained that it felt like they were ‘at war with NAME REDACTED (CEO of 
company B)’ (23). The minister at the time Greg Barker is recognised as 
referring to him as ‘Voldemort’, the fictional archenemy of Harry Potter 
(anonymous, anonymous). Another civil servant explained with regards to 
company ‘B’:  
Anonymous: ‘one of them we had a love hate relationship, I think 
we loved them and they definitely hated us and that was a 
[location redacted] based company 
RL: [name redacted] (company ‘B’)? 
Anonymous: Oh god yes, he's been very nice to me since I left, 
the guy from there, he's been quite pleasant since I'm no longer in 
charge’ (anonymous) 
One ex-civil servant from the ministerial office responsible for the RHI explained 
that the CEO of company ‘B’ would threaten going to the press and causing 
problems in Parliament and (as a result of a complaint by him) caused an 
internal investigation in DECC (anonymous). Another interviewee explained that 
eventually, all communications with the CEO in question had to go through 
DECC’s legal team; however, despite describing him as loud and threatening, 
the same civil servant explained that actually company ‘B’ had a 
‘disproportionate’ impact on policy (without explaining how) for a company of 
the size (29) as a result of their engagement with policy. However, another 
explained that ‘over time he undermined his position’ leading to a point where 
staff in Greg Barker’s office would recognise his telephone number and ignore 
his telephone calls (anonymous). 
The approaches by company ‘B’ to influence policy appear primarily associated 
with ideas of the third face of power and preference shaping. ‘B’ has attempted 
                                            
38 These comments regarding biomass may have some truth however for the purpose of this 
thesis, it is the use of these comments as a lobbying tool which is of interest. 
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to frame other technologies as inferior and used a particularly negative 
approach to do this. However, the approach of intimidation could also be 
potentially seen as linked to the first face of power with aggressive approaches 
potentially giving company ‘B’ power over the Government. These issues of 
framing and style of influencing are considered in more detail in section 10.1. 
One interviewee also suggested that company ‘B’’s efforts to influence policy 
went beyond simple communication but that they attempted to influence policy 
from within DECC: 
‘there was an industry person who was seconded into the RHI 
team, initially seconded and then actually became a civil servant 
on the payroll who had founded a renewable heating company 
and as part of the code under which ex industry people go into the 
civil service, it's published code written by the Cabinet Office they 
are required to conduct themselves in a particular way and they 
have to put aside their outside interests both current and past as 
well. So this character put the shares in the company into a blind 
trust which were then operated by his ex-wife who remained on 
the board of the company. So that all smelt a bit strange and we 
were all a bit concerned about this and undue influence being 
brought to bear and that individual became the subject of I think 
four consecutive liaison meetings that I had once a quarter with 
senior civil servants because we could see information being 
leaked to the company in question, they just knew things that they 
shouldn't know and we could also see quite clever aspects of the 
way certain papers were being written and so on which were 
clearly designed to create a market advantage for that company. 
And also that character was brought in, because of the civil 
service rules on this, to work on one specific renewable heating 
technology because the civil service code says that you shouldn't 
work on anything that you’ve got a commercial interest in or recent 
commercial interest in and the moment he got into DECC he was 
all over the policy brief that he had an interest in. And that actually 
slowed down the policy making process because this one 
individual who was really brought in as a technical advisor had so 
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much influence, he was quite a good operator to be fair to him, 
had so much undue influence that it was just inappropriate the 
way it played out’ (anonymous) 
Another interviewee also reported this example, explaining that the individual in 
question, a founder of company ‘B’ had such good contact with DECC that they 
let him work for DECC based in vicinity of the headquarters of company ‘B’, still 
having very good contact with company ‘B’ (anonymous). The person in 
question’s ‘Linked In’ profile shows them leaving company ‘B’ in 2011 and 
starting at DECC as technical advisor on the RHI where it explains they worked 
on increasing the tariffs for heat pumps (references not included for reasons of 
anonymity, extract shown in Figure 9-1). Information from the UK Government 
‘Companies House’ website which holds information on company directorships, 
shows the individual stepping down from his role of director at company ‘B’ in 
October 2011, the month he started at DECC (reference not included for 
reasons of anonymity), and since leaving DECC in 2014 he has returned to 
company ‘B’ as External Affairs Director (inferred from ‘Linked In’). Interestingly 
at the time that this secondment was taking place, there were reports in the 
media regarding secondees in DECC and the potential issues and conflicts of 
interest caused by these sorts of secondments although this did not relate 




Figure 9-1. An extract from employees linked-in profile with identifying information redacted (Linked-in, 
2016) 
This approach of trying to influence policy from the inside of Government as a 
secondee could be seen as linked to the first and second face of power. The 
secondee’s position within the Government gives them aspects of the first face 
of power where they are able to potentially do things that otherwise may not 
have happened such as shaping policy advice in a particular way but also 
sharing information externally. The second face of power may also be at play as 
the secondee has the power to shape the agenda of policy work, focusing his 
time on an issue which he appeared to have a personal interest in. This 
approach of having power does not however seem to be aligned with the civil 
service code requirement of ‘integrity’ which is described as ‘putting the 
obligations of public service above your own personal interests’ (HM 
Government, 2017a).      
While company ‘B’ has clearly been attempting to influence policy, they appear 
to have disengaged some ministers and civil servants and attacked other 
industries. Even though some policy changes identified in the policy episodes 
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should have supported company ‘B’ the policy episodes do not suggest any 
specific success by company ‘B’. 
9.1.4 Other actors 
As well as the three main groups of actors described previously, the interview 
data highlighted the engagement of a number of other actors in the 
development of UK heat policy. These actors included NGOs, cross-technology 
trade bodies, consumers and consumer groups.  
Only two interviewees mentioned the role of consumers and consumer groups 
in the development of heat policy. One civil servant interviewee explained that 
during the development of the RHI, consumers were represented by the Energy 
Saving Trust on the stakeholder group for the RHI and Feed in Tariff (26). The 
other interviewee from Citizens Advice, a consumer body, explained that they 
sit on DECC’s domestic consumer panel and advise on any energy issues for 
consumers including the RHI (30). 
A number of interviewees mentioned Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
however there does not appear to be any specific policy change caused by 
NGOs (8, 9, 39, 40) although NGOs were involved with policy episode 2 (the 
introduction of the RHI legislation). There was also a recognition from 
interviewees that some NGOs have been particularly vocal regarding the 
potentially negative impacts associated with the use of biomass (14, 36). 
9.2 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has considered the actors who have been highlighted during 
interviews as being particularly engaged with the development of UK heat 
policy. The interview data identified that the UK heat policy network contains a 
wide variety of participants, however, three main groups of actors have 
emerged.  
The first of these groups of actors are associated with the Government and 
within this group civil servants and ministers were seen as being particularly 
important and as identified in the policy episodes, ministers and civil servants 
have clearly had power in some instances. Ministers and civil servants have 
power as a result of their institutional position of being inside Government and 
in this position they are able to do things that others cannot. Civil servants have 
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the ability to advise and directly communicate with ministers and ministers have 
the ability to decide on specific courses of policy action. However, this power 
sits within an institutional context (i.e. how Government works) and while a 
minister or civil servant may have some power, this power can be constrained 
by civil servants or ministers other more powerful Government departments 
such as the Treasury. Ministers also have the ability to set departmental 
agendas although again, this power is linked to their institutional position and 
the wider Government agenda.  
The role of ‘incumbent’ regime heat actors was also recognised as being 
particularly important in the development of heat policy. It was recognised that 
the size of some of these actors meant they have the capacity to attempt to 
influence that smaller firms did not. These actors have the ability and resources 
to use more complicated and sophisticated influencing techniques such as the 
production of reports and evidence which have been recognised as being 
particularly important for the development of heat policy. It was also the case 
that incumbent actors have promoted technologies which protect their own 
products and business for example when lobbying for ‘low-carbon gas’ and 
against electrification. These approaches echo ideas of ‘regime resistance’ 
where established players work to attempt to maintain their current role within 
the socio-technical system (Geels, 2014).  
The final group of actors which emerged is ‘niche’ lower carbon heat interests 
which included specific companies as well as trade associations. Approaches of 
these actors varied, with some taking more hostile or forceful approaches and 
some looking to build trust and provide evidence. The one actor which appears 
to have had some success is the REA and data on the REA suggested that this 
organisation took a sophisticated approach which included both political 
lobbying (of ministers) and administrative lobbying (of civil servants). As was 
seen in the section on government power, both ministers and civil servants 
have power in the policy process but their power can constrain one another; 
focussing on political and administrative policy actors, as the REA has done, 
may be an important method to increase the impact of actors on policy.   
As well as considering which actors have been involved in UK heat policy, this 
chapter has also considered how the policy influencing behaviours of actors link 
to theoretical approaches to power. The power of Government actors including 
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ministers and civil servants can often be seen to be associated with the first and 
second face of power. This power is linked to much more structural elements of 
power associated with the privileged position of actors which allows them to set 
policy and departmental agendas. Incumbent actors, as a result of their size, 
have the ability and capacity to engage in power activities and much of their 
behaviour which has emerged from this research has highlighted the production 
of reports and models and their promotion (and derision) of certain 
technologies. The behaviour of incumbents is linked to ideas of the third face of 
power (preference shaping) and the fourth face of power around knowledge. 
Some of the behaviour of incumbents could be seen as linked to the second 
face of power as incumbents have been able to get issues and technologies 
onto the policy agenda. Smaller low carbon heat related actors have similarly 
used approaches linked to the third face of power around preference shaping 
and knowledge sharing and have also used more sophisticated approaches 
combining both political and administrative lobbying. The approaches of 
incumbents and low carbon heat industries are in general associated with more 
agent based forms of power although the incumbents, with their increased 
capacity for engagement, could be seen to have more structural power than the 
low carbon heat actors.  
This chapter has focused on the role or different actors during the development 
of heat policy and has touched on the approaches used by different actors to 
attempt to influence policy. Building on these findings, the next chapter 
considers the key approaches used by actors to (attempt to) shape the 







10 UK CASE STUDY – APPROACHES USED 
TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE DURING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF UK HEAT POLICY: 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION SECTION 3 
This chapter forms the final part of the UK heat policy case study. While the 
previous two chapters have considered actual policy changes (episodes) and 
the associated policy actors, this chapter considers the approaches which have 
been used by actors to attempt to influence the development of policy. These 
approaches will be considered in the context of the previous two results 
chapters in terms of the actual policy change and the actors also involved. The 
chapter will also link back to the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis in order 
to see how the approaches to attempt to have power to influence policy link to 
the theory around power. 
As well as being coded by ‘what’ and ‘who’, interview data was also coded by 
the approaches used to attempt to influence the development of policy. It is this 
‘how’ coding of data which forms the basis of this chapter. From the coding of 
interview data associated with approaches to influence, three key themes 
emerged, ‘knowledge’, ‘framing’ and ‘scale/situation’. These themes contain a 
number of sub-themes within them and these are explored in more detail in the 
rest of this chapter.  
10.1 KNOWLEDGE: THE USE OF EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION 
As recognised in chapter 4, the concept of knowledge is recognised as being 
central to some understandings of power. Clegg (1989, p152) suggests that the 
fixing of knowledge is the ‘accomplishment of power’. In the faces of power 
approach, knowledge could be linked to all four faces of power. Someone with 
knowledge which someone else doesn’t have could potentially have ‘power 
over’ that actor (the first face). Knowledge could also potentially support the 
attempts to get issues onto the agenda (the second face). Linked to the third 
face, knowledge could be used to shape preferences. Finally, in Foucauldian or 
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post-structural approaches to power (the fourth face), knowledge and power are 
seen as difficult to separate because knowledge sometimes is power (Haugaard 
2012). 
Translating some of these theoretical understandings of the role of knowledge 
within power debates into more applied contextualisations of power within policy 
research can be more straightforward than one might initially think. Goverde et 
al., (2000) suggest that one important aspect of power from a political science 
perspective is around the control of knowledge. From a lobbying and influencing 
perspective, this could equate to the information being provided by lobbyists to 
policy makers but this information could be aligned to the interests of an actor 
looking to influence. For example, a lobbyist from the heat pump industry could 
suggest that the costs of heat pumps are higher than they actually are in order 
to increase subsidy levels for heat pumps. Indeed, within research interviews 
and as explained in policy episode 11, the idea of ‘information asymmetries’ has 
been raised; lobbyists may have information which the policy maker does not 
but which the policy maker needs and therefore the lobbyist has some control 
over the knowledge. In general, the production, use and value of knowledge has 
emerged as an important aspect of power in the heat policy process.   
Sub-themes related to knowledge are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
10.1.1 Consultations 
A large number of interview comments related to the Government consultation 
process and the development of so-called ‘impact assessments’. During the 
consultation process, Government issues a consultation document on a specific 
policy change, or a number of policy changes, and the consultation includes a 
number of questions. Consultees can then respond to the questions and the 
policy suggestions, often providing evidence to support their positions. In this 
process, knowledge can be provided by actors with the purpose of influencing 
the Government. Because of the objectivity requirements of civil servants 
(introduced in section 7.3.1 and discussed in upcoming section 10.1.2.1), civil 
servants should be basing policy development on the best available evidence39. 
Evidence based impact assessments must be produced whenever the UK 
                                            
39 The difficulties associated with the term evidence were discussed in section 7.3.1. 
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Government intends to change regulations in a way which can increase or 
move regulatory burdens (BIS, 2010) and policy proposals must also be 
consulted on if this is required by existing legislation (Cabinet Office, 2016a).  
A number of interviewees described the official consultation process as an 
important window to attempt to influence Government suggesting that this was 
a key route to attempt to engender policy change (16, 21, 22, 31, 37). 
Government internal advice also suggests consultations are an important part of 
good policy development (Cabinet Office, 2016b) and a number of interviewees 
from DECC recognised consultations as important. Interestingly however, no 
interviewees suggested that their engagement in the consultation process had 
caused any specific policy changes and the policy episodes did not highlight 
any specific policy changes which happened as a result of a consultation. This 
does not mean that responding to consultations never results in policy changes, 
but this research has not shown it to be a way in which actors have had any 
power over heat policy. 
Whilst no policy changes specifically resulting from actors’ responses to 
consultations were identified, the policy episodes do describe the use of 
consultations by Government and interviews highlighted the perception of 
actors that they are important. The policy episodes also show that following the 
consultation process, a number of significant policy changes have been made. 
For example:  
 In policy episode 4, following consultation, the approach to funding the 
RHI was changed; 
 In policy episode 7, following consultation, changes to non-domestic RHI 
tariff rates were made; 
 Policy episode 10 explained that the Government’s view on heat 
decarbonisation suggested a reduced role for electrification of heat in the 
short term following their ‘strategic framework’ consultation; 
 Episode 11 described changes to domestic RHI rates following 
consultation; 
 Episode 13 described favourable treatment for biomethane compared to 
what had originally been proposed at consultation. 
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While this research hasn’t highlighted any examples where policy changes have 
resulted from the consultation process, the consultation process is believed by 
many to be an important aspect of the development of heat policy in the UK and 
represents a key aspect of how companies attempt to use knowledge and 
evidence to influence policy. This lack of obvious impact on policy change as a 
result of the consultation is possibly because the consultation process is seen 
by some civil servants as a legal requirement rather than a process with 
genuine policy development benefits. Policy makers may have already decided 
on policy approaches and policy may simply be being influenced more strongly 
by something else. Interestingly, while consultations are often a legally required 
aspect of policy development, taking notice of responses to the consultations 
and the contents of impact assessments is not a legal requirement. There is 
only a very limited academic literature on the role and importance of 
Government consultations (e.g Binderkrantz et al., 2014) and what does exist 
says little about the power associated with them. This could be an interesting 
area for further research around power and policy change.  
It should also be noted that while the formal consultation process is formed of 
the issuing of a consultation document followed by written responses, alongside 
this formal process, informal activities may also be taking play which may 
indeed have an impact. One such example would be the gas industry’s impact 
on the Government’s view on the potential for increased levels of gas for heat in 
the short term (policy episode 10). Engagement took place at the same time as 
the consultation on the heat strategy but appears to have come about as a 
result of the production of various reports separate to the official consultation. In 
this example, it appears that the consultation process provided a window of 
opportunity for Government to be influenced which industry appear to have 
capitalised on. 
When considering the theoretical understandings of power considered earlier in 
this thesis, using consultations as a way to attempt to have power over policy 
change could be seen as a way of potentially getting an issue onto the agenda 
through highlighting certain issues within responses (second face of power). It 
could also be seen as a way of attempting to shape the preferences of policy 
makers (third face of power) and with such a strong focus on knowledge, the 
consultation process could also be seen as linked to the fourth face of power. 
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Finally, grey data showed that in one example the biomass industry provided 40 
identical consultation responses regarding RHI support for biomass (DECC, 
2013i) showing that the industry was working together, this approach of working 
together in order to (attempt to) increase power, could be seen as linked to 
ideas of intransitive power.  
10.1.2 Information asymmetries and regulatory capture 
Following on from specifically considering consultations, many interviewees 
mentioned or recognised the importance of the provision of evidence to 
Government and the reliance of the Government on information from private 
actors for policy making purposes.  
Policy episode 10 described the potential impact of evidence produced by gas 
distribution networks and National Grid which appeared to lead to an increased 
role for gas in the decarbonisation of heat. As was recognised in this example, 
the energy system model used by National Grid was actually adopted by policy 
makers.  
Most comments which suggested a Government reliance on industry evidence 
with regard to UK heat policy related to the RHI. One interviewee suggested 
that in a time of declining Government spending, where consultants had 
previously been used to build gaps in the Government evidence base around 
heat, Government was now going straight to industry instead. It was however 
recognised that the consultants had previously been going to industry for 
information and so even under the consultant model, DECC still relied on 
industry for evidence albeit indirectly (11).  
This sentiment was repeated by other interviewees from industry who 
suggested ‘irrespective of who's doing the research, there will be a reliance on 
industry and the people actually building the plants’ (13) and, ‘I don't think 
there's any other way to do it, especially in the energy sector which is highly 
technical, very complicated’ (19). 
Interviewees from DECC who worked on the first stages of the RHI were clear 
that they relied on industry for information and evidence; two interviewees 
explained that because there was no international precedent or market 
intelligence around sustainable heat in the UK, there were no other options (26, 
29). According to one civil servant,  
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‘I think I was conscious there that I was hugely reliant on the 
industry to tell us what, to tell us what to do really…whilst you 
have to have a critical eye on these sorts of things, it would be 
naive to think that lobbying groups and the bigger companies 
didn't shape the policy in a certain way’ (29) 
One specific example highlighted by an interviewee of what appeared to be the 
reliance on a very small number of industry actors was associated with policy 
episode 7. This concerned a tariff change for large heat pumps from the point of 
consultation to the actual introduction of tariffs: ‘I suspect ours might have been 
the only numerical evidence or one of a small number for setting the [RHI] tariff’ 
explained the industry interviewee (2). Grey literature has not been found which 
provides any more information of this specific policy change however, this 
example shows the potential impact that industry can have on policy when there 
is only limited available data and the Government is relying on this data to make 
policy. 
The cost data underpinning the RHI and the associated tariff levels have been 
the subject of previous sections of this thesis. This includes policy episode 7 
which saw higher than expected tariff levels for biomass heat systems when the 
RHI was opened and policy episode 11 which saw increased tariffs for biomass 
systems and reduced levels for ASHPs under the domestic RHI.  
When the non-domestic RHI scheme was being introduced, DECC 
commissioned consultants ‘NERA’ to produce analysis for both technology 
costs and also potential uptake rates (NERA, 2010). This analysis used 
‘stakeholder feedback’ to produce its analysis and was also based on previous 
evidence produced by NERA alongside consultants AEA considering the supply 
cost curve for renewable heat which itself also used stakeholder feedback 
(NERA/AEA, 2009). In 2011, DECC commissioned AEA to produce updated 
cost data in advance of the introduction of the RHI scheme which again used 
stakeholder data and interviews (AEA, 2011) and it was as a result of this 
analysis that the costs for the renewable heat technologies had changed when 
the scheme opened (DECC, 2011d).  
The initial tariffs for the domestic RHI scheme (which as discussed in policy 
episode 11 were quite different to what was originally consulted on) were also 
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based on the 2011 AEA analysis and this analysis was built on by ‘sweett 
consultants’ who again used stakeholder analysis to further develop the tariffs 
(sweett, 2013). Overall for the RHI, in both elements of the scheme, there has 
clearly been a reliance on industry data to set the tariffs for the RHI scheme 
albeit via consultants.  
Another specific RHI policy change which was discussed during policy episode 
14 was the biomass budget increase in the RHI in 2013 which was underpinned 
by industry data (14) being collected by a civil servant with the remit of 
specifically gathering market data (23). As explained already, a civil servant 
working on the RHI at that time explained that with regard to the use of industry 
data in this example ‘there was quite a big feed-back loop with industry’ (27). 
Rightly or wrongly, there has been a clear reliance on industry data during the 
development of UK heat policy during the period of this research and this 
reliance implies a level of power over the Government by industry. Through the 
provision of evidence weighted towards the interests of actors, this information 
asymmetry could allow industry actors to exhibit the first face of power in getting 
Government to do something it would otherwise not have done. It is clearly the 
case that industry data was relied upon for the development of the RHI and the 
tariffs for biomass combustion were increased to a level which was too high 
leading to rapid biomass deployment (as described in section 2.4.2.2). 
However, it is not possible to attribute these RHI policy changes to specific 
industry actors. It is also the case that in this example, the Government altered 
tariffs to increase the deployment of more cost effective technologies (including 
biomass). As with consultations, more granular analysis of the data (and the 
production of data) used to underpin the RHI (or policies in general) could 
provide interesting evidence on the role of industry data in causing policy 
change and may be able to provide more specific recommendations for how 
policy makes could gather and treat data. It is however recognised that in a 
competitive energy market such as that in the UK, industry will most likely have 
better knowledge on certain elements of the energy system, such as costs, than 
policy makers. 
The reliance on industry data is sometimes referred to as regulatory capture 
which at its widest definition concerns ‘the process through which special 
interests affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as 
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diverse as the setting of taxes, the choice of foreign or monetary policy, or the 
legislation affecting R&D’ (Dal Bo, 2006, p203) but using a more narrow 
definition concerns regulated monopolies (such as networks) manipulating the 
regulators who are supposed to be able to adequately regulate them (Dal Bo, 
2006). A full review of the concept of regulatory capture in this instance is not 
necessary but is available at Dal Bo, (2006). 
Overall, the reliance on industry data such as cost data and energy system 
modelling has in places affected the development of UK heat policy and using 
evidence can be seen as a key approach to influence. However, attributing 
specific changes to heat policy due to regulatory capture and a reliance on 
industry data is not a simple task and in general, a much more granular level of 
enquiry is required, for example investigating very specific policy or regulatory 
changes. 
Linking back ideas of information asymmetries to theoretical approaches to 
power, it could be suggested that those with knowledge required by policy 
makers have power over policy makers (the first face) as without the relevant 
knowledge, policy can’t be made. Information asymmetries could also be seen 
to be linked to the second face of power, as those with information which policy 
makers do not have, may be able to get ideas on the agenda. The reliance on 
industrial evidence could also mean that the preferences of policy makers get 
shaped as a result of that evidence (third face). Ideas of the production of 
knowledge to suit interests and the reproduction of this knowledge also link 
closely to ideas of the fourth face of power around how knowledge and ideas 
are reproduced.  
10.1.2.1 The objectivity of civil servants and helping with evidence 
This section is closely linked to the previous section on regulatory capture and 
information asymmetry. While the interview coding highlighted this as a specific 
issue, many of the issues theoretically are the same and so it is treated as a 
sub-section.  
A large number of interviewees recognised the importance of objectivity and the 
use of evidence by civil servants (terms introduced in this context in section 
7.3.1). The ‘Civil Service Code’ which explains how civil servants must act in 




 provide information and advice, including advice to ministers, on the 
basis of the evidence, and accurately present the options and facts; 
 take decisions on the merits of the case; 
 take due account of expert and professional advice. 
You must not: 
 ignore inconvenient facts or relevant considerations when providing 
advice or making decisions; 
 frustrate the implementation of policies once decisions are taken by 
declining to take, or abstaining from, action which flows from those 
decisions’. 
(HM Government, 2017a) 
Almost all comments on this issue suggested that the civil servants working on 
heat were objective and used evidence appropriately. One interviewee (from a 
trade body) suggested that compared to other EU countries, the UK civil service 
was so objective that other countries found it amusing that even ministers 
struggled to pass policies without evidence (19).  
The civil servants themselves saw objectivity as central to their role (24, 26, 28) 
and one civil servant explained that ensuring the quality of data and evidence is 
becoming more important in the UK civil service (27). It was also suggested that 
the GB RHI was not particularly political and had stayed ‘under the radar’ and 
generally away from politics, allowing it to remain generally objective in the 
hands of civil servants although still obviously affected by the wider context of 
institutional goals (23). It is however of course the case that the actual funding 
of the RHI scheme was a political matter and is the subject of policy episode 5. 
Because civil servants (according to a DECC civil servant) ‘are often struggling 
to evidence things’ (27) but evidence is seen to be so important for civil 
servants, this reliance on evidence can mean that those looking to influence 
policy can exploit this reliance (as explained in the previous section regarding 
information asymmetries). Interviewees from industry recognised the need to 
provide DECC with evidence, studies and real project information in order to 
drive policy change (13, 14, 15). A good example of this specific approach of 
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playing to civil servants’ requirements for evidence is the provision of a ‘mock 
impact assessment’ by the SEA trade association to DECC (the SEA were 
discussed previously in section 9.1.3.2). It should however be noted that the 
policy episodes did not highlight any specific examples of those looking to 
influence providing civil servants with any incorrect evidence; it did however 
show that evidence was being provided by actors which suited their own 
interests such as the provision of evidence which specifically considered (and 
highlighted) the role of gas discussed in policy episode 10. It may therefore be 
that actors look to influence civil servants by providing ‘cherry picked’ data and 
evidence while ignoring or not highlighting evidence which doesn’t suit their 
interests. The capacity of large actors to attempt to influence (as recognised in 
upcoming section 10.3.1) could therefore mean that policy makers are often 
exposed to cherry picked evidence. 
A number of interviewees commented that while the civil service analysis may 
be objective or based on evidence, it might not be necessarily well informed (8, 
38, 40). This could be down to the provision of incorrect data by vested interests 
(40), or simply a lack of understanding (8, 25). Two interviewees believed that 
the potential lack of understanding by DECC within the heat policy debates was 
linked to a general lack of knowledge associated with low-carbon heat in the UK 
because of limited knowledge at a national level (14, 21).  
Interviewees also believed that Government did not have enough knowledge to 
set tariff levels under the RHI (15, 18) and this was recognised by civil servants 
as an issue during the development of the scheme (26, 27, 29). Indeed, 
throughout this thesis, the RHI tariff levels have been seen as having a number 
of issues, with significant changes made to both expected tariffs (i.e. in advance 
of the scheme’s opening) and tariffs which are operational (explored in section 
2.4). It was however recognised by one interviewee that as the policies have 
developed, data has been collected and the evidence base is growing (27) 
indicating that some learning may be taking place. 
Building on the previous section on information asymmetries, this section has 
specifically highlighted the requirement by civil servants to base policy analysis 
on evidence, an issue which means that those with evidence are important to 
civil servants and can be powerful. It should also be noted that civil service 
actors will have their own views, histories and approaches to working which are 
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likely to affect policy change, however the actual impact of these psychological 
issues on policy change has received only limited research focus (see Cairney 
and Kwiatkowski, 2017) and is beyond the scope of this research.   
10.1.3 Consultants and their models 
The previous sections partly considered the reliance of Government (heat) 
policy making on industry data and as was discussed, much of that data came 
to Government via consultancy firms such as ‘NERA’ or ‘sweett group’. The 
interview data highlighted that these consultancy firms have formed an 
important part of the UK heat policy development process, particularly in 
relation to the RHI and that the analysis produced by these consultancies can 
have real world impacts such as on the deployment of renewable heat 
technologies. This section therefore considers the role and behaviour of these 
consultancies and how their position can link to ideas of power.   
A number of interviewees specifically criticised the NERA/AEA work on the 
costs of renewable heat technologies discussed in section 10.1.2 which was 
used to set RHI tariffs (10, 11, 32). Policy episode 7 considered the setting of 
the original non-domestic RHI tariffs which at consultation had been based on 
the original analysis by NERA/AEA (2009) and NERA (2010); the original RHI 
tariffs were then updated based on further analysis by AEA (AEA, 2011). One 
interviewee suggested that the NERA/AEA model had been produced by an 
inexperienced consultant who had primarily used publicly available data from 
the internet (implying that this was unreliable) but explained that because it was 
branded by a consultancy, DECC accepted its findings (10). The interviewee 
was implying that consultants have a level of legitimacy with DECC even though 
the actual analysis may not be reliable40. Another interviewee from a trade 
association believed that the original report by NERA and AEA into 2020 
renewable heat targets (and on which the RHI tariff analysis tariff was also 
based, NERA/AEA, 2009) became so important within DECC that the report 
effectively became a target for the expected splits in renewable heat and 
eventually the tariff degression system was based upon these numbers (11): 
                                            
40 It may of course be that civil servants can blame consultants if policy does go wrong 
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‘…a scenario becomes a target, becomes a forecast and over 
time an illustrative breakdown became a technology prediction for 
2020 and even worse particularly when there was pressure on 
cost control became a prediction for each individual year and then 
essentially, the triggers, the caps if you like were built around that 
prediction so that is putting an awful lot of weight on a model 
which:  
One, acknowledged it had huge areas of uncertainty to start with 
and  
Two: was really not ever intended to be able do that’ (11) 
The previous quote highlights how this one piece of analysis from a consultancy 
appears to have become an enduring element of RHI policy design despite 
clear uncertainties around the costs of renewable heat in the UK. A civil servant 
who was the head of the RHI while it was being introduced, accepted that the 
NERA/AEA work had been used for policy development including for developing 
expected heat deployment pathways in spite of the fact that there were issues 
with the analysis; they did however explain that it was the best evidence they 
had (26). Another civil servant working on the RHI recognised that the originally 
suggested deployment and mix of technologies didn’t arise but suggested that 
the inclusion of further industry data had subsequently strengthened the 
knowledge base (27) again indicating that some learning by Government may 
have taken place. 
However, expanding the use of the already questionable data further and 
despite the recognised limitations of the analysis, the Committee on Climate 
Change also used the same data, extending the renewable heat cost model 
with some modifications, out to 2030 for their fourth Carbon Budget analysis (6) 
(NERA/AEA, 2010). Further still, the NERA/AEA modelling for the fourth Carbon 
Budget was then used as a baseline for further work by consultants (on behalf 
of the Committee on Climate Change) investigating the options for 
decarbonising buildings all the way out 2050 (Element Energy and AEA, 2012). 
Clearly, this ‘evidence’ has had an enduring impact on policy development and 
energy models looking out to 2050 despite the fact that the underlying 
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assumptions regarding the costs of renewable heat were highly uncertain in 
light of limited UK experience. 
As well as producing cost data, consultancies working on heat decarbonisation 
have also been involved in the development of energy system models to 
support policy development. The sharing of models has already been discussed 
previously in policy episode 10 with regards to the use of a model originally 
used by National Grid and then used by DECC during the development of the 
heat strategy. Policy episode 10 also described the development of a heat 
system model by consultants Delta ee on behalf of the Energy Networks 
Association as part of their gas advocacy work which was then used by a 
different trade association with similar interests. In this example, the ENA used 
the consultancy to produce a report to consider changes in heating technologies 
up to 2050 (Delta ee, 2012) and The Heating and Hot Water Industry Council 
used the same modelling tool for a potential heating technology pathway 
looking towards 2030 (HHIC and Delta ee, 2013). As a result of being based on 
the same assumptions, both models produced similar results which reflected 
the interests of the respective trade associations, showing a much greater role 
for gas used for heating than had been shown in the Government’s own 
modelling.  
Consultancies and their analysis, which includes data gathering and the 
development of energy system models, have had an important role in the 
development of UK heat policy and this appears to be partly, as identified in 
section 10.1.2.1, as a result of the reliance of civil servants on evidence. Two 
key issues regarding consultants and models have emerged from this research 
linked to power. The first relates to the data which is used to make policy, 
specifically in terms of UK heat policy, the data which underpinned the RHI 
schemes (including NERA/AEA, 2009; sweett, 2013). The original data was 
seen to be unreliable and as a result has had some impact on the RHI tariffs 
and potentially therefore RHI deployment. While this research has not shown 
that actors have necessarily had power to affect this data, it is apparent that the 
consultants have relied on industry sources for cost data.  
The second key power issue is to do with the reproduction of evidence. 
Because of the limited UK evidence base on sustainable carbon heating, 
evidence is precious. The evidence or knowledge that does exist is often 
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reproduced or integrated in further research meaning that potentially incorrect 
assumptions are reproduced. This research has highlighted the reproduction of 
extremely uncertain technology costs and the reproduction of energy system 
models. This idea of reproduction of evidence and knowledge links strongly to 
ideas of the fourth (poststructural) face of power as ideas and knowledge 
become reproduced and engrained across individuals; this also links strongly to 
ideas of more structural elements of power linked the reproduction of ‘ideas’. 
Interestingly, while these reproductions of knowledge appear as more structural 
rather than agent based elements of power, i.e. no one is specifically promoting 
the reproduction of this evidence in order to actively influence policy, it was 
actors originally responsible for the production of this knowledge (such as 
energy system modelling); this implies that historical agent based attempts to 
have power can become a more enduring and structural element of power. 
10.2  FRAMING: THE APPLICATION OF IDEAS AND MYTHS  
This section forms the second part of the ‘approaches to influence chapter’ and 
considers the use of framing as an approach to influence. As discussed in 
section 5.2, ideas have been seen as an important aspect of the power 
associated with policy change. While the concept of ideas and power may seem 
abstract, one way in which ideas are actively involved in the development of 
policy is through their use as policy frames by those looking to influence policy. 
Those looking to lobby can attempt to have power by framing their policy 
requests in a way which is expected to appeal to the policy maker making the 
policy maker more likely to be amenable to the proposed lobbying request. 
The concept of framing was introduced in some detail in section 5.2.1 and so 
requires little introduction here. Quite simply framing can be considered as an 
approach to attempt to influence in which those looking to influence shape their 
communications in a way which are aligned with the preferences of policy 
makers in order to make their suggested policy changes more salient with policy 
makers. For example, a heat pump manufacturer could ask for policy support 
for heat pumps while suggesting that heat pumps are good for reducing energy 
imports, this would therefore be framing their policy request around energy 
security issues. Similarly, lobbyists could frame their lobbying around other 
salient Government goals such as economic growth. 
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The interview data coding process coded interview data relating to the concept 
of framing as well as around the use of specific frames. The remainder of this 
section and the sub-sections within it consider the results of this coding. Section 
7.4.3 which considered the analysis of framing introduced a typology for 
considering ideas and influence which suggested that ideas can have influence 
on policy as mediated influence (where existing ideas are re-used by actors), 
unconscious influence (where ideas are used but it is not clear where the idea 
has emerged from), adoptive influence (where existing ideas are actively 
adopted), distorted influence (where ideas are deliberately misrepresented) or 
cumulative influence (where ideas have grown, emerged and developed over 
time) (Shorten, 2013). As well as considering the use of certain frames, this 
chapter uses Shorten's (2013) typology to consider the type of framing.  
10.2.1 General views on framing 
A large number of interviewees recognised the use of framing by those looking 
to influence policy, with some interviewees suggesting that everybody frames 
their arguments (2, 12). The utilisation of particular frames was considered 
audience specific with actors using different frames for different target 
audiences depending on the interests of the audience (4, 11, 19). A number of 
interviewees also suggested that their framing had changed with the change of 
Government in 2015 and framing was more focused around the cost-benefits of 
a particular policy change (9, 14, 16, 28). It was also suggested that, under the 
Conservative administration at the time of interviews, using the EU Renewable 
Energy Directive Target for 2020 as a frame for promoting renewable energy 
was no longer useful considering the Government’s less positive view of Europe 
(11, 39). The use of specific frames for particular audiences which may change 
over time implies a context-specific, considered and strategic approach to 
framing by those looking to influence. These approaches also suggest ideas of 
‘adoptive influence’ where frames are adopted by actors depending on their 
potential value. 
The use of framing was recognised by civil servants and it was even supported 
by civil servants if they believed it could drive policy. One civil servant even 
explained that they had asked industry to highlight employment and economic 
growth benefits that their proposed policy changes would cause (23):  
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‘we would help them with a hint, we would get back to them and 
say that's all very interesting but Greg Barker’s really gonna 
wanna see long term economic plan in there somewhere, if you 
can give him something that he can hook onto using in a speech 
that says if we do this this is good for our long term economic 
plan, the sort of stuff that politicians want to hear...’ (23) 
Interestingly in this example, use of the phrase ‘long term economic plan’ was 
encouraged and this is a phrase which, during the 2010-2015 Coalition 
Government had been used repeatedly by the Government including in many 
interviews and speeches to the point where it was being described as ‘a slogan’ 
(Telegraph, 2015).  
Another civil servant described the centrality of the use of framing in policy 
influencing: 
‘Well if these people are lobbyists then they wouldn’t be doing 
their job if they weren't listening to what the politicians say and 
since David Cameron has already made a speech about the 
importance of innovation and harnessing the power of the markets 
to meet our climate change objectives, then I would expect a good 
lobbyist to come to me and say this is all about innovation and 
harnessing the power of the market because they'd be a bit daft if 
they didn't say that.’ (24) 
In both of the examples described above, it appears that civil servants are, by 
setting objectives or laying out ideas, creating or at least recognising frames 
which will have political salience. 
As described previously, the interview data coding considered the different 
framing approaches recognised as being used by actors during the 
development of UK heat policy. It is recognised that there is a level of 
subjectivity in this process as the researcher has both selected the frames 
which are apparently important in the first place and then further allocated 
references to these frames. Furthermore, the position of the researcher as an 
interviewer may also have an impact on the coding and results with 
interviewees potentially attempting to frame their comments during interviews to 
reflect their own position and influence the researcher’s understanding. Whilst it 
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is recognised that this aspect of the coding has some difficulties, in order to 
mitigate the risk of subjective impacts, the frames emerged from the coding of 
interview data and were not pre-selected; all references to these frames were 
coded to these frames as accurately as possible. Interviewees were also asked 
explicitly about their knowledge of framing during interviews in order to attempt 
to gain straightforward views from actors across the heat sector on framing. 
The frequency of the number of references (highlighted by the coding) to 
particular framing approaches or frames is shown as a bar chart in Figure 10-1 
(which includes only frames with at least 2 references). 
 
Figure 10-1. Framing issues by number of references from UK interview data for all frames with at least 
two references sorted by number of references 
Some framing approaches occurred more frequently in the coding and overall, 
the UK interview data recognised the use of twenty nine different frames (some 
of which were inter-linked). The most frequently occurring frames which were 
most referenced by interviewees are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
Readers should bear in mind that some frames are closely related to each other 

























of detailed technical issues. The following discussion sections focus on the 
actual frames and associated issues in more detail. 
10.2.2 Renewables delivery versus carbon reduction 
The framing issue which was commented on the highest number of times by 
interviewees was a complex issue specifically regarding the playoffs between 
renewable energy delivery versus carbon emissions reduction. The UK has both 
a 2020 EU target for renewable energy deployment of 15% and long term 
targets for reducing carbon emissions under the Climate Change Act. However, 
these two objectives are not necessarily aligned as some technologies classed 
as renewable may not necessarily be low carbon (e.g. some forms of biomass) 
and some low carbon energy may not be renewable (e.g. nuclear or even 
potentially gas when compared to higher carbon fossil fuels). To make matters 
more complex, a technology which may be classed as renewable may be 
relatively high carbon now but may become low carbon over time (e.g. a heat 
pump as over time the electricity grid decarbonises). A more detailed technical 
description of this issue is contained in annex 5. 
The complexity of this issue has been used by actors across the heat policy 
network to promote specific technologies or approaches with actors using the 
‘renewable’ or ‘carbon reduction’ element of this issue when it suits them. A 
number of actors believed that the RHI incentive mechanism has focused on 
promoting renewable energy rather than reducing carbon (4, 10, 16, 17, 39), 
hence its focus on biomass heat (17) and this biomass lean has been discussed 
already in section 2.4.2.2. One interviewee suggested that subsiding biomass 
heat may help meet the 2020 renewable energy target but because of its 
relatively high carbon intensity, biomass is an expensive way to reduce carbon 
emissions and the Government should ‘abandon the focus on renewables’ and 
focus on carbon saving instead (4). In this example, it should be noted that this 
interviewee primarily represents combined heat and power and district heat 
technologies rather than specifically renewables or biomass. 
Other interviewees highlighted the more temporal aspect of the issue and 
believed that ‘carbon reduction’ should be the focus of the RHI and that the 
scheme should focus on longer term strategic carbon goals such as 
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electrification of heat rather than short term carbon savings or renewable heat 
(10, 16, 17, 39). 
The comments suggesting the RHI had not focussed on carbon were generally 
from actors representing technologies which had not delivered much capacity 
under the RHI, i.e. not biomass (4, 10, 16, 17, 39). However, actors involved 
with biomass heating did suggest that the benefit of framing technology as 
‘renewable’ was no longer as persuasive as ‘low-carbon’ under the current 
conservative Government (at the time of interview) (11, 14), suggesting that the 
‘carbon’ frame may now be more effective. This change in framing was also 
recognised in the previous section on framing in general (10.2) and was seen to 
be linked to the fact that the UK Government had a generally negative view of 
The EU including European targets for renewable energy. 
There was a recognition in DECC that the conflict between renewable 
deployment and carbon reduction exists and that the civil servants who set 
tariffs for the RHI have not always engaged with the longer term heat strategy 
team (24). It has however always been recognised by the Government that the 
RHI was designed to help meet the EU 2020 Renewable Energy Directive 
Target for the UK of 15% of energy from renewable sources (DECC, 2011c) 
and as explained by a civil servant, saving carbon was not the primary purpose 
of the scheme: ‘we'd been honest that if we were not being driven by the EU 
2020 targets we wouldn’t have designed it the way we did, it was designed 
purely to meet that 2020 [renewable energy] target. If you were looking at 
something purely on low-carbon terms you probably wouldn’t have done it like 
that (26).’ 
Although the RHI was designed to meet the 2020 EU renewable energy targets 
and suggested a possible energy mix previously described in section 2.4.2.2, it 
has primarily supported biomass, and there is a recognition within Government 
that the dominance of biomass in the scheme was not the original intention (27) 
and Government has since modified the scheme to support more mixed 
technology deployment (DECC, 2016c). 
The ‘renewables’ versus ‘carbon’ frame is a complicated issue and the evidence 
shows this complexity has been used by some actors to frame their own 
products as beneficial to the Government’s aims of reducing carbon and 
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promoting renewable energy, two aims which are not necessarily aligned. The 
use of framing around specific targets and goals is the focus of the following 
sub-section. 
Overall, the renewable deployment versus carbon reduction frame has been 
used by actors to frame their own attempts to influence policy depending on 
whether their technology is classed as ‘renewable’ or ‘low carbon’. This 
suggests an element of ‘adoptive influence’ where existing frames are actively 
adopted. Interestingly with regards to this frame, as the Government’s priorities 
have changed over time, it appears that actors have changed their framing to 
ensure it matches Government priorities.  
10.2.3 Targets and goals 
Linked to the previous framing issue but with differences, framing around 
‘targets and goals’ had the same number of references as ‘renewables delivery 
versus carbon reduction’ suggesting that this frame is also used widely. Under 
this framing, those looking to influence policy used frames associated with 
Government goals and targets to promote their policy interests. For example: 
you should support our technology because it will help you meet the 2020 
renewable energy target.  
The UK has legally binding targets for deployment of renewable energy 
(European Union, 2009), legally binding targets for carbon emissions reductions 
(Parliament, 2008a) and targets for reducing fuel poverty (HM Government, 
2015a) among others. From the interview data, it is recognised that using 
targets to frame proposals for policy influencing occurs frequently, and these 
targets are therefore seen to be important for those looking to influence policy. 
In the shorter term, the EU 2020 target for 15% renewable energy in the UK is 
recognised as being particularly important for driving the development and 
ongoing maintenance of the RHI (5, 11, 17, 40), with some interviewees 
suggesting that it’s legally binding nature made it a particularly powerful frame 
(39, 40). However, as was discussed in the previous section (10.2.2), some 
interviewees believed that in general, the renewable energy frame is becoming 
less useful than framing around carbon reduction. 
The carbon target for 2050 and associated interim carbon budgets were also 
recognised as being a useful way to frame potential policy changes (6). One 
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interviewee mentioned the role of the Committee on Climate Change who 
advise Government on carbon budgets and explained that they linked their 
policy influencing efforts to the carbon target frame and more specifically, the 
CCC advice around carbon budgets (39). 
But it was not just national and international targets but also other aspects of 
policy which appear to have effectively become targets which are used to frame 
policy influencing. A number of interviewees believed that the potential 
technology deployment split of the RHI published before the scheme opened 
which was based on analysis by consultants AEA and NERA (see section 
10.1.3 and DECC, 2011c) had effectively become a deployment target for 
renewable heat technologies. Companies then used this split to argue for policy 
change (7, 11) despite the fact that the suggested split in technology was never 
proposed to be a target (26). 
It is clear that those looking to influence heat policy have framed elements of 
their influencing approaches around Government targets and goals however, 
whether or not this approach has been successful has not been highlighted by 
this research. The various and sometimes competing goals for energy means 
that different frames can be used by different actors as and when a particular 
goals suits their interests and once again, this particular framing approach 
appears to be an ‘adoptive’ influencing approach whereby actors adopt frames 
to suit them. 
10.2.4 Carbon impact 
Framing around ‘carbon impact’ had sixteen references in the UK interview data 
suggesting it was relatively widely used. This frame refers to ideas around the 
general carbon savings associated with particular policy choices, rather than 
specific reference to carbon reduction targets or the playoff between carbon 
targets and renewables discussed in the previous two sections. 
It was suggested by both external actors looking to influence policy and civil 
servants in Government that focussing on carbon was central to heat policy in 
general to the point where it was almost a taken for granted frame i.e., if it 
doesn’t reduce carbon there’s no point asking for it (23, 25, 39). 
A number of interviewees used a slightly different approach to carbon based 
framing, focusing on the cost of carbon i.e. highlighting options for reducing 
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carbon emissions most cost effectively (15, 16, 34). Interviewees recognised 
that the frame around cost of carbon was particularly persuasive with the 
current Government (19, i.e. the Conservative led coalition) who were 
promoting policies of reduced Government spending and least cost 
decarbonisation, an idea that was in the Conservative Party manifesto before 
the election (20). 
While there is no evidence of this frame specifically driving policy changes in 
the policy episodes considered in chapter 8, clearly some of the development of 
the RHI has focused on carbon reduction and the development of the heat 
strategy has had decarbonisation at its centre. Interviewees generally saw 
carbon reduction as an important frame within the heat policy process and this 
framing again appears to be linked to ‘adoptive influence’ as those looking to 
influence adopt the frame. 
10.2.5 Customer choice and protection 
The ‘customer choice and protection’ frame had the same number of references 
as the ‘Carbon impact’ frame suggesting it is a relatively important frame. This 
frame centred on the issue of consumers having choice over their heating 
system (in the context of decarbonisation potentially meaning that consumers 
may need to change their heating system). 
It was recognised by an interviewee associated with the UK energy regulator 
that there are major consumer issues with a transformation to a low-carbon UK 
heating system both in terms of potential cost increases and a need for new 
regulation around district heating networks (5). With the potential changes to the 
UK’s heat system outlined in section 2.3, there could clearly be significant 
impacts on consumers. However, the use of this particular frame was generally 
associated with attempts to influence policy in order to support incumbents and 
slow down the envisaged heat transformation (3, anonymous, 40). It was 
suggested that this frame was employed in order to highlight potential consumer 
issues but this framing ignored other aspects such as long term costs (which 
may be similar for consumers) and other energy system issues (3). It was also 
specifically suggested that this frame was used to sow doubt about a more 
electric heat future (15). 
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The interview data showed that it was primarily incumbent heating companies 
which used this frame and this was recognised by the incumbents themselves 
(9, 16, 18, 38). One non-incumbent interviewee explained: ‘someone from the 
gas networks or the energy networks or somewhere, they will usually say 
something about how we've got to think about the consumer, that's how it 
masquerades, we've got to think about the consumer, the consumer values all 
these sorts of things, cheap convenient instantaneous, easily changeable and I 
think we've gotta value their perspective in these changes, we've got to take 
them with us, by which they mean don’t do anything yet’ (40).  
The link of this specific frame to incumbents highlights framing by a specific 
group of actors considered previously in section 9.1.2 who appear to have an 
interest in maintaining the existing system. As identified in policy episode 10, 
there was indeed pressure from the incumbents to reduce the perceived need 
for electrification. While the use of this frame by incumbents has been 
recognised, it is unclear from the interviews whether this framing had any 
impact on the policy change in episode 10 but it is seen as important. Linking to 
Shorten’s (2013) typology, the particular framing, which has been suggested to 
be a ‘masquerade’ to protect incumbent interests, could be seen as an example 
of ‘distorted influencing’ where ideas are deliberately misrepresented or 
distorted. However, it needs to also be considered that in general, framing is an 
attempt to highlight certain issues while ignoring others and framing in general 
could be seen as ‘distorting’ in some way. The approach to framing in this 
section may however be more distortive than other approaches.  
10.2.6 Economic growth benefits 
Framing policy changes around economic benefits for the country received the 
same number of references during interviews as the previous two frames. This 
framing approach included suggesting policy changes would create new jobs (8, 
14, 23, 29, 36), and suggesting that the policy change would promote economic 
growth in general (13, 14, 20, 23).  
Others framed the economic issue around the UK’s international 
competitiveness (19) or even recognised that threats linked to economic 
performance could be useful for example suggesting that investment would not 
happen unless policy was changed in a particular way (15, 29). It was also 
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believed (by some interviewees from trade associations) that these economic 
growth benefits would be particularly well received from organisations who 
represented large number of industries such as the renewable industry in 
general (14) or the UK’s boiler industry (8). It was recognised by one former civil 
servant that for some policy changes, framing policy changes around the 
increased jobs frame was so persuasive that it could even trump poor 
technology choices (36) (although it was not clear that this specifically related to 
heat policy).  
As described in section 10.2 on general uses of framing, civil servants and 
those attempting to influence heat policy recognised the value of framing policy 
wants around ideas of economic growth suggesting an element of ‘adoptive 
influence’ where the frame has been adopted because policy makers see it as 
important. However, despite the wide recognition of the use of this frame, the 
interview data and policy analysis has not shown that this specific framing has 
had any impact on the development of heat policy. 
10.2.7 Cost savings on energy bills 
A number of interviewees recognised the use of framing policy influencing 
around the potential of cost savings, in particular for consumers. This was 
believed to be a good frame to use because of political concerns around energy 
costs for consumers and fuel poverty (12, 19). This was also linked to the fact 
that reducing carbon cost-effectively was mentioned in the Conservative party 
manifesto previously discussed in section 10.2.4 (16, 19, 20). In general 
however, actors believed that this was always a frame that would appeal to 
policy makers and politicians. In policy episode 4, company ‘A’ were suggesting 
that the RHI should be funded from general taxation because if were to be 
funded via bills, that could increase fuel poverty. 
Despite the relative popularity of this frame, the data collected for this research 
hasn’t shown that the use of this frame by actors has had any significant impact 
on the development of policy as described in the policy episodes in chapter 8. It 
again appears that actors have adopted this frame when it suits them, 
highlighting ideas of ‘adoptive influence’.    
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10.2.8 Heat pump performance 
The next most frequently mentioned frame was around the performance of heat 
pumps, with actors using the frame of poor heat pump performance to promote 
other heat (non-heat pump) options. This included actors with an interest in 
fossil fuels framing heat pumps as poor replacements (16, 38, 39), actors from 
non-heat pump renewable heat companies suggesting their technology was 
better (26) as well as different types of heat pump i.e. ground source versus air 
source framing their particular technology as better than the other (3, 10).  
In policy episode 11, this frame was highlighted when one heat pump company 
explained that they had been telling policy makers that certain heat pumps 
could represent poor value for policy makers and rapidly consume the RHI 
budget. However, it is not apparent that this framing was successful in causing 
the reduction in ASHP tariffs.  
Some interviewees mentioned heat pump research conducted by the Energy 
Saving Trust which showed that heat pumps were performing less efficiently 
than expected (16, 38). However, the actual ‘field-trial’ of heat pumps suggested 
that some systems were performing very well but less efficient heat pumps 
systems were primarily performing poorly because of poor installation rather 
than because of the actual technology (Energy Saving Trust, 2010).  
The ‘heat pump performance’ frame is one that has been used fairly frequently 
in this research however it is not clear that its use has had any significant policy 
impact. The adoption of this frame by various actors suggested that this frame 
can be considered as ‘adoptive influence’. However, the framing of heat pumps 
as poor solutions could be seen as ‘distortive influence’ with actors 
misrepresenting the reality of heat pumps (which are in use across the world, 
see Hanna and Gross, (2016)) in order to promote other technologies which 
they are interested in. 
10.2.9 Biomass (un)sustainability 
The next most referenced frame linked to the ‘sustainability’ characteristics of 
biomass combustion technologies which are supported by the RHI. In general it 
was recognised that some actors suggested that biomass offered limited carbon 
savings and therefore shouldn’t be supported. Similarly to the previously 
described frame around heat pump performance, the biomass (un)sustainability 
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frame was used by potentially competing technologies including companies 
interested in selling liquefied petroleum gas to off-gas grid customers (11, 16) 
and also heat pump companies (31).  
While this frame appears to have been used, clearly its impacts on policy 
change have been limited with the rapid growth of biomass for heat under the 
RHI discussed previously in section 2.4.2.2. In the most general sense, the 
sustainability of bio-energy can vary significantly by both type of bio-energy 
source and use (Committee on Climate Change, 2011) and so, sometimes 
biomass used for heat may be ‘unsustainable’. However this is not necessarily 
always the case and framing all biomass based energy as unsustainable could 
be seen as ‘distortive influence’ as the reality is more complex than the frame 
being presented.   
10.2.10 Section summary 
This sub-section has considered the use of framing by actors as an approach to 
influence policy during the development of heat policy in the UK. It has shown 
that framing is a widely used approach to attempt to influence policy and the 
value of using framing is recognised by both those looking to influence policy 
and policy makers such as civil servants.  
It has shown that framing varies between actors and changes over time, with 
frames that are seen to be valuable being linked to current issues or foci within 
particular Governments. For instance, the salience of a particular frame such as 
‘meeting the EU renewable energy target’ would be less valuable for a 
Government which wasn’t particularly interested in the EU renewable energy 
target (or the EU). Some frames may therefore be more powerful than others at 
different times and therefore from Shorten’s typology of ideas (Shorten, 2013) it 
appears that in this research ‘adoptive influence’ seems to be particularly 
important where those looking to influence adopt a frame that suits them best at 
a certain point in time. This chapter has also highlighted the potential use of 
‘distorted influence’ in particular around the framing of the performance of other 
technologies with actors framing heat pumps as unsuitable and biomass 
combustion as unsustainable.  
However, other elements of Shorten’s typology (Shorten, 2013) have not 
emerged as significant elements of framing identified in this research. Mediated 
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influence, where ideas are re-used by different actors have not emerged 
particularly strongly although, there are examples of similar actors working and 
using frames together. Cumulative influence (where ideas have grown, merged 
and developed over time to have an influence) and unconscious influence 
(where ideas affected political outcomes but the source of how they have 
arrived with particular actors is not clear) have not been recognised during the 
analysis of framing.  
Overall, whilst framing is recognised as being a particularly widely used 
approach, whether or not the framing considered within this research has had 
any major impact on the development of heat policy is unclear. The dispersed 
nature of framing as an approach by actors means that measuring or attributing 
specific policy changes to it is complex and does not appear possible using the 
EAR method. It is also the case that framing may be used by actors as a part of 
or associated with other elements of lobbying and influencing activities. 
It is clear that framing could be considered as attempting to utilise the third face 
of power, shaping preferences in order to achieve policy outcomes. However, I 
suggest that framing may also be linked to the fourth face of power as the 
repeated use of framing could potentially strengthen ideas and knowledge 
across policy actors to the point where the individuals involved in policy making 
then themselves reproduce those ideas and frames. This idea of the 
reproduction of frames and the institutionalisation of ideas likes closely to the 
approaches of discursive institutionalism considered in section 5.4. Building on 
the evidence of framing highlighted in this chapter, discursive analysis of frames 
and ideas in the UK heat policy process could consider the relationship between 
framing and post structural understandings of power in more detail. 
10.3  SCALE AND SITUATION 
As well as using knowledge and framing, interview data has also highlighted 
that for those looking to influence heat policy, the relative size and situation of 
actors is linked to approaches to or the ability to influence. Certain actors or 
types of actor may take different approaches to influence and there may be 
differences approaches used for different influencing targets. While this scale 
and situation issue may not directly relate to active attempts to have power, it 
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was recognised as an important element of power by interviewees and so is 
considered in this section.  
10.3.1 Lobbying who? 
Those looking to influence UK heat policy may engage with a number of 
different actors as a number of different actors are involved with or can affect 
the policy process. As described in section 5.3.1, Rommetvedt (2000) 
suggested that there were two main directions of lobbying, parliamentary and 
administrative and this research has highlighted evidence of both approaches 
with lobbying of Members of Parliament and civil servants.  
This research has shown only two specific cases of direct parliamentary 
involvement in heat policy. The first example was around the development of 
the RHI legislation in 2008 which included an Early Day Motion and legislative 
amendment resulting in eventual legislative change (policy episode 2).  
The second policy issue where an element of parliamentary involvement has 
been identified was the biomethane tariff review and development of the 
biomethane sustainability criteria in 2014/15 (policy episode 13). In this 
example, those wealthy landowners attempting to influence policy appear to 
have lobbied and engaged with parliamentary connections in the House of 
Lords who have then contacted the DECC ministers in order to then have an 
influence on that policy through the department.  
In general, the majority of engagement and lobbying around heat policy appears 
to have been at an administrative level, where those looking to influence policy 
change have dealt primarily with civil servants and Government (policy 
episodes 1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12).  
The various routes used to attempt to influence are shown in Figure 10-2, with 
each route shown as a different coloured line. In practice, lobbyists could use 
just one route or a combination of different routes. The purple line represents a 
purely political lobbying route, an example of this is the development of 
legislation underpinning the RHI where DECC was not initially involved (policy 
episode 2). The green line represents a political-administrative route where 
political lobbying drives a politician to make contact with a connected minister or 
department who then modifies policy, an example of this being the changes to 
the biomethane rules described in policy episode 13. The red line represents 
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the purely administrative route where lobbyists go straight to the Government 
department (either ministers or civil servants) and then a policy change is 
implemented. An example of this purely administrative route being attempted 
would be around the increase of the biomass combustion budget under the RHI 
(policy episode 12) where lobbyists explained that this sort of policy change was 






Figure 10-2. Lobbying routes identified in UK heat policy 
The majority of attempts at heat policy influencing have utilised the primarily 
administrative route, shown in red in Figure 10-2 and this is believed to be for 
two main reasons. Firstly, as recognised previously in this chapter, heat policy 
has generally stayed ‘under the radar’ in political terms (23) and civil servants 
have been able to work with little political involvement. For example, the 
development of the heat strategy documents, while requiring ministerial sign off, 
did not need to pass through parliament before their release. And, following the 
acceptance of the RHI legislation into law, further amendments to the RHI 
legislation have not required the development of primary legislation and 
changes have been made through secondary legislation (which only receives 
limited parliamentary scrutiny (Rogers and Walters, 2004)). Of course, one 
exception to this was the political power of Chris Huhne who strongly supported 
the RHI when the coalition Government formed in 2010 (policy episode 5) 
however, this was not a high public profile issue and in general supported the 
development of the scheme.    
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While there appears to have been only limited political impact on the 
development of UK heat policy, a number of interviewees from industry and 
trade associations explained that they have engaged with MPs. This included 
local MPs or MPs with relevant interests (13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 33). One 
interviewee explained that their firm actively monitored Hansard, the written 
proceedings of the UK Parliament and contacted MPs and Lords who discussed 
or mentioned anything relevant to the company (16). It was also explained that 
some lobbyists engage with the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee, 
the group of MPs who scrutinised the work of DECC (9, 10, 16) and this could 
be seen as political-administrative lobbying as select committees can question 
relevant Government departments.  
One interviewee explained that MPs had been involved with reports around 
heat and this had raised awareness of heat issues (39). A report by think tank 
‘Carbon Connect’ released in 2014 considering UK heat decarbonisation 
pathways which was sponsored by the Institute of Gas Engineers and 
Managers and gas boiler interested trade association the EUA had two MPs as 
‘chairs’ of the analysis (Carbon Connect, 2014). It was also recognised by other 
interviewees that having a connection to your constituency MP also increases 
your connection to other MPs and policy makers (10, 38), something which 
could widen your engagement activities. 
Overall, those looking to influence heat policy clearly recognised that their 
approaches needed to take consideration of who they were attempting to 
influence and this research has identified three key routes to influence including 
parliamentary, administrative lobbying and a combination of both. In the case of 
UK heat policy over the time period considered, the majority of efforts to 
influence highlighted from this research have taken a primarily administrative 
route. This is believed to be in light of the fact that the development of most 
heat policy has taken place away from Parliament and politicians. However, 
political lobbying has also been used as has a combination of administrative 
and political. For those looking to influence policy, because of the involvement 
of different parts of Government at different times in the policy process or with 
different elements of policy making, those looking to influence may be wise to 
ensure that the correct targets for lobbying are identified in order to increase 
their chances of influencing success.  
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10.3.2 Big versus small 
In the UK energy policy discourse, there has been a recognition that larger 
companies such as the so-called ‘big 6’ have been particularly involved in the 
policy process and that they ‘wield considerable power’ (Kuzemko, 2013c). 
Overall, this research has shown that larger companies have higher levels of 
political capacity than smaller companies. There was a wide recognition among 
interviewees, from both the lobbying side and the policy making side, that larger 
companies had an influencing advantage because their scale meant that they 
had the resources and expertise to understand policy, regulation and the 
institutions associated with UK heat governance (4, 18, 19, 21, 23, 29, 35).  
One civil servant interviewee explained that the smaller companies just ‘don’t 
understand the way you behave’ when engaging with Government (23). Another 
suggested that only the larger companies have the capability to look at the 
future strategically, i.e. taking a wider view than their own business interests 
(24). Another interviewee also suggested that the smaller companies simply 
don’t have the scale to attend meetings and go to frequent workshops whereas 
larger companies can commit to this and mobilise appropriate resources (29). 
This dominance of the policy process by large actors with the capacity to 
engage has also been recognised elsewhere including during the development 
of UK energy network codes (Lockwood et al., 2016). 
Linked to the issues of regulatory capture and information asymmetry 
(considered previously in section 10.1.2), there was also a general recognition 
that larger companies are more able to provide evidence (18, 29) and are 
therefore able to use this evidence to their advantage. There was also a belief 
that integrated companies (large in nature) and trade associations (representing 
large numbers of actors with high levels of resource) were more able to provide 
a balanced view to Government and as such become a more legitimate source 
than technology specific companies (18, 22). One interviewee from EDF 
explained that having a sensible and technology neutral position (which they 
implied they had) meant that they could present a more rounded position (18). 
However, it was recognised within the civil service as an issue that because 
there are only limited numbers of actors who can provide evidence, they may 
provide selective evidence only (29): 
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‘…they [small companies] may not even know about it (policy) or if 
they do, they’re just not going to be able to respond, not going to 
be able to provide the evidence that the big companies are and I 
don’t think there’s an obvious solution.’ (29) 
Conversely, there was a belief that being a smaller company could also have 
some benefits, one interviewee suggested that the often passionate belief in a 
company’s own technology can be powerful and that the Government often 
want to be seen to help the ‘little guys’ (15). Another interviewee suggested that 
smaller companies could be more forceful and use ‘powerful and strong 
arguments’ which larger companies can’t (18). As discussed in upcoming 
section 10.4, it seems to be smaller companies who have taken the most 
aggressive style to influencing. There was a recognition by one civil servant that 
the frustration and noise of small companies was understandable and could be 
influential because the civil servants understood the difficult position of the 
certain small companies who rely on policy (26). 
However, other small companies explained that they had little or no involvement 
in heat policy development and this was generally attributed to a lack of time 
resource (33, 35) because within companies with a small number of staff 
‘there’s enough day to day stuff to be doing’ (33). Another interviewee, a 
managing director from a biomass company agreed with the resource issue and 
explained:  ‘…I’ve got a business to run and at the same time I have to be a 
policy specialist…’ (21). 
In general, it is perceived that larger companies appear better placed to engage 
with policy simply because they have the time and resources to commit to the 
policy process. While some small companies are perceived as potentially being 
powerful, this potential is often not utilised because the resources to utilise this 
power are not available. This power asymmetry could be seen to give larger 
companies and organisations a structural power advantage over smaller actors. 
Within the policy episodes in chapter 8, policy episode 10 did indeed highlight 
the success of the large and incumbent gas industry actors in reducing the 
perceived need for short term heat electrification. However, other policy 
successes can be attributed to smaller actors such as the origin of the RHI 
legislation (episode 2) and the success of the biomethane industry around tariffs 
and sustainability criteria (policy episode 13). Overall therefore, while large 
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actors are perceived as being more powerful than small actors, this perception 
is not confirmed by this research and while large actors may indeed have much 
more capacity to attempt influence, factors other than capacity are also at play. 
10.3.3 Empowerment by policy 
Section 9.1.2 suggested that larger actors may have a greater capacity to 
attempt to influence than smaller actors and it may therefore be the case that a 
growing market share or increasing business size should increase the political 
capacity of a business. As discussed in section 2.4.2.2, biomass heating has 
received a much higher than expected share of the RHI whereas other 
technologies have grown much more slowly. 
A number of interviewees recognised that the voice of the biomass lobby had 
grown as policy had developed the industry (14, 37, 39) with one interviewee 
suggesting that the size of the biomass heating industry means that ‘they are 
very muscular in what they try and do’ (39). Another interviewee suggested that 
the traction that biomass had gained in the market would continue for many 
years as the funding under the RHI lasts for 20 years for non-domestic projects 
(37). It was also recognised that biogas, another area which has grown 
substantially under the RHI, had growing influence (13). 
Conversely, for the ground source heat pump industry which has seen little 
deployment under the RHI, one interviewee suggested that the development of 
policy had, rather than empower the industry, ‘completely distracted us…we feel 
harshly treated and had we invented a biomass boiler in [redacted to maintain 
anonymity] 15 years ago instead of a heat pump life would be very different’ 
(10).  
But, although the policy may not have delivered the expected number of non-
biomass installations as expected, a number of interviewees believed that the 
existence of policy itself empowered industry. Much of this empowerment was 
associated with the fact that the existence of policy (the RHI), a heat strategy 
and a team within DECC meant that heat was on the agenda and this gave 
actors something to attempt to influence. This highlights the potential 
importance of agenda setting (the second face of power). One interviewee 
explained that while they did not feel that they had more influence directly, ‘I 
think it (heat policy) gives us an in, it gives us something to go in and talk 
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about…it opens the debate’ (16). Another interviewee suggested that once 
policy exists, it is much easier to tweak something than cancel it and there is ‘a 
presumption in favour of continuity…it is easier to influence something that is 
already there’ (11).  
Overall, both the emergence of policy onto the agenda alongside the growth of 
industries supported by policy is perceived to empower actors supported by that 
policy. Indeed in policy episode 13, the biomethane industry which was purely 
created by the RHI has been powerful around some elements of policy. 
However, it is also the case that other technologies which were supposedly 
supported by the policy agenda (heat pumps) do not appear to have had any 
particular policy successes over the time scale considered. So, while policy can 
empower actors, it does not seem that this is always the case. 
10.3.4 The position of trade associations 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, trade associations have been heavily 
involved in UK heat policy development and represent many different aspects of 
the heat industry and varying scales. A large number of interviewees including 
civil servants recognised that trade associations were relatively trusted sources 
of knowledge and information and were often approached regarding policy 
issues (24, 26, 29). Trade associations were generally trusted because they 
represented large numbers of industry actors across the supply chain and it was 
felt that it was much easier to deal with one actor than many (26) and this 
‘shortcut’ was recognised by industry actors (12, 15). 
It was suggested that technology specific trade associations were successful 
because they were clear in what they wanted to achieve (13, 14). Conversely it 
was also recognised that cross sector trade associations may have the benefit 
of perceived impartiality (11, 12, 13, 14). However, in reality, some interviewees 
believed that this perception of trade associations may be purposefully utilised. 
Trade associations may present themselves as impartial but are in fact 
representing industry interests covertly. This charge was levied specifically 
against the REA who, it was suggested, present themselves as generally pro-
renewables but were in the opinion of one interviewee, much more supportive of 
biomass heat (anonymous). Interestingly, the REA explained the importance of 
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maintaining credibility with policy makers, describing credibility as ‘our main 
product’ (14).  
Interviewees also described that as well as making the lives of civil servants 
easier, the trade associations also act as a buffer for information. With a good 
understanding of the workings of Government, they filter out extreme 
information before it gets to Government and control the release of information 
from the Government back to the private sector (11, 13, 20). This was described 
as a ‘deliberate…translation service’ by one interviewee (20). This interviewee 
(from a trade association) has previously been described as being ‘very much 
inside the tent’ by a DECC civil servant and it was recognised by civil servants 
that trade associations were trusted with information that wouldn’t be given 
directly to industry (26). It was indeed that case as highlighted in section 9.1.3.3 
that Government had shared draft regulations with trade associations (The REA 
and SEA) and did not appear to have shared them with anyone else. While 
these close relationships which trade associations want to maintain may be 
good for them and their respective members, one interviewee suggested that 
this buffer role of trade associations meant that DECC did not talk to industry 
directly and as such received a ‘sanitised view’ of industry (17). It was also 
suggested by an interviewee who had worked across industry and Government 
that because the trade association views were so watered down and 
communication was so managed, the potential for radical proposals for policy 
was limited because the trade associations were so closely aligned with the 
Government’s way of thinking (15).    
Trade associations have been very closely involved in the development of UK 
heat policy and have been involved and apparently successful in their work 
around the development of the RHI legislation (policy episode 2). Trade 
associations have also been involved in the design of the RHI (policy episode 
3), the increasing drive for heat decarbonisation (policy episode 8), the 
distribution of RHI funds (episode 12) and the changes for biomethane (episode 
13). Overall, trade association are sometimes, but not always, successful in 
having power to affect the development of policy in this study. 
Clearly, trade associations have an important role in the UK heat policy network 
and appear to be relatively trusted sources of information for policy makers. 
However, their actual policy impact appears limited. Despite being apparently 
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trusted by policy makers, trade associations have their own interests, primarily 
representing their membership. Trade associations are therefore in reality not 
necessarily objective sources of information and will often be representing 
interests. Although cross sector trade associations may balance the views of 
members, the apparent trust in trade associations by Government puts the 
associations in a potentially powerful and privileged position which they may not 
deserve.  
10.3.5 Working together or battling 
A number of interviewees recognised the benefits of working together with other 
organisations in order to develop joint messages, believing this has a greater 
influence over policy rather than if they were working as a single entity. The 
interview data suggested that a number of different coalitions existed and these 
could either be informal such as trade associations working together or much 
more formal such as trade associations themselves. As described in the 
previous section, some trade associations recognised a benefit in the fact that 
they represented a number of technologies and could provide a wider view than 
single companies (9, 11, 12).  
In the policy episodes considered, organisations including trade associations 
and NGOs came together to lobby for the introduction of the RHI (policy 
episode 2), companies worked together to push the heat strategy vision to a 
less electric future (episode 10) and the biomethane industry also worked 
together to lobby for maintained RHI tariffs and reduced sustainability standards 
for biomethane (episode 13). In all of these policy episodes actors appear to 
have had some success in causing policy change suggesting that working 
together has been successful in these examples. 
While working together through coalitions may create better outcomes in terms 
of policy change, the interviewee data also shows that working together did not 
always happen. There is evidence of infighting across the sustainable heat 
actors (7). This includes, as described in section 10.3.5, ground source heat 
pumps lobbying against air source heat pumps (10, 16), the heat pump industry 
lobbying against the biomass industry (19, 34) and biomass against heat pumps 
(21, 31). This infighting was recognised by those representing the niche 
renewable heat industry (7) with one explaining ‘I’ve been at meetings and 
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heard people completely disagree on pretty fundamental issues and you’re sort 
of thinking crikey, if we as an industry can’t agree, where the blinking hell do the 
policy makers start?’ (31). 
It was recognised by industry that the civil servants saw this as an issue (31) 
and a number of civil servants mentioned this infighting during interviews (23, 
26, 29). One civil servant explained that the fighting had become ‘counter-
productive’ to the policy making process (23) while another was more candid: 
‘the other thing that I think was a problem on the RHI was the 
infighting between all the, so they'd just slag each other off and I'd 
often sit in meetings or have workshops and I'd say look, you will 
all get tarred with the same brush, if you go out and say biomass 
is shit and you go out and say heat pumps are shit, the noise will 
be renewable heat is crap so don't do that...most people don’t 
know what a heat pump is and you’re going out there slagging off 
the other technology, it won't help you overall’ (29)   
Policy success has been achieved in some examples in this research where 
organisations have worked together, suggesting that working together may be 
able to increase the power of actors over policy change. The idea of working 
together links back to the idea of intransitive power which was considered in 
chapter 4 which suggests that by coordinating and working together, actors can 
increase their power and achieve goals.   
10.4 STYLE 
Whilst it was possible to assign most approaches to influence to one of three 
previous sections, style also emerged as an approach to influence which didn’t 
sit clearly within one of the previous sections. Interviewees suggested that 
actors used different styles in their approaches to attempt to influence heat 
policy and these varying styles are considered in this section. 
A large number of interviewees recognised the use of aggressive approaches 
by some of those looking to influence policy (14, 15, 23, 26, 28, 29, 31); these 
comments were associated with extreme views, attempts to damage 
reputations of technologies and even personal threats. The majority of these 
comments link to previous discussions in this thesis regarding company ‘A’ and 
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company ‘B’ (sections 9.1.2.1 and 9.1.3.4 respectively) and therefore, the 
details around these companies are not explored in detail. It was explained by 
one civil servant that the ‘level of aggression from some of the stakeholders was 
quite frightening’ and the ultimate conclusion of this approach was that ‘Greg 
Barker doesn’t want to take your phone calls anymore, the officials don’t want to 
meet you anymore and invariably it doesn’t do your cause any good’ (23). This 
civil servant also explained that another actor, ‘who represented one of the 
biomass fuel manufacturers would just suddenly fly off the handle in a rage 
about how bad heat pumps were’ going on to explain that ‘we [civil servants] all 
found that rather puzzling, that here we are in DECC trying to give your industry 
billions of pounds of tax payers money and all you can do is complain about it’ 
(23).  
Other civil servants recognised this aggression among those attempting to 
influence, suggesting that these approaches undermined people’s own 
positions (28). However, some civil servants suggested that in general people 
were negative about policy (24), that aggressive voices could still have an 
important point (29) and Government could sometimes understand where they 
were coming from i.e. why they were so negative (26) (this could for example 
because policy has failed to support certain technologies when it was expected 
to). From the policy episodes considered, it is not clear that the use of negative 
or aggressive approaches has directly driven any of the policy changes 
identified and it is therefore not possible to say that any actors using these 
approaches have had any policy successes. 
It was noted by a number of interviewees that using a positive style when 
conveying messages was likely to be more influential than more negative 
approaches (14, 16, 20) and a number of civil servants believed that positive 
messages which help provide solutions were much more useful (23, 29). As 
explored in section 9.1.3, the REA and the SEA, trade associations which 
represented lower carbon heat actors (rather than incumbents and gas 
interests) were recognised as having a particularly positive approach to 
influencing. Both the REA and SEA were associated with significant elements of 
a number of policy episodes in chapter 8 and appear to have had a close 
working relationship with Government. Policy episode 2 highlights that the REA 
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have also had some influencing success in driving the RHI legislation although 
this episode didn’t necessarily highlight a ‘positive’ approach. 
A number of interviewees also believed that an approach which worked with 
Government, by using Government’s own approaches and using balanced and 
objective arguments would be particularly beneficial (14, 16, 19, 20, 31, 32). It 
was also recognised that the use of balanced approaches was also important 
for people to maintain credibility with policy makers (14, 18). This use of 
balanced arguments is possibly linked to the importance of perceived objectivity 
by policy makers which has already been considered in section 10.1.2.1. 
It appears that only a very small volume of literature has considered lobbying 
style in any detail. Some previous research has considered the differences in 
lobbying styles between the USA and Europe and this research showed that in 
the USA, approaches to lobbying were brash and highly pressured whereas in 
Europe, lobbying approaches tended to be more softly spoken, consensus 
based and informational in Europe; this was put down primarily to the different 
political styles between the EU and the USA (Woll, 2012). This research has 
highlighted the both brash and more softly spoken attempts to lobbying 
associated with UK heat policy.   
While the research has shown that actors did use different styles in their 
approaches to influence, the data does not show that the use of particular styles 
for attempting to influence is likely to increase policy change success. With 
regards to theoretical approaches to power, style could be potentially seen as 
linked to the third face of power with actors shaping their approach to 
communication in order to attempt to affect the preferences of policy makers in 
order to engender policy change. It is not clear how style as an approach could 
link to the other faces of power. 
10.5  CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
Building on the previous two results and discussion chapters which have 
considered the policy episodes and also the actors involved in attempts to 
influence UK heat policy, this chapter has considered the approaches used by 
different actors to attempt to influence policy. It has linked the approaches 
identified back to the previous two chapters as well as the theoretical 
understandings of power introduced earlier in this thesis.  
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The interviews identified three key elements of approaches to attempt to have 
power over the policy process. The first element was around knowledge and the 
use of evidence and within this element, the use of consultations, information 
asymmetries and the role of consultants and energy models appeared as key 
themes.  
Knowledge has been absolutely central to the development of UK heat policy 
and knowledge has been an important element of many of the policy episodes 
around for example setting RHI tariffs and influencing the development of the 
Government’s strategy for heat. Knowledge is centrally important to the UK’s 
policy process as civil servants who are involved in all policy decisions are 
required to make evidence based decisions. This implies that those with 
knowledge which is in demand can indeed have power and the production of 
and interests behind the production of knowledge can be extremely important.  
The analysis suggested that knowledge could be associated with all four faces 
of power but in particular, in the approaches identified, knowledge was used to 
attempt to give certain actors power over other actors (first face), to allow actors 
to try to set agendas (second face) and could be used by actors to attempt to 
shape preferences (third face). The embedding and reproduction of knowledge 
and evidence also could be seen to be linked to the fourth face of power. 
Overall, it appears that knowledge and power are closely related in this study, 
an idea recognised in the theoretical underpinning section of this thesis 
(Gordon, 1980).  
The second key element of approaches to influence was around the use of 
framing by actors looking to influence UK heat policy. There was a clear 
recognition by both policy makers and those looking to influence that framing 
was a very important approach and the detailed section on framing considered 
many of the specific frames used in more detail. Generally, the use of framing 
can be considered as an approach linked to the third face of power, whereby 
those looking to influence use framing to attempt to shape the preferences of 
policy makers so that proposed policy changes are aligned with the interests of 
the policy makers. However, it is also the case that in using frames which link to 
the existing beliefs of policy makers or indeed linking frames to institutionalised 
ideas such as targets for renewable energy, the use of framing is also linked to 
the fourth face of power. Framing was an approach to influence that appeared 
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to be used alongside or as part of other approaches to influence. While framing 
on its own was not seen to have caused any specific policy changes, it was 
seen as one of a set of influencing measures which could be used together with 
other approaches showing that attempts to influence may use combinations of 
various approaches. 
The third key area of ‘approaches to influence’ recognised from the interviews 
was linked to the scale and situation of actors. Larger actors may have more 
capacity to attempt to influence and trade associations which can represent 
entire sectors can also capitalise on their scale, this issue highlighted a 
structural element of power where power can be linked to scale. However, small 
actors involved with technologies which Government was looking to support 
were sometimes seen as being powerful if the Government wanted to grow 
those particular technologies (i.e. the technologies of interest were already on 
the agenda). Companies or actors working together was also seen as an 
approach which could increase policy success linking to ideas of intransitive 
power. 
This chapter also highlighted that actors used varying styles in their approaches 
to influence, ranging from aggressive approaches to more balanced 
approaches. Style could be seen as being linked to the third face of power, as 
an attempt to shape preferences of policy makers although style could of course 
simply be a reflection of the personalities of the interested companies and 
individuals. Overall, this chapter has provided an interesting example of the 
approaches used by actors to attempt to influence policy during the process of 
system transformation. As well as providing examples of the approaches used, 
it has also linked these approaches back to the theoretical understandings of 
power suggesting that connections with all four faces of power are present in 








11 NETHERLANDS CASE STUDY – POWER 
AND LOBBYING IN DUTCH HEAT POLICY 
 
Rotterdam Sunset, September 2015. 
‘Well I am not fond of politicians, there are places where the law has made a 
mistake but you are stuck with it and with ours at least they are not that worse 
as Putin’  
(anonymous interviewee) 
11.1  INTRODUCTION 
This case study considers Dutch heat policy and the role that power has had on 
the development of the policy and regulation for low-carbon and sustainable 
heat between the years 2007-2015. The Netherlands was chosen as a case 
study because of its similarity to the UK in terms of both the current provision of 
heat which is mostly supplied by gas and also because the country faces similar 
challenges to the UK - depleting gas resources and goals for decarbonisation. It 
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was expected that there may be similar power struggles and issues in Dutch 
and UK heat policy and therefore the focus of this chapter is on considering 
power in Dutch heat policy and how this compares to UK heat policy. As with 
the UK study, it has used a number of interviews with those involved in the 
Dutch heat policy network alongside a review of relevant grey literature.  
The scale of the Dutch case study in terms of data collection is smaller than the 
UK study. This reflects the fact that the UK was the primary focus of the 
research and was also due to the more complex nature of identifying and 
analysing relevant data and interviewees. Some Dutch interviewees spoke only 
limited English and much of the grey literature was not available in English and 
required translation. Despite the smaller scale, the Dutch case study does 
provide a valuable comparison to the UK study.  
Following the structure of the UK sections of this thesis, this chapter firstly 
considers the Dutch heat regime describing the current provision of heat and 
then considers how and why the Dutch heat system may need to change 
(section 11.2). The chapter then considers early efforts and ideas around 
transforming the heat system in the Netherlands as well as more recent 
developments in the Netherlands with regards to gas and heat.  
The chapter then goes on to consider what interviewees have identified as the 
key heat policy changes and developments in the Netherlands and using the 
EAR approach, investigates if actors have had any power in affecting Dutch 
heat policy change (section 11.3). Following this, section 11.4 considers the 
approaches identified which have been used to attempt to influence Dutch heat 
policy. Unlike the UK case study, this chapter does not contain a specific 
section on ‘actors’ as this is a smaller scale study than the UK case; comments 
regarding particular actors are included in the sections on policy change and 
approaches to influence. As well as comparing findings from The Netherlands to 
those from the UK, ideas in this chapter are also considered in relation to the 
theoretical understandings of power introduced in earlier sections of this thesis. 
As with the UK results, all information gained from interviews is referenced as a 
number in round brackets and interviewees are listed in annex 2. Interviews 
were carried out in person in September 2015 or over the phone during the 
winter of 2015/16. 
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11.2  HEATING IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In 2012, heat made up around 55% of the Netherland’s total energy 
consumption (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015b). The role of gas in the Dutch 
domestic heating regime has such a high penetration that even almost two 
decades ago gas for heat has been described as ‘approaching (if not having 
actually reached) saturation’ (Griffin, 2000, p3). Of the 8 million households in 
The Netherlands (CBS, 2018c), 93% of homes are connected to the Dutch gas 
network and use gas for heating; the majority of remaining homes (4.5%) are 
connected to district heating networks (ECN et al., 2016). In the service sector, 
gas also dominates (approximately 70% of heat consumption) although like in 
the UK, electricity makes up a slightly bigger share in this sector (around 20%); 
space heating in industry is provided primarily by gas (Heat Roadmap Europe, 
2017). 
The high level of natural gas for heat in the Netherlands is often attributed to 
access to indigenous supplies of natural gas and a high population density, 
allowing the development of a low cost per household gas network using 
indigenous resources (Griffin, 2000). It should be noted however, that before 
natural gas became dominant in heating, the Netherlands was using town gas 
which, via a gas distribution network, was already supplying 76% of households 
in 1962 (Oxford ECI, 1999). 
With 501 people per square kilometre of land, the high population density of the 
Netherlands is almost double that of the UK overall (World Bank, 2014). 
However, in England, where the penetration of gas is higher than other parts of 
the UK, the population density is 423 people per square kilometre of land 
showing a similar population density to The Netherlands (ONS, 2014). High 
population densities and access to indigenous sources in both the UK and the 
Netherlands may explain why gas use for heat is so prolific in both countries. 
The direct use of electricity, oil and solid fuels for domestic heating in the 
Netherlands is very limited (Menkveld and Beurskens, 2009) reflecting the high 
penetration of gas and the fact that the remainder of households are generally  
served by district heating. While the high gas penetration in the Netherlands 
shows a similar pattern to most of England where the UK gas network is at 
almost full saturation point, in areas of the UK not on the gas grid, there are a 
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number of properties which use oil or electric heating representing around a fifth 
of total space heating demand (DECC, 2013c). 
11.2.1 Netherlands gas supply 
In 2009, The Netherlands overtook the UK (whose gas production was 
declining) and became the largest producer of natural gas in Europe; in 2016 
the Netherlands produced around 443 terawatt hours of natural gas in 2016 
compared to the UK’s 416 terawatt hours41 (Eurostat, 2018b). The country has 
historically been and was expected to continue to be a net exporter of gas at 
least in the short term however, over the longer term (decades), gas production 
in the Netherlands was expected to reduce as gas resources depleted (IEA, 
2012). 
Much of the Netherland’s gas has been produced from the Groningen gas field 
which has provided around half of all the Dutch gas production for the past two 
decades (Mulder and Perey, 2018). In 2013, the Groningen field produced 54 
billion cubic meters of natural gas, the highest level in over 30 years (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2017a). However, the extraction of gas from the Groningen 
field has resulted in an increasing intensity and frequency of earthquakes in the 
area as gas extraction has caused the overlying land to shift and sink (TNO, 
2016). As a result of the earthquakes and the resulting damage to buildings, the 
gas supply outlook for the Netherlands has changed dramatically.  
The Dutch Government announced in January 2014 that in order to reduce the 
risk of further earthquakes it would reduce the allowed annual gas output for 
Groningen for 2014, 2015 and 2016 to 42.5, 42.5 and 40 billion cubic meters 
respectively (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014). However, in 2015, the 
Government announced that the annual output for Groningen would be reduced 
further so that for 2015/2016 allowed production would be 27 billion cubic 
meters of gas (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015a). In 2016, this limit was 
reduced again to 24 billion cubic meters of gas per year for a maximum of four 
years (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2017b). More recently, the Dutch 
Government has announced that gas production from the Groningen field may 
be reduced to below 12 billion cubic meters per annum before 2020 (Ministry of 
                                            




Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, 2018a). These reduced outputs from the 
Groningen field clearly represent a major change to gas supply in the 
Netherlands from only five years ago. 
Figure 11-1 and Figure 11-2 display expected gas production for both 
Groningen (based on current Government limits) and other gas fields 
respectively and show that as well as seeing a rapid reduction in output from 
Groningen, other Dutch gas fields are expected to be nearly depleted by the 
mid-2040s. As a result of reduced gas production, the Netherlands became a 
net importer of gas for the first time in 2017 (CBS, 2018a). Unless demand is 
reduced (or production is increased), the further expected reductions in gas 
output will increase Dutch gas import dependency further. 
 
Figure 11-1. Expected gas production from Groningen field taking into account Government limits (Ministry 




Figure 11-2. Expected gas production from small fields (not Groningen) (Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Climate Policy, 2017, p22) 
The Dutch Government has suggested that in order to reduce the country’s 
reliance on indigenous gas, it will look to increase gas imports and that in the 
longer term, the reliance on natural gas for heating will be reduced: ‘In the 
future, Dutch households and businesses will rely less on gas for heating and 
more on sustainable heating solutions. Energy conservation measures will also 
reduce demand for gas’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015a). 
11.2.2 Transforming the Dutch heat regime and the ‘Heat 
Vision’ 
Following the 2014 announcement on reducing gas output from Groningen, in 
April 2015, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs which is responsible for 
energy policy issued a letter to the Dutch Parliament outlining its ‘Heat Vision’ 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015b). This document built on the Dutch 
ambition to have a ‘wholly sustainable energy supply system by 2050’ which 
had been previously outlined in the 2013 ‘Energy Agreement’ (Netherlands 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2013, p3). Specifically the ‘Energy Agreement’ 
introduced targets for reductions in Dutch energy demand, an increase in the 
proportion of renewable energy used (a minimum of 16% of all energy by 2023) 
and an increase in the number of energy related jobs. The ‘Energy Agreement’ 
did not however contain a specific carbon reduction target or explain what it 
meant by ‘sustainable’. The 2015 ‘Heat Vision’ suggested that transforming the 
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heat system would be a crucial aspect of meeting the ‘Energy Agreement’ 
goals.  
The ‘Heat Vision’ paper also discussed the issues with gas production in 
Groningen and suggested that significant reductions in heating demand, 
increases in the use of heat networks and the roll-out of renewable heat were 
central to this vision; it also suggested that the gas network would be replaced 
in many areas by other forms of heat including district heat networks and 
electric heating options (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015b).  
Although the ‘Heat Vision’ was recognised as being an important step, it was 
suggested by one interviewee that it was a small step because it didn’t contain 
firm commitments and was believed to have been watered down: ‘at a certain 
point we said if you dilute it even further you can use it for the washing machine 
industry. It was so non-specific and so did it help us, let's say it was another 
step in the right direction’ (49). 
The development of the ‘Heat Vision’ represents a similar step to the 
development of ‘heat strategy’ in the UK which took place around 2012 and 
2013. The ‘heat vision’ also suggested similar options for the decarbonisation of 
heat including a replacement of much of the heating currently provided by gas 
with increasing levels of electric heat and heat networks; like the UK’s heat 
strategy, the Dutch ‘Heat Vision’ also didn’t propose any specific policies or 
targets. 
11.2.3 The ‘Energy Report’      
The Dutch Government had been working towards a wider sustainable energy 
strategy beyond heat and in January 2016, the Dutch Government released: 
‘Energy Report - Transition to sustainability’ which described the Government’s 
plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 and to reduce its 
dependence on energy imports (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2016). Within this 
document, the Dutch Government proposed transformative changes to the 
Dutch energy system and for heat explained that: 
 The heat system would need to emit (almost) no carbon emissions by 
2050; 
 Natural gas use in heating should be reduced as much as possible; 
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 Reducing energy demand of new and some existing buildings to very low 
energy levels would need to take place; 
 A rapid growth in renewable heating sources (including solar thermal, 
heat pumps and biogas) and district heat would need to take place; 
 Local and regional governments will be required to develop low carbon 
heat plans but the national Government will provide support and a 
‘framework’. 
The report went on to suggest that the gas network may need to be replaced in 
some areas with district heating but suggested that it was ‘an excellent time to 
explore options for different, sustainable heat supplies’ due to the fact that many 
parts of the gas network would soon require replacement (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 2016). This marks an interesting comparison to the UK where for the 
current price control period (RIIO GD1) which runs from 2013 to 2021, an 
average of 3,200 km of gas main is being replaced each year. How the mains 
replacement scheme should continue beyond 2021 is yet to be decided 
although regulator Ofgem currently appear minded to maintain much of the 
programme in the period from 2021 to 2026 as there are safety concerns 
around not replacing certain pipes (Ofgem, 2018d). 
The Dutch ‘Energy Report’ was released after the research interviews for this 
thesis had been carried out and while providing useful context for the Dutch 
approach to heat is not directly relevant for questions of power considered in 
this research. 
11.2.4 Support for renewable heat and heat networks 
As well as having the long-term goal for a ‘sustainable’ energy system, the 
Netherlands has a renewable energy target of 14% by 2020 under the EU 
Renewable Energy Directive (European Union, 2009), comparable to the UK’s 
15% target.  
The capacity of renewable energy in the Netherlands has grown although it is 
suggested that at current rates, the Netherlands is not likely to meet its 2020 
renewable energy target (AURES, 2016). Figure 11-3 shows how the capacity 
of renewable energy has grown in the Netherlands and it is clear that in order to 
reach the 2020 target, a much faster level of growth in renewable energy 
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production will need to be achieved and the 2020 target looks unlikely to be 
met. 
 
Figure 11-3. Share of renewable energy in the Dutch final energy consumption compared to 2020 target. 
Data from Eurostat (2016) 
Dutch energy statistics show that in 2017, renewable heat was responsible for 
just over half of Dutch renewable energy consumption. Around 10% of total 
Dutch heat for 2017 came from renewable sources and the split of renewable 
heat production by technology is shown in Figure 11-4 (CBS, 2018b). Biomass 
is by far the largest constituent of Dutch renewable heat production and data 
from 2014 shows that the majority of biomass used for heat was used in homes 
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Figure 11-4. Heat production in the Netherlands for 2017 split by technology with the renewable 
component expanded. Geothermal includes ground source heat pumps, aerothermal is air source heat 
pumps, bioenergy includes biogas. Other includes heat primarily provided by district heating. Data 
synthesised from CBS, (2018c) and CBS, (2018b) 
The Dutch Government has supported renewable energy for a number of years 
through various schemes and since 2008 the ‘SDE’ (Stimulation of Sustainable 
Energy Production) policy has been the main mechanism which supports 
renewable energy. From 2008 the scheme supported renewable electricity and 
biogas for electricity or grid injection (Hahn et al., 2010). In 2012, the scheme 
became the ‘SDE+’ and it now supports a variety of renewable heat sources 
including geothermal, solar thermal and biomass heat (AURES, 2016). The 
scheme is a competitive auction process designed to reward the lowest cost 
renewable energy projects and if successful, projects receive a guaranteed 
income (relative to wholesale energy prices) for a number of years dependent 
on the type of renewable energy technology (AURES, 2016). 
The most recent data regarding total capacity delivered by the SDE scheme 
which shows the total cumulative capacity delivered is show below in Figure 
11-5 and this does indeed show growth in all technologies. However, 
determining how renewable heat capacity in the Netherland’s has changed as a 
result of the SDE+ scheme is not an easy task because the data from the 
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Figure 11-5 Capacity realised under the SDE (+) scheme (MW) (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2018a) 
Figures from the 2015 Netherlands ‘Renewable Energy Report’ which did break 
down data from the SDE into heat and electricity (this report appears to have 
been replaced by CBS statistics which now do not break down projects into 
electricity and heat) show that the majority of renewable heat capacity delivered 
by the scheme has been from biomass using boilers or combined heat and 
power (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2015a). According to the 2015 report, 
the SDE+ had delivered heat capacity of: 
 1 MW of solar thermal has been installed;  
 128 MW of biogas has been built; 
 849 MW of biomass heat/CHP has been built; 
 140MW of geothermal heat has been built  (Netherlands Enterprise 
Agency, 2015a).  
The capacity of renewable energy in the Netherlands is growing and this growth 
is supported by the SDE policy however, it appears unlikely the target for 14% 
of energy to come from renewable energy sources will be met. One specific and 
significant failing of the SDE policy has been the number of projects which have 
withdrawn after being allocated subsidy highlighting an issue with reverse 
auctions often known as ‘the winners curse’ (Woodman and Fitch-Roy, 2016). 
Around half of the projects which won auctions in 2012, 2013 and 2014 
withdrew and as a result that budget went unspent; much of the capacity which 
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A scheme for small scale low-carbon heat technologies, similar to the GB 
domestic Renewable Heat Incentive, (The Investment Subsidy for Sustainable 
Energy (ISDE)) was only introduced in 2017 which supports heat pumps, solar 
thermal and biomass (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2017). Early 
Government data shows that the ISDE scheme has been primarily supporting 
the deployment of heat pumps and that for 2018, there have been around 
24,000 applications which equates to around 75% of the budget (Netherlands 
Enterprise Agency, 2018b). 
As well as attempting to support renewable heat, the Netherlands has also 
introduced price regulation for district heating networks, through ‘The Heat Act’. 
This came into force on the 1st January 2014 with the main aim of protecting 
consumers for paying too much for heat and ensuring they are generally 
protected (Warmetewet, 2014). The introduction of this legislation was led by 
the Dutch Parliament (rather than Government) and is considered in more detail 
in section 11.3.3. There has been concern that this regulation has not been 
appropriate and the Heat Act has since been reviewed. The review explained 
that the central ‘not more than otherwise principle’ where a heat consumer 
should pay no more than an equivalent gas user has been very difficult to 
regulate because of the complexity in comparing gas prices to district heating 
prices (Ecorys, 2016). This review also suggested that in relation to the required 
changes to the heat system: 
 The current heat market does not provide an attractive investment 
proposition because of the relative costs of the alternative (primarily gas); 
 There is limited public support for heat networks; 
 Heat networks are not generally considered by local developers and 
planners because other options are cheaper; 
 The incentives to both produce and supply sustainable heat into heat 
networks do not support renewable heat and so gas is often used to 
produce heat. 
(Ecorys, 2016) 
Building on the review of the Heat Act and as described in section 11.3.3, the 
Government has since amended the legislation. However, as explored in the 
upcoming section, the amended legislation is not yet fully in force. 
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11.2.5 Section overview 
The heat policy context of the Netherlands shows many similarities to the UK. 
Firstly, both countries are similar in terms of the current situation, both countries 
have significant gas grids with a high proportion of households connected and 
using gas for heat. Expectations of a system transformation to a future heat 
system which has lower levels of energy demand, and a higher proportion of 
heat coming from renewable sources and via district heat network are also 
similar for both countries. It should however be noted that the UK is currently 
investigating the option of converting the gas grid to run on hydrogen produced 
from fossil gas whereas there appears to be a focus in the Netherlands of 
removing gas from the system. Finally, early delivery of renewable heat under 
renewable energy incentives in both countries (the SDE+ in the Netherlands 
and the RHI in GB) has led to significant growth in biomass combustion in both 
countries although the ISDE scheme appears to be delivering some non-
biomass systems (primarily heat pumps) at the smaller scale. The policy 
mechanisms to achieve this deployment of low carbon heat in the Netherlands 
(auctions and grants) are however very different to those in the UK where tariff 
based mechanisms have been used. 
11.3  HEAT POLICY CHANGE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
The following sections consider the development of heat policy in the 
Netherlands investigating where actors have tried to influence policy, who these 
actors are and if there has been any policy influencing success or power. The 
inclusion of specific episodes has emerged from interview data and the 
episodes also draw on grey literature in order to support attempts at data 
triangulation. 
In general the data has highlighted that there have been some significant heat 
policy developments in the Netherlands. There was a recognition that the 
Government had begun to work across departments on heat issues and the 
Ministry of the Interior (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties), The Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment 
(Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(Ministerie van Economische Zaken) worked together on the energy transition 
plans (41). According to one representative from the Rotterdam Government: 
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‘I'm very happy with what you see and that was also nice with both the ‘Energy 
Agreement’ and the ‘Heat Vision’ is that both departments have found each 
other and realised that it's the combination of things that make it work, that's a 
big benefit but we still have a long way to go’ (41). The ‘Heat Vision’ document 
does indeed explain that the Ministry of Economic Affairs has worked with the 
Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2015b) suggesting that departments have been working together on heat issues 
indicating interest in heat across Government. 
There was also a general recognition that the Dutch Government was seriously 
considering transformative change with according to one interviewee, a Dutch 
Government official publicly saying at a conference: ‘what I would really like to 
write down in our plan is that we will stop in 2035, in 20 years’ time, stop 
heating houses with natural gas, we will just stop, we won’t do it anymore’ (50). 
At the time of interview it was however recognised that this position did not yet 
represent official Government policy (50). However, with the release of the 
‘Energy Report’ in 2016, major changes to the Dutch heat system including the 
total decarbonisation of heat and the general removal of gas by 2050 do appear 
to have Government support.  
Overall, there was a recognition from interviewees that the Government is 
supportive of major changes to the Dutch heat system and this support for 
change has grown. The following sections explore the power associated with 
more specific Dutch heat policy issues which have been highlighted by 
interviews. 
11.3.1 Dutch policy episode 1 - The inclusion of renewable heat 
in the SDE/SDE+ 
As the key measure to promote renewable heat sources with financial support, 
the SDE+ policy represents an important area where actors could attempt to 
influence Dutch heat policy. The first major change to the scheme of relevance 
to heat was the inclusion of renewable heat within the scheme in 2012 when it 
became ‘SDE+’ (from ‘SDE’).  
One interviewee suggested that the geothermal and glasshouse food 
production industry were the loudest lobby supporting the inclusion of heat into 
the scheme as geothermal was seen as being a good technology to replace gas 
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in the glasshouse industry (45). While the interviewee (not from the glasshouse 
or geothermal industry) explained that lobbying had taken place, the 
interviewee, did not believe that this lobbying caused the policy change as the 
ministry had existing plans to broaden the scheme anyway (45).  Separately, 
there was a suggestion from a representative of the heat pump industry that the 
heat pump industry had been involved in a long lobbying process to support the 
inclusion of heat in the SDE+ (49).  
When asked about the lobbying impact of industry on the SDE, a civil servant 
who worked the development of SDE scheme explained that while there had 
been some lobbying from industry, this had not been the cause of the inclusion 
of heat in the scheme: ‘often there is a lot of pressure from lobby groups and we 
have to change things because of them...in this case the pressure was not that 
big’ (46).  
In this example of policy change, while it appears that the industry has 
attempted to influence the SDE policy to include heat and the policy eventually 
did support heat, the view of a policy maker and one industrial lobbyist does not 
actually suggest that the industry had any power over that particular policy 
change. In order to triangulate this policy change further, a review of grey 
literature was carried out which provided only limited results. A report by Dutch 
public research institute ECN (Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands who 
advise on energy issues including SDE tariffs) explains that the Dutch 
Government had asked ECN to provide analysis and advice on whether and 
how to include heat in the SDE scheme but did not show that any sort of 
industrial lobbying had caused this request to be made (ECN, 2011). The Dutch 
Government’s 2011 ‘Energy Report’ did mention changes to the SDE including 
the inclusion of heat, but did not explain the reasons for its inclusion thereby 
providing no further information on the change (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2011). 
According to an interviewee from ECN, ECN were actually involved even earlier 
than the 2011 analysis and had produced renewable heat cost data for the 
Dutch Government in 2009/2010 (51), however, the grey literature review did 
not discover this earlier analysis on heat.  
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Overall, while the inclusion of heat within the SDE scheme is a significant policy 
change, this analysis which has been able to use ‘thorough’ triangulation hasn’t 
shown that any specific actors have caused this policy change, despite 
apparent attempts to lobby the Dutch Government on this issue. It does appear 
however that the Dutch Government and its advisor ECN were discussing the 
inclusion of renewable heat in advance of eventual policy changes. As with the 
UK policy episodes, this episode highlights the limits of so-called ‘preference 
attainment’ methods for considering the impact of actors on policy as, under this 
method, this episode would have provided a positive result which has not been 
confirmed by more detailed analysis. 
In the UK at the time of introduction of the RHI, industry pressure for support for 
renewable heat was large, particularly from renewable energy trade 
associations and unlike in the Netherlands, the industry was seen to be 
successful in encouraging the introduction of the RHI in the UK (see policy 
episode 2, section 8.2). However, it is worth bearing in mind that in the UK it is 
also known that the Government was planning to introduce support for 
renewable heat and the industry pressure may have simply sped up the 
process. One key difference in the policy process uncovered in this section is 
the role of ECN in engaging with and advising the Government on technical 
energy issues; the UK does not have an equivalent independent and official 
energy research and advisory body (although the Committee on Climate 
Change does advise on carbon budgets and decarbonisation). 
11.3.2 Dutch policy episode 2 - Influence over SDE+ tariffs and 
budgets 
With heat included in the SDE+ scheme since 2012, the potential was there for 
more specific lobbying around tariffs and budgets for particular heat 
technologies. An interviewee from ECN (the research organization who advise 
the Dutch Government on the tariffs) explained that as an organisation they are 
‘almost constantly’ approached by industry and trade associations trying to 
influence the SDE+ policy (51) and another interviewee from a large utility also 




An interviewee from ECN explained that they consult annually on the costs of 
heat technologies on behalf of the government and the results of this analysis 
form the key advice they give to Government on heat (51). The interviewee also 
explained that ECN are lobbied on much wider points regarding the operation of 
the SDE+ scheme. While these issues are the responsibility of civil servants 
rather than ECN,  there was a recognition that the lobbying of ECN by industry 
means the industry concerns are sometimes passed on to the Government via 
ECN because the relationship between ECN and the ministry is relatively 
informal and not bound by strict legal requirements (51). This informal and open 
relationship implies that ECN is seen by the Dutch Government as able to 
provide legitimate and trusted information on the SDE+ and means that 
potentially, ECN is a powerful actor in Dutch heat (and perhaps wider energy) 
policy as well as a target for lobbying. 
The interviewee from research institute ECN believed that the SDE scheme is 
influenced by industry however, this was believed to be only where there is a 
valid point (51). Interviewees from ECN and industry described a specific 
success of the biomass industry in causing the splitting of the single biomass 
category into a small and a large category (44, 51). ECN was the recipient of 
some of the associated lobbying (51). This policy change was introduced in 
2014 and rather than having a single biomass combustion tariff, after 2014 the 
scheme included a small (between 0.5. and 5 MW) and large biomass tariff 
(over 5 MW tariffs) in order to provide support for biomass across scales 
(Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2014).  
The simple triangulation above includes evidence from both an industrial actor 
and the organization being lobbied (ECN) alongside grey literature which shows 
the policy change did happen. This implies that the biomass lobby did have the 
power to affect the SDE and appears to be an example of the first face of power 
where the biomass industry caused the Dutch Government to do something that 
would otherwise not have happened. However no further grey literature on this 
issue has been found allowing only ‘part’ triangulation.  
The UK case study showed that the biomass industry has seen some success 
around policy change in particular around tariffs for both the non-domestic and 
domestic RHI schemes and available budgets but doesn’t appear to have 
necessarily caused these changes (policy episodes 7, 11 and 12 respectively). 
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With regards to the specifics of this Dutch policy change it should however be 
noted that more recently, the non-domestic biomass RHI tariff in the UK has 
been merged from a tariff which has three size categories down to just one 
category apparently for reasons of cost effectiveness (BEIS, 2016); this appears 
to be the opposite of what has happened in the Netherlands.  
Despite the recognition of the importance of ECN around the SDE+, it was 
believed that the SDE+ had a high degree of flexibility in that it could be quickly 
modified if necessary as tariffs could be decided by the minister without seeking 
parliamentary approval (51). This implies that although ECN advises on the 
SDE+ support levels, the power to actually modify the tariffs sits fully with the 
Dutch energy minister highlighting the institutional power of the minister. In the 
UK, changes to RHI tariffs do need to pass through Parliament and can be 
subject to scrutiny by parliamentarians highlighting a clear institutional 
difference between the two countries.  
11.3.3 Dutch policy episode 3 - The ‘Heat Act’ 
As previously mentioned in section 11.2.4, the Dutch Parliament introduced a 
law to regulate the heat prices for customers connected to district heat networks 
which came into force in 2014.  The Heat Act is a controversial area of policy 
and a number of interviewees mentioned concerns around it. One civil servant 
said simply: ‘it's a disaster’ (43). While heat generation rather than distribution is 
the key focus of this thesis, this section on heat networks is included because 
the issue of the Heat Act was repeatedly raised (unprompted) as an issue 
where power and influence was seen to be important. The issue of heat 
networks was not raised in the same way by UK interviewees.  
The Heat Act was initiated in Parliament in 2007 as a result of concerns that 
consumers on district heating networks were paying too much and that district 
heat company profits were too high. The key reason the Act was introduced 
was to introduce the ‘not more than otherwise principle’ whereby those on 
district heat should pay no more than those with gas heating (43, 45, 47, 48, 
50). This initial bill was produced by members of Parliament rather than being 
led by the Government in a similar process to the introduction of a private 
members bill in the UK and was not therefore not official Government policy. 
According to one interviewee from a sustainable heat network organisation: 
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‘yeah I was involved for eleven years in the battlefield concerning the heat act, 
terrible’ (50). He went on to say that the political power behind the bill was 
extremely strong: 
‘I went to a member of Parliament, I said ‘I am a director of a 
district heating company, these are my annual figures, you can 
see I don’t make a big profit, I make perhaps a too small profit in 
order to maintain my supply obligations’ and he said ‘I don’t 
believe you’. I said ‘OK that's my problem you don’t believe me but 
here's my statement from the accountant verifying the figures I 
gave you’, he said ‘I don’t believe him at all as well’, I said, ‘OK so 
I have a problem, how can I convince you?’ He said ‘I don’t want 
to be convinced, I just want to have this law passed and you not to 
make too much profit, that's it’. I said ‘can I do anything for you?’. 
‘Nothing, just sit still, your hair is being cut don’t move’’ (50) 
This example highlights a potential limit to the power of evidence as according 
to the interviewee, the parliamentarian in question was keen to progress the 
legislation even though evidence suggested it may not be necessary. This 
example also highlights the power of parliamentarians to propose and push 
legislation. 
There was a recognition that because the Heat Act was introduced in an 
abnormal process, similar to a Private Member’s Bill in the UK, it included a 
number of incorrect definitions and loopholes (50). One interviewee explained 
that as a result of the Heat Act, because it introduced a maximum price per unit 
of heat, for some consumers prices had actually increased because district heat 
suppliers increased their tariffs up to the maximum level (47).  
Using triangulation and the EAR instrument is slightly complex in this example 
as the issue has been raised by non ‘ego’ actors. However, with ‘thorough’ 
triangulation of sources from both inside and outside Government, it is clear in 
this example that Dutch parliamentarians had power to introduce the Heat Act 
and the history of the development of the policy is visible in grey literature 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, 2018b). This example appears 
to show Dutch parliamentarians having the first face of power to cause the 
emergence of legislation from the Dutch parliament which would have otherwise 
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not happened. This power is clearly linked to their institutional power as 
members of Parliament and can therefore be seen as a more structural or fixed 
element of power. 
Dutch members of Parliament are believed to have acted in the case of the 
Heat Act because there was a concern that consumers needed protection from 
district heating companies (43, 47). One interviewee from the Dutch civil service 
believed that the political concerns around heat networks were generally 
attributed to direct complaints from consumers (43). It was however explained 
that despite the fact that the majority of customers who have heat provided by 
district heating networks are generally satisfied, a small and vocal minority were 
successful in putting the issue on the agenda (the second face of power); 
following this, apparently the media saw it as a good story because of the 
monopoly nature of heat networks and the fact that consumers are unable to 
switch supplier (48, 50). A grey literature review has identified a three page 
article in Dutch ‘Home’ magazine (Eigen Huis) in 2007 which discusses the 
potential issues with heat networks and interviews a district heat customer who 
believes they are paying too much for heat; this suggests that there was some 
media interest in the issue when the Heat Act was initiated. It is however 
interesting to note, that in considering the introduction of heat price control, the 
Dutch Consumer and Markets Authority didn’t make any references to excess 
costs or a need for consumer protection with regards to heat networks in a 2009 
statement, this suggested that at the time they were not concerned (NMA, 
2009). 
Dutch civil servants from the Ministry of Economic Affairs explained that in 
general they did not believe that heat suppliers were over charging and as such 
the Heat Act would be redesigned (43). Since interviews were carried out, an 
amendment was made to the Dutch Heat Act in order to correct some of the 
perceived errors. While the new law is in place, according to the most recent 
Government ‘Explanatory Note’ on the amendment, the Dutch Consumers and 
Markets authority (ACM) has issued guidance on complying with the amended 
regulations but explain that further clarity is needed from the Dutch Government 
before the new rules can be fully implemented (Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Climate Policy, 2018b). 
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In the UK, the role of consumers in having any even indirect effect on heat 
policy appears to be extremely limited and consumers were not involved in any 
of the policy episodes and did not emerge as important actors associated with 
heat policy. However, domestic consumer issues, particularly around energy 
prices have affected other areas of UK energy governance around the 
regulation of energy suppliers (see Geels, 2014) suggesting the domestic 
energy consumers have some power. The Heat Act situation in the Netherlands 
around district heating shows the potential consumer issues associated with 
increasing the use of district heating, a technology of which the UK Government 
is generally supportive. While currently UK district heat networks are completely 
unregulated and prices are at the behest of the network operator, the UK 
Association for Decentralised Energy (ADE) along with the Chartered Institution 
of Building Services Engineers has introduced a voluntary best practice guide 
for heat network operators (CIBSE, 2015). More recently, the ADE has 
explained that greater levels of regulation of heat networks would not just 
protect consumers but could also support the growth of the industry (ADE, 
2018). The UK Competition and Markets Authority also announced last year 
that ‘Heat markets must be regulated’ (Competition and Markets Authority, 
2018) suggesting that the UK Government will introduce regulation for heat 
networks. 
11.3.4 Dutch policy episode 4 - The ‘Heat Vision’ 
The ‘Heat Vision’ was the first official recognition that a transformation of the 
Dutch heat sector was required and marks a substantial shift in Dutch energy 
policy (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015b).  
It was suggested by one civil servant that the Dutch CHP lobby (which was 
described as ‘very strong’ because there is a high proportion of CHP in the 
Netherlands) was pushing hard for a CHP strategy associated with the 2013 
Dutch ‘Energy Agreement’ in order to increase the capacity of CHP in the 
Netherlands. ‘The CHP lobby, they tried to get in the energy deal, a 
commitment from the Government to make a policy on CHP, a vision on CHP 
and they suggested that. They came with a text and we broadened that to a 
‘Heat Vision’ because we always say we don’t want to make technology choices 
… I know it because I did it’ (43). It appears that while the CHP lobby was 
involved in the early development of the ‘Heat Vision’, the ‘Heat Vision’ may 
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have emerged without them and they were unsuccessful in getting the 
Government to develop a specific CHP vision. While the ‘Heat Vision’ did 
mention CHP a number of times, the vision explained that the potential to 
increase CHP capacity may actually be limited if this CHP used fossil gas 
because of greenhouse gas emissions (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015b).  
Interestingly, in the UK’s development of a heat strategy, there was also 
recognition that the CHP lobby was specifically pushing for the development of 
a UK heat strategy and similarly, the actual policy impact of the CHP lobby in 
the UK appears limited (see section 8.8). 
Trade associations Warmtenetwerk (which represents heat network developers) 
and BDHO (which is involved with primarily heat pumps) suggested that they 
had also been involved with the development of the ‘Heat Vision’ (50, 49 
respectively). It was however not clear how these organisations believed they 
had had any specific impact and these organisations weren’t recognised as 
being particularly influential by policy makers (43).  
According to one interviewee, Gasunie (the Dutch gas transmission operator 
which is fully owned by the Dutch state (Gasunie, 2017)) was arguing that the 
removal of gas from heating could cause energy system issues. They 
suggested that a move to a more electrified heat system as outlined in the 
vision would cause issues on the electricity system by significantly increasing 
the peak electricity load and they were seen to be promoting a more hybrid 
system which retained some gas but combined heat systems with electric heat 
pumps (41). The Gasunie website doesn’t contain any specific response from 
the company  to the ‘Heat Vision’ document; however the website does explain 
that Gasunie is a member of the international ‘Green Gas Initiative’ which 
believes that ‘gas and gas infrastructure are key to achieve EU carbon 
objectives at a reasonable cost for society and consumers’ (Gasunie, 2015).  
There is no evidence gained from interviews with civil servants that Gasunie 
has had any impact on the development of the ‘Heat Vision’ or more recent 
policy developments however the 2016 ‘Energy report’ which was released after 
interviews took place does suggest a potential role for hybrid heat pumps 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2016). The arguments around peak heat and the 
potential role for hybrid systems are very similar to arguments made by gas 
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companies in the UK in light of the UK Government’s heat strategy and the 
potential for heat electrification (see section 8.10, policy episode 11). 
Two interviewees believed that the emergence of the ‘Heat Vision’ was related 
to EU legislation (renewable energy targets in the Renewable Energy Directive) 
(41, 49) and the fact that the Netherlands was not likely to meet its sustainable 
energy goals without making much more significant progress (43, 49). It is 
indeed clear from Figure 11-3 (on p293) that the Netherlands has been 
struggling to increase the proportion of energy from renewable sources at a rate 
commensurate with its EU Renewable Energy Directive requirement; the ‘Heat 
Vision’ document does also make reference to the EU targets (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2015b). This therefore suggests that the EU (law) had some 
power in driving the development of the ‘Heat Vision’ although reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions was also seen as a key goal in the vision. While the 
UK’s ‘heat strategy’ didn’t appear to emerge as a result of EU law but is more 
closely linked to the UK’s own greenhouse gas reduction targets, it does appear 
that the EU Renewable Energy Directive (European Union, 2009) did have 
some influence over the shape of the RHI and its design focus on renewable 
energy deployment rather than carbon reduction (see section 8.6 which is policy 
episode 6).  
Overall then, the development of the ‘Heat Vision’ represents an important 
development in Dutch energy policy and lobbying to support specific 
technologies within the ‘Heat Vision’ has been identified. ‘Thorough’ 
triangulation has however not shown that any specific actors have driven the 
development of the vision. Rather, the development of the ‘Heat Vision’ appears 
linked to the Dutch goal of a ‘sustainable’ energy system and concerns around 
gas import dependency. In the words of the ‘Heat Vision’ document:  
‘The resource intensity of heat supply puts on our energy 
consumption also means that sustainable and reduce them is 
crucial for achieving the transition to a fully sustainable energy 
system in 2050. This is all the more urgent in view of the reduction 
of gas production and the decrease in gas supplies in the 
Netherlands, where the government wants to minimize the import 
dependency increases from politically unstable regions to meet 
future natural gas demand.’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015b) 
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11.3.5 Section summary 
This section has considered Dutch heat policy issues where interviewees have 
suggested that power and influence may have had an impact. Similarly to the 
UK, two important areas of heat policy are identified, subsidy support for 
renewable heat (SDE+) and the long term vision for heat (The ‘Heat Vision’). 
These mirror the RHI and the heat strategy work in the UK. However, 
interviewees also highlighted the Dutch Heat Act which regulated district 
heating as another important policy issue and a similar issue has not emerged 
in the UK.  
Actors have attempted to influence the SDE policy, by lobbying Government so 
that it covered renewable heat. While the scheme does now include renewable 
heat, there is no evidence that industry lobbying caused this change but there is 
clear evidence of attempts to influence. However, once up and running it 
appears from interview data that the biomass industry has been successful in 
lobbying to split the SDE+ biomass tariff into two scales; this appears to be a 
direct policy change due to lobbying and can be considered as the first face of 
power. 
With regards to district heating, the first face of power has also been observed 
as the Dutch Parliament forced through legislation around district heat pricing 
(the Heat Act) against the will of the Government as a result of perceived 
consumer issues. In this example, the first face of power can be associated with 
the structural or institutional power of members of parliament to develop 
legislation. A similar development in the UK took place around the introduction 
of the legislation for the RHI (policy episode 2) however in this example, while 
parliamentarians proposed amendments, it was actually a Government led 
amendment which was eventually included in the legislation. The legislative 
change in the Netherlands also appears to have been impacted by a group of 
consumers who have been able to put the issue of district heating costs on the 
agenda (the second face of power). 
With regards to wider discussions around a transformation of the Dutch heat 
system, it appears that the development of the ‘Heat Vision’ has been in the 
context of wider Government goals rather than specifically being driven by 
specific actors and this is similar to the UK.  
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11.4  APPROACHES TO INFLUENCE DUTCH HEAT POLICY 
This section considers the approaches used by actors to attempt to influence 
Dutch heat policy which were highlighted in the interviews. The section follows a 
similar order to chapter 10 which explored approaches to influence in the UK. 
The first section (11.4.1) considers the role of knowledge and evidence, the 
second on the use of framing (11.4.2), the third section focuses on 
situational/institutional factors of different actors (11.4.3) and the final section 
briefly considers the style of influencing approaches (11.4.4). 
11.4.1 Knowledge and evidence 
A large number of interviewees recognised the important role of evidence and 
knowledge in the Dutch heat policy network. One interviewee suggested that 
there was a general reliance on industry for technological information for policy 
making (49).  
One area in which it was recognised that evidence has been particularly 
important is around the SDE+. Section 11.3.1 considered the inclusion of heat 
in the SDE scheme and this was associated with data on renewable heat costs 
and official advice from research agency ECN which was passed on to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs; following the development of this evidence, the 
ministry supported the inclusion of heat in the SDE (51). It should be however 
noted that the Dutch government did not believe that heat was added to the 
SDE because of the ECN data. 
Separately, there was a recognition by two interviewees (one from a company 
and one a civil servant) of the importance of evidence supplied by ECN for the 
purpose of setting SDE+ tariffs and SDE+ budget allocations by the 
Government (45, 46). One civil servant explained that the evidence gained from 
consultation by ECN was particularly important for setting tariffs (46). In fact, 
one interviewee believed that because of ECN’s role they could be a good 
target to lobby because of their reliance on industry evidence and their 
importance in setting tariffs and as such attempts had previously been made to 
influence ECN on offshore wind costs (45). It was however suggested by 
another interviewee that while ECN does engage with industry, they do not 
always believe industry data and in one example ECN disagreed with cost data 
for heat pumps provided by the heat pump industry (49). 
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This evidence gathering by ECN on behalf of policy makers for the SDE+ is 
extremely similar to the exercise carried out by consultants in the UK around the 
development of the RHI tariffs (section 10.1.2) and highlights similar issues with 
reliance on industry evidence and information asymmetries. It is clear from the 
data that there have been attempts to influence the SDE+ via ECN in the 
Netherlands but it is not clear that this approach has resulted in any success. In 
the UK, while it is apparent that actors attempted to influence the RHI tariffs, it is 
not apparent that actors actively lobbied consultancies and research 
organisations in order to try and affect policy outcomes. It is however the case 
that consultancies engaged with industry in order to gather evidence on behalf 
of Government. One difference between the two countries is the existence of 
ECN in the Netherlands which is a semi-public organization which is subject to 
Government control and is expected to advise the Government on technical 
energy issues (ECN, 2018). No such organization exists in the UK and the close 
relationship between ECN and the Dutch Government is something which does 
not appear to be replicated in the UK case study. 
Beyond the SDE scheme, there appears to be only limited evidence of the use 
of evidence to influence. One interviewee suggested that this may be due to the 
fact the ‘Heat Vision’ document contained only small amounts of evidence and 
data and that further analysis was expected (48). With the development of the 
more detailed and specific ‘Energy Report’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2016) 
this may have changed but this is outside the scope of this research. 
Overall, as with UK heat policy, using evidence is an important aspect of 
approaches to influence Dutch heat policy but successes using this approach 
appear limited. Approaches to influence using evidence in the Dutch study can 
be seen to be linked to the third face of power with actors attempting to shape 
the preferences of policy makers using evidence which is supplied to officials 
via ECN. It is also the case that some interviewees believed that ECN had 
provided evidence to the Dutch Government in order to drive the inclusion of 
heat in the SDE scheme and to get heat on the agenda although this was not 
confirmed by civil servant, if this was indeed the case, this could be seen as the 
second face of power. 
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11.4.2 Framing and ideas in the Dutch heat policy network 
As with UK interviews, interviewees in the Netherlands were asked about the 
use of framing within Dutch heat policy lobbying, including whether the actors 
used frames themselves or whether they had seen others frame their particular 
lobbying positions. The use of these frames are considered under Shorten's  
(2013) typology for ideas. This typology suggests that the use of ideas can be 
understood as mediated influence (where existing ideas are re-used by actors), 
unconscious influence (where ideas are used but it is not clear where the idea 
has emerged from), adoptive influence (where existing ideas are actively 
adopted), distorted influence (where ideas are deliberately misrepresented) or 
cumulative influence (where ideas have grown, emerged and developed over 
time) (Shorten, 2013). 
There was a wide recognition from across interviewees that framing was used 
in attempts to influence Dutch heat policy. One interviewee described how his 
organisation plays on the views of politicians and explained: ‘let’s just say we try 
and treat the message to ignite their interest’ (49). 
Figure 11-6 shows the number of times different frames were mentioned by 
interviewees in the Netherlands. As with the UK section on framing (10.2), 
quantifying the appearance of certain frames is methodologically complex and it 
is clear that some frames are related to each other. The most frequently 
appearing frames with over five references are described in more detail below 




Figure 11-6 Frames by number of references from Dutch interview data for all frames with at least two 
references sorted by number of references 
11.4.2.1 Earthquakes 
The issue of earthquakes was recognised as being very important for driving 
Dutch heat policy. Earthquakes have had a major political and human impact in 
the Netherlands as households have been damaged and subsequently 
compensated as a result of the earthquakes (41, 49). It was mentioned that 
some politicians have even been pushing for the complete removal of all gas 
production and consumption from the Netherlands (45). One interviewee also 
mentioned that some residents who had been affected by the earthquakes had 
installed energy efficiency and renewable energy measures in response to the 
earthquakes (41). Overall, earthquakes appear to have had a significant social 
and political impact.  
There was also a recognition from the civil servants in the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs that the earthquake issue had significantly influenced policy (43). The 
pro-gas frame was extremely weak because of the earthquakes and according 





























‘If they are trying to influence policy by saying now we should 
keep on using gas because gas is the best option and it's the least 
dirty option next to renewables, at this moment people say 'shut 
up…go away'’ (43). 
Even the Government itself no longer talked about the benefits of gas. The 
quote below concerns a discussion between three civil servants regarding the 
Dutch gas trading hub project during one interview: 
‘Civil servant 1: I have a small question, is the gas roundabout a 
part of what we want? 
Civil servant 2: It's finished, it's there. 
Civil servant 1: But in the 2011 ‘Energy Report’ it was a goal to 
invest more and become a hub 
Civil servant 2: Well a lot of that has been done but we now 
officially say that that's finished 
Civil servant 3: I think we also say that because we don't talk gas 
Civil servant 1: So it’s no longer a chapter in the ‘Energy Report’? 
Civil servant 2: No, but we are very strong in gas…but we are not 
allowed to say it’ (43) 
There was also a view from two interviewees that the power of the Dutch gas 
industry had been reduced by issues outside of their direct control. It was 
explained that due to the earthquakes in Groningen, ‘Everything connected to 
gas here is infected at the moment’ and as a result, the political power of gas 
companies has been weakened (43). One interviewee from a sustainable heat 
interested trade association explained that policy makers simply ignore gas 
companies (43). Another suggested that their image is ‘down the drain’ and 
added that as well as the earthquake issue, the science of climate change is so 
compelling that companies can no longer argue against decarbonisation (44). 
It was believed that because earthquakes happened at the time the ‘Heat 
Vision’ was being developed, low-carbon heat technologies were being given a 
‘level playing field’ compared to gas which could have otherwise dominated 
policy discussions around the future of heating (45). One interviewee suggested 
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that the earthquake issue was significantly affecting the Dutch heat discourse 
and suggested that the whole ‘atmosphere, the total mood’ related to gas in the 
Netherlands is changing, which has weakened gas and put sustainable heat in 
a more effective lobbying position (49). He went on: 
‘You can imagine if they [the gas industry] now would come up 
with a kind of bull shitting approach trying to diminish our role, we 
have good arguments to fight back and we do’ (49) 
Another interviewee from a heat network organisation explained: ‘now we are 
finding we have another ear, a far more interested ear and I don’t think this can 
be attributed to all our efforts but at least we can benefit from it’ (50). 
Overall, the earthquake issue has clearly had a significant impact on Dutch heat 
policy which is believed to have reduced the power of incumbents and 
increased the power of sustainable heat actors. While actors may have used 
the issue to frame their own policy changes, it appears that the issue is so 
powerful that actors interested in sustainable (non-gas) heating don’t 
necessarily need to actively apply the frame and can instead simply rely on the 
fact that they are relatively popular compared to gas. Because of the passive 
nature of the earthquake issue in empowering sustainable heat actors, it is not 
clear how much value Shorten’s typology is for understanding the power of 
ideas in this example. However, where actors have actively used the 
earthquake issue to frame their policy asks, this could be seen as ‘adoptive 
influence’. 
11.4.2.2 Consumers and protection 
The next most frequently referenced frame from the Dutch interviews was 
around the issues of consumer prices and consumer protection.  
One interviewee suggested that the idea of consumer safety could be used as 
an argument to move people off gas and explained that she had heard a district 
heat consumer explain: ‘I'm actually quite happy that my old neighbour who is 
getting a little bit crazy is not using gas, so from a safety perspective gas is no 
longer the best option so you see in dense cities or apartments where you don’t 
know each other that well’ (41). 
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However, the majority of comments regarding consumer issues referred to the 
fact that district heating customers couldn’t switch suppliers and the belief that 
the companies were making excess profits (41, 42, 47, 50). One interviewee 
explained simply ‘The idea of being able to switch is very important and DH 
does not allow this’ (42). The framing around an inability to switch could be 
seen as ‘adoptive influence’ under Shorten’s typology as existing ideas are re-
used by actors as required. 
While these consumer issues were recognised as important frames, there was 
no evidence from the interview data that attempts to use these frames had any 
sort of influence on the development of Dutch heat policy. However, the 
introduction of the Heat Act has been associated with consumer concerns. 
11.4.2.3 Putin and Russian gas 
The next most frequently mentioned frame was associated with the potential for 
the use of Russian gas or mentions of the Russian president Vladimir Putin. As 
reported earlier, the Netherlands only became a net importer of gas last year 
however, imports of gas from Russia have been rapidly increasing, doubling 
from around 6 billion cubic meters in 2014 to around 12 billion cubic meters in 
2016 (Interfax Energy, 2018). 
There was a suggestion that the diplomatic relationship between Russia and the 
Netherlands had been damaged since the shooting down of the MH17 Boeing 
jet flying between Amsterdam and Malaysia in 2014 which had killed a number 
of Dutch citizens and was which had been attributed to Russian weapons (45). 
It was also believed that this situation, combined with the earthquakes put the 
Dutch Government in a very difficult position as they could neither rely on 
indigenous gas nor imports from Russia (45). 
Interviewees suggested there was a general anti-Putin feeling in the 
Netherlands (49, 50). However, there was a recognition that Putin and Russia 
had created a beneficial environment for sustainable heat polices and one 
interviewee associated with heat networks explained that for district heating 
which has its own issues around consumers: ‘we noticed that Mr Putin is a 
bigger enemy than we are so he even has a worse image with the customer 
than ourselves so we can use him more’ (50). He went on: 
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‘It's incredible how this works, if you talk to customers and do a 
presentation and your 4th or 5th slide shows a nice cartoon or 
picture of Mr Putin and say this is the alternative and everybody is 
OK we don’t want this so let’s hear more carefully what this man 
has to say, it really works like this, incredible. Strange, I 
understand it really works.’ (50) 
Overall the perceived issues with Russia and Russian gas in the Netherlands 
meant that gas was often seen negatively and interviewees explained that these 
issues could be used to frame the benefits of low-carbon heat. However, the 
evidence does not show that this framing has actually had an impact on the 
development of Dutch heat policy. Interestingly, the negative image associated 
with Russian gas appears to have a similar image to the earthquake issue and 
is also believed to have empowered actors involved in non-gas forms of 
heating. The use of the Russian gas frame could be seen as a form of adoptive 
influence under Shorten’s typology as the frame has been actively adopted. 
11.4.2.4 Other frames 
As well as the most frequently used frames mentioned above, interviewees 
recognised the use and importance of a number of other frames. 
There was a wide recognition that the ability to reduce carbon emissions was a 
very important aspect of the debate (44, 48). Some interviewees also 
mentioned the importance of economic impacts of particular policies, 
recognising the difficulty of reducing gas production for the Government’s tax 
take and the benefits that the income from gas has had for the country (41, 43, 
48). There was also a belief that the value of the energy efficiency frame had 
also become increasingly important (47, 48) as well as the general importance 
of using the frame of security of supply (43, 48, 50).  
A small number of interviewees mentioned other frames including the 
sustainability issues of using biomass, reducing costs, the peak heat issue 
associated with electrification and air pollution among others. 
11.4.2.5 Section summary 
In general, the use of framing in the Netherlands is seen to be an important 
element of heat policy influencing activities and many of the frames recognised 
as important by interviewees are similar to those used in the UK. However, the 
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most frequently recognised frames are very different to the most popular frames 
in the UK as a result of specific Dutch issues, in particular the earthquakes 
associated with the Groningen gas field and the relationship between the 
Netherlands and Russia. These two issues are used as frames by those looking 
to influence and appear to have empowered actors involved with sustainable 
heating while disempowering those involved in gas. The framing used in the 
Netherlands could be primarily considered as adoptive influence under 
Shorten’s typology; while much of the framing in the UK can be considered as 
adoptive influence, the UK analysis also highlighted distorted influence which 
wasn’t discovered in the Dutch research.  
11.4.3 Scale and situation 
Following the structure of the UK chapter around approaches to influence, this 
section considers the type of actors involved in influencing as well as lobbying 
targets and considers how the relative position and type of actors can be liked 
to power and influence over Dutch heat policy. The key aspects associated with 
scale and situation are broken down in more detail in the following sections. 
11.4.3.1 Routes to influence 
As in the UK, Dutch interviewees described various routes used to attempt to 
influence policy. Heat actors were seen to be involved in both parliamentary 
lobbying as well as administrative lobbying where they would engage with the 
department responsible for energy (41, 42, 46) and also the Ministry of Finance 
(48). Whilst the interview data did not show that consumer organisations were 
lobbying parliamentarians regarding the costs of district heating, one example of 
parliamentary power within Dutch heat policy (described in section 11.3.3) is the 
development of the Heat Act which was driven by politicians (apparently as a 
result of being lobbied by vocal consumers) who developed the legislation (43).  
For the SDE+ policy there is evidence from interviews of lobbyists attempting to 
influence the tariffs and policy through both the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
directly as well as through ECN, the research organisation which is heavily 
involved in advising the Dutch Government on various aspects of the SDE+. 
The evidence from the Netherlands shows that four routes can be identified 
from interviews to influence heat policy and these are shown in Figure 11-7. 
Firstly, as shown by the purple line is the purely political route such as that 
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behind the development of the Heat Act. The route in green shows the political-
administrative route where lobbyists engage with parliamentarians in order for 
those parliamentarians to then engage with the administration; the evidence 
from interviews shows that during the development of the Heat Act in 
Parliament, there were indeed pressures from Dutch Parliament on the energy 
department although it was the Parliament that developed the Heat Act. The red 
and blue routes have also been used in order to attempt to influence the SDE+. 
The red route, the administrative route, is used by lobbyists engaging directly 
with the department and the blue, which I term the quasi-administrative route 
shows lobbyists engaging with ECN (who advise the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs on the SDE) in order to influence policy.  
The purple, green and red routes are the same as the routes seen in the UK. 
However, the blue route is unique to the Dutch study specifically because of the 
role of ECN in supporting and advising the Dutch Government on the SDE+ 
policy and there is clear evidence of lobbyists looking to use this route. While in 
the UK study, consultants have been used to support policy development, 
active engagement with these consultants in order to attempt to influence policy 
has not been identified and consultants appear to have been less closely 








Figure 11-7 Routes to influencing policy change in Dutch heat policy 
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11.4.3.2 District heat network operators   
There are already a number of district heating projects in urban areas in the 
Netherlands with 4.5% of homes connected to heat networks and the Dutch 
Government expects the number of schemes to increase as part of their energy 
transition (ECN et al., 2016). There was a recognition that the municipal 
Governments who tend to own local heat networks including Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam work closely with central Government to help develop policy 
particularly around district heating (41, 48, 50). There was also a belief that 
district heating networks were relatively powerful in the Dutch heat policy 
debate (45). 
It was also suggested by one interviewee from a heat network advocacy 
organisation that because municipalities who often own the energy 
infrastructure, such as district heating, have legitimacy with central government 
policy makers, there was merit in the private sector working with municipalities. 
‘A civil servant listens to a civil servant and on the country level as well as the 
provincial or municipal level they more or less like each other or they are more 
inclined to listen so we use those local politicians we use more frequently 
nowadays, it has been very effective’ (50). 
While the interview data has not shown that district heating organisations or 
municipalities in the Netherlands have had any major policy successes, the data 
does show that district heating organisations and the municipalities often behind 
them are seen to be particularly powerful actors. While the UK study wasn’t 
specifically focusing on district heating, interview data did not show that district 
heating operators and local authorities were seen as particularly powerful actors 
or had any particular policy success. This difference between the two countries 
could be linked to the fact that the UK is known to have very high levels of 
central Government control on fiscal and wider policy (IEA, 2015) whereas in 
the Netherlands municipal Governments are much more powerful; this is 
reflected in the ‘Energy Report’s’ requirement for Dutch regional governments to 
develop and then lead their own heat transformations (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 2016). This difference between the two countries could also be linked to 
the differing market structures between the two countries with much of the 
Dutch gas and heat network infrastructure owned by municipalities interested in 
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social benefits but with British gas and heat infrastructure mostly owned by the 
private sector interested in financial profits.   
These major differences between the two countries could be an interesting area 
for further research as both countries are looking to expand the role of district 
but have very different institutional settings; the power of the Dutch 
municipalities could be an important driver of low-carbon heat in the 
Netherlands which UK does not have. 
11.4.3.3 Trade associations  
Unsurprisingly, two interviewees from trade associations mentioned the 
important role of trade associations in the Dutch heat policy network. One 
suggested that trade associations could make the life of Government much 
simpler by providing cross industry views and a balanced and ‘middle position’ 
(48). Another suggested that trade associations are able to provide the most up 
to date information to Government and suggested the Government actively 
seeks the views of trade associations (49). There was also a belief that trade 
associations, because of their scale, could be involved with many different 
aspects of policy and politics. For example, some trade associations are part of 
much larger organisations which have close connections to Parliament and 
therefore have a good understanding of political developments (49). 
However, it was suggested that trade associations representing heat companies 
weren’t particularly influential because it was not the associations themselves 
but their member companies which actually held the more detailed cost and 
performance data (50, 51). According to an interviewee from ECN: ‘it’s actually 
the combination of a good trade association with a specific company that can 
lay down the numbers and only that combination is most effective in changing 
the legislation’ (51). 
Trade associations in the Netherlands saw themselves similarly to how trade 
associations are perceived in the UK where they are seen to act as a buffer for 
information and make the lives of policy makers easier by representing sectoral 
views and reducing the need for Government to speak to multiple organisations 
(see section 10.3.4). However, whilst trade associations in the Netherlands 
believed they were seen to be legitimate sources of information by policy 
makers, the interviews did not highlight that they were actually viewed as 
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legitimate and no particular heat policy changes as a result of trade 
associations were identified. It was also recognised that good data from 
companies (rather than trade associations) was also required for policy making.  
11.4.3.4 Growing power created by policy 
A number of interviewees including both civil servants and representatives from 
trade associations believed that developments around heat policy and the ‘Heat 
Vision’ were empowering sustainable heat actors and giving them the ability to 
have more influence over policy. One interviewee suggested that because of 
the development of the SDE+ to include heat, heat actors had become much 
louder within the policy debate (46). It was also recognised that the momentum 
around sustainable heat in general had increased (47) and that heat was 
moving into an ‘improving position’ (48). One interviewee explained that the 
lobbying capacity of the heat actors was increasing as they were becoming 
more competent and engaging with policy makers (51).  
This is similar to the situation in the UK where both the policy focus itself had 
put heat issues on the agenda and where policy had also grown the renewable 
heat (primarily biomass) industry. 
11.4.4 Style 
This final section of the Dutch approaches to influence section considers the 
style of those looking to influence. A number of comments by interviewees 
suggested that the style of communication was an important aspect of the way 
actors communicated their lobbying positions. One important approach was to 
provide measured and supportive comments rather than going against the 
Government. One interviewee described using a ‘constructive and open 
dialogue…trying to help them solving problems’ (48). Another interviewee 
described the importance of a ‘balanced position’ (50) and another explained 
that trade associations are quite often able to provide this balanced view (51). 
This approach of balance and offering support and positive relationship was 
also recognised as being important within the UK study (see section 10.4). 
Similarly, it was also believed by one interviewee that having an approach 
which provided an integrated view which takes into account wider issues across 
the market was seen as being important (48). The district heating association 
took a similar view and explained that their message did not sell district heating 
322 
 
as a panacea for heat supply in all areas but supported it where it was most 
beneficial (50). The value of this integrated view appears to echo comments 
regarding trade associations in the previous section who can be seen to 
represent cross sector views rather than the view of a single company (section 
11.4.3.3). 
It was recognised by civil servants in the Ministry of Economic Affairs that an 
‘open’ approach to engagement by industry was generally positive and 
conducive to good policy making, however they also recognised the potential for 
industry to covertly attempt to influence policy: ‘it is our task to weigh all those 
arguments and see which one is true and which one might not be as strong as 
they are making it sound’ (43). Overall, while the Dutch case study showed that 
actors used a generally constructive style to engage, the data didn’t indicate 
that this approach had any particular impact on policy. 
The UK study highlighted that as well as using constructive approaches, some 
actors in the UK also used aggressive communication approaches in their 
attempts to influence heat policy. These sorts of approaches were not 
encountered during the Dutch case study. 
11.5  CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS  
The Dutch case study provides a valuable comparison to the development of 
heat policy in the UK. The Dutch space heating regime is very similar to the 
UK’s, with both primarily reliant on natural gas for heating. Both also have 
rapidly diminishing indigenous gas resources and the countries also have 
similar EU 2020 renewable energy targets. As a result, both countries have 
policies to support the deployment of renewable heat and have long term 
visions for heat which include plans to expand district heating and electrify a 
proportion of heat demand.  
In both countries, power has affected the development of policy although power 
struggles associated with district heating have been a much bigger element of 
Dutch heat policy. This could be because district heating provides a greater 
proportion of heat in the Netherlands than it does in the UK. A major impact of 
power on heat policy in the Netherlands is associated with the development of 
the Heat Act, which aims to protect customers on district heating networks. 
While this law was introduced by the Dutch Parliament, as a result of issues 
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with the Act, the government has amended this legislation. This research has 
also identified evidence of actors looking to influence the SDE+ policy which 
supports the development of renewable heat and has shown that actors have 
had some success in influencing this policy around the rules for biomass 
combustion. 
In both the UK and the Netherlands, it is also the case that as heat policies 
have promoted sustainable forms of heating, the noise and scale of attempts to 
influence have increased.  
There are also some significant differences between the UK and the 
Netherlands. Institutional factors such as municipal ownership of networks, and 
geographical factors such as the situation of gas supplies mean that the shape 
of the policy network and the different aspects of power within it vary between 
the UK and the Netherlands. The relatively large role of municipally owned gas 
networks in the Netherlands means that heat policy power appears to be more 
skewed towards municipal authorities (who appear to be trusted by policy 
makers) in the Netherlands and a similarly trusted network owner does not exist 
in the UK. One other significant difference is that in the Netherlands, the issue 
of earthquakes and concerns over Russian gas dominate the heat policy 
discourse, acting as a driver for sustainable heat and weakening the power of 
actors associated with the gas industry who are likely to be keen to promote a 
longer term role for gas. No such obvious anti-gas frame exists in the UK heat 
discourse.  
Both the Dutch case and the UK research has highlighted attempts by the 
biomass and CHP lobby to influence heat policy. The biomass industry appears 
to have had some success in the Netherlands but limited policy influencing 
success in the UK. However, the success of the CHP lobby appears limited in 
both countries. Nonetheless, as in the UK, in the Netherlands, biomass 
combustion has dominated the delivery of renewable heat. 
The role of evidence has been highlighted as an important factor in the 
development of policy in the Netherlands as it has in the UK. In the 
Netherlands, ECN has a particularly important role with no equivalent UK 
organization funded and relied on by the Government for energy analysis. In 
both situations however, policy makers need to take significant consideration of 
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the data that is being used for policy making purposes because it is such an 
important aspect of policy design in particular the setting of tariffs for renewable 
heat support policies.  
With regards to how theoretical understandings of power relate to the Dutch 
case study, the first, second and third faces of power have been acknowledged. 
The first face seems to be present in the biomass industry’s ability to influence 
the SDE policy as well as with the Dutch Parliament’s ability to develop the Heat 
Act. It should however be noted that the development of the Heat Act was 
linked to the institutional power of Parliamentarians which could be seen as a 
more structural element or power. The second face of power has also been 
acknowledged, as the issue of district heat costs appears to have been put on 
the agenda of Parliamentarians by consumers and the issue of renewable heat 
was believed to have been put on the Government’s policy agenda by ECN 
(although this was not confirmed by civil servants). Finally, the third face of 
power has been recognised in attempts to frame policy changes and with the 
use of knowledge; both can be seen as approaches which shape the 
preferences of policy makers in order to affect policy change. The fourth face of 
power has not been specifically identified in this analysis and this may be due to 
the limited scope of the case study and the focus of the research on more active 
attempts to have power. The fourth face of power could however potentially be 
associated with approaches which include evidence and knowledge. Finally, the 
Dutch case study has not highlighted any examples of groups of actors working 
together to have power suggesting that ideas of ‘intransitive power’ have not 
been particularly important in the developments considered. 
Based on this research, the UK could take some learning from the Dutch heat 
policy experience so far: 
 Some administrative changes to Dutch renewable heat support policies 
(for example to tariff levels) can be made without Parliamentary 
approval. If the UK adopted a similar approach, while this may reduce 
democratic oversight, changes to policies such as the RHI could be 
much more rapid and responsive. 
 The Dutch experience of earthquakes caused by gas extraction has led 
to a social movement against gas use which appears to have 
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empowered sustainable heat actors and depowered incumbents. No 
such anti-gas vision exists in the UK and because of the lack of this 
push factor, heat decarbonisation may be harder to drive in the UK. 
 The Dutch Government has a good relationship with municipalities and 
municipalities are trusted sources of information on energy issues who 
are tasked with developing local heat plans. Municipalities also often 
own a significant share of energy network infrastructure. The UK has 
neither a strong relationship between national and local Government on 
heat issues nor a requirement on local authorities to develop heat plans. 
A better relationship between local authorities and the national UK 
government, alongside a requirement for locally led heat planning and 
municipal ownership could support UK heat decarbonisation.  
 The Dutch government uses an independent and public advisor (ECN) 
to advise on cost and technical issues to do with energy and ECN 
provide what appears to be objective and reliable information. No such 
body exists in the UK and more formalised cost and technical 
information provision on energy could support UK heat decarbonisation 
policy. 
 The ‘Heat Act’ policy in the Netherlands has been an abject failure. UK 
heat network regulation is needed but a simple ‘must cost less than gas’ 
approach to cost regulation is unlikely to be suitable. 
While there are a number of lessons that the UK government may be able to 
take from the Dutch approach to heat decarbonisation, it is unclear that there is 
currently much that the Dutch could learn from the UK. The UK RHI scheme 
has deployed well below expected levels and has not deployed the types of 
technologies expected and the UK’s long term heat strategy appears deeply 
uncertain.  
Overall however, many of the similarities between the two countries are 
reflected in the recent developments of policy and the associated power 
struggles. While there are strategic differences around gas supply issues and 
the structure of the energy markets meaning that the two countries are not 
always directly comparable, it may make sense for the UK to work with one of 
its closest neighbours as both countries attempt to decarbonise heat systems 






12 CONCLUSIONS, REFLECTIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
This thesis has investigated elements of power associated with the UK’s 
potential transformation to a sustainable heat system and used the Netherlands 
as a comparative case study. Specifically, the research has examined the ability 
of, and attempts by, actors to have power to affect policy associated with the 
heat transformation. To recap, project research questions were: 
1. How has UK heat generation policy been affected by the power of actors? 
2. What approaches have been used by actors to attempt to affect UK heat 
policy? 
3. Do ideas have power as frames in the heat policy process? 
4. How can understandings of power which emerge from this research be used 
to strengthen the multi-level perspective on transitions? 
Through combining elements of the multi-level perspective, theoretical 
approaches to power and ideas of power and policy change, a ‘transformation 
policy power framework’ was developed (introduced in section 6.2, Figure 6-1, 
p130) to visualise how theoretical understandings of power may be seen to be 
associated with the different elements of the UK’s heat system. Within this 
thesis, power has primarily been considered under the ‘four faces’ approach 
although consideration has also been paid to whether power can be seen as 
agent based or structural. Power is also considered from the perspective of 
‘power over’ or ‘power to’ (transitive and intransitive power respectively). 
In order to investigate the framework and the power of actors to affect policy, a 
triangulation approach based on the ‘EAR’ instrument was used which has 
never before been applied to UK energy policy. Data was collected through a 
number of interviews with those involved in the policy process. Interview data 
was analysed by comparing the views of lobbyists with policy makers alongside 
a detailed investigation into relevant grey literature. A smaller comparative 
Dutch case study was also carried out. 
This chapter draws together the key conclusions of the thesis, considers the key 
issues raised by the research and introduces some potential solutions to these 
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issues. Overall, this thesis has presented original research associated with 
power, influence and UK energy policy and used a triangulation methodology 
which hasn’t been used before in a UK context. The research develops a UK 
literature on power and energy policy where few previous examples of 
academic analysis exist. The analysis is particularly novel in considering the 
impacts of actors on specific policy changes. Much of the previous research on 
energy lobbying in general has considered only attempts to influence rather 
than the actual impact. The case studies and findings also add value to 
understandings of power in the field of sustainable transitions. The transitions 
literature has been critiqued for not considering issues of power in enough detail 
and this research responds to calls for researchers to consider how power and 
policy development may impact sustainable change.  
The first section (12.1) of this chapter looks to answer the research questions 
which were introduced at the start of the thesis and also re-introduces the 
theoretical model: ‘The transformation policy power framework’, which was first 
introduced in chapter 6. The model is updated in light of empirical results. 
The second section of this chapter (12.2) considers some generalizable findings 
regarding power which have emerged from the research and discusses some of 
the similarities between the UK and Dutch case studies. This section also 
considers the fit and contribution of this thesis to the wider, associated literature 
and goes on to consider areas for further research. 
The third section (12.3) pulls together methodological and theoretical issues 
which have been discussed in the results and discussions chapters and 
explores how these issues can be considered alongside the general issues 
associated with considering and analysing power. This section also considers 
some personal reflections on the methodological issues associated with 
researching power. 
The fourth and final section (12.4) introduces some recommendations for policy 
makers which have been developed based on this research. 
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12.1  PROJECT SUCCESSES AND CONSIDERATION OF THE PROJECT 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis has delivered two case studies associated with power and heat 
policy change. The thesis has also delivered an original application of a specific 
theory of power to an example of a transformation and has provided a research 
focus on the issue of heat policy. 
A key issue highlighted in the methodology section was associated with the 
potential lack of data on power as a result of issues to do with confidentiality 
and interests and general interviewee concerns. It was expected that 
interviewees would be very cautious about making comments. However, this 
issue did not materialise and in fact, the detail and honesty of interviewees has 
been surprising. One clear unavoidable difficulty with this research has been 
associated with limited access to relevant grey literature. This has meant that in 
some elements of the thesis, full data triangulation has either been limited or not 
possible and therefore it has not always been possible to identify if a particular 
power issue has been affected by the power of actors. However, the analysis 
has provided a detailed description of the actors involved in attempting to 
influence heat policy and the approaches used. 
The following sub-sections consider the project research questions in light of 
the results discussed in the previous chapters. 
1. How has UK heat generation policy been affected by the power of 
actors? 
The thirteen policy episodes described in chapter 8 describe the key policy 
changes where power was believed to have had an impact. While all these 
episodes showed evidence of actors attempting to influence policy change, the 
analysis of the available, and necessarily limited data, only showed that actors 
affected policy change in a small number of episodes. Table 6 on page 208 
contains all these policy episodes and summarises how different theoretical 
elements of power appear in each of the episodes. 
The first area where actors have had power over policy concerns policy episode 
2, where a coalition of actors, led by the REA caused an amendment to the 
2008 Energy Act which effectively created the Renewable Heat Incentive. This 
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episode highlights the ability of actors to drive policy change associated with 
promoting sustainability. 
The second area where an actor appears to have had power over the RHI was 
the splitting of the RHI into the non-domestic and domestic schemes (policy 
episode 6). Interestingly, rather than this change happening as a result of 
lobbying, it was the DECC permanent secretary who had the power to cause 
this change and this suggests that when considering the power of actors in 
policy change, researchers should look beyond just lobbyists. 
The third area where the results highlight that actors have had power is around 
the UK’s long term strategy for heat (policy episode 10). While linked to the 
provision of useful evidence, the gas industry was successful in reducing the 
rate and level of electrification of heat in the Government’s 2013 ‘meeting the 
challenge’ paper (DECC, 2013k). This change indicates the power of 
incumbents to affect Government visions on sustainable futures. 
The fourth and final area where the results show that actors have influenced UK 
heat policy is around the favourable treatment of biomethane considered in 
policy episode 13. Evidence shows that landowners involved in biomethane 
projects were successful in maintaining RHI biomethane tariffs which were 
expected to see reductions and were also successful in reducing the impact of 
the introduction of sustainability criteria. This episode highlights the impact that 
actors can have on specific, and primarily administrative, policy issues which 
can have significant real world consequences. 
The comparative Dutch case study also showed that actors had influenced the 
development of Dutch heat policy. Specifically, the biomass industry had 
successfully affected the SDE subsidy scheme tariffs for biomass and 
separately the Dutch Parliament had power to introduce the Dutch Heat Act. 
While the clear power of actors has only been shown in a small number of 
episodes, the other episodes highlight the complex nature of power and policy 
change. They show that policy change can be linked to a combination of factors 
including power, knowledge and evidence, wider Government agendas and 
institutions. Overall, while the power of actors can be an important driver of 
policy change, the research shows that the wider (policy) context must always 
be considered too; indeed, the EAR instrument already has a requirement for 
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the consideration for external or autonomous elements associated with policy 
change (Arts, 2000). 
Because this research has shown that actors have already had power over 
elements of policy change associated with the UK’s heat system transformation, 
it can be expected that actors will continue to attempt to influence and continue 
to have power. While this may not come as a huge surprise and indeed one 
would expect actors to be able to shape change, a key issue will be if powerful 
actors attempt to and successfully constrain or shape the UK’s transformation in 
line with their own interests. If heat policy reflects the interests of powerful 
actors, then the impacts of policy are likely to primarily support those with power 
rather than primarily supporting the rapid transformation to secure and equitable 
low-carbon heat. It may not necessarily be that those with power want to slow or 
stop decarbonisation. However, clearly some actors are attempting to shape 
heat decarbonisation policy in a way that suits them and if successful they could 
stop, slow or shift the heat transformation away from social and environmental 
goals.  
It is not possible to say exactly what the impact of political power on the UK’s 
transformation to low carbon heat has been or may be in the future. The 
introduction of the RHI policy appears to have been sped up by the Renewable 
Energy Association and a wider coalition potentially increasing the total amount 
of renewable heat deployed. However the scheme was also slowed down by 
civil servants reducing the overall deployment of low carbon heat. The RHI also 
appears to have been influenced by biogas interests who have, as a result of 
their influencing, seen unexpected biogas growth and a reduction in 
sustainability requirements (although these requirements have since been 
tightened). The gas industry also appears to have had some success in 
increasing the role for gas in the Government’s 2013 framework for heat 
although whether this has had any impact on the UK heat system remains to be 
seen. Overall, this analysis has highlighted that power (on policy) drives the 
heat system in various directions rather than having a uniform impact. And while 
the impacts of power which have been identified may be material over the time 
period studied, there is little to suggest that the direction of influencing will 
remain constant over time. 
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The impact of certain vested interests in this analysis is clear and heat policy 
has been affected by actors. Based on the results of this research, section 12.4 
introduces some policy recommendations which may limit certain elements of 
the power of vested interests. 
2. What approaches have been used by actors to attempt to affect UK 
heat policy? 
The results highlight a wide range of approaches used by actors to attempt to 
influence UK heat policy. Fundamental to all approaches discovered from this 
research, is the engagement by those private interests looking to influence 
policy with Parliamentarians (i.e. MPs and Lords) and the relevant 
administrations (i.e. Government departments including Ministers and civil 
servants) or a combination of both.  
The activities of those looking to influence are nearly always linked to the 
provision of evidence from actors to the Government or Parliamentarians and 
these efforts have related to both the UK’s long term heat strategy and the 
Renewable Heat Incentive. The importance of evidence is linked to the fact that 
civil servants are required to make objective decisions. It has also been 
recognised that the Government’s knowledge on low carbon heat has been 
relatively limited. Good evidence is therefore seen as valuable to policy makers 
and so those with evidence which is seen as legitimate and valuable can be 
seen to have power over policy makers. In many ways, knowledge is power.  
Knowledge is exchanged between influencers and policy makers in a number of 
ways. This includes through:  
 Direct one-to-one engagement such as from a company to a civil servant 
on the costs of a particular technology;  
 Through consultations such as those concerning the RHI; 
 Through the sharing of analysis carried out by consultants including 
modelling exercises such as those investigating the optimal long term 
future heat system produced by the gas industry (e.g. Delta ee, 2012; 
HHIC and Delta ee, 2013).  
This research has also shown that the scale and situation of those looking to 
influence can be an important element of approaches to influence. Large 
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integrated companies use the fact that they work across the market to provide 
what they believe is perceived as balanced and objective information, an 
approach also taken by trade associations. However, small companies were 
seen as having power because of the fact that they can provide specific 
information about technologies and can be open and honest. Overall, the 
evidence showed that actors working together (having intransitive power) can 
increase the power of actors. This of course relies on actors sharing goals, 
which as has been shown in this research, is not always the case. 
The analysis has also shown that those attempting to influence heat policy 
shape their style of communications, with approaches varying from balanced 
and objective to frightening and threatening. The specific use of the approach of 
framing is considered in the following section. 
The results from the Dutch case study show very similar results to approaches 
to influence in the UK, again highlighting the importance of knowledge and 
evidence. However, the Dutch study described some significant differences in 
issues of power between the two countries, resulting from a different 
institutional situation. The existence of public research organisation ECN, which 
advises Government and the municipal ownership of elements of energy 
infrastructure in the Netherlands, means that power structures are different to 
those in the UK at the time of analysis. The impacts of earthquakes caused by 
gas extraction in the Netherlands has also had a major effect on Dutch heat 
policy. 
Overall, a wide range of approaches to influence are available however, all rely 
on an actor having the capacity both to engage and also to engage effectively. 
This requirement for capacity means that small actors are always likely to 
struggle compared to larger actors when attempting to influence policy. This 
capacity issue is closely linked to ideas of economic power which can see 
political and economic power as closely related (Strange, 1975). However, this 
research has shown that some relatively small actors (companies ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
discussed in chapter 9) have chosen to invest significant amounts of time and 
capital into policy influencing activities, and are recognised as being vocal 
actors. It should however be noted that despite being vocal these companies do 
not appear to have had any significant policy impact. 
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In general, evidence from this research suggests that those looking to have 
power over policy change should focus on a combination of: 
 Working together with other organisations with similar goals; 
 Understanding the true structure of Government power (and how 
Government works); 
 Producing and providing legitimate evidence;  
 Developing and using Parliamentary and administrative connections. 
3. Do ideas have power as frames in the heat policy process? 
Overall, the use of framing as an element of influencing activities was 
recognised by both those looking to influence and policy makers. Even policy 
makers suggested to lobbyists that there was value in actors framing arguments 
in particular ways.  
Rather than being a key approach to influence or have power, framing is used 
as a tool within wider approaches to influence. The results highlighted the use 
of numerous frames which link to various issues including Government goals 
and targets, technology performance, concerns over consumer issues and 
wider economic issues. Based on the typology for ideas (closely linked to 
framing) which was introduced in chapter 7 (Shorten, 2013), two key types of 
framing were identified in the UK analysis, ‘adoptive’ where ideas (frames) are 
actively adopted and used by actors and ‘distortive’ where framing is based 
around the purposive misrepresentation of ideas.  
The research highlighted that actors believed that the value of certain frames 
had changed over time in the UK heat policy discussions. In particular it was 
believed that it had become increasingly valuable to frame policy asks around 
ideas of economic growth and carbon reduction rather than the deployment of 
renewable energy. However, within the policy episodes identified, while framing 
was clearly used by actors, there is no evidence that framing drove any specific 
policy changes or that certain approaches to framing were more influential than 
others.  
The Dutch case study highlighted significant differences in framing in the 
Netherlands compared to the UK. Specifically, concerns around the sourcing of 
natural gas dominated both policy discussions and approaches to framing; this 
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was all driven by the earthquakes at the Groningen gas field and concerns over 
sourcing gas from Russia.  
4. How can understandings of power which emerge from this research be 
used to strengthen the multi-level perspective on transitions? 
Empirical findings from this thesis strengthen the MLP in a number of ways and 
open up routes for further research into power and transitions. Firstly the thesis 
provides an interesting case study for scholars involved in sustainability 
transitions research who are interested in power and policy and the thesis 
follows calls for a much greater consideration of power in transitions research. 
This study also provides a UK case study considering power and sustainability 
transitions. Previously much of the investigation of power and transition has 
focussed on the Netherlands. 
Secondly, this thesis follows specific calls for the use of the ‘three faces of 
power’ model by Geels' (2010) and uses an approach which take into account 
three faces and adds a fourth dimension. This work also builds upon Smith et 
al's (2010) suggestion that MLP approaches would benefit from ‘opening the 
black-box of public policy’ (p446). 
Thirdly, while there is a growing literature considering issues of power and 
transitions in general, this research provides the only case study specifically 
considering the power of actors in affecting policies associated with a systemic 
transformation. However, because of the unique nature of this study it may be 
hard to draw general conclusions about power, policy and transformations. In 
this study alone, attempts to have power have been associated with driving 
change in various directions reflecting various interests and the impact of power 
can be considered as multi-directional. In a general sense, it is however 
possible to say that attempts to have power and the impacts of power on the 
policy associated with the transformation of the UK’s heat system have been 
identified from the research. Overall, the power of actors to affect policy can be 
an important element of sustainable transformations potentially shaping or 
slowing change. The power of interested actors to affect relevant policy should 
therefore always be considered by those working on sustainable 




Fourthly, this thesis adds evidence to the literature on ‘regime resistance’ in 
transitions studies (Geels, 2014). Policy episode 10 described efforts by 
incumbents who face risk from the electrification of heat to attempt to influence 
policy in a way that protects their interests. While in Dutch discussions around 
energy transformations it was seen to be incumbents who dominated 
discussions in general (Kemp et al., 2007), this research has shown 
engagement and impact by actors across scales and market positions in 
agreement with Rotmans and Kemp (2008). Their research suggests that 
‘power is distributed over various actors, with different beliefs, interests and 
resources’ (p1007). While this spread of power in the UK across scales of actor 
suggests that for the time period considered by this research, small actors have 
had power over policy change, more recent research has suggested that large 
incumbent actors have dominated the UK heat policy space as the threats 
posed by decarbonisation to incumbents have become more apparent (Lowes 
et al., 2018b). It may therefore be that the power of actors varies over time and 
is dependent on the relevant policy issue and how it may affect relevant 
interests. 
It is also clear that the incumbents have the capacity to attempt to influence in 
ways that smaller actors do not, with resources available to pay for influencing 
activities and political engagement. Because larger actors will always have 
greater resources than smaller actors, one political power element of Unruh’s 
(2000) ‘Carbon Lock-In’ is that regime actors structurally have greater capacity 
to have power than smaller niche actors, this could potentially lead to lock-in 
effects. 
The most valuable aspect of this research for scholars interested in the MLP is 
its consideration and use of a specific approach to power alongside the MLP 
model and the development of a specific model for visualising political power 
across socio-technical systems. In much of the research on power and 
transitions, a clear approach to power and clear methodology is absent. This 
thesis is explicit about the approach to power taken (the four faces plus ideas of 
structural/agent based power and ideas of power over/power to) and uses a 
methodology (the EAR instrument) which is clearly repeatable. The four faces of 
power approach, in its all-encompassing yet relatively clear nature, represents a 
valuable tool for those interested in power and transitions. However, it should 
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be noted that the fourth face or post structural approach to power is, as has 
been described elsewhere, particularly difficult to apply. Indeed, throughout the 
results sections, it has been possible to recognise the first face of power (power 
over another), the second face (agenda setting) and the third face (preference 
shaping). However for those interested in the fourth face or post-structural 
elements of power, a more specific focus and methodology may be required. 
This could potentially be based around more discursive or ideational 
approaches to considering policy change where language and ideas are a much 
more central focus of analysis (e.g. (Kendall and Wickham, 1999; Carstensen 
and Schmidt, 2016). 
Chapter 6 introduced the transformation policy power framework which looked 
to combine insights from theories of power and policy change with the multi-
level perspective model. Drawing on the results of this research allows this 
model to be updated, as shown in Figure 12-1. This updated model contains 
only two minimal changes. Firstly, ‘the existing heat regime’ isn’t purely formed 
of gas and so the word gas has been removed from the title. Secondly, the 
second face of power arrow has been modified to show that niche actors can 
utilise the second face of power and successfully raise issues onto the agenda.  
As well as providing a visual representation of the outputs of this research, this 
model will be of value to others looking to investigate power, policy and 
transformations and could be applied and tested for other socio-technical 
systems or for other geographies.  
It should however be noted that the focus on the power of actors in this 
research means that power at the landscape level has not been investigated in 
any detail. Further research considering the landscape impact on policy 
development, including some of the fourth face elements of power described 




Figure 12-1. The transformation policy power framework updated from Figure 6-1 p130 chapter 6 
12.2  GENERAL FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Power has been shown to have impacted the policy associated with the UK’s 
transformation to low carbon heating. As highlighted in this study, actors have 
been able to affect policy in a way which suits them, speeding up the 
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introduction of the RHI policy, increasing tariffs for certain technologies (bio-
energy in this study) and affecting the Government’s long term heat strategy 
(apparently increasing the future role for gas in heating). The specific changes 
to the RHI will have had a material effect on the UK’s heat system affecting the 
deployment of certain heat technologies. It is however unclear what impact the 
gas industry lobbying will have on the UK’s actual heat future. 
The power of actors is not something that can be obviously managed and 
interests will be an important part of any transformation. However, the main 
concern highlighted by this analysis is that if certain vested interests are able to 
shape the transformation around their own interests, the resulting system or 
transformation may be sub-optimal or perhaps worse, change will either not 
happen or will happen too slowly. The power of actors could therefore result in 
policy targets (such as those for decarbonisation) being missed, have energy 
security implications and result in poor consumer outcomes such as high cost 
technologies. A key issue for policy makers therefore is around the ability of 
existing interests to influence policy and cause sub-optimal outcomes. 
As well as contributing to debates associated with power and the 
transformations of large systems, this thesis also fits into two other areas of 
study, (i) power and policy change and (ii) policies for heat decarbonisation.  
As explained in the literature review, systematic analyses specifically 
investigating power in UK policymaking are limited in number and much 
investigation into power and lobbying has been carried out by journalists and 
private organisations. While some research exists which considers certain 
elements of power such as the role of institutions or ideas, this thesis provides a 
recent and applied example of power in UK policy making which focuses on the 
power of actors. 
In the most general sense, this research has shown that interested actors are 
clearly engaging in this particular element of UK policy and do attempt to 
influence and so this study builds on the limited and mostly descriptive research 
into lobbying in the UK which was considered in section 5.3.2. Where this 
research adds value and novelty is in considering how specific (UK) policy 
changes have actually been impacted by actors. Previous research has 
primarily provided accounts of attempts to influence rather than considering 
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impact. This research also develops what appears to be an extremely limited 
academic literature associated with UK energy lobbying. 
This research has also highlighted the role of framing in approaches to 
influence, providing a detailed view on how actors frame their policy requests. 
However, this research did not recognise the frequent use of framing around 
energy security in the UK which has been recognised previously (Kuzemko, 
2013d), although it should be noted that the Dutch policy context made the 
energy security frame particularly powerful. It was recognised in the analysis 
within this thesis that framing can be an extremely fluid approach and 
approaches to framing change over time depending on the perceived views of 
the person who is being lobbied. 
This thesis has also employed a theoretical approach to power, the four faces 
approach, which does not appear to have been used in a specific policy context 
before. The approach has been found to be useful and the first three faces of 
power have been identified in various elements of the research. Table 6 in the 
conclusions of chapter 8 details the faces of power identified in each of the 
policy episodes and also details other elements of power including its structural 
or agent-based nature. As explained in the previous section however, the fourth 
face, post-structural or Foucauldian approaches to power, do not emerge from 
the research as clearly as the other three faces. This may reflect known issues 
with the complexity of analysing the fourth face of power (Arts and Tatenhove, 
2005) but can also be attributed to the fact that the research method was 
considering the active approaches of actors to have power over policy changes.  
Overall, while the faces of power approach does have value in its ability to 
cover and arrange what appear to be the key elements of power, for 
researchers investigating actor based or more active power, Lukes’ ‘radical’  
three faces of power (power over, agenda setting and preference shaping) may 
be radical enough (Lukes, 2005). Only those with an interest in the more post-
structural (and potentially passive) understandings of power should consider the 
fourth face and should employ appropriate methodologies. A fuller 
understanding of the power associated with socio-technical systems could be 
attempted by combining methodological approaches to consider actor based 
power and post-structural power. However, the required time needed for such a 
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mixed-methods study could limit the scope of this sort of research. This issue is 
slightly expanded in the following section on methodological issues (12.3). 
Considering whether power is more agent based or structural has added 
greater depth to this analysis and in some examples has highlighted the 
importance of the institutional context of power and the power of institutions 
themselves to control or limit power. Much of the power observed in the 
research has resulted from the situational (institutional) position of actors such 
as civil servants or ministers who as a result of their position are able to do 
things and exercise power which others simply cannot. Where small or non-
institutional actors or agents appear to have had power, this seems to have 
resulted from working together in unison creating intransitive ‘power to’ rather 
than the more dominating ‘power over’. This highlights the potential importance 
of ‘intransitive power’ for actors working collaboratively to achieve policy 
change.       
A key question is whether any general comments can be made about power in 
UK heat policy, based on the results from this research. This analysis suggests 
that it is possible to make some general comments on power issues:  
 Actors of varying scales have been involved in UK heat policy and scale 
of actor does not appear to be a predictor of policy success. This finding 
is in slight contrast with Geels (2014) who suggests that UK energy 
policy makers are most likely to deal with ‘incumbents and technical 
experts’ (p34). 
 The approaches used by actors do appear to vary across scales, with 
larger actors in general appearing to take a more balanced and 
constructive approach to engaging with policy makers, and some small 
actors appearing to take particularly aggressive approaches. It appears 
that both approaches are seen as valid by policy makers but it is not 
possible to make any conclusions about whether either approach is more 
influential. This difference between ‘brash’ and ‘soft spoken’ lobbying 
styles has indeed been recognised elsewhere but has been seen to be 
linked to where lobbing is taking place rather than being linked to the 
type of actor (Woll, 2012).  
342 
 
 While certain trade associations appear to be particularly trusted by 
policy makers, these organisations do not appear to have had any 
particular policy successes.  
 It does appear from this analysis that tactical approaches to lobbying can 
be most successful, in particular working together and forming coalitions 
and jointly lobbying both politicians and the administration can increase 
policy success.  
 Legitimacy and trust can also be particularly important attributes for 
those looking to influence. The role of legitimacy in maintaining political 
support has been highlighted previously (Smink, 2015). 
However, what this research also highlights is that the power of actors is 
extremely contextual. For example, some actors (such as senior civil servants 
or ministers) have power as a result of their institutional position. Some frames 
are important at particular times and not others. The timing of influencing may 
also be particularly important; the Dutch earthquakes appear to have 
empowered the low carbon heat industry in the Netherlands (potentially 
providing what has been referred to as ‘a window of opportunity for 
sustainability transitions’ (Geels, 2013, p93).  
While this research focused on a relatively small element of the UK’s energy 
policy, even focusing on this small area has shown significant efforts to attempt 
to influence policy and shown that lobbyists can have an impact. Because of the 
potential impact that lobbying may be able to have across UK policy and the 
current lack of research, more investigations into lobbying in the UK would be of 
value. This thesis has specifically highlighted that further research to investigate 
the role and impact of actors influencing the consultation process as well as 
more detailed consideration of discursive or ‘ideational’ elements of power 
would provide an even more detailed picture of power in UK heat policy.  
12.3  METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH 
THIS RESEARCH AND PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 
As recognised in the theoretical chapters of this thesis, the concept of power is 
not just a difficult issue to tie down, but it is also difficult to measure and there is 
no set or standard approach. The approach that I have taken in this thesis is the 
closest to an ‘applied’ approach as appeared possible, with a clear and 
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repeatable methodology. The methodology has been particularly successful 
because it made no presuppositions about power. Instead, issues of power 
emerged naturally from interviews through both interview data itself (through 
coding), but also from suggestions from interviewees of other interviewees and 
issues to consider.  
The use of the EAR approach in a UK setting is novel and the approach of 
attempting to apply the faces of power to a specific policy issue is also unique.  
Overall, the use of interviews has provided a great deal of valuable data which 
has led to interesting results and it is not obvious that there would have been a 
better methodology for data collection for the study. Whilst providing useful 
results, fifty two interviews with transcription and coding took up a significant 
proportion of the project’s time and more interviews would not have been 
possible within the project timescales.  
However, while the methodological approach has been a success, a key issue 
which emerged repeatedly from this research was the scale of analysis. The 
explorative nature of this research meant that rather than picking a particular 
issue and driving down in detail into this, interviews were used to highlight 
where power struggles had taken place across heat policy. As a result, this 
thesis is relatively broad and considers a large number of policy changes 
related to heat.  
Focussing only on a smaller element of heat policy such as the development of 
the heat strategy could have provided a more detailed specific example of 
power. More time to focus on fewer issues could allow for more interviews on 
specific issues (potentially through a second round of interviews) and further 
grey literature analysis alongside the potential use of ‘freedom of information’ 
requests. However, focussing on a smaller scale issue would have reduced the 
breadth of the analysis and would have meant that making generalisations 
would have been even more difficult. There is no set scale to consider power 
and it is clearly possible to investigate power at varying scales. Researchers 
therefore need to make a judgement when carrying out research into power to 
consider both what scale of enquiry will produce the most meaningful outputs 
and what is possible in the available time. 
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The four faces of power approach is a relatively straightforward concept. 
However, as identified several times in this chapter, the fourth face of power 
has not clearly emerged from the findings. If post-structural understandings of 
power are to be considered, the fourth face of power would be expected to be 
present across all individuals and across all of society. This therefore suggests 
that the positivist and applied EAR methodology is not appropriate for 
considering the fourth face and for those interested in active approaches to 
power where actors drive change, post-structural approaches to power may be 
of only limited value. This echoes the view of Arts and Tatenhove (2005) who 
suggested that the post-structural approach to power can deny a role for human 
agency which is central to policy analysis. 
While post-structural or Foucauldian approaches to power are notoriously 
difficult and it is questionable whether Foucault even set out to measure or 
investigate power specifically, there are methods to consider post-structural 
approaches to power which take into account ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt, 
2016), discourses (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002) and specifically ideas of 
Foucault (Kendall and Wickham, 1999). Further mixed methods studies which 
combine the use of the EAR instrument alongside post-structural approaches 
could potentially provide results which consider all four faces of power in detail 
and in doing so provide a fuller and non-actor centric approach to power. As 
explained in the previous section, combining power methods may also have 
value for those interested in how power is present across the entirety of socio-
technical systems. 
Post-structural approaches may also be able to shine some light on the wider 
power of ideas to cause policy change. This research has highlighted how 
energy modelling, reports and scenarios are used by actors to have power. The 
study has also highlighted ideas of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘workability’ are seen to 
affect policy change. Further, more discursive research could investigate the 
power of these sorts of issues in more detail and investigate the policy impacts 
of ideas on transformation related policy.   
The EAR instrument has proved a valuable tool for this research which is both 
straightforward to apply and repeatable. The use of the EAR approach has also 
repeatedly shown the limits of preference attainment methods to consider 
lobbying and has highlighted several examples where the preference attainment 
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approach would have delivered what appear to be false results under more 
detailed analysis. This suggests that preference attainment methods should be 
avoided. In building on Arts and Verschuren (1999), the use of the EAR 
instrument in this thesis has been modified to include the use of email 
communications as well as interviews; this change has been extremely valuable 
for gaining very specific information for the purposes of triangulation. The use of 
the EAR instrument has also shown that examples of lobbying may not primarily  
be raised by lobbyists (egos) during interviews as the method proposes but may 
also be raised by policy makers (alters).  
It is however clear that the EAR approach is not infallible. The reliance on policy 
makers’ views to triangulate the views of lobbyists is limited by the fact that a 
policy maker will often not want to explain that they have been successfully 
lobbied and if this is the case, thorough triangulation will never be possible. 
Conversely, lobbyists may not want to describe their own lobbying behaviours 
for reputational reasons. For these reasons, it may be valuable to engage with 
policy makers or lobbyists who no longer work on the policy in question or no 
longer work for the civil service or relevant company in order to glean more 
honest answers. The EAR approach also relies on having access to relevant 
lobbyists, the relevant policy maker (who may have moved roles) and grey 
literature to enable full triangulation, clearly this is not always possible and is an 
extremely time consuming approach. The issue around access to data sources 
was highlighted by the Dutch case study, which required complex logistics to 
identify relevant interviewees and to locate and translate documents. As well as 
limiting the potential for triangulation, if certain interviewees or data sources are 
not available, then it is possible that certain power issues will simply not be 
spotted. This issue once again highlights the importance of selecting an 
appropriately sized study and having good access to data and interviewees. 
Investigating power can also be personally challenging for several reasons. This 
is primarily because practices around lobbying are often carried out away from 
public view and are generally viewed negatively. As a result, considering power 
and influence requires a level of investigation into the behaviour of individuals 
and companies which may not be appreciated, and which may be challenged. It 
should however be noted that I was often surprised by the openness of some 
interviewees and I actually anonymised some comments which were allowed to 
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be attributable. Conversely, during some interviews it often felt as if 
interviewees were attempting to lobby me and shape my own views on the 
topics under investigation. This issue highlights the importance of triangulation 
when investigating power issues.  
One key personal concern was that the research and its focus on power and 
influencing could negatively affect my relationship with actors in the UK heat 
sector and therefore affect the potential for future research or even jobs. This 
research was therefore carried out in as sensitive a way as possible. In 
particular, the historic focus of the analysis and the use of anonymisation and 
hiding company names meant that potential for reputational damage for 
individuals and companies as a result of this research is reduced. These 
personal issues should be considered by researchers in advance of making 
decisions around whether or not to investigate power. 
12.4  IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS 
As this thesis focuses on policy and attempts to be an applied piece of 
research, this final section provides some recommendations for policy makers 
which have been synthesised from the findings of this thesis. These are split 
into two sections, the first which considers general recommendations for policy 
with regards to power and the second which contains recommendations for 
policy makers working on UK heat policy. 
12.4.1 General policy recommendations 
1. A good understanding of power, interests and policy change would 
benefit all individuals involved in the development of policy. Currently 
there appears to be no specific training on power for UK civil servants, 
although there is a basic guide to ‘contact with lobbyists’ which primarily 
links back to the civil service code (Cabinet Office, 2010). 
2. Knowledge and evidence and its representation should always be treated 
carefully, with consideration always given to the sources of that 
evidence. Independent, and ideally peer reviewed, research should 
always be used. 
3. Policy makers should be able to recognise situations of regulatory 
capture or information asymmetries and provide resource to remove or 
reduce these asymmetries by carrying out independent research. 
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4. Investigating lobbying is hard but it is extremely important. Government 
should make efforts to significantly increase transparency around 
lobbying by expanding the register of lobbyists to cover all lobbyists and 
publishing details of all meetings of civil servants, ministers and 
parliamentarians with those looking to influence. 
5. The importance of objectivity in the civil service should be maintained 
and continuously reinforced. 
12.4.2 Recommendations for UK heat policy makers in addition 
to the above 
1. Efforts should be made to increase the speed at which changes to the 
RHI can be made. Removing the need for parliamentary involvement by 
modifying legislation to authorise ministers to make scheme changes 
could help. 
2. Recognising the resource limits of small firms, policy makers should 
actively encourage engagement with smaller companies directly involved 
in low carbon heating and not rely on trade associations or large 
integrated firms. 
3. A central, independently operated and publicly available database of 
technology costs and performance should be developed and updated 
frequently. This should be used for all energy analysis to maintain a 
standardised dataset for heat (and energy) analysis. This happens in 
Denmark and a study of good practice and usefulness there might inform 
an equivalent development in the UK (Danish Energy Agency, 2018). 
This could minimise some of the issues associated with power and 
evidence/knowledge. 
4. Building on existing analysis, the UK Government should further 
investigate international examples of where low carbon heat has been 
deployed at scale to gain evidence on future heat technologies. 
5. UK heat policy makers should work closely with the Dutch Government 
who face an almost identical heat challenge as that in the UK. Particular 
notice should be taken of the strong energy relationship between national 




6. Policy makers should be aware that incumbents have a history of 
attempting to block or limit change and protect markets. The policy 
design process should ensure that incumbent interests do not negatively 
influence policy outcomes.    
The UK (and international challenge) for heat decarbonisation is clearly 
significant and considering the power of actors makes the transformation 
appear even more complex. I hope that as one of the early interventions in the 
UK’s debate around heat decarbonisation policy, this research and the 
associated policy recommendations have some value for policy makers who are 
dealing with the heat challenge. I also hope that I and others are able to build 
on this research and further support policy makers with heat decarbonisation, 





13 ANNEX 1 - ASSOCIATED RESEARCH, 
OUTPUTS, IMPACT AND THE EXPERIENCE 
OF THE RESEARCHER 
13.1  THE HEAT, INCUMBENCY AND TRANSFORMATIONS PROJECT 
The research which contributed to this thesis originally started in 2014 and 
interviews were carried out in 2015 but following interviews, the write up of the 
thesis was delayed. The delay was a result of the UK Energy Research Centre 
(UKERC) Heat, Incumbency and Transformations (HIT) project for which 
Bridget Woodman, Catherine Mitchell and I received funding and which took 
place between June 2016 and June 2018. I was working almost full time on the 
project leaving little time to complete my thesis. 
Still focusing on heat, the HIT project took a very different focus to this PhD, 
considering a different time horizon (2015-2018) and also focusing specifically 
on ideas of ‘incumbency42’. While the research highlighted significant ‘power’ 
issues associated with attempts to influence Government policy, the project also 
considered wider issues of innovation and investment and what these meant for 
a move to a more sustainable heating system.  
Overall, the research highlighted numerous attempts by incumbents (primarily 
gas network operators and the gas boiler manufacturers) to maintain the 
existing gas-based system through the promotion of low carbon gases which 
are suggested to be a like for like replacement for natural gas but which are 
very uncertain approaches. There are significant known issues with many of the 
approaches proposed by the incumbents suggesting that incumbents may have 
                                            
42 Incumbency can be considered as the impact of incumbents. Lowes et al., (2017, p32) 
suggested that incumbency can be defined ‘…in the context of sustainable transformations as 
the presence of existing actors within a specific socio-technical system. An incumbent will be 
currently active in the socio-technical system or a part thereof and therefore likely to be or have 
been involved in unsustainable practices. Incumbents have the economic, social or 
technological capacity to influence system change.’ In the UK’s heat system the incumbents 
include the businesses currently operating in the system. 
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been promoting ideas based purely on their own interests rather than offering 
an optimum solution for heat decarbonisation (Lowes et al., 2018b).  
13.2  OUTPUTS AND IMPACT 
There are a number of publications directly associated with this PhD: 
 A key output associated with this thesis is a paper which was presented 
to the 2016 British Institute of Energy Economics conference in Oxford. 
This paper specifically considered the power of actors to cause policy 
change and links closely to chapter 8 in this thesis (Lowes, 2016).  
 This paper has since been redrafted and following peer review has been 
published in ‘Energy Policy’ (Lowes et al., 2019).  
 Separate to this paper, I also contributed to an article which has now 
been published in Renewable Energy which describes the design of the 
renewable heat support policies in the UK (Connor et al., 2015). 
Since starting my PhD I have also been involved in a number of impact 
activities. These include:  
 Reviewing Parliamentary Offices of Science and Technology Postnotes 
investigating the future of the natural gas network and the carbon 
intensity of heat generation  
 Presenting early findings from my PhD to civil servants in BEIS 
 Making a number of appearances on local and national media including 
taking part in a Radio 4 debate on bio-energy (and separately talking to 
Anne Diamond about British Gas price increases) 
 Advising the National Audit Office on its review into the Renewable Heat 
Incentive Policy and subsequently being invited to give evidence to the 
Parliamentary Accounts Committee which was referenced in their final 
report 
 Reviewing and contributing to various reports on heat decarbonisation 




13.3  ABOUT THE RESEARCHER 
Prior to commencing this PhD and following an MSc in Energy Policy and 
Sustainability in 2010, I worked for a UK gas distribution network (SGN) on 
energy policy issues associated with the future of the UK gas distribution 
network and new sources of gas, such as biogas and shale gas. Throughout the 
early days of my PhD, I continued some work for this gas network owner 
focussing on issues to do with renewable gas policy. This work came to an end 
in 2016 however since then I have been sitting on the gas network’s 
Stakeholder Advisory Committee, advising the company on its stakeholder 
engagement to do with issues around the long term future of the gas grid. My 
experience at SGN meant that before starting my PhD I had some knowledge of 
the subject area and a small network of contacts in the relevant area.  
There was the potential for existing knowledge and experience to affect the 
research process and eventual outcomes. In order to minimise this risk and 
increase the rigour of this thesis, the research has been designed with this in 
mind. Specifically, the research has taken an applied and realist approach to 
power which considers purposive and observable attempts to affect heat policy 
rather than less observable and more subtle types of power (read chapter 4 for 
more detail on this). This approach of focusing on observable power was 
designed so that rather than taking any pre-judgements on what power may 
look like in the context of heat policy, ideas of power and its impacts on heat 
policy emerged purely from the explorative research (i.e. interviews). This 
approach reduced the likelihood of research being skewed towards my own 
potential interests which could be possible with less active approaches to power 
such as more reflective discursive or language based approaches. That is not to 
say these other elements of power are not important, but is to highlight the more 





14 ANNEX 2 – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Interviews are numbered and referenced accordingly throughout the thesis. 
1. Academic with expertise in renewable heat policy 2015, 11th March 2015 
2. Heat expert with experience in large energy supplier and in UK civil 
service, 9th March 2015 
3. Civil servant from DECC/BEIS, 25th March 2015 
4. Chief executive of trade association interested in heat, 25th March 2015 
5. Heat expert with experience working in regulator and academia, 29th 
April 2015 
6. Heat expert from on UK Government Climate Change advisor, 29th April 
2015 
7. Ex chief executive of trade association interested in renewable heat, 30th 
April 2015 
8. Representatives from trade association representing heating and hot 
water appliance sector, 1st May 2015 
9. Representative from trade association which represents UK energy 
networks, 1st May 2015 
10. Chief executive of heat pump manufacturer, 5th May 2015 
11. Policy manager at trade association interested in renewable heat, 19th 
May 2015  
12. Policy manager from trade association which represents energy 
suppliers, 20th May 2015 
13. Policy manager from trade association representing biogas sector, 20th 
May 2015 
14. Policy manager from trade association interested in renewable heat, 20th 
May 2015 
15. Policy manager from large energy supplier, 5th June 2015 
16. Fully anonymous, 16th June 2015 
17. Head of external engagement for large appliance manufacturer, 17th 
June 2015 
18. Policy manager for large energy supplier, 22nd June 2015 




20. Chief executive of trade association interested in low carbon heat, 10th 
July 2015 
21. Owner of biomass supply company, 14th July 2015 
22. Strategy manager at gas network company, 17th July 2015 
23. Civil servant from DECC working on low carbon heat market 
development, 24th July 2015 
24. Senior civil servant working on heat at DECC, 6th August 2015 
25. Director of consultancy interested in low carbon heating, 7th August 2015 
26. Civil servant at DECC, 11th August 2015 
27. Civil servant at DECC, 12th August 2015 
28. Fully anonymous, 12th August 2015 
29. Civil servant at DECC, 12th August 2015 
30. Employee at consumer protection organisation, 13th August 2015 
31. Policy manager at trade body interested in heat pumps, 12th October 
2015 
32. Policy manager at trade body interested in heat pumps, 13th October 
2015 
33. Employee at heat installation firm, 12th October 2015 
34. Policy manager at UK energy regulator, 28th October 2015 
35. Representative from heat installation firm, 1st November 2015 
36. Previous DECC ‘Chief Scientist’, 5th November 2015 
37. Owner of renewable heat appliance manufacturer, 12th November 2015 
38. Policy manager from trade association interested in off gas grid heating, 
9th December 2015 
39. Policy manager from NGO interested in clean energy, 14th December 
2015 
40. Chief scientist from NGO interested in clean energy, 17th December 2015 
41. Representatives from Government of Rotterdam, 9th September 2015 
42. Representative from Dutch energy network company, 8th September 
2015 
43. Civil servants from Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 9th September 
2015 




45. Representative from large Dutch energy supply company, 11th 
September 2015 
46. Civil servant from Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 12th October 2015  
47. Ex-employee of organisation interested in social housing, 15th October 
2015 
48. Dutch energy industry trade association, 5th November 2015 
49. Representative from trade association interested in low carbon heat, 6th 
November 2015 
50. Representative from Dutch low carbon heat network, 8th December 2015 
51. Representative from Dutch research organisation, 9th December 2015 




15 ANNEX 3 – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
15.1 QUESTIONS POSED TO EGOS (THOSE ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE) 
1. What is your interest or experience in heat policy? 
2. Have you had any success in influencing policy around heat? 
a. How do you know you have been successful? 
3. Have you had any failures and if so why? 
4. What approaches did you find particularly useful for influencing policy? 
5. Are there any other companies or organisations that you believe have 
been particularly successful in influencing heat policy? 
a. How do you know they have been successful? 
6. Do you feel that the existing heat providers have a particularly great 
influence over policy? 
a. How and why? 
7. When you try and get a policy change do you frame arguments in a 
particular way to try and make the change seem necessary to policy 
makers? 
8. Have you got any experience of other companies or organisations 
framing arguments in particular ways? 
9. Do you feel that the Government organisations involved in heat policy 
take a purely objective approach when formulating policy? 
a. If not, what else is driving the development of heat policy? 
10. Do you have any experience of companies and organisations trying to 
shape perceptions of themselves or their company or product? 
a. For example the shaping of consumer preferences? 
b. Or the shaping of political preferences? 
15.2 QUESTIONS POSED TO ALTERS ALTER (THOSE WHO EGOS ARE 
ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE)  
1. What is your experience in heat policy? 
2. Do you have any experience of companies and organisations trying to 
influence heat policy? 
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3. Do incumbent heat organisations and companies have significant 
influence over heat policy? 
a. Talk about areas where they believe they have been successful 
4. Are renewable heat companies particularly successful? 
a. Talk about where niche companies believe they have been 
successful 
b. Has their influence increased because of policies which support 
them? 
5. Do you ever see organisations use particular frames or ideas to argue for 
their particular preferred approach to policy? 
6. Do you feel that the Government organisations involved in heat policy 
take a purely objective approach when formulating policy? 
a. If not, what other than evidence is driving the development of heat 
policy? 
7. Do you have any experience of companies and organisations trying to 
shape perceptions of themselves or their company or product? 
a. For example the shaping of consumer preferences? 




16 ANNEX 4 – TARIFFS FOR THE RHI 
INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL 2010 DECC 














17 ANNEX 5 – UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONTEXT BEHIND THE ‘RENEWABLES 
VERSUS CARBON FRAME’ (THE SUBJECT 
OF SECTION 10.2.2) 
Renewable energy is according to the International Energy Agency: ‘Energy 
derived from natural processes (e.g. sunlight and wind) that are replenished at a 
faster rate than they are consumed. Solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, and some 
forms of biomass are common sources of renewable energy.’ (IEA, 2016). The 
EU, under the renewable energy directive is more specific in defining renewable 
energy as specific technologies and sources: 
‘(a) ‘energy from renewable sources’ means energy from renewable non-fossil 
sources, namely wind, solar, aerothermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and ocean 
energy, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and 
biogases; 
(b) ‘aerothermal energy’ means energy stored in the form of heat in the ambient 
air; 
(c) ‘geothermal energy’ means energy stored in the form of heat beneath the 
surface of solid earth; 
(d) ‘hydrothermal energy’ means energy stored in the form of heat in surface 
water; 
(e) ‘biomass’ means the biodegradable fraction of products, waste and residues 
from biological origin from agriculture (including vegetal and animal 
substances), forestry and related industries including fisheries and aquaculture, 
as well as the biodegradable fraction of industrial and municipal waste; ‘ 
(European Union, 2009) 
While the definition of renewable energy is generally un-contested in the 
literature and within my data, defining ‘low-carbon’ is significantly more difficult 
because it is a relative measure; just because something is lower-carbon than 
360 
 
something else does not necessarily make it low carbon. For example, natural 
gas being used for heat in a boiler is lower carbon than oil in a boiler (POST, 
2016), however few would view gas as ‘low-carbon’ particularly in the context of 
a decarbonised or zero carbon heat system which is seen as a requirement by 
DECC in 2050 under the UK’s carbon constraints (DECC, 2013k). 
As well as the semantic nature of the construction ‘low carbon’, specific heat 
technologies can have widely varying carbon intensities due to operational 
factors such as efficiencies and the application, for example an efficient gas 
boiler would have lower carbon emissions than a less efficient gas boiler and a 
biomass boiler’s carbon intensity can vary significantly depending on the source 
of biomass among other factors (POST, 2016).  
With electric heating technologies such as resistive heating and ground source 
or air source heat pumps, the carbon intensity of the heat will vary depending 
on the installation and operation of the heater; it will also vary depending on the 
carbon intensity of the electricity running it (POST, 2016). This means that as 
the electricity sector reduces its carbon intensity as is expected (DECC, 2013k), 
over time, electric forms of heat become lower carbon. Carbon footprints ranges 
for a number of space and water heating technologies are shown in Figure 
17-1, which clearly shows the variation in carbon heating between different 
heating technologies, within specific technology groups and also the impact that 
the grid intensity of electricity can have. 
 
Figure 17-1. Carbon intensity estimates for non-electric space and water heating (left) and electric heating 
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